Meeting of the Preliminary Proceedings Committee
at 23 Portland Place, London, W1N 4JT
on 24 September 2002

Agenda

PART 1 **New cases to decide whether to:**

1. **decline to proceed with the matter**
2. **require further investigation to be conducted**
3. **adjourn consideration of the matter**
4. **refer the matter to the professional screeners**
5. **take the advice of a solicitor**
6. **require a complaint to be verified by a statutory declaration**
7. **issue a Notice of Proceedings**

1 [redacted]

Case Ref 11290
PIN 91I0693E
RMN (Part 3 of the register)

Summary of allegations: Failure to provide nursing care to patients; failed to administer CPR to patient; left the ward without qualified staff; failed to complete patient notes.

Decision **to issue a Notice of Proceedings after a solicitors investigation**

2a Phillip Beed

Case Ref 11978
UNIDENTIFIED

Decision **to adjourn consideration of the matter**

2b Jill Hamblin

Case Ref 12010
UNIDENTIFIED

Decision **to adjourn consideration of the matter**

2c	Freda Shaw	Case Ref 12011 UNIDENTIFIED
Decision		**to adjourn consideration of the matter**
2d	SN Barker	Case Ref 12012 UNIDENTIFIED
Decision		**to adjourn consideration of the matter**
2e	EN Bell	Case Ref 12013 UNIDENTIFIED
Decision		**to adjourn consideration of the matter**
3	[redacted]	Case Ref 11136 PIN 81F0910E EN(MH) (Part 6 of the register)
Summary of allegations:		Administered unprescribed medication to clients, failure to record administration of medication.
Decision		**to decline to proceed**
4	[redacted]	Case Ref: 12018 PIN 75A0545E EN(M) (Part 4 of the register)
Summary of allegations:		Incorrect administration of medication, falsified entry in controlled drug register.
Decision		**to decline to proceed**
5	Maureen Jones (née Lee)	Case Ref: 9495 PIN 85J1063E RGN (Part 1 of the register) RHV (Part 11 of the register)
Summary of allegations:		Failure to visit clients; failure to keep adequate records; inappropriately referred client to counselling.
Decision		**to issue a Notice of Proceedings**

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NURSING & MIDWIFERY COUNCIL

Preliminary Proceedings Committee

24 September 2002

Private and Confidential

Agenda Item Part 1 - New Case – No allegations served yet

Name:	a) b) c) d) e)	Code A
Case Reference Number:	a) 11978 b) 12010 c) 12011 d) 12012 e) 12013	
PIN and Date of Birth:	UNIDENTIFIED	
Council's solicitor:	none	
Complainant:	Mrs M Jackson & Code A & Mr Page .	
Date of incident(s):	1998 - 1999	
Date complaint received:	11 June 2002	

Summary of Allegations:

Papers attached:

Allegations	Section A, page 1
Professional Conduct report	Section B, pages 1-5
Solicitor's report	Section C, none
Statements supporting the complaint	Section D, pages 1 - 218
Practitioner's response	Section E, none

Professional Conduct Report
For the meeting of the
Preliminary Proceedings Committee
On

24 September 2002

Case Name:	a) b) c) d) e)	Code A
Case Ref:	a) b) c) d) e)	11978 12010 12011 12012 12013

The complaints were received from Mrs Jackson, Code A and Mrs Page concerning the above named practitioners who were employed at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The complaints relate to events in 1998 and 1999. The practitioners have not yet been identified on the register.

A detailed report has been compiled by H Code A nd this is attached for the committee's attention (pages 2 – 5).

Supporting documents can be found at section D pages 1 – 218. These documents have been referred to throughout the attached report and are annexed as follows :

Annexe 1	pages 1 – 3
Annexe 2	pages 4 – 42
Annexe 3	pages 43 – 46
Annexe 4	page 47
Annexe 5	pages 48 – 121
Annexe 6	pages 122 - 218

No allegations have been served on the practitioner at this stage and the committee are invited to consider whether or not the case should be further investigated and if so to draught a summary of allegations to be forwarded to the Council's solicitors.

NURSES AT GOSPORT WAR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

We have received complaints about several nurses working at Gosport War Memorial Hospital relating to events in 1998 and 1999 when the deaths of five elderly patients were the subject of a police investigation. Two of the complaints relate to two of those patients, Mrs Alice Wilkie who died on 21 August 1998 and Mrs Eva Page who died on 3 March 1998.

A further complaint concerns Mrs Elsie Devine who died on 21 November 1999, and whose case was not part of the police investigation.

Code A

Code A who still works for the Trust, has been reported to the NMC by Mrs Jackson, Alice Wilkie's daughter. The allegations she makes have been summarised below, and the full letter of complaint is attached as **Annexe 1.**

She alleges, amongst other things, that in caring for her mother Alice Wilkie, Code A

1. Failed to explain to Mrs Wilkie's daughter the actions that were being taken in relation to her mother.

2. Made an inaccurate record in the nursing notes that Mrs Wilkie's daughter had agreed that active treatment for her mother was inappropriate, and that she agreed to the setting up of a syringe driver.

3. Delayed in attending to Mrs Wilkie when he was informed that she was in pain, and then failed to examine her.

4. Failed to query with the doctor the dose of 30 mg of diamorphine which he had administered to Mrs Wilkie.

Furthermore, Mrs Jackson has concerns about matters not directly related to Code A but about the general nursing care given to her mother. These matters include the poor state of the nursing records. She cites an incident where her mother's records were muddled up with those of another patient. She was also concerned that there had been a failure to record fluid balance and a failure to record that there was blood in her mother's catheter bag.

During the police investigation, medical expert opinion was sought and one of those medical experts, Dr Ford, although not singling out Code A, had criticisms of the drug regime in existence at the time. He comments on Mrs Wilkie's care as follows:

He said that there was no clear evidence that Mrs Wilkie was in pain although she was commenced on opiate analgesics. There was no information recorded in the nursing or medical notes to explain why Mrs Wilkie was commenced on diamorphine and hyoscine infusions. In his opinion there was no indication for diamorphine and hyoscine in Mrs Wilkie, and that other oral analgesics such as paracetamol and mild opiate drugs could and should have been tried first.

He considered that the medical and nursing notes were inadequate, not sufficiently detailed and did not provide a clear picture of Mrs Wilkie's condition. Copies of Mrs Wilkie's medical and nursing notes are attached at **Annexe 2**

He went on to say that medical and nursing staff had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care and to monitor and document the effect of drugs prescribed to Mrs Wilkie. In his opinion the duty of care was not met. Furthermore, in his opinion the prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine and midazolan was inappropriate and may have hastened her death. although he notes that she was very frail, with dementia and was at high risk of developing pneumonia.

Code A

The other complaint received concerned Code A

Code A

The complaint was made by Code A Mrs Elsie Devine who died on 21 November 1999. Mrs Devine was not one of the patients who was the subject of the police experts' reports. The allegations have been summarised as follows and the letter of complaint is attached as **Annexe 3**.

In relation to Code A expresses concern about the administration of drugs, and she alleges that Code A failed to keep the family informed as to her mother's condition, and failed to maintain nursing records.

In relation to Code A she was concerned about her failure to discuss medication with the family.

She made no specific allegations relating to the Code A but expressed general concerns about the nursing care given to her mother.

Code A and others

Mr Page, son of Eva Page, made generalised complaints against all the nursing staff in relation to the care of his mother including Code A whom he names, and his letter is enclosed as **Annexe 4.** His mother's case was reviewed by Dr Ford who, whilst having concern about the prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine,midazolam and hyoscine, which he felt caused Mrs Pages' respiratory depression, concluded that 'the medical and nursing care she received was appropriate and of adequate quality.'

Police Investigation

The police investigated the practices at Gosforth War Memorial hospital as there was concern that there may have been unlawful killing of patients by the use of the particular regime of sedation. However, in February 2002, the police concluded that there was no evidence to support a conviction against any individual. In the course of their investigations, they had obtained two medical experts reports which they sent to the NMC and CHI, amongst other bodies, for review. The medical experts' reports relating to 5 patients including Alice Wilkie, are attached as **Annexe 5.**

CHI Investigation

The full report of the investigation by CHI has been included and is attached at **Annexe 6.** In the Executive summary its key conclusions were set out as follows;

Key conclusions

i) There were insufficient local prescribing guidelines in place, governing the prescription of powerful pain relieving and sedative medicines.

ii) There had been a lack of a rigorous routine review of pharmacy data, which led to high levels of prescribing on wards caring for older people and this wasn't being questioned.

iii) There was an absence of Trust wide supervision and appraisal systems, which meant that poor prescribing practices were not identified.

iv) There was a lack of thorough multidisciplinary total patient assessment to determine care needs on assessment.

CHI also concluded that the trust now has adequate policies and guidelines in place, which are being adhered to in respect of the prescription and administration of pain relieving medicines to older patients.

Summary

The cases are in Part 1 of the agenda for the committee to decide whether or not the case should be further investigated. If so, solicitors can be instructed to review the material with a view to bringing allegations of misconduct against the nurses.
The committee should note that the second complaint concerning Mrs Devine did not form part of the police investigation, and we have not yet received consent from the complainant to obtain the medical and nursing notes.

Account must be taken of the serious shortcomings identified by CHI in relation to the prescribing practice and the care of elderly patients admitted for rehabilitation. These shortcomings were found to be trust-wide as well as involving individual members of staff. CHI has considered current nursing practice and has found that many changes have been effected and that they now have 'no significant concerns regarding the standard of nursing care provided to the patients of Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan Wards.'

Account must also be taken of the view of both medical experts that there was inappropriate combined administration of diamorphine, midazolam and haloperidol, which could carry a risk of excessive sedation and respiratory depression in older patients leading to death. The police concluded that there was no evidence to support any criminal charges.

ANNEXE 1

11 JUN 2002

Mrs M Jackson

Code A

New
PHILIP Reed

01 June 2002

UKCC For Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting
23 Portland Place
LONDON

Dear Sir / Madam

FORMAL COMPLAINT

I am writing to make a formal complaint regarding the appalling level of care given to my mother Mrs Alice Wilkie prior to her death in August 1998 at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. I understand from Hampshire Constabulary that you have already been sent copies of the police medical files regarding this case.

To summarise briefly the events which took place, my mother was taken from Addenbrooke Nursing Home on 31 July 1998 to Queen Alexandra Hospital in Portsmouth as a result of a Urinary Tract Infection. My mother stayed at Queen Alexandra for five days and appeared to be making good progress. Subsequently, she was sent to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital for 'Assessment and Rehabilitation'.

At the Gosport War Memorial Hospital my mother appeared increasingly sleepy, weak and unwell, she couldn't stand or walk unaided. When I queried this with the ward sister I was simply told "yes, she was deteriorating". I was given no explanation as to why or what actions were being taken to help her. The ward sister's attitude was completely ambivalent. Incidentally there is no record on her notes that we had expressed our concern about my mother's health or of any concerns from the nursing staff. Just a few days later I was called into Code A office and was advised that my mother was dying and there was nothing that the hospital could do to help her. I thought this was strange at the time as she had entered the Gosport War Memorial for rehabilitation and assessment, not to die. At this point I was again given no further explanation as to why this deterioration had taken place and why nothing could be done. I told Code A that I did not wish for my mother to suffer but that was the depth of our conversation at this time. There was no explanation of what actions would be taken with my mother regarding her care. I was subsequently horrified when I received my mother's medical file to see a note written by Code A suggesting that I had agreed to a syringe driver for my mother and that active treatment was not appropriate. This conversation NEVER took place and I am appalled that an outright lie has been written into my mother's medical file and I would like an explanation for Code A actions. When I received my mother's medical file I was surprised to see the note from Code A suggesting that my mother was dying as there is no corresponding note from a doctor. I do not believe that it is the responsibility of

SECTION D1

nursing staff to decide whether or not a patient is dying or that active treatment was not appropriate. Who made this decision?

Whilst visiting on August 20th I noticed that my mother appeared to be in pain. When I mentioned this to the nursing staff they were dismissive and said that they could see no evidence of this. I had to ask twice and waited for over an hour for Phillip Beed to come and see me. He did not examine my mother at this stage and did nothing to ascertain the level of pain she was in, but he did say that he would arrange for some pain relief that would make her sleepy. I left the hospital at 13:55 and at this point nothing had been done to alleviate my mother's discomfort despite the fact that her notes state she was placed on a syringe driver at 13:50. I had not left the hospital at this time so where does this discrepancy come from? I telephone my daughter as I was very concerned about my mother and asked her to go to the hospital to find out what was happening. When my daughter arrived, the nurse said to her in a very rude manner "your mother **SEEMS** to think that your grandmother is in pain". What sort of care is this? By the time I returned to the hospital at eight o'clock that evening my mother had been placed on a syringe driver administering Diamorphine drugs into her system. She was already unconscious and never regained it. She died the next evening. Why did the nursing staff not do any examination or summon a doctor to my mother? There is no note on the medical file to say that she had been assessed by any of the nursing staff or any doctor. How did it get from the nursing staff appearing unaware of my mother being in pain to being unconscious as a result of the Diamorphine?

I have many questions that have never been answered regarding this. Why was my mother placed on Diamorphine via a syringe driver, when only that afternoon, the nursing staff appeared unaware and unconcerned that she was in any pain? Why were other drugs not tried first to relieve her discomfort and why was the Diamorphine administered in 30mg quantities? I believe that 5 to 10 mg's would be a normal dosage and why did the nursing staff not query this level of drug?. I cannot understand why Diamorphine was used when no other drugs had been tried first. Why was no investigation done to find out where my mother's pain was and the cause of it. I suggest that it could have been a simple problem that could have been resolved with less severe pain relief.

I was persuaded to go home for some food and a change of clothes late in the afternoon of the 21st. I expressed my concern about leaving her to [Code A] as I did not wish for her to be alone. I was assured by [Code A] that should any change take place then he would contact us immediately. However, when I returned a short while later [Code A] entered my mother's room in front of us and told us that she had just died. However, I do not believe that she died upon our return, but I believe that she died alone and had not been monitored in our absence. [Code A] tried to tell us that my mother had waited until she heard our voices before passing away, however, it was quite obvious that she had died much earlier than this. My mother's records state that her daughter and granddaughter were present, but I dispute this. I would like for [Code A] to explain why a patient was left for that amount of time without being monitored.

I am appalled by the state of my mother's medical file. The file in itself appears to be incomplete and the details contained within it are sadly lacking to say the least. Apart

from the 'alleged' conversation where I agreed to a syringe driver, which I repeat did NOT take place, I also have a number of other concerns. There appears to be a mix up on the records of my mother and another patient Mrs Gladys Richards. A note stating that my mother was given Oromorph was crossed out with a note saying that this was written on the wrong notes. Was this drug given to my mother in error? And how did the notes come to be mixed up in the first place? Also, the time of death on my mother's files says 18:30 and 21:20. How can she die twice? After speaking with Gladys Richard's daughter she has confirmed that the 21:20 time is when her own mother passed away. The notes had obviously been mixed up yet again (days after the last time) and I would have expected a nurse such as Sylvia Roberts, who wrote the incorrect times on the file, should have known better after 25 years of experience in Nursing. This is gross incompetence on behalf of the nursing staff and the nurses concerned should be accountable for their actions. The notes themselves are incomplete and there are whole days when nothing is written on them and there is no record of what, if anything, she was given to eat or drink. I would expect that if she had a UTI, was catheterised and dehydrated then there should be a note of both her intake and her urinary output. There was a note on her file to say that her catheter bag was emptied on 21st August but no note to say that it was full of blood which both my daughter and myself had noticed. I wonder why this was not done? Just what sort of care did my mother receive when she was in the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. It was neglectful and uncaring to say the very least.

I believe that my mother died as a direct result of the drugs given to her and the abuse she received from the nursing staff in relation to their appalling lack of any sort of care. She did not even get basic care and the nursing staffs couldn't care less attitude is shocking. I will not rest until the nursing staff are held accountable for their actions and changes are made to ensure that this never happens again.

I look forward to hearing from you shortly.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Mrs M Jackson

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ANNEXE 3

The United Kingdom Council for Nursing,Midwifery and Heath Visiting
The Directorate of Conduct
23 Portland Place
London
WIB 1P

11 JUN 2002

Code A

June 6th 2002

Dear Sir or Madam

Re: FORMAL COMPLAINT

I wish to make a Formal Complaint against the following Nurses: Code A Hamblin, Staff Nurse Code A and the named nurses Code A all who worked at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital in November 1999.

This complaint is with regard to the care received by Code A Mrs Elsie Devine who died at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital on the 21st November 1999 .

My complaint over the Doctor concerned is at present being investigated by the General Medical Council, but I now understand that this does not cover Nurses. We took our complaint to Independent Review and 16 months later we are now beginning to understand why those involved never had the courage to tell us exactly what happened that Friday morning for reasons still only known to them, which led to our Code A being heavily sedated. This was abuse, to Code A and to my family.

Code A s evidence was extremely disturbing for all the family. She was a nurse of 12 years; 9 of which as a Ward Sister. In her statement on page 15 of the Independent Report she confirms that Mrs Devine woke and dressed herself by 5:30am but was more agitated than usual. -- At this point I would say that none of the Family had ever seen our Code A agitated or aggressive at the Gosport War Memorial. -- Our Mother then, apparently pushed one nurse across the room and another up against a book case. This was our frail disabled Code A who had difficulty standing as one of her knees had gone completely over. They then persuaded her to sit in an armchair and 50mg of Chlorpromazine was given to our Code A by a nurse initals L.B. while still wearing a Fentanyl Patch, which Jill Hamblin had applied the day before - for the pain she was not in!
It took 4 nurses to hold our Code A down while they administered this drug and our dear Code A must have been terrified. We are still trying to ascertain if Dr. Barton was actually present before and during this injection or was the drug wrote up afterwards?

Less than one hour later they administered a Morphine Syringe Driver with 40mg morphine/40mg Midazolam. Code A does not remove the Fentanly Patch until 12:30pm which is 3 hours after the syringe driver is in place. Contradictory to Dr Barton who in the report states that it was removed before the syringe driver was put in place. Two nurses then walked our Code A around the ward until she settled in an armchair, even though she could hardly have walked without the cocktail of drugs. They must have dragged her around. Code A had phoned Code A at 8:15am and told her that our Code A was standing in the corridor confused, my Code A was visiting at 1pm, however did she want him to come now, was it an emergency? No, she said 1pm was fine. But we all now have learnt differently and it has taken an Independent Review to find out some of the true happening of that Friday morning. By 1pm when Code A arrived, our dear Code A was completely unconscious and we would never be able to speak to her again.

However Code A and the nurses involved then went on with their lives with not even a thought for our family or our dearest Code A as she lay dying. It is a disgrace and the cruelest thing not to have told us what was happening. I have to wonder what sort of person Code A is and what her reasoning was behind keeping the family away? Our dearest Code A should have been able to have drawn some comfort from having her family around her. So what were they thinking about? Are these nurses unaware that even the strongest of men would have succumbed to such a combination of drugs. All those involved in our Code A care are inhumane and a poor representation of the medical profession.

Code A also states that there was tension between Code A and myself regarding Code A This is an extremely unprofessional statement and if this were the case, what has this got to do with our Code A medical condition? Code A and I were wanting answers at various meetings, of which not one did she attend. But even if this was the case with regards to Code A then why leave it until the Independent Review? It must have been bothering her so much 16 months later, that she found it necessary to discuss it at the Independent review, yet she cannot find it in herself to apologise for the disgusting way she kept her nursing notes on Code A I am trying to understand this statement regarding my Code A states. I would appreciate her clarifying her source of information, Code A and I were extremely close. Code A can find something to write that has nothing to do with our Code A care, yet our Code A care notes can go for days without anything being written in them, or the drug chart written up. I would like to know why they have photocopied the first page of the drug chart twice and why was oramorph written up on Code A admission? What were her intentions for the use of this drug?

Although the staff at the Gosport War Memorial state that they knew our Code A was deteriorating they continued to bathe and wash her hair excessively, apparently because our Code A requested it. Even two days before her death our dear Code A had her hair washed twice. She also states that they left our Code A to bathe until she requested it and, it is a good thing that our confused Code A as they state, did request to bathe, yet nothing is written up for this in our Code A notes.

Our Code A was 88 years old and it was her routine that she bathed every night. Stating in her notes on the 3rd November that our Code A could not climb stairs and has not been able to for sometime is also total rubbish! Who is she talking about? Our only fear was our Code A falling down the stairs should she not have her knee brace on and nobody being there with her. On our return from Hammersmith Hospital we found her knee brace with clothes that Code A sent home that were considered too good for my Code A stay. Our Code A was terribly unhappy in the Gosport War Memorial and never having been into Hospital before she found her life turned upside down. She was given sleeping tablets which she refused to take. which we believe were given solely to keep her in bed. Is this why they then treated her with Morphine Patches - that were the cause of her confusion that Friday morning.

When a relative asked if she could take Code A to the hospital restaurant she was told NO! which did upset our Code A and no explanation was given to her. Yet when patients requested to go to the bathroom hospital staff told them that they did not want to go and let them wet themselves instead. This was confirmed by Code A at a NHS meeting, as he witnessed it during a visit to see Code A

Dr Barton states that although our Code A was diagnosed with a kidney infection on the 15th November 1999 and on the 11th and 12th November 1999 Antibiotics were started, yet it was not written up in the notes. So what exactly was Code A doing? Was she administering these and forgetting to write them in the notes or did our Code A not get them at all? If she did her job properly instead of worrying about private family matters perhaps our Code A would be alive today.

I consider Freda Shaw also to be an accomplice in the detrimental care of our Code A She never explained to me or my family about our Code A medication and on arrival at the Gosport War Memorial when we asked her what had happened regarding our Code A sudden deterioration, she stated that she could not comment as she had just come on duty. Do they not have hand-overs? She had come on duty and was then directly responsible for our Code A who was dying and also the other patients but, with her attitude how was she going to care for them? She states in her evidence that she does remember asking Code A was present with me) if I understood what I was being told, and I had said, "I did and that I was going to sit with my Code A However, in the same statement she states she could not recall my emotional state or what was said, which was very confusing for everybody. So what was she trying to say? I can categorically tell you that this was not true as she discussed nothing with the family because she did not know anything having just come on duty.

C.H.I. and their investigation will not unfold these terrible misdoings. Code A and Freda Shaw's statement are nothing less than a fabrication of the truth to cover themselves for the disgusting, inhumane and unprofessional way in which they practice nursing.

Let us all hope that they never have to endure the same level of care as they gave to our dear Code A

Yours sincerely

Code A

ANNEXE 4

21 MAY 2002

Code A

Friday 17th May 2002

Tel: Home Code A
Work

The Director
The Nursing and Midwifery Council
(NMC)
23 Portland Place
London
W1B 1PZ

RE: GOSPORT WAR MEMORIAL – DEATH OF Mrs E I PAGE

I wish to make a formal complaint against Nursing staff working at The Gosport War Memorial in Gosport, Hampshire, during the time that my mother was in their care.
The nurses concerned are Code A **and others.**

My mother was admitted from Queen Alexandra's Hospital, Portsmouth on 27th Feb 1998 and died the evening of the 3rd of March 1998.

The events leading up and including her death were investigated in a serious crime investigation carried out by The Major Incident Complex, Portsmouth. Her case was serious enough to be sent to medical experts for opinion, I believe this report substantiates concern in her treatment. I also believe you have a copy and am aware of this case.

It is important to note that I was first made aware that there was concern in the treatment of elderly patients during 1998, when Mrs Gillian MacKenzies's case made local press news. At that time I wrote a letter to the police stating that I had concern relating to my mother, this was on the 9th April 2001. I was told that my mother's case would be investigated. I heard nothing until the 13 February 2002. At that time I was invited with other concerned relatives to a meeting with the head of the enquiry team who explained the events of the investigation and the reasons as to why no further action would be taken. At this meeting I first learnt that my mother's case was one of four cases investigated and expert opinions sought. I was also told at this meeting that these reports, which were highly critical of the care given to these patients, would be available to me. This promise was rescinded, and I was later told later that a Court Order would be required, and that this may well be refused.

I subsequently obtained my mothers notes and after perusal with a professional opinion, I found several areas of grave concern. I now understand from Mrs Ann Reeves (another unhappy relative) that these police reports were sent to you as an area of concern. A copy was also sent to the General Medical Council who I believe are investigating further as regards the doctors concerned.

I am annoyed that throughout this time I have been kept in the dark by the police as to any investigation made, and the investigating officer's decision to take no further criminal action, and his subsequent withdraw of the offer to release the medical opinions. I am presently making a formal complaint to The Chief Constable, Hampshire Police.

I trust you are able to assist me in this very serious matter.

Yours truly,

Code A

Bernard Page

ANNEXES.

Medical Report:
concerning the case of Gladys Mable Richards deceased

Prepared for:

Hampshire Constabulary
Major Crime Complex, Fratton Police Station, Kingston Crescent,
North End, Portsmouth, Hampshire PO2 8BU

by: Professor Brian Livesley MD FRCP
The University of London's Professor in the Care of the Elderly
Imperial College School of Science, Technology, & Medicine
The Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, London SW10 9NH

For the purpose of ... providing an independent view about treatment given to Mrs Gladys RICHARDS and the factor(s) associated with her death.

Synopsis

1. At the age of 91 years, Mrs Gladys RICHARDS was an in-patient in Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

1.1. A registered medical practitioner prescribed the drugs diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine for Mrs Gladys RICHARDS.

1.2. These drugs were to be administrated subcutaneously by a syringe driver over an undetermined number of days.

1.3. They were given continuously until Mrs RICHARDS became unconscious and died.

1.4. During this period there is no evidence that Mrs RICHARDS was given life sustaining fluids or food.

1.5. It is my opinion that as a result of being given these drugs, Mrs RICHARDS's death occurred earlier than it would have done from natural causes.

CONTENTS

The writer's declaration

1. This report consisting of thirty-four pages is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that if tendered in evidence, I shall be liable for prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything that I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Introduction

2. The documents with which I have been provided and the visits I have made to the hospitals involved in this enquiry are listed in the Appendix A.

2.1. Appendix B contains facts of the environment provided by the statements of Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE (the elder daughter of Mrs Gladys RICHARDS (deceased)) and Mrs Lesley Frances LACK (the younger daughter).

2.2. I have indicated any medical terms in **bold type**. I have defined these terms in a glossary in Appendix C.

2.3. I have included in Appendix D references to published material.

2.4. Appendix E contains details of my qualifications and experience.

2.5. This report has been presented on the basis of the information available to me—should additional information become available my opinions and conclusions may be subject to review and modification.

Information relating to Mrs Gladys Richards (deceased)

3. Mrs Gladys Mable RICHARDS (née Beech) was born on 13th April 1907 and died on 21st August 1998 aged 91 years.

3.1. Mrs Richards has two daughters. They are Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE (the elder daughter) and Mrs Lesley Frances LACK.

3.1.1. Mrs Lack is a retired Registered General Nurse. She retired during 1996 after 41 years continuously in the nursing profession. For 25 years prior to her retirement she was involved in the care of elderly people. For 20 years prior to retirement she held supervisory and managerial positions in this particular field of nursing.

3.2. The Glen Heathers Nursing Home is a private registered nursing and residential home at Lee on the Solent, Hampshire. Dr J BASSETT is a general practitioner who visits.

3.3. The Royal Hospital Haslar is an acute general hospital in Gosport, Hampshire serviced by the Armed Forces at the time of the incident but available as a National Health Service facility to local people.

3.4. Gosport War Memorial Hospital is part of the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

3.4.1. Daedalus ward is a continuing care and rehabilitation ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

3.5. Dr Jane Ann BARTON is a registered medical practitioner who in 1988 took up a part-time post as clinical assistant in elderly medicine. This post became centered at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. She retired from this part-time post in the year 2000.

3.6. M[Code A] is the clinical manager and charge nurse on Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. [Code A] and [Code A] are registered general nurses who were working on Daedalus ward at the time of the incident.

3.7. Dr Anthea Everista Geredith LORD is a consultant physician, within the department of elderly medicine of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, who was usually responsible for the patients on Daedalus ward and who was on study leave on 17/18 August 1998.

3.7.1. Other consultant physicians from the department of elderly medicine provide on-call consultant physician cover when Dr LORD is absent from duty.

Relevant aspects of Mrs RICHARDS's medical history

4. Mrs RICHARDS became resident at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home on 5th August 1994 at the age of 87 years and although disorientated and confused she was able to wash and dress herself and able to go up and down stairs and walk well.

4.1. It is noted that she also had a past medical history of bilateral deafness for which she required hearing aids.

4.1.1. Unfortunately both of her hearing aids were lost by December 1997 while she was at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home and had not been replaced by July 1998 when she was admitted to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital).

4.1.2. It is noted that on 8th July 1998 her general practitioner, Dr J BASSETT wrote to the audiologist at Queen Alexandra Hospital, Cosham requesting an '**URGENT** [sic]' domiciliary visit to Glen Heathers Nursing Home. This was '... with a view to supplying her [Mrs RICHARDS] with two new hearing aids.... Since her poor hearing probably contributes to her

confusional state I would be grateful if you would visit with a view to fitting of replacement aids as soon as possible please.'

4.2. It is also noted that Mrs RICHARDS had had operations for the removal of cataracts and required glasses.

4.2.1. Unfortunately her spectacles were also lost at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home and had not been replaced by August 1998 when she was admitted to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

4.2.2. As Dr BASSETT had noted Mrs RICHARDS poor hearing probably contributed to her confusional state. The absence of her spectacles would also make it difficult for Mrs RICHARDS to be aware of what was going on around her, further aggravate her confusional state due to lack of sensory stimulation, and increase her dependency on others for her normal daily activities.

4.2.3. The absence of both her hearing aids and her spectacles would make the assessment of and communication with Mrs RICHARDS extremely difficult.

4.2.3.1. It is noted that such sensory deprivation can produce and aggravate confusional and disorientated states.

4.3. At the beginning of 1998, she had become increasingly forgetful and less able physically but was inclined to wander and she had about a six months' history of falls.

4.4. On 29th July 1998, at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home, Mrs RICHARDS developed a fracture of the neck of her right femur [thighbone] and she was transferred to the Royal Hospital Haslar, Gosport.

4.4.1. In the Accident & Emergency department she was given 2.5mg of **morphine** and 50 mg of **cyclizine** at 2300 hours to relieve her pain and distress. She was known to be taking **haloperidol** 1mg twice daily and **Tradazone** 100mg at night.

4.5. On 30th July 1998 Mrs RICHARDS had a right cemented hemiarthroplasty [an artificial hip joint inserted].

4.5.1. Post-operatively she was given 2.5 mg morphine intravenously on July 30th at 0230 hours, 31st at 0150 and 1905 hours, and on August 1st at 1920 hours and 2nd at 0720 hours. From August 1st –7th she was weaned over to two tablets of **co-codamol,** requiring these on average twice daily for pain relief.

4.5.2. On 3rd August 1998 it was noted 'All well. Sitting out early mobilization'.

4.6. On 5th August 1998, Dr REID, a consultant geriatrician, saw her. He stated in a letter that '... she appeared to have a little discomfort on passive movement of the right hip. I understand that she has been sitting out in a chair and I think that, despite her dementia, she should be given the opportunity to try to re-mobilise. I will arrange for her transfer to Gosport Memorial Hospital.'

4.6.1. Dr REID also noted that Mrs RICHARDS had continued on Haloperidol and '... her Trazodone has been omitted. According to her daughters it would seem that since her Tradozone has been omitted she has been much brighter mentally and has been speaking to them at times.'

4.7 A discharge letter, dated 10th August 1998, was sent by the sergeant staff nurse at the Royal Hospital Haslar and addressed to 'The Sister in Charge Ward [sic] Memorial Hospital, Bury Road, Gosport, Hants.' It contained the following information:-

4.7.1. After the operation Mrs RICHARDS became '...fully weight bearing, walking with the aid of two nurses and a **Zimmer frame**.' She was noted to require 'total care with washing and dressing, eating and drinking....' She was '... continent, when she become[s] fidgety and agitated it means she wants the toilet....' She 'Occasionally says recognisable words, but not very often.' Her wound 'Is healed, clean and and dry.'

4.8. On 11th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was transferred to Daedalus ward at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. She was not in pain and had been fully weight bearing at the Royal Hospital Haslar walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame.

4.8.1. At the Gosport War Memorial Hospital there was an unsigned 'Summary' record which is apparently a Nursing record and this states:-

4.8.1.1. '11-8-98 Addmitted [sic] from E6 Ward Royal Hospital Haslar, into a continuing care bed. Gladys had sustained a right fractured neck of Femur on 30th July 1998 in Glen Heathers Nursing Home. She has had a right cemented hemi-arthroplasty and she is now fully weight bearing, walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame. Daughter visits regularly and feeds mother. She wishes to be informed Day or night of any deterioration in mothers condition....'

4.8.2. The contiguous 'Assessment Sheet' states, 'Patient has no apparent understanding of her circumstances due to her impaired mental condition ... Deaf in both ears ... Cataract operation to both eyes ... occasionally says recognisable words, but not very often ... soft diet. Enjoys a cup of tea ... requires feeding ... Dental/Oral status Full "Set" – keeps teeth in at night.'

4.8.3. The 'Patient Medication Information' states, '11.8.98 ... Haloperidol O[rally] 1 mcg [looks like 'mcg' but probably is 'mg' since this drug is not prescribed in single **microgram** doses] B.D. [twice daily]'

4.9. ??[initials]B [subsequently identified as Dr BARTON] has written in the medical case records '11-8-98 Transferred to Daedalus Ward Continuing Care.... O/E [on examination] Impression frail demented lady [paragraph] not obviously in pain [paragraph] Please make comfortable [paragraph] transfers with hoist Usually continent needs help with **ADL [activities of daily living]**.... I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death.'

4.10. At 1300 hours on the 13th August 1998 the Nursing Contact Record states 'Found on floor at 13.30hrs [sic]. Checked for injury none apparent at time hoisted into safer chair 20.00 [hours][altered on record to 19.30] pain Rt [right] hip internally rotated. Dr BRIGG contacted advised Xray AM [in the morning] & **analgesia** during the night. Inappropriate to transfer for Xray this PM [evening] [initialled signature (? by whom)] RGN [Registered General Nurse] [next line] Daughter informed.'

4.11. Dr BARTON has recorded '14-8-98 Sedation/pain relief has been a problem screaming not controlled by haloperidol 1 [illegible symbol or word] but very sensitive to **oramorph**. Fell out of chair last night ... Is this lady well enough for another surgical procedure?'

4.12. In her contiguous note Dr BARTON has recorded '14-8-98 Dear [?] Cdr [Commander] SPALDING Further to our telephone conversation thank you for taking this unfortunate lady who slipped from her chair at 1.30 pm yesterday and appears to have dislocated her R[ight] hip.... She has had 2.5ml of 10mg/5ml Oramorph at midday.'

4.12.1. According to the letter signed by Code A Mrs RICHARDS was given 10mgs of Oramorph at 1150 hours on 14th August 1998 prior to being transferred back to the Royal Hospital Haslar.

4.13. The Nursing Contact Record at Daedalus ward continues:-

4.13.1. '14/8/98 am [morning] R[ight] Hip Xrayed – Dislocated [paragraph] Daughter seen by Dr BARTON & informed of situation. For transfer to Haslar A&E [accident and emergency department] for reduction under sedation [initialled signature]'

4.13.2. 'pm [afternoon or evening of 14th August 1998] Notified that dislocation has been reduced. [Mrs RICHARDS] To stay in Haslar [hospital] for 48 hours then return to us [[initialled signature] Family aware.'

4.14. At the Royal Hospital Haslar (at 1400 hours) Xray having confirmed that the hemiarthroplasty had dislocated, intravenous sedation using 2 mgs of midazolam

allowed the dislocation to be corrected by traction. The procedure was described as 'Under sedation c [with] CVS/RS [cardiovascular and respiratory systems] monitoring. ... Easy reduction.' Mrs RICHARDS was noted to be 'rather unresponsive following the sedation. The [She] gradually became more responsive....' She was then admitted the Royal Hospital for 48 hours observation.

4.15. Apart from two tablets of co-codamol on the 15th August 1998, she did not need to be given any pain relief following the reduction of her hip dislocation.

4.15.1. Two days later, on 17th August 1998, it was recorded that 'She was fit for discharge that day and she was to remain in straight knee splint for four weeks. In the discharge letter from Haslar Hospital it was also recorded that Mrs RICHARDS was to return to Daedalus Ward. It was further stated that 'She has been given a canvas immobilising splint to discourage any further dislocation, and this must stay in situ for four weeks. When in bed it is advisable to encourage abduction by using pillows or abduction wedge. She can however mobilise fully weight bearing.'

4.16. On 17th August 1998 it was also recorded that she was 'Fit for discharge today (Gos[port] War Mem[orial hospital). To remain in straight knee splint for 4/52 [four weeks] ... No follow-up unless complications.'

4.17. She was returned to Daedalus ward in the Gosport War Memorial Hospital later that day but in a very distressed state. The Daedalus ward nursing record states 'Returned from R.N. Haslar, patient very distressed appears to be in pain. No canvas under patient – transferred on sheet by crew To remain in straight knee splint for 4/52 [four weeks] For pillow between legs at night (abduction) No follow-up unless complications.'

4.17.1. Mrs RICHARDS was given Oramorph 2.5 mg in 5mls. The nursing record for 17th August 1998 further states '1305 [hours] ... Daughter reports surgeon to say her mother must not be left in pain if dislocation occurs again. Dr Barton contacted and has ordered an Xray. Code A [paragraph] pm Hip Xrayed at 1545 [hours] Films seen by Dr PETERS & radiologist & no dislocation seen. For pain control overnight & review by Dr BARTON mane [in the morning]. ?[illegible nurse signature]

4.17.1.1. This radiograph was reported by Dr. DOMJAN, Consultant Radiologist as showing 'RIGHT HIP: The right hemiarthroplasty is relocated in the **acetabulum**.'

4.18. On 17th August 1998, Dr BARTON noted 'Readmission to Daedalus from RHH [Royal Hospital Haslar] Closed reduction under iv [intravenous] sedation remained unresponsive for some hours now appears peaceful. Plan Continue haloperidol [paragraph] Only give oramorph if in severe pain See daughter again.'

4.19. On 18th August 1998, Dr BARTON recorded 'Still in great pain [paragraph] Nursing a problem. [paragraph] I suggest sc[subcutaneous] diamorphine/Haloperidol/midazolam [paragraph] I will see daughters today [paragraph] please make comfortable.'

4.20. The nursing Contact Record on Daedalus ward in the Gosport War Memorial Hospital continues:-

4.20.1 '18/8/98 am Reviewed by Dr Barton. For pain control via syringe driver. [paragraph] 1115 Treatment discussed with both daughters [Mrs LACK and Mrs MACKENZIE]. They agree to use of **syringe driver** to control pain [It is noted that Mrs LACK has disagreed with this statement] & allow nursing care to be given. [paragraph] 1145 Syringe driver diamorphine 40 mg. Haloperidol 5 mg. Medazolam [midazolam] 20 mg commenced'

4.20.2. '18/8/98 20.00 Patient remained peaceful and sleeping. Reacted to pain when being moved – this was pain in both legs. [paragraph] Daughter quite upset and angry about mother's condition, but appears happy that she is pain free at present. Code A

4.20.2.1. It is noted that a 'disturbance reaction' occurs in patients when they are moved that is easily mistaken for pain requiring specific treatment. It is noted here that Mrs RICHARDS was described as being 'pain free' at this time apart from when she was being moved.

4.20.3. The nursing Contact Record continues 'Daughter, Jill, stayed the night with Gladys [Mrs RICHARDS], grandson arrived in early hours of morning [initialled signature; dated '19/8/98'] [paragraph] He would like to discuss Grand mother's condition with someone – either Dr. Barton or Code A later today [initialled signature]' [paragraph] '19/8/98 am Mrs Richards comfortable. [paragraph] Daughters seen. Unhappy with various aspects of care, complain[t] to be handled officially by Mrs S Hutchings Nursing co-ordinator [initialled signature]'

4.20.4. It is noted that there is no continuing nursing Contact Record for the 20th August 1998.

4.20.5. The contiguous nursing Contact Record states '21/8/98 12.13 [hours] Patient's [Mrs RICHARDS] overall condition deteriorating, medication keeping her comfortable. Daughters visited during the morning Code A

4.21. Dr BARTON's next contiguous medical record was on 21st August 1998 when she wrote 'Much more peaceful [paragraph] needs Hyoscine for rattly chest'.

4.21.1. It is noted that Mrs RICHARDS was already being given hyoscine at this time and had been doing so continuously since 19th August 1998.

4.21.2. Nurse GRIFFIN made the next note in the medical records on 21st August 1998 stating that Mrs Richards was dead at 2120 hours.

4.22. The Nursing Care Plan records state:-

4.22.1. '12.8.98 Requires assistance to settle and sleep at night.... 12.8.98 Haloperidol given at 2330 [hours] as woke from sleep very agitated shaking and crying. Didn't settle for more than a few minutes at a time. Did not seem to be in pain.'

4.22.2. '13.8.98 oromorph at 2100 [hours] Slept well [initialled signature] [paragraph] For Xray tomorrow morning [initialled signature]'

4.22.3. '14.8.98 Same pain in rt[right] leg / ?[query] hip this am. [initialled signature]'

4.22.4. 'Re-admitted 17/8/98'

4.22.5. '17.8.98 Oromorph [Oramorph] 10mg/5ml at present.'

4.22.6. '18.8.98 Now has a syringe driver with 40mgs Diamorphine – comfortable. Daughters stayed. [initialled signature]'

4.22.7. 'Daughters stayed with Gladys [Mrs RICHARDS] overnight. [initialled signature]'

4.22.8. There is no record of continuance of the Nursing Care Plan for 20th and 21st August 1998.

4.22.9. After Mrs RICHARDS had been readmitted to Daedalus ward on 17th August 1998, there is no record between 17th and 21st August 1998 in the patient Nursing Care Plan for 'Nutrition'. On 21st August the record states 'no food taken [initialled signature]'.

4.22.9.1. There is no record that Mrs RICHARDS was offered any fluids.

4.22.10. Similarly, the Nursing Care Plan for 'Constipation' shows no record between 17th and 21st August1998. On 21st August the record states 'BNO [bowels not open] [initialled signature]'

4.22.11. The Nursing Care Plan for 'Personal Hygiene' states:-

4.22.11.1. '18.8.98 Complete Bed Bath given plus oral [Signature] Hygiene [second signature]'

4.22.11.2. '18.8.98 Night: oral care given frequently'

4.22.11.3. '19.8.98 Nightie changed & washed, repositioned. Apparently pain free during care [initialled signature]'

4.22.11.4. It is noted that there is no record of Mrs Richards being attended to for 'Personal Hygiene' on 20th August 1998.

4.22.11.5. '21.9.98 General care and oral hygiene given [initialled signature]'

4.23. The drugs prescribed for Mrs RICHARDS at Gosport War Memorial Hospital from the time of her admission there on 11th August 1998 are described below.

Drugs prescribed for Mrs RICHARDS at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

5. Dr BARTON wrote the following drug prescriptions for Mrs RICHARDS.

5.1. On 11th August 1998:-

5.1.1. Oramorph 10mgs in 5mls to be given orally four hourly. On the Administration Record these doses are recorded as being given—

5.1.1.1. twice on 11th August 1998 (10mg at 1015 [?1215] and 10mg at 1145 [?pm]);

5.1.1.2. once on 12th August (10mg at 0615);

5.1.1.3. once on 13th August (10mg at 2050);

5.1.1.4. once on 14th August (5ml [10mg] at 1150);

5.1.1.5. four times on 17th August (2.5ml [5mg] at 1300, 2.5ml [5mg] at ????[time illegible], 2.5ml [5mg] at1645, and 5ml [10mg] at 2030); and,

5.1.1.6. twice on 18th August 1998 5ml [10mg] at 01230[sic and ? meaning 0030 hours] and 5ml [10mg] at [?]0415).

5.1.2. Diamorphine at a dose range of 20 – 200 mg to be given subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.1.2.1. None of this diamorphine prescription is recorded on the Administration Record as having been given between 11th – 14th August inclusive.

5.1.3. Hyoscine at a dose range of 200 – 800 mcg [micrograms] to be given subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.1.3.1. None of this hyoscine prescription is recorded on the Administration Record as having been given between 11th – 14th August inclusive.

5.1.4. Midazolam at a dose range of 20-80 mgs to be given subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.1.4.1. None of this midazolam prescription is recorded on the Administration Record as having been given between 11th – 14th August inclusive.

5.1.5. Haloperidol 1mg orally twice daily. It is noted that at the top of this prescription chart 'TAKES MEDICINE OFF A SPOON' [sic] is clearly written.

5.1.5.1. She was give 1mg of haloperidol at 1800 hours on 11th August 1998, at 0800 and 2330 hours on 12th August 1998, at 0800 and 1800 hours on 13th August 1998.

5.1.5.2. In addition, on 13th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was prescribed haloperidol 2mgs in 1ml to be administered orally as required at a dose of 2.5ml [this figure has been altered and also can be read as 0.5 ml] to be given 'IF NOISY' [sic]. She was given a dose [quantity not stated bearing in mind the altered prescription] at 1300 on 13th August 1998.

5.1.5.3. She was also given 1mg of haloperidol at 0800 hours on 14th and also at 1800 hours on 17 August 1998.

5.1.6. It is noted that, apart from 2330 hours on 12 August 1998, at the above times when Mrs RICHARDS was given haloperidol she was also give 10ml of **Lactulose** [a purgative].

5.2. On 12th August 1998:-

5.2.1. Oramorph 10mgs in 5mls to be given orally in a dose of 2.5 mls four hourly [equivalent to 5mgs of oramorph].

5.2.1.1. Although this drug was apparently not administered its prescription was written up on the 'Regular Prescription' chart but at the side in an ink-drawn box there are the letters PRN [meaning that the prescription is to be administered as required].

5.2.2. Oramorph 10mgs in 5mls to be given orally once at night.

5.2.2.1. Although this drug was apparently not administered its prescription was also written up on the 'Regular Prescription' chart but at the side in an ink-drawn box there are the letters PRN [meaning that the prescription is to be administered as required].

5.3. 18th August 1998:-

5.3.1. Diamorphine at a dose range of 40-200mg to be administered subcutaneously in 24 hours

5.3.2. Haloperidol a dose range of 5-10 mgs to be administered subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.4. On 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was given simultaneously and continuously subcutaneously diamorphine 40mgs, and haloperidol 5mgs, and midazolam 20mgs during each 24 hours.

5.4.1. These drugs are recorded as being administered at the same time of day on each of the four days they were given. They were administered at 1145, 1120, 1045, and 1155 for 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998 respectively.

5.4.1.1. All these drugs were administered at the times stated and were signed off by initials as being co-administered by the same person each day. Over the four days of 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998, at least three nurses were involved in administering these drugs.

5.4.1.2. According to the prescription charts these drugs were signed for as being administered to Mrs RICHARDS via the syringe driver by Code A 18th and 19th August 1998, by Code A on 20th August 1998, and by Ms Code A on 21st August 1998.

5.4.2. It is noted that on the 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998 the drugs midazolam 20mgs, diamorphine 40mgs, and haloperidol 5mgs were also co-administered subcutaneously in 24 hours with 400mcg of hyoscine [this last drug had been

prescribed by Dr BARTON to be given as required on 11th August 1998 but its administration was not commenced until 19th August 1998].

5.4.3. It is also noted that all the drugs for subcutaneous administration were not prescribed at specific starting dosages but each was prescribed for a wide range of dosages and for continuous administration over 24-hour periods

5.4.3.1. It is not known who selected the dosages to be given.

Death certification and cremation

6. The circumstances of Mrs RICHARDS death have been recorded as follows:

6.1. In a document [Case no. 1630/98] initialled by the Coroner on 24th August 1998 'Reported by Dr BARTON [sic]. Deceased had undergone surgery for a fractured neck of femur. Repaired. Death cert[ificate] issued. [paragraph] THOMAS [sic]

6.2. The cause of death was accepted by the Coroner on 24th August 1998 as being due to:-

6.2.1. '1(a) Bronchopneumonia'..

6.2.2. The death was certified as such by Dr J A BARTON and registered on 24th August 1998.

6.2.3. It is noted that the continuous subcutaneous administration of diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine to an elderly person can produce unconsciousness and death from respiratory failure associated with pneumonia.

6.3. The body was cremated.

Conclusions

7. Mrs Gladys Mable RICHARDS died on 21st August 1998 while receiving treatment on Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

7.1. Some fours years earlier, on 5th August 1994, Mrs RICHARDS had become resident at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home.

7.2. Mrs RICHARDS's had a confused state that after December 1997 had been aggravated by the loss at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home of her spectacles and both of her hearing aids.

7.3. On 29th July 1998, Mrs RICHARDS developed a fracture of the neck of her right femur [thighbone] and she was transferred from the Glen Heathers Nursing Home to the Royal Hospital Haslar, Gosport.

7.4. Despite her confused state, Mrs RICHARDS was considered by medical staff at the Royal Hospital Haslar to be suitable for implantation of an artificial hip joint. This took place on 30th July 1998.

7.5. On 11th August 1998, and having been seen by a consultant geriatrician, Mrs RICHARDS was transferred for rehabilitation to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

7.6. At that time Dr BARTON recorded that Mrs RICHARDS was not obviously in pain but despite this Dr BARTON prescribed Oramorph [an oral morphine preparation] to be administered orally four hourly.

7.6.1. At that time also Dr BARTON prescribed for Mrs RICHARDS diamorphine, hyoscine, and midazolam. These drugs were to be given subcutaneously and continuously over periods of 24 hours for an undetermined number of days and the exact dosages were to be selected from wide dose ranges.

7.6.2. Also on 11th August 1998, at the end of a short case note, Dr BARTON wrote 'I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death'.

7.6.3. It is noted that although prescribed on the day of her admission to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital these drugs (diamorphine, hyoscine, and midazolam) were not administered at that time.

7.7. On 13th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS's artificial hip joint became dislocated.

7.8. The following day, 14th August 1998, although Dr BARTON had recorded 'Is this lady well enough for another surgical procedure?' she arranged for Mrs RICHARDS to be transferred back to Haslar Hospital where the dislocation of the hip was reduced.

7.8.1. It is noted that at the age of 91 years, and despite Dr Barton's comment about Mrs RICHARDS, and her confused mental state, Mrs RICHARDS was considered well enough by the staff at the Royal Hospital Haslar to have two operations on her right hip within about two weeks.

7.9. Three days later, on 17th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was returned to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital on a sheet and not on a stretcher. She was very distressed when she reached Daedalus ward.

7.10. There is no evidence that Mrs RICHARDS, although in pain, had any specific life-threatening and terminal illness that was not amenable to treatment and from which she could not be expected to recover.

7.11. Despite this, and on 18th August 1998, Dr BARTON, while knowing of Mrs RICHARDS's sensitivity to oral morphine and midazolam, prescribed diamorphine. midazolam, haloperidol, and hyoscine to be given (from wide dosages ranges) continuously subcutaneously and by a syringe driver over periods of 24 hours for an unlimited period.

7.11.1. Neither midazolam nor haloperidol is licensed for subcutaneous administration

7.11.2. It is noted, however, that in clinical practice these drugs are administered subcutaneously in the management of distressing symptoms during end-of-life care for cancer.

7.11.3. It is also noted that Mrs RICHARDS was not receiving treatment for cancer.

7.12. There is no evidence that in fulfilling her duty of care Dr BARTON reviewed appropriately Mrs RICHARDS's clinical condition from 18th August 1998 to determine if any reduction in the drug treatment being given was indicated.

7.13. During this period when a syringe driver was being used to administer the subcutaneous drugs, there is no evidence that Mrs RICHARDS was given fluids or food in any appropriate manner.

7.14. There is no evidence that in fulfilling their duty of car[Code A] Ms Margaret [Code A] viewed appropriately Mrs RICHARDS's clinical condition from 18th August 1998 to determine if any reduction in the drug treatment they were administering was indicated.

7.15. There is, however, indisputable evidence that the subcutaneous administration of drugs by syringe driver continued without modification and during every 24 hours from 18th August 1998 until Mrs RICHARDS died on 21st August 1998.

7.16. Dr Barton recorded that death was due to bronchopneumonia.

7.16.1. It is noted that the continuous subcutaneous administration of diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine to an elderly person can produce unconsciousness and death from respiratory failure associated with pneumonia.

My opinion

8 When Mrs RICHARDS was first admitted to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial hospital on 11th August 1998 she was not in pain and had been fully weight bearing walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame.

8.1. Despite recording that Mrs RICHARDS was not in pain, on 11th August 1998 Dr BARTON prescribed wide dosage ranges of opiate and sedative drugs to which Mrs RICHARDS was known to be sensitive.

8.1.1. Dr Barton also recorded that 'I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death.' when Mrs RICHARDS had been admitted for rehabilitation and her death was not obviously imminent.

8.2. When, at the age of 91 years, Mrs RICHARDS dislocated her operated hip and despite her confused mental state, she was considered well enough to have a second operation on her right hip within about two weeks of the first operation.

8.3. There is no evidence to show that after her second operation Mrs RICHARDS, although in pain, had any specific life-threatening and terminal illness that was not amenable to treatment and from which she could not be expected to recover.

8.4. It is my opinion, and there is evidence to show, that Mrs RICHARDS was capable of receiving oral medication for the relief of the pain she was experiencing on 17th August 1998.

8.5. Mrs RICHARDS was known by Dr BARTON to be very sensitive to Oramorph, an oral morphine preparation, and to have had a prolonged sedated response to intravenous midazolam.

8.6. Despite this, and from 18th August 1998 for an undetermined and unlimited number of days, Dr BARTON prescription led over 24-hours periods to the continuous subcutaneous administration to Mrs RICHARDS of diamorphine 40mgs, haloperidol 5mgs, and midazolam 20mgs to which was added hyoscine 400mcg from 19th August 1998.

8.7. The administration of these drugs continued on a 24-hours regime without their dosages being modified according to Mrs RICHARDS's response to them and until Mrs RICHARDS died on 21st August 1998.

8.8. There is no record that Mrs RICHARDS was given any food or fluids to sustain her from the 18th August 1998 until she died on 21st August 1998.

8.9. As a result of the continuous subcutaneous administration of the prescribed drugs diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine Mrs RICHARDS became unconsciousness and died on 21st August 1998.

8.10. No other event occurred to break the chain of causation and in my opinion Mrs RICHARDS's death was directly attributable to the administration of the drugs she continuously received by syringe driver from 18th August 1998 until her death on 21st August 1998.

8.11. It is my opinion that Mrs Gladys RICHARDS's death occurred earlier than it would have done from natural causes and was the result of the continuous administration of diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine which had been prescribed to be administered continuously by a syringe driver for an undetermined number of days.

APPENDIX A

14. I have received and read the following documents:-

14.1. The letter of DCI BURT dated 22nd November 1999 that gave an initial overview of the case.

14.2. The documents in the file DCI BURT presented at our meeting on 28th January 2000 as follows:-

14.2.1. 1) Draft (unsigned) statement (MG11) of Lesley HUMPHREY.
14.2.2. 2) Copy of PEC (NHS) T Health Record (LH/1/C).
14.2.3. 3) Copy of RHH Medical Record (AF/1/C).
14.2.4. 4) Draft (unsigned) statement (MG11) of Gillian MACKENZIE.
14.2.5. 5) Draft (unsigned) statement of Lesley LACK.

14.3. The documents in the file DCI BURT presented at our meeting on 8th March 2000 including those pursuant to my request of 28th January 2000 (documents WX1, WX2, and YZ were forward to me on 9 March 2000) as follows:-

14.3.1.	A	Typed copy of Notes prepared by Mrs LACK and given to Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust
14.3.2.	B	Typed copy of additional page of notes which was prepared by Mrs LACK but, apparently, not passed to Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust
14.3.3.	C	Typed copy of Notes prepared by Mrs LACK and given to Social Services
14.3.4.	D	Typed copy of comments made by Mrs LACK in respect of letter from Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust which represented a response to her Notes of complaint (A)

14.3.5.	E	Typed copy of comments made by Mrs LACK in respect of a Report prepared by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust which resulted in the letter referred to above
14.3.6.	F	As D above but made by Mrs MACKENZIE
14.3.7.	G	As E above but made by Mrs MACKENZIE
14.3.8.	HI	Copy of letter written by Mrs MACKENZIE to DI MORGAN (OIC of initial investigation) plus 5 copies newspaper cuttings
14.3.9	JK	Copy of Coroner's Officer's Form
14.3.10.	L	Copy of letter from Dr REID to S/Cdr SCOTT
14.3.11.	M	Copy of Report made by Dr LORD during original investigation
14.3.12.	N	Copy of additional newspaper cutting
14.3.13.	O (1)	Typed copy of signed statement of Anne FUNNELL (RHH)
14.3.14.	O (2)	Typed copy of signed statement of Lesley HUMPHREY (Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust)
14.3.15.	O (3)	Copy of signed statement of Lesley LACK
14.3.16.	O (4)	Copy of final draft of Gillian MACKENZIE's statement
14.3.17.	PQ	Copy of schedule of x-ray images (RHH)
14.3.18.	R	Copy of Risk Event Record (Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust)
14.3.19.	S (1)	Copy of letter which DCI BURT has sent to Lesley HUMPHREY (Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust) raising various issues
14.3.20.	S (2)	Copy of entries in medical directories 1998/1999 - Dr Jane Ann BARTON
14.3.21.	S (3)	Copy of letter from Mrs MACKENZIE to DCI BURT
14.3.22.	S (4)	Copy of documents which accompanied the two Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust x-ray images
14.3.23.	T	Copy of various documents which featured in a Social Services Case Conference stemming from receipt of Mrs LACK's Notes of complaint (C above)
14.3.24.	UV	Copy of Death Certificate - Mrs RICHARDS
14.3.25.	WX1	Witness Statement of Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE dated March 6 2000
14.3.26.	WX2	Copy of letter from DR J.H. BASSETT to Mrs MACKENZIE with an addendum of five pages being a photocopy from 'Toxic Psychiatry' a book by Dr Peter BREGGEN published by Harper Collins.
14.3.27.	YZ	Two extracts from 'Criminal Law. Diana Rowe. Hodder & Stoughton 1999.'

14.4. On 8th March 2000, in the presence of DCI BURT, I visited:-

14.4.1. the Gosport Memorial Hospital and followed the passageways along which Mrs Richards was conveyed and the ward areas in which she was treated; and,

14.4.2. the Royal Hospital Haslar and followed the passageways along which Mrs Richards was conveyed and the ward area in which she was treated.

14.4.2.1. At the Royal Hospital Haslar, on 8th March 2000, in the presence of DCI BURT, I was also shown twelve (12) radiographs relating to Mrs Richards' treatment there on 12th April 1998, 17th July 1998, 14th August 1998, 29th July 1998, and 31st July 1998.

14.5. In addition I have read the following the documents given to me by DCI BURT on 12th May 2000 consisting of the following which are numbered below as listed in the two containing ring binders:

14.5.1.	E 25	Copy of Glen Care Homes file Re: Gladys RICHARDS supplied by Glen Care Homes
14.5.2.	E 22	Copy of Hampshire County Council Social Services file Re: Gladys RICHARDS
14.5.3.	E23	Copy of Glen Care Homes file Re: Gladys RICHARDS supplied Nursing Homes Inspectorate
14.5.4.	E 24	Copy Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority GP Patient Records of Gladys RICHARDS
14.5.5.	D 63	Police letter 090300 to Miss CROSS, Haslar Hospital with further questions
14.5.6.	D 65	Letter 100400 from Miss CROSS at Haslar including Patient transfer order and further medical records
14.5.7.	D 104	Letter 080200 from Mrs. MACKENZIE with notes Re: draft statement
14.5.8.	D 108	Portsmouth NHS Trust Dept. of Diagnostic Imaging report folder
14.5.9.	D 110	Copy typed Gladys RICHARDS Death Certificate dated 240898

14.6. I have also read the documents given to me by DCI BURT on 19th July 2000, consisting of copies of the statements made by:-

14.6.1. Code A
14.6.2. GIFFIN Sylvia Roberta
14.6.3. PULFORD Monica Catherine
14.6.4. WALKER Fiona Lorraine
14.6.5. MARJORAM Catherine
14.6.6. BALDACCHINO Linda Mary
14.6.7. PERKINS Margaret Joan
14.6.8. TUBBRITT Anita
14.6.9. Code A
14.6.10. WALLINGTON Kathleen Mary
14.6.11. FLETCHER Anne
14.6.12. COOK Joanne
14.6.13. MOSS JEAN Kathleen
14.6.14. TYLER Christina Ann

14.7. I have also read statements, provided on 30th August 2000 by DCI BURT, made by:

14.7.1. Doctor Jane Ann BARTON
14.7.2. Code A

14.8. I have also received from DCI BURT on 8th September 2000 and read copies of -

14.8.1. A letter dated 18th August 2000 from Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE to DCI BURT.

14.8.1.1. Enclosed with this letter was a copy of a letter dated 9th August 2000 from Ms Jill BAKER to Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE to which had been added a petition form.

14.9. A letter dated 21st August 2000 from Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE to DCI BURT.

14.9.1. Enclosed with this letter was a copy of a letter dated 14th December 1998 from Ms Lesley HUMPHREY, Quality Manager at Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust Central Office to Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE. This had enclosed with it a copy of a letter dated 22nd September 1998 from Mr Max MILLETT, Chief Executive of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

14.10. Copies of Witness Statements (taken by Mrs S HUTCHINGS who led the initial Internal Inquiry as Investigating Officer of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust) as follows:-

14.10.1. On 3rd September 1998 statement consisting of four pages from Mrs Jenny BREWER – Staff Nurse Daedalus Ward to which is attached an additional statement (three pages) by Staff Nurse Brewer (the first page of this three pages is headed Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust and has been signed on page three by S. N J Brewer RGN and dated 9-9-98 (Reference D142)).

14.10.2. On 8th September 1998 statement consisting of five pages from Code A Code A Clinical Manager Daedalus Ward (Reference D143).

14.10.3. On 9th September 1998 statement consisting of three pages from Ms Code A – Staff Nurse Daedalus Ward (Reference D144).

14.10.4. On 8th September 1998 statement consisting of two pages from Ms Monica PULFORD – Enrolled Nurse Daedalus Ward (Reference D145).

14.10.5. On 3rd September 1998 statement consisting of four pages from Ms Code A – Staff Nurse Daedalus Ward (Reference D146).

14.11. A copy of the National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services paper entitled 'Ethical decision-making in palliative care'.

14.12. On 5th and 6th October 2000 I received from Hampshire Constabulary and subsequently read:-

14.12.1. The records of the interviews conducted with Dr Anthea Everista Geredith LORD on 27th September 2000

14.12.2. During these interviews Dr LORD produced as listed in the Officer's Report by DC McNally the following documents:-

14.12.2.1. Drug Therapy Guidelines for subcutaneous fluid replacement as approved by the Elderly Medicine and Formulary & Medicines Group of Portsmouth Hospitals and Portsmouth Healthcare updated for 1998.

14.12.2.2. Consultants' Rota for August 1998 of the Department of Medicine for Elderly People (Ref: CI/28.7.98).

14.12.2.3. Memorandum from Mrs. L HUMPHREY of Portsmouth Health Care NHS Trust to Dr. LORD dated 17th December 1998 and headed 'Mrs. Richards deceased, Gosport War Memorial Hospital, 21st August, 1998.'

14.12.2.4. Letter from Dr R I REID, Medical Director of Portsmouth Health Care NHS Trust giving approval of study leave for Dr. LORD for the dates of 17/18 August 1998.

14.12.2.5. Consultants' Timetable of the Department of Medicine for Elderly People from 4.5.98 – 8.2.99.

Appendix B

Facts of the environment - obtained from the statements of Mrs RICHARDS's daughters

15. Mrs MACKENZIE is the elder of Mrs RICHARDS's two daughters. It is noted that her sister, Mrs LACK, is a retired Registered General Nurse.

15.1. Mrs LACK retired in 1996 after 41 years continuously in the nursing profession. For 25 years prior to retirement she was involved in the care of elderly people. For 20 years prior to retiring she held supervisory and managerial positions in this field of nursing.

15.2. By July 1998, Mrs RICHARDS had been resident at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home for some four years. She had a past medical history of bilateral deafness for which she required two hearing aids (unfortunately these were lost while she was at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home). She had had operations for the removal of cataracts and required glasses (unfortunately these were also lost at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home).

15.3. Also by July 1998, Mrs RICHARDS had become increasingly forgetful and less able physically. She had had 17 falls documented at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home between 29th January 1998 and 29th July 1998.

15.3.1. During this period Mrs MACKENZIE decided to meet and question her mother's general practitioner, Dr BASSETT. Mrs MACKENZIE had formed the opinion that the drugs Dr BASSETT was prescribing could contribute to her mother's confused mental state and deterioration of her physical health. One drug was Trazodone and the other was haloperidol. Following this meeting she sent him a copy of a book entitled *Toxic Psychiatry*.

15.3.2. Dr BASSETT replied, in a hand-written letter, thanking Mrs MACKENZIE and stating '... I have a reputation in Lee [-on-Solent] of being somewhat sparing with 'mood' drugs and especially antibiotics. ... most drugs are prescribed with more caution these days. [paragraph] Hopefully we can continue to keep your Mother's drugs to a minimum!'

15.4. It is convenient to mention here that both Mrs MACKENZIE and Mrs LACK have registered serious concerns about the care given to their mother in the Glen Heathers Nursing Home.

15.4.1. Jane PAGE, Principal Nursing Home Inspector, Portsmouth & S.E. Hants Health Authority investigated these concerns formally. On 11th August 1998, she made an unannounced visit to the Glen Heathers Nursing Home. She reported, on 26th August 1998, that 'From the written records obtained and discussions held, I can find no evidence to substantiate that Mrs RICHARDS did not receive appropriate care and medication.'

15.4.2. These concerns were discussed further by the Social Services Department at a meeting held on 23rd November 1998 when Mrs LACK was present. The conclusion was that 'There was no evidence of deliberate abuse [of Mrs RICHARDS] although there seemed to be problems of complacency in some of the care practices which needed review.... However, there was no evidence of malpractice by the Home.'

15.5. On 29th July 1998, while in the Glen Heathers Nursing Home, Mrs RICHARDS sustained a fracture of the neck of her right femur (thighbone). According to Mrs

LACK her mother underwent a surgical operation on 30th July 1998 'following a discussion with the consultant who thought my mother should be given the chance to remain ambulant.'

15.6. Mrs LACK has also stated:-

15.6.1. 'My mother received a replacement hip, on her right side, and remained in the Haslar Hospital a further eleven days until Tuesday the 11th August 1998. [paragraph] I visited my mother every day during this period and, in my view, when taking into account the serious injury which she had sustained and the trauma she had suffered, my mother appeared to make a good recovery during this period.'

15.6.2. 'Prior to her discharge, and transfer to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, my mother was responding to physiotherapy, able to walk a short distance with the aid of a zimmer frame and no longer required a catheter. Her medication had been reduced and she was able to recognise family members and make comments to us which made sense.'

15.6.3. 'She was with encouragement, eating and drinking naturally and as a result the drips, which had facilitated the provision of nourishment after the operation, had been removed.'

15.6.4. 'Significantly, my mother was no longer in need of pain relief. It was quite apparent, to me, that she was free of pain.'

15.6.5. 'Such was the extent of my mother's recovery that it was considered appropriate to discharge her and transfer her to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital where she was admitted to Daedalus Ward on Tuesday the 11th August 1998. This was the first occasion that my mother had been admitted to this particular hospital.'

15.7. On 12th August 1998, the day after her mother's admission to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, Mrs LACK visited her mother there and has recorded '... I was rather surprised to discover that I could not rouse her [Mrs RICHARDS]. As she was unrousable she could not take nourishment or be kept hydrated. [paragraph] I enquired among the staff and I was told that my mother had been given the morphine based drug 'Oramorph' for pain. This also surprised me. When my mother had been discharged from the Haslar Hospital, the day before, she had not required pain relief for several days. [paragraph] I was distressed to observe my mother's deteriorated condition which significantly contrasted with the level of recovery which had been achieved following treatment at the Haslar hospital during the period after the surgical operation to replace her hip. [paragraph] I was told that my mother had been calling out, showing signs of being anxious, and it was believed that she was suffering pain. They did not investigate the possible cause. I consider it likely that she was in need of the toilet. ... One of the

consequences of being rendered unrousable, by the effects of 'Oramorph', was that no fluids could be given to my mother and this, together with the abandonment of other forms of rehabilitation, would have served to inhibit or prevent the recovery process which had begun prior to her admission to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.'

15.8. Mrs RICHARDS had a fall on 13th August 1998 (as described above). On the following morning (14th August 1998), Mrs LACK noted that while her mother was being taken to the X-ray department at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital 'She was still deeply under the effects of the 'Oramorph' drug.'

15.9. As described above Mrs RICHARDS was then transferred to the Royal Hospital Haslar for the reduction of her dislocated artificial hip. She was returned to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital on 17th August 1998 having been noted the previous day (16th August) by Mrs LACK [a nurse experienced in the care of elderly people] to be 'easily manageable'.

15.9.1. In accepting that he would transfer Mrs RICHARDS to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, Dr REID (consultant geriatrician) had stated that '... despite her dementia, she [Mrs RICHARDS] should be given the opportunity to try to re-mobilise.'

15.10. On visiting her mother at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital at about 1215 hours on 17th August 1998, Mrs LACK accompanied by her sister [Mrs MACKENZIE], found her mother to be screaming and in pain. The screaming ceased 'within minutes' when Mrs LACK and a registered general nurse repositioned Mrs Richards.

15.11. Subsequently, the X-ray at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital showed no fresh dislocation of the artificial hip.

15.12. Following this further X-ray, Mrs LACK told Dr BARTON that Haslar Hospital would be prepared to readmit her mother. Dr BARTON is reported to have '... felt that was inappropriate.' Mrs LACK '... considered this was essential so that the 'cause' of my mother's pain could be treated and not simply the pain itself.'

15.12.1. Dr BARTON is stated to have said to Mrs LACK that, '..."It was not appropriate for a 91 year old, who had been through two operations, to go back to Haslar Hospital where she would not survive further surgery." '

15.13. Mrs LACK states that, on 18th August 1998, the Ward Manager [Mr Philip BEED] explained to her and her sister that a syringe driver was going to be used. This was to ensure Mrs RICHARDS 'was pain free at all times' so that she would not suffer when washed, moved, or changed in the event she should become incontinent. Mrs LACK has also described in her contemporaneous notes (as well as in her Witness Statement, see below) that 'A little later Dr BARTON appeared and confirmed that a haematoma

was present and that this [the use of a syringe driver] was the kindest way to treat my mother. She [Dr BARTON] also stated "And the next thing will be a chest infection." '.

15.13.1. In her Witness Statement, Mrs LACK has recorded 'The outcome of the syringe driver was explained to my sister and I fully. Drawing on my experience as a nurse I [Mrs LACK] knew that the continuous use of morphine, as means of relieving her pain, could result in her death. She [Mrs RICHARDS] was, at the time, unconscious from the effects of previous doses of 'Oramorph'.... [paragraph] As result of seeing my mother in such great pain I was becoming quite distressed at this stage. My sister asked the Ward Manager, "Are we talking about euthanasia? It's illegal in this country you know." The Ward Manager replied, "Goodness, no, of course not." I was upset and said, "Just let her be pain free". [paragraph] The syringe driver was applied and my mother was catheterised to ease the nursing of her. She had not had anything by mouth since midday Monday 17th August 1998. [paragraph] A little later Dr BARTON [sic] appeared and confirmed that a haemetoma [sic] was present and that this was the kindest way to treat my mother. She also stated, "And the next thing will be a chest infection." .... [In her witness statement Mrs Mackenzie has stated that ' DR BARTON [sic] then said, "Well, of course, the next thing for you to expect is a chest infection".'][paragraph] I would like to clarify the issue of my 'agreement' to the syringe driver process. It was not a question, in my mind, of 'agreement'. [paragraph] I wanted my mother's pain to be relieved. I did not 'agree' to my mother being simply subjected to a course of pain relief treatment, at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, which I knew would effectively prevent steps being taken to facilitate her recovery and would result in her death. [paragraph] I also wanted my mother to be transferred back to the Haslar Hospital where she had, on two occasions, undergone operations and recovered well. My mother was not, I knew, terminally ill and, with hindsight, perhaps I should have challenged Dr BARTON [sic] more strongly on this issue. [paragraph] In my severe distress I did not but I do believe that my failure to pursue the point more vigorously should not have prevented Dr BARTON [sic] from initiating an alternative course of action to that which was taken, namely a referral back to the Haslar Hospital where my mother's condition could have been treated and where an offer had already been made to do so. [paragraph] I accept that my mother was unwell and that her physical, reserves had been depleted. However, she had, during the preceding days and weeks, demonstrated great courage and strength. I believe that she should have been given a further chance of recovery especially in the light of the fact that her condition had, it would seem likely, been aggravated by poor quality service and avoidable delay experienced whilst in the hands of those whose responsibly [responsibility] it was to care for her. [paragraph] My mother's bodily strength allowed her to survive a further 4 days using her reserves. She suffered kidney failure on 19th August and no further urine was passed. The same catheter remained in place until

her death. [paragraph] Because the syringe driver was deemed to be essential following the night of several doses of pain relief my mother's condition gradually deteriorated during the next few days, as I knew it inevitably would, and she died on Friday the 21st August 1998.'

15.14. It is noted that Mrs LACK had made contemporaneous hand-written notes comprising five numbered pages. In her Witness Statement she records these '... are in the form of a basic chronology and I incorporated within them a series of questions which focused on particular areas of concern in respect of which I sought an explanation or clarification from the hospital authorities. Following presentation of my notes we were visited on the ward by Mrs Sue HUTCHINGS [sic] on 20.8.98.'

15.14.1. Mrs LACK also made a further one page of contemporaneous hand-written notes. In these she states she was so appalled about her mother's condition, discomfort and severe pain that she visited Haslar Hospital at about lunchtime on 17th August 1998 to ask questions about her mother's condition before she [Mrs RICHARDS] had left the Haslar Hospital ward for her second transfer to Gosport War Memorial Hospital. She learned that, prior to her discharge from Haslar Hospital on 17th August 1998, her mother had been eating, drinking, using a commode and able to stand if aided. Mrs LACK also states in this contemporaneous record that 'On leaving the ward [at Haslar Hospital at about lunchtime on 17th August 1998] I bumped into the Dr [doctor] who had been in casualty theatre for my mothers [sic] second [sic] operation. He was with consultant when all the procedures were explained to me on Friday 14th [August 1998] He said "How's your mother". I explained the current position to him in detail. I told him that she was in severe pain since the transfer which had been undertaken a short time earlier. He said "We've had no referral. Get them to refer her back. We'll see her."

15.15. It is noted that a Discharge Letter from the Royal Hospital Haslar describes Mrs RICHARDS' condition on discharge on 17th August 1998 as "She can, however, mobilise fully weight bearing."

15.16. It is also noted that Mrs LACK has stated that she and her sister were constantly at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, day and night, from 17th August 1998 until the time their mother died.

15.16.1. Mrs MACKENZIE has stated that 'I stayed with my mother until very late that Tuesday night [18th August 1998], it was past midnight, in fact, when my son arrived from London. As from the Wednesday night my sister also sat with me all night long and we both remained, continuously, until twenty past nine on the following Friday evening [21st August 1998] when my mother died. During that time Dr Barton [sic] did not visit my mother. I am quite certain about this because our mother was not left alone, in her room, at

any time apart from when she was washed by the nursing staff. Either my sister or I, [sic] was with her throughout.'

15.16.2. Mrs MACKENZIE has also stated that although she did not sign the contemporaneous notes made by Mrs LACK she ' was a party, at times, to the preparation process and where, on occasions, my sister has referred to 'I' in fact it could read 'we' as we were together when certain events occurred.'

15.16.3. Mrs MACKENZIE continues 'It seems to me that she [Mrs RICHARDS] must have had considerable reserves of strength to enable her to survive from Monday until Friday, five days, when all she had was a diet of Diamorphine and no hydration whatsoever, apart from porridge, scrambled eggs and a drink, at the Royal Hospital Haslar, before transfer to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.'

Appendix C

Glossary

Acetabulum is the name given to the two deep socket into which the head of the thigh bone (femur) fits at the hip joint.

ADL [activities of daily living] are those physical activities of daily life necessary for normal human functioning and include getting up, washing, dressing, preparing a simple meal, etc.

Analgesia is the relief of pain. This can be achieved by physical means including warmth and comfortable positioning as well as by the use of drugs. The aim is to keep patients pain free with minimal side effects from medication.

Bronchopneumonia is inflammation of the lung usually caused by bacterial infection. Appropriate antibiotic therapy, based on the clinical situation and on microbiological studies, will result in complete recovery in the majority of patients. It can contribute to the cause of death in moribund patients.

Co-codamol is a drug mixture consisting of paracetamol and codeine phosphate, which is used for the relief of mild to moderate pain.

Cyclizine is a drug used to prevent nausea and vomiting, vertigo, and motion sickness.

Dementia is the name given to a condition associated with the acquired loss of intellect, memory, and social functioning.

Diamorphine, also known as heroin, is a powerful opioid analgesic.

Haematoma is an accumulation of blood within the tissues, which clots to form a solid swelling.

Haloperidol, a drug used in the treatment of psychoses including schizophrenia and mania and also for the short-term management of agitation, excitement, and violent or dangerously impulsive behaviour. Dosage for all indications should be individually determined and it is best initiated and titrated under close clinical supervision. For patients who are elderly the normal starting dose should be halved, followed by a gradual titration to achieve optimal response. It is not licensed for subcutaneous administration (see **licensed** below).

Hemiarthroplasty is the surgical remodelling of a part of the hip joint whereby the bone end of the femur is replaced by a metal or plastic device to create a functioning joint.

Hyoscine is a drug used to reduce secretions and it also provides a degree of amnesia and sedation, and has an anti-vomiting effect. Its side effects include drowsiness.

Lactulose is a preparation taken by mouth to relieve constipation.

A microgram is one millionth of a gram and is not to be confused with a milligram dosage of a drug, which is one thousand times larger.

Midazolam is a sedative drug about which there have been reports of respiratory depression. It has to be use with caution in elderly people. It is used for intravenous sedative cover for minor surgical procedures. It is also used for sedation by intravenous injection in critically ill patients in intensive care. It can be given intramuscularly. In the management of overdosage special attention should be paid to the respiratory and cardiovascular functions in intensive care. It is not licensed for subcutaneous administration (see **licensed** above).

Morphine is an opioid analgesic used to relieve severe pain.

Oramorph is a drug used in the treatment of chronic pain. It contains morphine and is in the form of a liquid. 10mls of Oramorph at a strength of 10mgs of morphine sulphate in 5mls of liquid is an appropriate first dose to give to a person in severe pain, which had not responded to other less potent, pain relieving drugs.

Respiratory depression is the impairment of breathing by drugs or mechanical means which leads to asphyxia and, if uncorrected, to death.

Subcutaneous means beneath the skin.

A **syringe driver** is a power driven device for pushing the plunger of a syringe forward at an accurately controlled rate. It is an aid to administering medicinal preparations in liquid form over much longer periods than could be achieved by injecting by hand. In this case the syringe driver used was a Sims Graseby MS 26 Daily rate syringe driver which operates over periods of 24 hours.

Tradazone is a drug used in the treatment of depressive illness, particularly when sedation is required.

Unlicensed medicines. In order to ensure that medicines are safe, effective and of suitable quality, they must have a product licence (now called a market authorisation) before being marketed in the United Kingdom. Unlicensed drugs are not licensed for use for any indication or age group. Licensing arrangements constrain pharmaceutical companies but not prescribers. The Medicines Act 1968 and European legislation make provision for doctors to use unlicensed medicines. Individual prescribers of unlicensed medicines, however, are always responsible for ensuring that there is adequate information to support the quality, efficacy, safety and intended use of a drug before using it.

A **Zimmer frame** is a lightweight, but sturdy, frame the patient can use for support to assist safe walking.

APPENDIX D

Texts used for reference have included:

1. Adam J. ABC of palliative care: The last 48 hours. *British Medical Journal* 1997; 315: 1600-1603.

   1.1. This paper is from the widely read, British Medical Journal which is published weekly and received by about 30,000 general practitioners and 45,000 hospital doctors in England and Wales. It records that treatment with opioids (viz. morphine and diamorphine) should be individually tailored, the effect reviewed, and the dose titrated accordingly.

2. *ABPI Compendium of data sheets and summaries of product characteristics 1998-99: with the code of practice for the Pharmaceutical Industry*. Datapharm Publications Limited, 12 Whitehall, London SW1A 2DY.

3. Breggin P R. *Toxic psychiatry. Drugs and electroconvulsive therapy: the truth and the better alternatives*. 1993. HarperCollins Publishers. London. pp. 578.

4. British Medical Association and the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. *British National Formulary*. Number 32 (September 1996). The Pharmaceutical Press. Oxford.

5. *Cecil Textbook of Medicine*. eds. J.C. Bennett & F. Plum. W.B. Saunders Co. 20th Edition. 1996.

6. Letter from Clive Ward-Able (Medical and Healthcare Director) and Lee Neubauer BSc (Hons) (New Product Specialist), Roche Pharmaceuticals.

6.1. A copy of this letter has already been supplied to the Police and reports that the product licence does not cover the administration of Hypnovel® (midazolam) by subcutaneous injection.

7. Roche Pharmaceuticals. Hypnovel® [midazolam]. Summary of product characteristics.

8. Letter from Dr R J Donnelly, Medical Director of Janssen-Cilag Ltd.

8.1. A copy of this letter has already been supplied to the Police and reports that Haldol™ decanoate (haloperidol) is not licensed for subcutaneous use.

9. Letter from Miss Jo Medlock, Manager of Medical Information and Pharmacovigilance, Norton Pharmaceuticals.

9.1. A copy of this letter has already been supplied to the Police and reports that Serenace™ (haloperidol) ampoules are not licensed for subcutaneous administration.

10. MeReC. Pain control in palliative care. *MeReC Bulletin National Prescribing Centre*. 1996; 7 (7); 25-28.

10.1. MeReC is the abbreviation for the 'Medicines Resource Centre'. This bulletin is sent free to all general practitioners in England and Wales and also to NHS Hospital and Community Pharmacists. The list of those who receive this bulletin is updated every few weeks.

11. Sims Graseby Limited. *MS 16A Syringe Driver. MS 26 Syringe Driver: Instruction manual*. Sims Graseby Limited. 1998.

Appendix E

The writer's qualifications and experience including the management of dying patients

I, Brian Livesley, qualified MB, ChB (Leeds) in 1960.
My principal additional qualifications are MD (London) 1979, FRCP (London) 1989.

From 1961-69, I held a series of clinical training and teaching posts through all hospital medical grades to senior medical registrar level at University and District Hospitals in Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool in which I gained a wide range of general medical expertise.

At the beginning of my medical career during 1961, I was also trained in the management of diabetic patients in Leeds by Professor (later Sir) Ronald Tunbridge. For five years (1963-67), I held a regular weekly diabetic out-patient clinic in Manchester (two diabetic clinics each week during 1963-65) being also responsible for the acute and follow-up management of newly presenting diabetic patients as well as having a full range of general medical experience.

For four years (1969-72), I was Harvey Research Fellow in cardiology at King's College Hospital, London, where I developed original research in electrocardiographic, cardiac pacing, and metabolic techniques for the study of ischaemic heart disease. This also involved extensive follow-up studies over a period of more than six years. The several and separate aspects of this work were published in internationally reputable professional journals and now form part of the corpus of present day knowledge in cardiology. My continuing interest in this area led me to specialise in geriatric medicine with some emphasis on cardiology in elderly people.

I have been a consultant physician since 1973 and am entered in the General Medical Council's Principal List as a specialist in both General Medicine and Geriatric Medicine.

In 1987, I was appointed against open competition to a Foundation Chair as the University of London's Professor in the Care of the Elderly based at Charing Cross and Westminster Medical School (now the Imperial College School of Medicine) and as Honorary Consultant Physician.

I am in active clinical practice at the Chelsea & Westminster Hospital, London, where I head up a busy clinical department consisting of three consultant-led medical teams. These are all routinely involved in the emergency medical admissions and follow-up management of adults of all ages including those with diabetes mellitus, cardiac, respiratory, and skeletal diseases. During the last two years I have developed one other team that is providing a palliative care service for non-cancer patients.

Since 1969 I have taught not only undergraduate and postgraduate medical students, but also by invitation have lectured (throughout the United Kingdom, Europe, and elsewhere) to a wide range of other groups—professional and lay. I have also initiated and led courses teaching and appraising senior medical teachers. For fifteen years (1980-94), I served as a clinical examiner for the Final MB degree at the University of London—latterly (1990-94) as a senior clinical examiner. For six years (1987-93), I also examined in Medicine for the Worshipful Society of Apothecaries of London. For seven years (1986-93), I was Royal College of Physicians of London Examiner for the Diploma of Geriatric Medicine; and, for two years (1994-96) was an appointed Member of the United Examining Board for England and Scotland. In addition, I have examined externally for the degrees of BPharm and PhD. During 1998, 1999, & 2000 I have been an invited external clinical examiner for the Final MB degree at the Royal Free and

University College London Medical School where by recent invitation I will examine the candidates being considered for a Distinction in 2001.

In 1991, by invitation, I addressed a House of Lords group on issues relating to the clinical management of elderly people.

In 1992, I was one of a team at the Royal College of Physicians who contributed to the College's publication entitled, 'High quality long-term care for elderly people.'

From 1983-1995 I was a Justice of the Peace for the SE London Commission of the Peace having to stand down following a invitation in 1995 to head up a comprehensive review of the care provided in a 150-bedded nursing home. In 1996 all 16 recommendations in the resulting 40,000-word report were accepted and acted upon by the commissioning Health Agency (1). Also in 1996, I gave invited evidence on this topic to a Health Committee in the House of Commons (2).

In 1999 and again in 2000, the King's Fund in London identified the work in my clinical department as a national model for the care of elderly people.

In July 2000, I was the only clinician to give a presentation by invitation at a meeting on "Emerging Intermediate Care Strategy — 'Leading edge' Practice" held at the Royal College of Surgeons of England, London. This was well received and repeated by invitation in the North of England in November 2000.

During 1999 and 2000 I was working with the British Medical Association's Ethics department on the topics of 'dying as a diagnosis' and 'the appropriate care of the dying'. In addition, I have recently chaired a medico-legal group within my NHS Hospital Trust and produced a report on 'Guidelines for the artificial nutrition of patients affected by strokes'. My clinical, teaching, and research work on the management of dying patients extends over the last twenty five years and I was a leader of the concept that 'dying should be a recognised diagnosis' to allow for the appropriate palliative care of patients dying from non-cancer conditions. More recently I have established an original palliative care service for non-cancer patients in my own department at the Chelsea & Westminster hospital where we are pursuing research in this topic.

My over 120 publications include several monographs, many peer-reviewed research investigations into clinical, scientific, social, historical, and educational problems of medicine in our ageing society, editorials and leading articles by invitation of professional journals, and, in addition by invitation, more than 100 standard and extended book reviews. My peer-reviewed publications also include those on the clinical management of dying patients.

References as numbered above:

1. Livesley B, Ellington S. Report on the independent comprehensive review of the care of elderly people at St. Christopher's Nursing Home, Hatfield. East and North Hertfordshire Health Authority, 1996. (by invitation)

2. Livesley B. Memorandum of recommendations and evidence submitted to the Health Committee on long-term care provision and funding. Volume II; pp. 114-22. London: HMSO. 1996. (by invitation)

signed Code A date 10 July 2001

BRIAN LIVESLEY

MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT

Re: **Gladys Mabel RICHARDS**
Arthur "Brian" CUNNING HAM
Alice WILKE
Robert WILSON
Eva PAGE

Prepared by:
Professor G A Ford, MA, FRCP
Consultant Physician, Freeman Hospital
Newcastle upon Tyne
Professor of Pharmacology of Old Age, University of Newcastle upon Tyne

For: **Hampshire Constabulary**

Date: **12th December 2001**

Contents

Introduction and Remit of the Report

8.1 I am Professor of Pharmacology of Old Age in the Wolfson Unit of Clinical Pharmacology at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, and a Consultant Physician in Clinical Pharmacology at Freeman Hospital. I am a Doctor of Medicine and care for patients with acute medical problems, acute poisoning and stroke. I have trained and am accredited on the Specialist Register in Geriatric Medicine, Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics and General Internal Medicine. I provide medical advice and support to the Regional Drugs and Therapeutics Centre Regional National Poisons Information Service. I was previously clinical head of the Freeman Hospital Care of the Elderly Service and have headed the Freeman Hospital Stroke Service since 1993. I undertake research into the effects of drugs in older people. I am co-editor of the book 'Drugs and the Older Population' and in 2000 was awarded the William B Abrams award for outstanding contributions to Geriatric Clinical Pharmacology by the American Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics. I am a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians and have practised as a Consultant Physician for nine years.

8.2 I have been asked by Detective Superintendent John James of Hampshire Constabulary to examine the clinical notes of five patients (Gladys Mabel Richards, Arthur "Brian" Cunningham, Alice Wilkie, Robert Wilson, Eva Page) treated at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital and to apply my professional judgement to the following:

- The gamut of patient management and clinical practices exercised at the hospital
- Articulation of the leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved
- The accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments
- An evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimes
- The quality and sufficiency of the medical records
- The appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made
- Comment on the recorded causes of death
- Articulate the duty of care issues and highlight any failures

1.3 I have prepared individual reports on each case and an additional report commenting on general aspects of care at Gosport War Hospital from a consideration of all five cases.

1.4 I have been provided with the following documents by Hampshire Constabulary, which I have reviewed in preparing this report:

- Comment on the recorded causes of death
- Letter DS J James dated 15th August 2001
- Terms of Reference document
- Hospital Medical Records of Gladys Richards, Brian Cunningham, Alice Wilkie, Robert Wilson and Eva Page
- Witness statements by Leslie France Lack, and Gillian MacKenzie
- Report of Professor Brian Livesley
- Transcripts of police interviews with Gosport War Memorial staff Dr Barton, Mr Beed, Ms Couchman, Ms Joice

- Transcript of police interviews with Royal Hospital Haslar staff Dr Reid and Flt. Lt. Edmondson
- Transcript of interviews with patient transfer staff Mr Warren and Mr Tanner
- Transcript of police interviews with or statements from following medical and nursing staff: Dr Lord, LM Baldacchino, M Berry, JM Brewer, J Cook, E Dalton, W Edgar, A Fletcher, J Florio and A Funnell.

Gladys Mabel RICHARDS

Course of Events

2.1 Gladys Richards was 91 years old when admitted as an emergency via the Accident & Emergency Department to Haslar Hospital on 29th July 1998. She had fallen onto her right hip and developed pain. At this time she lived in a nursing home and was diagnosed as having dementia. She had experienced a number of falls in the previous 6 months and the admission notes comments "*quality of life has ↓↓ markedly last 6/12*". She was found to have a fracture of the right neck of femur. An entry in the medical notes by Surgeon Commander Malcom Pott, Consultant orthopaedic surgeon dated 30 July 1998 states '*After discussion with the patient's daughters in the event of this patient having a cardiac arrest she is NOT for cardiopulmonary resuscitation. However she is to be kept pain free, hydrated and nourished.*' Surgery (right hemiarthroplasty) was performed on 30 July 1998.

2.2 On 3rd August she was referred for a geriatric opinion and seen by Dr Reid, Consultant Physician in Geriatrics on 3rd August 1998. In his letter dated 5th August 1998 he notes she had been on treatment with haloperidol and trazadone and that her daughters thought she had been 'knocked off' by this medication for months, and had not spoken to then for 6-7 months. Her mobility had deteriorated. Her daughters commented to Dr Reid that she had spoken to them and had been brighter mentally since the trazadone had been omitted following admission. Dr Reid found Mrs Richards to be confused but pleasant and cooperative, unable to actively lift her right leg from the bed but appeared to have little discomfort on passive movement of the right hip. He commented '*I understand she has been sitting out in a chair and I think that despite her dementia, she should be afforded the opportunity to try to re-mobilise her.* He arranged for her transfer to Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

2.3 Following Dr Reid's entry in the notes on 3rd August two further entries are made in the medical notes by the on call house officer (Dr Coales?) on 8th August 1998. Dr Coales was asked to see Mrs Richards who was agitated on the ward. She had been given 2mg haloperidol and was asleep when first seen at 0045h. At 02130 hr a further entry records Mrs Richards was '*noisy and disturbing other patients n ward. Unable to reason with patient. Prescribed 25mg thioridazine*'. A transfer letter for Sergeant Curran, staff nurse to the Sister in Charge dated 10th August 1998 describes Mrs Richards status immediately prior to transfer and notes *'Is now fully weight bearing, walking with the aid of two nurses and a zimmer frame. Gladys needs total care with washing and dressing eating and drinking. Gladys is continent, when she becomes fidgety and agitated it means she wants the toilet. Occasionally incontinent at night, but usually wakes.*

2.4 On 11th August 1998 Mrs Richards was transferred to Daedalus ward. Dr Barton writes *in the medical notes "Impression frail demented lady, not obviously in pain, please make comfortable. Transfers with hoist, usually continent, needs help with ADL Barthel 2. I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death".* The summary admitting nursing notes record *"now fully weight bearing and walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame".* On 12th August the nursing notes record "*Haloperidol given at 2330 as woke from sleep. Very agitated, shaking and crying. Didn't settle for more than a few*

minutes at a time. Did not seem to be in pain". On 13th August nursing notes record "*found on floor at 1330h. Checked for injury none apparent at time. Hoisted into safer chair. 1930 pain Rt hip internally rotated, Dr Brigg contacted advised Xray am and analgesia during the night. Inappropriate to transfer for Xray this pm."*

2.5 On 14th August 1998 Dr Barton wrote '*sedation/pain relief has been a problem. Screaming not controlled by haloperidol 1g ? but very sensitive to Oramorph. Fell out of chair last night. R hip shorter and internally rotated, Daughter nurse and not happy. Plan Xray . Is this lady well enough for another surgical procedure?"* A further entry the same day states *"Dear Cdr Spalding, further to our telephone conversation thank you for seeing this unfortunate lady who slipped from her chair and appears to have dislocated her R hip. Hemiarthroplasty was done on 30-8-98. I am sending Xrays. She has had 2.5ml of 10mg/5ml oramoroph at midday. Many thanks".*

2.6 Following readmission to Haslar hospital Mrs Richards underwent manipulation of R hip under iv sedation (2 mg midazolam) at 1400h. At 2215h the same day she was not responding to verbal stimulation but observations of blood pressure, pulse, respiration and temperature were all in the normal range. A further entry on 17th August by Dr Hamlin (House Officer) states "*fit for discharge today (Gosport War Mem) To remain in straight knee splint for 4/52. For pillow between legs (abduction) at night.*" A transfer letter to the nurse in charge at Daedalus ward states "*Thank you for taking Mrs Richards back under your care... was decided to pass an indwelling catheter which still remains in situ. She has been given a canvas knee immobilising splint to discourage any further dislocation and this must stay in situ for 4 weeks. When in bed it is advisable to encourage abduction by using pillows or abduction wedge. She can however mobilise fully weight bearing".*

2.7 Nursing notes record on 17th August " 1148h *returned from R.N.Haslar patient very distressed appears to be in pain. No canvas under patient – transferred on sheet by crew."* Later that day at 1305h "*in pain and distress, agreed with daughter to give her mother Oramorph 2.5mg in 5ml*". A further hip Xray was performed which demonstrated no fracture. Dr Barton writes on 17th August 1998 *"readmission to Daedalus ward. Closed reduction under iv sedation. Remained unresponsive for some hours. Now appears peaceful. Can continue haloperidol, only for Oramorph if in severe pain. See daughter again"* and on 18th August "*still in great pain, nursing a problem, I suggest sc diamorphine/ haloperidol/midazolam. I will see daughters today. Please make comfortable".* Nursing notes record "*reviewed by Dr Barton for pain control via syringe driver".* At 2000h "*patient remained peaceful and sleeping. Reacted to pain when being moved – this was pain in both legs".* On 19th August the nursing notes record "*Mrs Richards comfortable*" and in a separate entry "*apparently pain free*". There are no nursing entries I can find on 20th August. I can find no entries in the nursing notes describing fluid or food intake following admission on 17th August.

2.8 The next entry in the medical notes is on 21st August by Dr Barton "*much more peaceful. Needs hyoscine for rattly chest*". The nursing notes record "*patient's overall condition deteriorating. Medication keeping her comfortable*". A staff

nurse records Mrs Richards's death in the notes at 2120h later that day. The cause of death was recorded as bronchopneumonia.

2.9 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate, analgesic and sedative drugs during Mrs Richards's first admission to Haslar Hospital.

29 July 2000h Trazadone 100mg (then discontinued)
29 July to 11th August. Haloperidol 1mg twice daily
30 July 0230h Morphine iv 2.5mg
31 July 0150h morphine iv 2.5mg
1905h morphine iv 2.5 mg
1 Aug 1920h morphine iv 2.5mg
2 Aug 0720h morphine iv 2.5mg
Cocodamol two tablets as required taken on 16 occasions at varying times between 1-9th August

2.10 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate, analgesic and sedative drugs during Mrs Richards second admission to Haslar Hospital

14 Aug 1410h midazolam 2mg iv
15 Aug 0325h cocodamol two tablets orally
16 Aug 0410h haloperidol 2mg orally
0800h haloperidol 1mg orally
1800h haloperidol 1mg orally
2310h haloperidol 2mg orally
!7 Aug 0800h haloperidol 1mg orally

2.11 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate and sedative drugs on Daedalus ward:

11 Aug	1115h	5mg/5ml Oramorph
	1145h	10 mg Oramorph
	1800h	1 mg haloperidol
12 Aug	0615h	10 mg Oramorph
		haloperidol
13 Aug	2050h	10mg Oramorph
14 Aug	1150h	10mg Oramorph
17 Aug	1300h	5mg Oramorph
	?	5 mg Oramorph
	1645h	5mg Oramorph
	2030h	10mg Oramorph
18 Aug	0230h	10mg Oramorph
	?	10mg Oramorph
	1145h	diamorphine 40mg/24hr, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hrby
19 Aug	1120h	diamorphine 40mg/24hr, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 400microg/24hr
20 Aug	1045h	diamorphine 40mg/24hr, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 400microg/24hr
21 Aug	1155h	diamorphine 40mg/24h, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 400microg/24hr

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

2.12 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Richards during her two admissions to Gosport Hospital lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for his care. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was delegated to the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital (statement of Dr Lord in interview with DC Colvin and DC McNally). Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Richards during her two admissions to Queen Alexandra Hospital lay with Surgeon Commander Scott, Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon. Junior medical staff were responsible for day-to-day medical care of Mrs Richards whilst at Queen Alexandra Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mrs Richards and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

2.13 Dr Reid, Consultant Geriatrician was responsible for assessing Mrs Richards and making recommendations concerning her future care following her orthopaedic surgery, and arranged transfer to Gosport Hospital for rehabilitation.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

2.14 The initial assessment by the orthopaedic team was in my opinion competent and the admitting medical team obtained a good history of her decline in the previous six months. Surgeon Commander Pott discussed management options with the family and a decision was made to proceed with surgery but for Mrs Richards to not undergo cardiopulmonary resuscitation if she sustained a cardiac arrest, with a clear decision to keep Mrs Richards pain free, hydrated and nourished. There are good reasons to offer surgery for a fractured neck of femur to very frail patients with dementia even when a high risk of peri-operative death or complications is present. This is because without surgery patients continue to be in pain, remain immobile and nearly invariably develop serious complications such as pneumonia and pressure sores, which are usually fatal. From the information I have seen I would, as a consultant physician/geriatrician recommended the initial management undertaken. I consider it good management that the trazadone as discontinued when the history from the daughters suggested this might have been responsible for decline in the recent past.

2.15 After Mrs Richards was stable a few days following surgery it was appropriate to refer her for a geriatric opinion, and Dr Reid rapidly provided this. Dr Reid's assessment was in my opinion thorough and competent. He identified the potential for her to benefit from rehabilitation. I would consider his decision to refer her for rehabilitation despite her dementia to be appropriate. An elderly care rehabilitation, rather than an acute orthopaedic ward is in general a preferable environment to undertake such rehabilitation. It is implicit in his decision to transfer her to Gosport War Memorial Hospital that she would receive rehabilitation there and not care on a continuing care ward without input from a rehabilitation team. Dr Lord in an interview with DC McNally and DC Colvin describes Daedalus ward as "*Back in '98 .. Daedalus was a continuing care ward with 24 beds of which 8 beds were for slow stream stroke*

rehabilitation". Although Mrs Richards had a fractured neck of femur and not stroke as her primary problem requiring rehabilitation I would assume, in the light of Dr Reid's letter that she was transferred to one of the 8 slow stream rehabilitation beds on Daedalus ward.

2.16 The transfer letter from Sergeant Curran provides a clear description of Mrs Richards's status at the time of transfer. The observation that she was walking with the aid of two nurses and a zimmer frame, and the usual cause of agitation was when she needed to use the toilet are relevant to subsequent events following transfer to Gosport Hospital. The use of a Barthel Index score as a measure of disability is good practice and demonstrates that Mrs Richards was severely dependent at the time of her transfer to Gosport Hospital.

2.17 The initial entry by Dr Barton following Mrs Richards' transfer to Daedalus ward does not mention that she has been transferred for rehabilitation, and focuses on keeping her 'comfortable' despite recording that she is "*not obviously in pain*". The statement "*I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death*" also suggests that Dr Barton's assessment was that Mrs Richards might die in the near future. Dr Barton in her statement to DS Sackman and DC Colvin, confirms this when she states "*I appreciated that there was a possibility that she might die sooner rather than later*". Dr Barton refers to her admission as a "*holding manoeuvre*" and her statement suggests a much more negative view of the potential for rehabilitation. She does not describe any rehabilitation team or focus on the ward and suggests her transfer was necessary because she was not appropriate for an acute bed, rather than her being appropriate for rehabilitation- "*.her condition was not appropriate for an acute bed. ....seen whether she would recover and mobilise after surgery. If as was more likely she would deteriorate due to her age, her dementia, her frail condition and the shock of the fall followed by the major surgery, then she was to be nursed in a clam environment away from the stresses of an acute ward*". In my opinion this initial note entry and the statement by Dr Baron indicate a much less proactive view of rehabilitation, less appreciation than Dr Reid of the potential for Mrs Richards to recover to her previous level of functioning, and probably a failure to appreciate the potential benefits of appropriate multidisciplinary rehabilitation to Mrs Richards. This leads me to believe that Dr Barton's approach to Mrs Richards was in the context of considering her as a continuing care patient who was likely to die on the ward. It was not wrong or incorrect of Dr Barton to believe Mrs Richards might die on the ward, but I would consider her apparent failure to recognise Mrs Barton's rehabilitation needs may have led to subsequent sub-optimal care.

2.18 There are a number of explanations and contributory factors that may have led to Dr Barton possibly not recognising Mrs Richard's rehabilitation needs in addition to her nursing and analgesic needs. First she may have not clearly understood Dr Reid's assessment that she needed rehabilitation. In her statement Dr Barton states " *Dr Reid was of the view that, despite her dementia, she should be given the opportunity to try to remobilise*" which suggests Dr Barton may not have considered the necessity for Mrs Richards to receive Physiotherapy as a necessary part of her opportunity to remobilise. Second the ward had both continuing care and rehabilitation beds and these patients may require very different care. It is not uncommon for "slow stream" rehabilitation beds to be in the same ward as continuing care beds, but it does

require much broader range of care to meet the medical and social needs of these patients. I would anticipate that some patients would move from the slow stream rehabilitation to continuing care category. Dr Lord describes the existence of fortnightly multidisciplinary ward case conference suggesting there was a structured team approach that would have made Dr Barton and nursing staff aware of rehabilitation needs of patients. In Mrs Richards's case no such case conference took place because she became too unwell in a short period. Third Dr Barton may not have received sufficient training or gained adequate experience of rehabilitation or geriatrics despite working under the supervision of Dr Lord. Dr Lord states that Dr Barton was "*an experienced GP*" who had rights of admission to a GP ward and that Dr Lord had admitted patients "*under her care say for palliative care*". Experience in palliative care may possibly have influenced her understanding and expectations of rehabilitating older patients.

2.19 The assessment of Mrs Richard's agitation the following day on 12th August was in my opinion sub-optimal. The nursing records state that she did not appear to be in pain. There is no entry from Dr Barton this day but in her statement she states which I have some difficulty in interpreting: "*When I assessed Mrs Richards on her arrival she was clearly confused and unable to give any history. She was pleasant and co-operative on arrival and did not appear to be in pain. Later her pain relief and sedation became a problem. She was screaming. This can be a symptom of dementia but could also be caused by pain. In my opinion it was caused by pain as it was not controlled by Haloperidol alone. Screaming caused by dementia is frequently controlled by this sedative. Given my assessment that she was in pain I wrote a prescription for a number of drugs on 11th August, including Oramorph and Diamorphine. This allowed nursing staff to respond to their clinical assessment of her needs rather than wait until my next visit the following day. This is an integral part of team management. It was not in fact necessary to give diamorphine over the first few days following her admission but a limited number of small doses of Oramorph were given totalling 20mg over the first 24 hours and 10mg daily thereafter. This would be an appropriate level of pain relief after such a major orthopaedic procedure*".

2.20 I am unable establish from the notes and Dr Barton's statement whether she saw Mrs Richards in pain after she wrote in the notes and then wrote up the opiate drugs later on the 11th August, or if she wrote up these drugs after seeing her when she was not in pain, because she considered she might develop pain and agitation. In either case there is no evidence that the previous information provided by Sergeant Curran that Mrs Richards usually required the toilet when she was agitated was considered by Dr Barton. Screaming is a well-described behavioural disturbance in dementia (Dr Barton was clearly aware of this), which can be due to pain but is often not. In some cases it is not possible to identify a clear precipitating cause although a move to a new ward could precipitate such a behavioural disturbance. I would consider the assumption by Dr Barton that Mrs Richards screaming was due to pain was not supported by her own recorded observations. There is no evidence from the notes that Dr Barton examined Mrs Richards in the first two days to find any evidence on clinical examination that pain from her hip was the cause of her screaming. If the screaming had been worse on weight bearing or movement of the hip this would have provided supportive evidence that her screaming was

due to hip pain. Staff Nurse Jennifer Brewer in her interview with DC Colvin and DC McNally states that the nursing staff had considered the need for toileting and other potential causes of Mrs Richards screaming.

2.21 Mrs Richards pain following surgery had been controlled at Haslar hospital by intermittent doses of intravenous morphine and then intermittent doses of cocodamol (paracetamol and codeine phosphate). Dr Barton did not prescribe cocodamol or another mild or moderate analgesic to Mrs Richards to take on a prn basis when she was transferred. This makes me consider it probable that Dr Barton prescribed prn Oramorph, diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam when she first saw Mrs Richards and she was not in pain. If this is the case it is highly unusual practice in a patient who has been transferred for rehabilitation, was not taking any regular or intermittent analgesics for 36 hours prior to transfer, and had last taken two tablets of cocodamol. In a rehabilitation or continuing care ward without resident medical staff I would consider it reasonable and usual practice to prescribe a mild or moderate analgesic to take on an as required basis in case further pain developed. In Mrs Richards's case a reasonable choice would have been cocodamol since she had been taking this a few days earlier without problems. I do not consider it was appropriate to administer intermittent doses of oramorph to Mrs Richards before first prescribing paracetamol, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs or mild opiate. It is not appropriate to prescribe powerful opiate drugs as a first line treatment for pain not clearly due to a fracture or dislocation to a patient such as Mrs Richards 12 days following surgery. Dr Barton's statement that diamorphine and oramorph were appropriate analgesics at this stage following surgery when she had been pain free is incorrect and in my opinion would not be a view held by the vast majority of practising general practitioners and geriatricians.

2.22 The management of Mrs Richards when sustained a dislocation of her hip on 13th August was in my opinion sub-optimal. The hip dislocation most likely occurred following the fall from her chair at 1330h. The nursing notes suggest signs of a dislocation were noted at 1930h. If there was a delay in recognising the dislocation I would not consider this indicates poor care, as hip fractures and dislocations can be difficult to detect in patients who have dementia and communication difficulties. Mrs Richards suspected dislocation or fracture was discussed with the on-call doctor, Dr Briggs, who I would assume is a medical house officer. Given the concern about a fracture or dislocation I would judge it would have been preferable for her to b transferred to the orthopaedic ward that evening and be assessed by the orthopaedic team. I certainly consider the case should have been discussed with either the on call consultant geriatrician or the orthopaedic team. The benefits of transfer that evening in a patient where it was highly probable a fracture or dislocation were present would have been Mrs Richards could have received manipulation earlier the following morning and possibly that same evening, and that traction could have been applied even if reduction was not attempted.

2.23 Mrs Richards was found to have a dislocation of her right hip and this was manipulated under intravenous sedation the same day. Although she was initially unresponsive, most probably due to prolonged effects of the intravenous midazolam, 3 days later on 17th August she was mobilising and fully weight bearing and not requiring any analgesia. Although there are few medical note entries, the management at Haslar hospital during this period

appears to be appropriate and competent. Shortly after transfer back to Daedalus ward Mrs Richards again became very distressed. The nursing notes indicate there was an incorrect transfer by the ambulance staff of Mrs Richards onto her bed. Repeat dislocation of the right hip was reasonably suspected but not found on a repeat Xray. My impression is that this transfer may have precipitated hip or other musculoskeletal pain in Mrs Richards but that other causes of screaming were possible.

2.24 Intermittent doses of oral morphine were first administered to Mrs Richards, again without first determining whether less powerful analgesics would have been helpful. On 18th August Dr Barton suggested commencing subcutaneous diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam. The diamorphine and midazolam had been prescribed 7 days earlier. An infusion of the three drugs was commenced later that morning and hyoscine was added on 19th August. Both Dr Barton's notes and the nursing notes indicate Mrs Richards was in pain, although it is not clear what they considered was the cause of the pain at this stage, having excluded a fracture or dislocation of the right hip. Dr Barton states in her prepared statement "*... it was my assessment that she had developed a haematoma or large collection of bruising around the area where the prosthesis had been lying while dislocated*".

2.25 Although there are no clear descriptions of Mrs Richard's conscious level in the last few days, her level of alertness appears to have deteriorated once the subcutaneous infusion of diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam was commenced. It also seems that she was not offered fluids or food and intravenous or subcutaneous fluids were not considered as an alternative. My interpretation is that this was most probably because medical and nursing staff were of the opinion that Mrs Richards were dying and that provision of fluids or nutrition would not change this outcome. In her prepared statement Dr Barton states "*As their mother was not eating or drinking or able to swallow, subcutaneous infusion of pain killers was the best way to control her pain.*" and "*I was aware that Mrs Richards was not taking food or water by mouth*". She then goes on to say "*I believe I would have explained to the daughters that subcutaneous fluids were not appropriate*".

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

2.26 The decision to prescribe oral opiates and subcutaneous diamorphine to Mrs Richards initial admission to Daedalus ward was in my opinion inappropriate and placed Mrs Richards at significant risk of developing adverse effects of excessive sedation and respiratory depression. The prescription of oral paracetamol, mild opiates such as codeine or non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs such as ibuprofen, naproxen would have been appropriate oral and preferable with a better risk/benefit ratio. The prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam infusions to be taken if required was inappropriate even if she was experiencing pain. Subcutaneous opiate infusions should be used only in patients whose pain is not controlled by oral analgesia and who cannot swallow oral opiates. The prescription by Dr Barton on 11th August of three sedative drugs by subcutaneous infusion was in my opinion reckless and inappropriate and placed Mrs Richards at serious risk of developing coma and respiratory depression had these been administered by the nursing staff. It is exceptionally unusual to prescribe subcutaneous infusion of these three drugs with powerful effects on conscious level and respiration to

frail elderly patients with non-malignant conditions in a continuing care or slow stream rehabilitation ward and I have not personally used, seen or heard of this practice in other care of the elderly rehabilitation or continuing care wards. The prescription of three sedative drugs is potentially hazardous in any patient but particularly so in a frail older patient with dementia and would be expected to carry a high risk of producing respiratory depression or coma.

2.27 I consider the statement by Dr Barton "*my use of midazolam in the dose of 20mg over 24 hours was as a muscle relaxant, to assist movement of Mrs Richards for nursing procedures in the hope that she could be as comfortable as possible. I felt it appropriate to prescribe an equivalence of haloperidol to that which she had been having orally since her first admission.*" Indicates poor knowledge of the indications for and appropriate use of midazolam administered by subcutaneous infusion to older people. Midazolam is primarily used for sedation and is not licensed for use as a muscle relaxant. Doses of benzodiazepine that produce significant muscle relaxation in general produce unacceptable depression of conscious level, and it is not usual practice amongst continuing care and rehabilitation wards to administer subcutaneous midazolam to assist moving patients.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

2.28 The medical and nursing records relating to Mrs Richards admissions to Daedalus ward are in my opinion not of an adequate standard. The medical notes fail to adequately account for the reasons why oramorph and then infusions of diamorphine and haloperidol were used. The nursing records do not adequately document hydration and nutritional needs of Mrs Richards during her admissions to Daedalus ward.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

2.29 There are a number of decisions made in the care of Mrs Richards that I consider to be inappropriate. The initial management of her dislocated hip prosthesis was sub-optimal. The decision to prescribe oral morphine without first observing the response to milder opiate or other analgesic drugs was inappropriate. The decision to prescribe diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam by subcutaneous infusion was, in my opinion, highly inappropriate.

Recorded cause of death

2.30 The recorded cause of death was bronchopneumonia. I understand that the cause of death was discussed with the coroner. A post mortem was not obtained and the recorded cause was certainly a possible cause of Mrs Richards's death. I am surprised the death certificate makes no mention of Mrs Richards's fractured neck of femur or her dementia. It is possible that Mrs Richards died from drug induced respiratory depression without bronchopneumonia present or from the combined effects of bronchopneumonia and drug-induced respiratory depression. Mrs Richards was at high risk of developing pneumonia because of the immobility that resulted following her transfer back to Daedalus ward even if she had not received sedative and opiate drugs. Bronchopneumonia can also occur as a secondary complication of opiate and sedative induced respiratory depression. In the absence of post-mortem, radiological data (chest Xray) or recordings of Mr Cunningham's respiratory rate I would consider the recorded cause of death of bronchopneumonia was possible. However given the rapid decline in

conscious level that preceded the development of respiratory symptoms (rattly chest) I would consider it more likely that Mrs Richards became unconscious because of the sedative and opiate drugs she received by subcutaneous infusion, that these drugs caused respiratory depression and that Mrs Richards died from drug induced respiratory depression and/or without bronchopneumonia resulting from immobility or drug induced respiratory depression. There are no accurate records of Mrs Richards respiratory rate but with the doses used and her previous marked sedative response to intravenous midazolam it is highly probable that respiratory depression was present.

Duty of care issues

2.31 Medical and nursing staff on Daedalus ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care to attempt to monitor Mrs Richards and to document the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of care was not adequately met. The prescription of diamorphine, midazolam and haloperidol was extremely hazardous and Mrs Richards was inadequately monitored. The duty of care of the medical and nursing staff to meet Mrs Richard's hydration and nutritional needs was also in my opinion probably not met.

Summary

2.32 Gladys Richards was a frail older lady with dementia who sustained a fractured neck of femur, successfully surgically treated with a hemiarthroplasty, and then complicated by dislocation. During her two admissions to Daedalus ward there was inappropriate prescribing of opiates and sedative drugs by Dr Baron. These drugs in combination are highly likely to have produced respiratory depression and/or the development of bronchopneumonia that led to her death. In my opinion it is likely the administration of the drugs hastened her death. There is some evidence that Mrs Richards was in pain during the three days prior to her heath and the administration of opiates can be justified on these grounds. However Mrs Richards was at high risk of developing pneumonia and it possible she would have died from pneumonia even if she had not been administered the subcutaneous sedative and opiate drugs.

Arthur "Brian" CUNNINGHAM

Course of Events

3.1 Mr Cunningham was 79 years old when admitted to Dryad ward, Gosport Hospital under the care of Dr Lord. Dr Lord had assessed him on a number of occasions in the previous 4 years. A letter dated 2nd December 1994 from Dr Bell, Clinical Assistant, indicates Parkinson's disease had been diagnosed in the mid 1980s and that he was having difficulties walking at this time. In 1998 it was noted he had experienced visual hallucinations and had moved into Merlin Park Rest Home. His weight was 69Kg in August 1998. In July 1998 he was admitted under the care of Dr Banks, Consultant in Old Age Psychiatry to Mulberry Ward A and discharged after 6 weeks to Thalassa Nursing Home. He was assessed to have Parkinson's disease and dementia, depression and myelodysplasia. Dr Lord in a letter dated 1 September 1998 summarises her assessment of Mr Cunningham when she saw him on Mulberry Ward A on 27 August 1998 before he was discharged to Thalassa Nursing Home. At this time he required 1-2 people to transfer and was unable to wheel himself around in his wheelchair. She commented that more levodopa might be required but was concerned it would upset his mental state. She arranged to review him at the Dolphin Day Hospital.

3.2 On 21st September 1998 he was seen at the Dolphin Day Hospital by Dr Lord who recorded *'very frail, tablets found in mouth, offensive large necrotic sacral sore with thick black scar. PD - no worse. Diagnoses listed as sacral sore (in N/H), PD, old back injury, depression and element of dementia, diabetes mellitus –diet, catheterised for retention. Plan – stop codanthramer and metronidazole. looks fine. TCI Dyad today –aserbine for sacral ulcer – nurse on side – high protein diet – oramorph prn if pain. N/Home to keep bed open for next 3/52 at least. Pt informed of admission agrees. Inform N/Home Dr Banks and social worker. Analgesics prn.'* He was admitted to Dyad ward. An entry by Dr Baron on 21 September states *'make comfortable, give adequate analgesia. Am happy for nursing staff to confirm death'.* On 24th September Dr Lord has written *'remains unwell. Son has ??? again today and is aware of how unwell he is. sc analgesia is controlling pain just. I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death.'* The next entry by Dr Brook is on 25th September *'remains very poorly. On syringe driver. For TLC'.*

3.3 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate and sedative drugs:

21 Sep 1415h Oramorph 5mg
1800h Coproxamol two tablets
(subsequent regular doses not administered)
2015h Oramorph 10mg
21 Sep 2310h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, midazolam 20mg/24hr infusion sc
22 Sep 2020h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, midazolam 20mg/24hr infusion sc
23 Sep 0925h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 200microg/24hr
midazolam 20 mg/24hr infusion sc
2000h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 200microg/24hr
midazolam 60mg/24hr infusion sc
24 Sep 1055h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 800microg/24hr
midazolam 80mg/24hr infusion sc
25 Sep 1015h Diamorphine 60mg/24hr, hyoscine 1200mg/24hr

midazolam 80mg/24hr infusion
26 Sep 1150h Diamorphine 80mg/24hr, hyoscine 1200mg/24hr
midazolam 100mg/24hr infusion
Sinemet 110 5 times/day was discontinued on 23rd September

3.4 The nursing notes relating to the admission to Dyad ward record on 21st Sept *'remained agitated until approx 2030h. Syringe driver commenced as requested* (unclear who made this request) *diamorphine 20mg, midazolam 20mg at 2300. Peaceful following".* On 22nd Sep *'explained that a syringe driver contains diamorphine and midazolam was commenced yesterday evening for pain relief and to allay his anxiety following an episode where Arthur tried to wipe sputum on a nurse saying he had HIV and going to give it to her. He also tried to remove his catheter and empty the bag and removed his sacral dressing throwing it across the room. Finally he took off his covers and exposed himself.'*

3.5 On 23rd Sep *'Has become chesty overnight to have hyoscine added to driver. Stepson contacted and informed of deterioration. Mr Farthing asked is this was due to the commencement of the syringe driver and informed that Mr Cunningham was on a small dosage which he needed.'* A later entry *'now fully aware that Brian is dying and needs to be made comfortable. Became a little agitated at 2300h, syringe driver adjusted with effect. Seems in some discomfort when moved, driver boosted prior to position change'.* On 24th Sept *'report from night staff that Brian was in pain when attended to, also in pain with day staff – especially his knees. Syringe driver renewed at 1055".* On 25th Sept *'All care given this am. Driver recharged at 1015 –diamorphine 60mg, midazolam 80mg and hyoscine 1200mcg at a rate of 50mmols/hr. Peaceful night - unchanged, still doesn't like being moved.'* On 26th September *'condition appears to be deteriorating slowly'.*

3.6 On 26th September staff nurse Tubbritt records death at 2315h. Cause of death was recorded on the death certificate as bronchopneumonia with contributory causes of Parkinson's disease and Sacral Ulcer.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

3.7 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mr Cunningham during his last admission lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for his care. She saw Mr Cunningham 5 days before his death in the Dolphin Day Hospital, and 2 days before his death on Dyad ward. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was the responsibility of the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mr Cunningham and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

3.8 Initial assessment by Dr Lord was comprehensive and appropriate with a clear management plan described. The nursing staff record Mr Cunningham was agitated following admission on 21st September. Dr Lord had prescribed prn (intermittent as required) oramorph for pain. Nursing staff made the decision to administer oramorph but there is no clear recording in the nursing notes that he

was in pain or the site of pain. The nursing entry on 22nd Sept indicates a syringe driver was commenced for 'pain relief and to allay anxiety. Again the site of pain is not states. My interpretation of the records is that the nursing staff considered his agitation was due to pain from his sacral ulcer. The medical and nursing teams view on the cause of Mr Cunningham's deterioration on 23rd September when he became 'chesty' are not explicitly stated, but would seem to have been thought to be due to bronchopneumonia since this was the cause of death later entered on the death certificate. The medical and nursing staff may not have considered the possibility that Mr Cunningham's respiratory symptoms and deterioration may have been due to opiate and benzodiazepine induced respiratory depression. The nursing staff filed to appreciate that the agitation Mr Cunningham experienced on 23rd Sept at 2300h may have been due to the midazolam and diamorphine. It was appropriate for nursing staff to discuss Mr Cunningham's condition with medical staff at this stage.

3.9 When Dr Lord reviewed Mr Cunningham on 24th September the notes imply that he was much worse that when she had seen him 3 days earlier. There is clear recording by Dr Lord that Mr Cunningham was in pain. The following day the diamorphine dose was increased three fold from 20mg/24hr to 60mg/24hr and the dose was further increased on 26th September to 80mg/24hr although the nursing and medical notes do not record the reason for this. The notes suggest that the nursing and medical staff may have failed to consider causes of agitation other than pain in Mr Cunningham or to recognise the adverse consequences of opiates and sedative drugs on respiratory function in frail older individuals.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

3.10 The prescription of oramorph to be taken 4 hourly as required by Mr Cunningham was reasonable if his pain was uncontrolled from cocodamol. I consider the decision by Dr Barton to prescribe and administer diamorphine and midazolam by subcutaneous infusion the same evening he was admitted was highly inappropriate, particularly when there was a clear instruction by Dr Lord that he should be prescribed intermittent (underlined instruction) doses of oramorph earlier in the day. I consider the undated prescription by Dr Baron of subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr to be poor practice and potentially very hazardous. In my opinion it is poor management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam in a frail elderly underweight patient such as Mr Cunningham. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and it would have been more appropriate to review the response to diamorphine alone before commencing midazolam, had it been appropriate to commence subcutaneous analgesia, which as I have stated before was not the case.

3.11 In my opinion it is doubtful the nursing and medical staff understood that when a syringe infusion pump rate is increased it takes an often appreciable effect of time before the maximum effect of the increased dose rate becomes evident. Typically the time period would be 5 drug half-lives. In the case of diamorphine this would be between 15 and 25 hours in an older frail individual.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

3.12 In my opinion the medical and nursing records are inadequate following Mr Cunningham's admission to Dryad ward. The initial assessment by Dr Lord on 21st September is in my opinion competent and appropriate. The medical notes following this are inadequate and do not explain why he was commenced on subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine and midazolam. The nursing notes are variable and at times inadequate.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

3.13 An inappropriately high dose of diamorphine and midazolam was first prescribed. There was a failure to recognise or respond to drug induced problems. Inappropriate dose escalation of diamorphine and midazolam and poor assessment by Dr Lord. The assessment by Dr Lord on 21st September 1998 was thorough and competent and a clear plan of management was outlined. There is a clear note by Dr Lord that oramorph was to be given intermittently (PRN) for pain and not regularly. It is not clear from the medical and nursing notes why Mr Cunningham was not administered the regular cocodamol he was prescribed following the initial dose he received at 1800h following admission. It is good practice to provide regular oral analgesia, with paracetamol and a mild opiate, particularly when a patient has been already taking this medication and to use prn morphine for breakthrough pain. I consider the prescription by Dr Barton on admission of prn subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr to be unjustified, poor practice and potentially very hazardous. It is particularly notable that only hours earlier Dr Lord had written that oramorph was to be given intermittently and this had been underlined in the medical notes. There is no clear justification in the notes for the commencement of subcutaneous diamorphine and midazolam on the evening following admission. If increased opiate analgesia was required increasing the oramorph dose and frequency could have provided this. I would judge it poor management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and it would have been more appropriate to review the response to diamorphine alone before commencing midazolam.

3.14 I am concerned by the initial note entry by Dr Barton on 21st September 1998 that she was happy for nursing staff to confirm death. There was no indication by Dr Lord that Mr Barton was expected to die, and Dr Barton does not list the reason she would have cause to consider Mr Cunningham would die within the next 24 hours before he was reviewed the following day by medical staff. In my opinion it is of concern that the nursing notes suggest the diamorphine and midazolam infusions were commenced because of Mr Cunningham's behaviour recorded in the nursing entry on 22nd September.

3.15 Hyoscine was commenced on 23rd September after Mr Cunningham had become 'chesty' overnight. I consider it very poor practice that there is no record of Mr Cunningham being examined by a doctor following admission on 21st September, and a decision to treat this symptomatically with hyoscine appears to have been made by the medical staff. At this stage Mr Cunningham's respiratory signs are likely to have been due to bronchopneumonia or respiratory depression resulting in depressed clearance of bronchial secretions. A medical assessment was very necessary at this

stage to diagnose the cause of symptoms and to consider treatment with antibiotics or reduction in the dose of diamorphine and midazolam.

3.16 Again I consider it very poor practice that the midazolam was increased from 20mg/24hr to 60mg/24 hr at 2000h on 23rd September. There is no entry in the medical notes to explain this dose increase. The decision to triple the midazolam dose appears to have been made by a member of nursing staff as the nursing notes record "*agitated at 2300h, syringe driver boosted with effect*".

3.17 A medical assessment should have been obtained before the decision to increase the midazolam dose was made. At the very least Mr Cunningham's problems should have been discussed with on call medical staff. Mr Cunningham's agitation may have been due to pain, where increasing analgesia would have been appropriate, or hypoxia (lack of oxygen). If Mr Cunningham's agitation was due to hypoxia a number of interventions may have been indicated. Reducing the diamorphine and midazolam dose would have been appropriate if hypoxia was due to respiratory depression. Commencement of oxygen therapy and possibly antibiotics would have been appropriate if hypoxia was due to pneumonia. Reducing the dose diamorphine or midazolam would have been indicated if hypoxia was due to drug-induced respiratory depression. The decision to increase the midazolam dose was not appropriately made by the ward nursing staff without discussion with medical staff.

3.18 When Mr Cunningham was reviewed by Dr Lord on 24th September he was very unwell but there is not a clear description of his respiratory status or whether he had signs of pneumonia. At this stage Dr Lord notes Mr Cunningham is in pain, but does not state the site of his pain. It is not clear to me whether the subsequent alteration in infusion rate of diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam was discussed with and sanctioned by Dr Lord or Dr Barton. I consider the increase in midazolam from 60mg/24 hr to 80mg/24 hr was inappropriate as a response to the observation that Mr Cunningham was in pain. It would have been more appropriate to increase the diamorphine dose or even consider treatment with a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug. The increase in midazolam dose to 80mg/24 hr would simply make Mr Cunningham less conscious than he already appears to have been (there is not a clear description of his conscious level at this stage).

3.19 The increase in hyoscine dose to 800microg/24 hr is also difficult to justify when there is no record that the management of bronchial secretions was a problem. The subsequent threefold increase in diamorphine dose later that day to 60mg/24 hr is in my view very poor practice. Such an increase was highly likely to result in respiratory depression and marked depression of conscious level, both of which could lead to premature death. The description of Mr Cunningham, was that analgesia was 'just' controlling pain and a more cautious increase in diamorphine dose, certainly no more than two fold, was indicated with careful review of respiratory status and conscious level after steady state levels of diamorphine would have been obtained about 20 hours later. A more appropriate response to deal with any acute breakthrough pain is to administer a single prn (intermittent) dose of opiate by the oral or intramuscular route, depending on whether Mr Cunningham was unable to swallow at this time.

3.20 The increase in both diamorphine dose and midazolam dose on 26th September is difficult to justify when there is no record in the medical or nursing notes that Mr Cunningham's pain was uncontrolled. Although it is possible to accept the increase in diamorphine dose may have been appropriate if Mr Cunningham was observed to be in pain, I find the further increase in midazolam dose to 100mg/24hr of great concern. I would anticipate that this dose of midazolam administered with 80mg/24hr of diamorphine would be virtually certain to produce respiratory depression and severe depression of conscious level. This would be expected to result in death in a frail individual such as Mr Cunningham. I would expect to see very clear reasons for the use of such doses recorded in the medical notes.

3.21 I can find no record of Mr Cunningham receiving food or fluids following his admission on 21st September despite a note from Dr Lord that Mr Cunningham was to receive a 'high protein diet'. There is no indication in the medical or nursing notes as to whether this had been discussed, but given that Mr Cunningham was admitted with the intention of returning to his Nursing Home (it was to be held open for 3 weeks) I would expect the notes to record a clear discussion and decision making process involving senior medical staff accounting for the decision to not administer subcutaneous fluids and/or nasogastric nutrition once Mr Cunningham was commenced on drugs which may have made him unable to swallow fluids or food.

Recorded causes of death

3.22 The recorded cause of death was bronchopneumonia with contributory causes of Parkinson's disease and sacral ulcer. A post mortem was not obtained and the recorded causes were in my opinion reasonable. It is possible that Mr Cunningham died from drug induced respiratory depression without bronchopneumonia present or from the combined effects of bronchopneumonia and drug-induced respiratory depression. Mr Cunningham was at high risk of developing pneumonia even if he had not received sedative or opiate drugs, bronchopneumonia can occur as a secondary complication of opiate and sedative induced respiratory depression. In the absence of post-mortem, radiological data (chest Xray) or recordings of Mr Cunningham's respiratory rate I would consider the recorded cause of death of bronchopneumonia as reasonable. Even if the staff had considered Mr Cunningham had drug-induced respiratory depression as a contributory factor, it would not be usual medical practice to enter this as a contributory cause of death where the administration of such drugs was considered appropriate for symptom relief.

Duty of care issues

3.23 Medical and nursing staff on Dryad ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care to attempt to heal Mr Cunningham's sacral ulcer and to document the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of are was not adequately met and the denial of fluid and diet and prescription of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mr Cunningham's death.

Summary

3.24 In summary although Mr Cunningham was admitted for medical and nursing care to attempt to heal and control pain from his sacral ulcer, Dr Barton and the ward staff appear to have considered Mr Cunningham was dying and had been admitted for terminal care. The medical and nursing records are inadequate in documenting his clinical state at this time. The initial prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine by Dr Barton was in my view reckless. The dose increases undertaken by nursing staff were inappropriate if not undertaken after medical assessment and review of Mr Cunningham. I consider it highly likely that Mr Cunningham experienced respiratory depression and profound depression of conscious level due to the infusion of diamorphine and midazolam. I consider the doses of these drugs prescribed and administered were inappropriate and that these drugs most likely contributed to his death through pneumonia and/or respiratory depression.

ALICE WILKIE

Course of Events

4.1 Alice Wilkie was 81 years old when admitted under the care of Dr Lord, by her general practitioner on 31st July 1998 from Addenbrooke Rest Home to Phillip Ward, Department of Medicine for Elderly People, at the Queen Alexandra Hospital, Portsmouth. The general practitioner referral letter states "*This demented lady has been in this psychogeriatric care home for a year. She had a UTI early this week and has not responded to trimethoprim. Having fallen last night, she is not refusing fluids and is becoming a little dry*". The medical admitting notes record she was taking prozac (fluoxetine) syrup 20 mg once daily, codanthramer 5-10ml nocte, lactulose 10ml once daily zopiclone 1.875 or 3.75mg nocte and promazine syrup 25mg as required. On examination she had a fever and bilateral conjunctivitis but no other significant findings. The admitting doctor diagnosed a urinary tract infection and commenced intravenous antibiotics to be administered after a blood culture and catheter specimen of urine had been obtained. The following day DNR (do not resuscitate) is recorded in the notes. On 3rd August 1998 the medical notes record the fever had settled, that she was taking some fluids orally, was taking the antibiotic Augmentin elixir orally and receiving subcutaneous fluids. The notes then record (date not clear) that her Mental Test Score was 0/10 and Barthel 1/20 (indicating severe dependency). Mrs Wilkie was to be transferred to Daedalus NHS continuing care ward on 6th August 1998 with a note that her bed was to be kept at Addenbrooke Rest Home.

4.2 Following transfer on 6th August an entry in the medical notes states "*Transferred from Phillips Ward. For 4-6/52 only. On Augmentin for UTI*". Dr Lord writes on 10th August 1998 '*Barthel 2/20. Eating and drinking better. Confused and slow. Give up place at Addenbrooke's. R/V* (review) *in 1/12* (one month) *–if no specialist medical or nursing problems D* (discharge) *to a N/Home. Stop fluoxetine*'. The next entry is by Dr Barton on 21st August "*Marked deterioration over last few days. sc analgesia commenced yesterday. Family aware and happy*". The final entry is on the same day at 1830h where death is confirmed. The most recent record of the patient's weight I can find is 56Kg in April 1994.

4.3 The nursing notes, which have daily entries during her one week stay on Phillip ward note she was catheterised, was confused at times and was sleeping well prior to transfer. The nursing notes on Daedalus ward record "6/8/98 *Transferred from Philip ward QAH for 4-6 weeks assessment and observation and then decide on placement. Medical history of advanced dementia, urinary tract infection and dehydration"* and that she was seen by Dr Peters. The nursing assessment sheet notes *"does have pain at times unable to ascertain where"*. The nutrition care plan states on 6th August 1998 "*Due to dementia patient has a poor dietary intake*". And dietary intake is recorded between 12th August and 18th August but not before or following these dates. Nursing entries in the contact record state on 17th August 1998 "*Condition has generally deteriorated over the weekend Daughter seen- aware that mums condition is worsening, agrees active treatment not appropriate and to use of syringe driver if Mrs Wilkie is in pain*". There is no entry in the notes on 20th August or preceding few days indicating Mrs Wilkie was in pain.

4.4 A nursing entry on 21st August 1998 at 1255h states "*Condition deteriorating during morning. Daughter and granddaughters visited and stayed. Patient comfortable and pain free*". There are a number of routine entries in the period 6th August 1998 to death on 21st August 1998 in nutrition, pressure area care, constipation, catheter care, and personal hygiene. The nursing care plan records no significant deterioration until 21st August where it is noted death was pronounced at 2120h by staff nurse Sylvia Roberts. Cause of death was recorded as bronchopneumonia.

4.5 The drug charts records that Dr Barton prescribed as a regular daily review (not intermittent as required) prescription diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr all to be administered subcutaneously. The prescription is not dated. Drugs were first administered on 20th August, diamorphine at 30mg/24hr and midazolam 20mg/24hr from 1350h and then again on 21st August. Mrs Wilkie had not been prescribed or administered any analgesic drugs during her admission to Daedalus ward prior to administration of the diamorphine and midazolam infusions. During the period 16th-18th August she was prescribed and received zopiclone (a sedative hypnotic) 3.75mg nocte and co-danthramer 5-10ml (a laxative) orally.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

4.6 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Wilkie during her admission to Daedalus ward lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for her care. She saw Mrs Wilkie on 10th August 1998, 11 days prior to her death. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was the responsibility of the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mrs Wilkie and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

4.7 The initial diagnosis of a urinary tract infection and dehydration was reasonable and appears correct. Mrs Wilkie had a diagnosis of dementia, which there was clear evidence for. The entry by Dr Lord on 10th August 1998 provides a reasonable assessment of her functional level at this time, and a plan to review appropriate placement in one month's time. No diagnosis was made to explain the deterioration Mrs Wilkie is reported to have experienced around 15th August. There is no medical assessment in the notes following 10th August except documentation on 21st August 1998 of a marked deterioration. There is no clear evidence that Mrs Wilkie was in pain although she was commenced on opiate analgesics.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

4.8 No information is recorded in the medical or nursing notes to explain why Mrs Wilkie was commenced on diamorphine and hyoscine infusions. In my opinion there was no indication for the use of diamorphine and hyoscine in Mrs Wilkie. Other oral analgesics, such as paracetamol and mild opiate drugs could and should first have been tried, if Mrs Wilkie was in pain, although there is no evidence that she was. If these were inadequate oral morphine would have

been the next appropriate choice. From the information I have seen in the notes it appears the diamorphine and midazolam may have been commenced for non-specific reasons, perhaps as a non-defined palliative reasons as it was judged she was likely to die in the near future.

4.9 I consider the undated prescription by Dr Barton of subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr to be poor practice and potentially very hazardous. I consider it poor and hazardous management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam in a frail elderly underweight patient with dementia such as Mrs Wilkie. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and it would have been more appropriate to review the response to diamorphine alone before commencing midazolam, had it been appropriate to commence subcutaneous analgesia, which as I have stated before was not the case.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

4.10 The medical and nursing records during her stay on Daedalus ward are inadequate not sufficiently detailed, and do not provide a clear picture of Mrs Wilkie's condition. In my opinion the standard of the notes falls below the expected level of documentation on a continuing care or rehabilitation ward. The assessment by Dr Lord on 10th August 1998 is the only satisfactory medical note entry during her 15 day stay on Daedalus ward.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

4.11 As discussed above I do not consider the decision to commence diamorphine and hyoscine was appropriate on the basis of the information recorded in the clinical notes.

Recorded causes of death

4.12 There was no specific evidence that bronchopneumonia was present, although this is a common pre-terminal event in frail older people, and is often entered as the final cause of death in frail older patients. I am surprised the death certificate did not apparently refer to Mrs Wilkie's dementia as a contributory cause. It is possible Mrs Wilkie's death was due at least in part to respiratory depression from the diamorphine she received, or that the diamorphine led to the development of bronchopneumonia. However since there are no clear observations of Mrs Wilkie's respiratory observations it is difficult to know whether respiratory depression was present Mrs Wilkie deteriorated prior to administration of diamorphine and midazolam infusion, and in view of this, my opinion would be that although the opiate and sedative drugs administered may have hastened death, and these drugs were not indicated, Mrs Wilkie may well have died at the time she did even if she had not received the diamorphine and midazolam infusions.

Duty of care issues

4.13 Medical and nursing staff on Daedalus ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care, to monitor, and to document the effects of drugs prescribed to Mrs Wilkie. In my opinion this duty of care was not adequately met, the prescription of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and this may have contributed to Mrs Wilkie's death.

Summary

4.14 In my opinion the prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine and midazolam was inappropriate, and probably resulted in depressed conscious level and respiratory depression, which may have hastened her death. However Mrs Wilkie was a frail very dependent lady with dementia who was at high risk of developing pneumonia. It is possible she would have died from pneumonia even if she had not been administered the subcutaneous sedative and opiate drugs.

Robert WILSON

5.1 Mr Wilson was 75 years old man when he was admitted to Queen Alexandra Hospital on 22nd September 1998 after he sustained a proximal fracture of the left humerus. He was treated with morphine, initially administered intravenously and then subcutaneously. He developed vomiting. On 24th September he was given 5mg diamorphine and lost sensation in the left hand. On 29th September an entry in the medical notes states *"ref to social worker, review resus status. Not for resuscitation in view of quality of life and poor prognosis".*

5.2 On 7th October the notes record he was *"not keen on residential home and wished to return to his own home".* Dr Lusznat, Consultant in Old Age Psychiatry on 8th October 1998, saw him. Dr Lusznat's letter on 8th October notes that Mr Wilson had been sleepy and withdrawn and low in mood but was now eating and drinking well and appeared brighter in mood. His Barthel score was 5/20. Dr Lusznat noted he had a heavy alcohol intake during the last 5 years. At the time he was seen by Dr Lusznat her was prescribed thiamine 100 mg daily, multivitamins two tablets daily, senna two tablets daily, magnesium hydroxide 10 mls twice daily and paracetamol 1g four time daily. On examination he had mildly impaired cognitive function (Mini Mental State Examination 24/30). Dr Lusznat considered Mr Wilson might have developed an early dementia, which could have been alcohol related, Alzheimer's disease or vascular dementia. An antidepressant trazadone 50mg nocte was commenced. Dr Lusznat states at the end of her letter "*On the practical side he may well require nursing home care though at the moment he is strongly opposed to that idea I shall be happy to arrange follow up by our team once we know when and where he is going to be discharged*". On 13th October the medical notes record a ward round took place, that he required both nursing and medical care, was at risk of falling and that a short spell in long-term NHS care would be appropriate. Reviewing the drug charts Mr Wilson was taking regular soluble paracetamol (1g four times daily) and codeine phosphate 30mg as required for pain. Between 8th and 13th October Mr Wilson was administered four doses of 30mg codeine. Mr Wilson's weight in March 1997 was 93Kg

5.3 On the 14th October Mr Wilson was transferred to Dryad Ward. An entry in the medical notes by Dr Barton reads "*Transfer to Dryad ward continuing care. HPC fracture humerus. needs help with ADL (*activities of Daily Living*), hoisting, continent. Barthel 7. Lives with wife. Plan further mobilisation".* On 16th November the notes record; '*Decline overnight with S.O.B. o/e ? weak pulse. Unresponsive to spoken work. Oedema ++ in arms and legs. Diagnosis ?silent MI, ? decreased __ function. ↑frusemide to 2 x 40mg om* '. On 17th October the notes record '*comfortable but rapid deterioration*'. On 18th October staff nurse Collins records death at 2340h. Cause of death is recorded as congestive cardiac failure.

5.4 Nursing notes state in the summary section on 14th October "*History of left humerus fracture, arm in collar and cuff. Long history of heavy drinking. LVF chronic oedematous legs. S/B Dr Barton. Oramorph 10mg/5ml given. Continent of urine – uses bottles*". On 15th October "*Commenced oramorph 10mg/5ml 4 hrly for pain in L arm. Wife seen [Code A] who explained Robert's condition is poor*". An earlier note states *"settled and slept well"*. On 16th October "*seen by Dr Knapman an as deteriorated over night. Increase*

*frusemide to 80mgdaily. For A.N.C (*active nursing care*)*". Later that day a further entry states "*Patient very bubbly chest this pm. Syringe driver commenced 20mg diamorphine, 400mcgs hyoscine. Explained to family reason for driver*". A separate note on 16th October in the nursing care plan states "*More secretions – pharyngeal – during the night, but Robert hasn't been distressed. Appears comfortable*". On 17th October 0515h "*Hyoscine increased to 600mcgs as oro-pharyngeal secretions increasing. Diamorphine 20mg.*" Later that day a further entry states "*Slow deterioration in already poor condition. Requiring suction very regularly – copious amounts suctioned. Syringe driver reviewed at 15.50 s/c diamorphine 40mg, midazolam 20mcgs, hyoscine 800 mcgs*". A later note states "*night: noisy secretions but not distressing Robert. Suction given as required during night. Appears comfortable*". On 18th October "*further deterioration in already poor condition. Syringe driver reviewed at 14:40 s/c diamorphine 60mg, midazolam 40mg, hyoscine 1200mcg. Continues to require regular suction*".

5.5 The medication charts record administration of the following drugs:

14 Sep 1445h oramorph 10mg
2345h oramorph 10mg
16 Sep 1610h diamorphine 20mg/24 hr, hyoscine 400 microg/24hr subcutaneous infusion
17 Sep 0515h diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 600 microg/24hr
1550h diamorphine 40mg/24hr, hyoscine 800 microg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr
18 Sep 1450h diamorphine 60mg/24hr, hyoscine 1200 microg/24hr midazolam 40mg/24hr

Frusemide was administered at a dose of 80mg daily at 0900h on 15th and 16th October. An additional 80 mg oral dose was administered at an unstated time on 16th October.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

5.6 Responsibility for the care of Mr Wilson during his admission to Dryad ward lay with Dr Lord as the consultant responsible for his care. My understanding is that day to day medical care was delegated to the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during the out of hours responsibility was with the on call doctor based at Queen Alexandra Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mr Wilson and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

5.7 Dr Lusznat was responsible for assessing Mr Wilson and making further recommendations concerning his future care when he was seen at Queen Alexandra Hospital.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

5.8 Dr Barton assessed Mr Wilson on 14th October the day he was transferred to Dyad ward. There was a plan to attempt to improve his mobilisation through rehabilitation. There is no record of any significant symptomatic medical problems, in particular any record that Mr Wilson was in pain in the medical

notes. The nursing notes suggest Mr Wilson was prescribed oramorph for pain in his arm following his admission to Dryad Ward. He was prescribed paracetamol to take as required but did not receive any paracetamol whilst on Dryad Ward.

5.9 Mr Wilson deteriorated on 15th September when he became short of breath. The working diagnosis was of heart failure due to a myocardial infarct. I do not consider the assessment by the on call doctor of Mr Wilson was adequate or competent. There is no record of his blood pressure, clinical examination findings in the chest (which might have indicated whether he had signs of pulmonary oedema or pneumonia). In my opinion an ECG should have been obtained that night, and a Chest Xray obtained the following morning to provide supporting evidence for the diagnosis. Mr Wilson was admitted for rehabilitation not terminal care and it was necessary and appropriate to perform reasonable clinical assessments and investigations to make a correct diagnosis.

5.10 Following treatment Mr Wilson was noted to have had a rapid deterioration. The medical and nursing teams appear to have failed to consider that Mr Wilson's deterioration may have been due to the diamorphine infusion. In my opinion when Mr Wilson was unconscious the diamorphine infusion should have been reduced or discontinued. The nursing and medical staff failed to record Mr Wilson's respiratory rate, which was likely to have been reduced, because of respiratory depressant effects of the diamorphine. The diamorphine and hyoscine infusion should have been discontinued to determine whether this was contributing to his deteriorating state. There is no record of the reason for the prescribing of the midazolam infusion commenced the day before his death. At this time the nursing notes record he was comfortable. Mr Wilson did not improve. The medical and nursing teams did not appear to consider that the diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam infusion could be a major contributory factor in Mr Wilson's subsequent decline. The infusion should have been discontinued and the need for this treatment, in my opinion unnecessary at the time of commencement, reviewed.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

5.11 The initial prescription and administration of oramorph to Mr Wilson following his transfer to Dryad ward was in my opinion inappropriate. His pain had been controlled with regular paracetamol and as required codeine phosphate (a mild opiate) prior to his transfer, and in the first instance these should have been discontinued.

5.12 I am unable to establish when Dr Barton wrote the prescription for subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr, and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr as these are undated. The administration of diamorphine and hyoscine by subcutaneous infusion as a treatment for the diagnosis of a silent myocardial infarction was in my opinion inappropriate. The prescription of a single dose of intravenous opiate is standard treatment for a patient with chest pain following myocardial infarction is appropriate standard practice but was not indicated in Mr Wilson's case as he did not have pain. The prescription of an initial single dose of diamorphine is appropriate as a treatment for pulmonary oedema if a patient fails to respond to intravenous diuretics such as frusemide. Mr Wilson was not administered intravenous

frusemide or another loop diuretic. Instead only a single additional oral dose of frusemide was administered. In my opinion this was an inadequate response to Mr Wilson's deterioration. The prescription of continuous subcutaneous infusion of diamorphine and hyoscine is not appropriate treatment for a patient who is pain free with a diagnosis of a myocardial infarction and heart failure. When opiates are used to treat heart failure, close monitoring of blood pressure and respiratory rate, preferably with monitoring of oxygen saturation is required. This was not undertaken.

5.13 The increase in diamorphine dose to 40mg/24hr and then 60mg/24 hr in the following 48 hours is not appropriate when the nursing and medical notes record no evidence that Mr Wilson was in pain or distressed at this time. This was poor practice and potentially very hazardous. Similarly the addition of midazolam and subsequent increase in dose to 40mg/24hr was in my opinion highly inappropriate and would be expected to carry a high risk of producing profound depression of conscious level and respiratory drive.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

5.14 The initial entry in the medical records by Dr Barton on 14th October is reasonable and sufficient. The subsequent entries relating to Mr Wilson's deterioration are in my opinion inadequate, and greater detail and the results of examination findings should have been recorded. No justification for the increases in diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine dose are written in the medical notes. The nursing notes are generally of adequate quality but I can find no record of fluid and food intake by Mr Wilson.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

5.15 I consider the prescription of oramorph was inappropriate. The subsequent prescription and administration of diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam was highly inappropriate, not justified by information presented in the notes and could be expected to result in profound depression of conscious level and respiratory depression in a frail elderly man such as Mr Wilson.

Recorded causes of death

5.16 The recorded cause of death was congestive cardiac failure. The limited clinical information recorded in the absence of a chest Xray result or post-mortem findings, suggest this may have been the cause of Mr Wilson's death. However in my opinion it is highly likely that the diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam infusion led to respiratory depression and/or bronchopneumonia and it is possible that Mr Wilson died from drug induced respiratory depression.

Duty of care issues

5.17 Medical and nursing staff on Dryad ward had a duty of care to deliver appropriate medical and nursing care to Mr Wilson, and to monitor the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of care was not adequate. The administration of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mr Wilson's death.

Summary

5.18 Mr Wilson was a frail elderly man with early dementia who was physically dependent. Following his admission to Dryad ward he was, in my opinion, inappropriately treated with high doses of opiate and sedative drugs. These drugs are likely to have produced respiratory depression and/or the development of bronchopneumonia and may have contributed to his death.

Eva PAGE

6.1 Eva Page was 87 years old when admitted as an emergency on 6th February 1998 to the Department of Medicine for Elderly People at Queen Alexandra Hospital. The medical notes record that she had experienced a general deterioration over the last 5 days was complaining of nausea and reduced appetite and was dehydrated. She had felt 'depressed' during the last few weeks. On admission she was taking ramipril 5mg once daily (a treatment for heart failure and hypertension), frusemide 40mg once daily (treatment for fluid retention), digoxin 125microg once daily (to control irregular heart rate), sotalol 40 mg twice daily (to control irregular heart rate), aspirin 75 mg once daily (to prevent stroke and myocardial infarction) and sertraline 50mg once daily (an antidepressant commenced by her general practitioner on 26th January 1998). A discharge summary and medical notes relating to an admission in May 1997 states that she was admitted with acute confusion, had reduced movement on the right side and was discharged back to her residential home on aspirin. No admitting diagnosis is recorded in the clerking notes written by Dr Harris on 6th February 1998 but they record that *"patient refuses iv fluids and is willing to accept increased oral fluids"*.

6.2 On 7th February 1998 the medical notes record an opacity seen on the chest Xray and sate *"mood low. Feels frightened – doesn't know why. Nausea and ??. Little else. Nil clinically."* An increased white cell count is noted (13.0) and antibiotics commenced. A subsequent chest Xray report (undated) states there is a 5cm mass superimposed on the left hilum highly suspicious of malignancy. The medical notes on 11 February 1998 record this at the Xray meeting. On 12th February 1998 the notes record (? Dr Shain) *'In view of advanced age aim in the management should be palliative care. Charles Ward is suitable. Not for CPR'.* On 13th February the notes record *'remains v low Appears to have 'given up' d/w son re probably diagnosis d/w RH (residential home) re ability to cope'.* The notes record *'son agrees not suitable for invasive Tx (*treatment*). Matron from RH visiting today will check on ability to cope.'*

6.3 On 19th February the notes record she fell on the ward and experienced minor cuts. On 16th February *'gradual deterioration, no pain, confused. For Charles Ward she could be discharged to community from Charles Ward'.* On 19th February the notes summarise her problems *'probable Carcinoma of the bronchus, previous left ventricular failure, atrial fibrillation, digoxin toxicity and a transient ischaemic attack, that she was sleepy but responsive, states that she is frightened but doesn't know why. Says she has forgotten things, not possible to elicit what she can't remember, low MTS (mental test score). Plan encourage oral fluids, s/c fluid over night if tolerated. Continue antidepressants'*. On 18th February the medical notes state *"No change. Awaiting Charles Ward bed"*.

6.4 The nursing notes record she was confused but mobilised independently. On 19th February she was transferred to Charles Ward instead of the preferred option of a bed at Gosport Hospital, which the notes record was full ('no beds'). The Queen Alexandra Hospital medical notes record a summary of her problems on 19th February prior to transfer as follows " *Diagnosis CA bronchus probable [no histology] Diag based on CXR. PMH 95 LVF + AF 95 Digoxin toxicity 97 TIA. Admitted 6.2.98 general deterioration CXR ? Ca Bronchus.*

Well defined O lesion. Exam: sleepy but responsive answers appropriately. States that she is frightened but doesn't know why. Says she has forgotten things. Not possible to elicit what she can't remember. Low MTS" and *"Feels in general tired and very thirsty. Plan encourage oral fluids, s/c fluid overnight is tolerated continue antidepressants".*

6.5 The medical notes on 23rd February record diagnoses of depression, dementia, ? Ca bronchus, ischaemic heart disease and congestive heart failure. On 25th February Dr Lord records in the medical notes "*confused and some agitation towards afternoon – evening try tds* (three times daily) *thioridazine, son in Gosport, transfer to Gosport 27/2, heminevrin prn nocte'.* A further entry states *'All other drugs stopped by Dr Lord'.*

6.6 Mrs Page was transferred to Dryad ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital on 27th February 1998. Dr Barton writes in the medical notes "*Transfer to Dryad ward continuing care, Diagnosis of Ca Bronchus on CXR on admission. Generally unwell off legs, not eating, bronchoscopy not done, catheterised, needs help with eating and drinking, needs hoisting, Barthel 0. Family seen and well aware of prognosis. Opiates commenced. I'm happy for nursing staff to confirm death".* The nursing notes state she was admitted for *'palliative care'*, that she had a urinary catheter (inserted on 22nd February 1998) was incontinent of faeces, and was dependent for washing and dressing but could hold a beaker and pick up small amounts of food. Barthel Index was 2/20. The nursing action plan states *'encourage adequate fluid intake'.* On 28th February an entry in the medical notes by Dr Laing (duty GP) record *'asked to see: confused. Feels 'lost' agitated esp. night/evening, not in pain, to give thioridazine 25mg tds regular, heminevrin noct.* The nursing notes record she was very distressed and that she was administered thioridazine and Oramorph 2.5ml.

6.7 On 2nd March Dr Barton records *'no improvement on major tranquillisers. I suggest adequate opioids to control fear and pain; Son to be seen by Dr Lord today'.* A subsequent entry by Dr Lord on the same day states *' spitting out thioridazine, quieter on prn sc diamorphine. Fentanyl patch started today. Agitated and calling out even when staff present (diagnoses) 1) Ca Bronchus 2) ? Cerebral metastases. -ct* (continue) *fentanyl patches.'* A further entry by Dr Lord that day records *'son seen. Concerned about deterioration today. Explained about agitation and that drowsiness was probably due in part to diamorphine. He accepts that his mother is dying and agrees we continue present plan of Mx* (management)".

6.8 On 2nd March the nursing notes record "*commenced on Fentanyl 25mcg this am. Very distressed this morning seen by Dr Barton to have and diamorphine 5mg i/m (intramuscular) same given 0810h by a syringe driver.* A further entry the same day states *"S/B Dr Lord. Diamorphine 5mg i/m given for syringe driver with diamorphine loaded".* On 3rd March a rapid deterioration in Mrs Page's condition is recorded *'Neck and left side of body rigid – right side rigid,* At 1050h diamorphine and midazolam were commenced by syringe driver. Death is recorded later that day at 2130h, 4 days following admission to Dyad ward.

6.9 The prescription charts (which are incompletely copied in notes made available to me) indicate she received the following drugs during this admission Two doses of intramuscular diamorphine 5 mg were administered at 0800 and 1500h (date not visible)

28 Feb 1998	1300h thioridazine 25mg
	1620h oramorph 5mg
	2200h heminevrin 250mg in 5ml
1 Mar 1998	0700h thioridazine 25 mg
	1300h thioridazine 25 mg
	2200h heminevrin 250mg
2 Mar 1998	0700h thioridazine 25mg
	0800h fentanyl 25microg
3 Mar 1998	1050h diamorphine 20mg/24hr, midazolam 20 mg/24hr by subcutaneous infusion

On 27th February Dr Barton prescribed thioridazine 25mg (prn tds) and Oramorph (10mg/5ml) 4hrly prn. On 2nd March Dr Barton prescribed fentanyl 25microg patch (x3 days) to take as required (prn). On 3rd March Dr Barton prescribed diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr, hyoscine 200-800ucg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr by subcutaneous infusion.
The notes do not indicate that the fentanyl patch was removed and I would assume this was continued when the diamorphine and midazolam infusion was commenced.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

6.10 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Page during her admission to Dryad Ward lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for his care. She saw Mrs Page 2 days before her transfer to Dryad ward and two days following her admission, the day before she died. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was the responsibility of the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mrs Page and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

6.11 The assessment and management of Mrs Page at Alexandra Hospital was in my opinion competent and considered. From the information in the clinical notes I would agree with the diagnosis of probable carcinoma of bronchus. The decision to prescribe an antidepressant was in my opinion appropriate. Prior to transfer to Dryad ward she was not in pain but was transferred for palliative care. Although Mrs Page was clearly very dependent and unwell, it is not clear why Dr Barton prescribed opiates to Mrs Page on admission to Dryad ward when there is no evidence she was in pain. I suspect the reason was to provide relief for Mrs Page's anxiety and agitation. This is a reasonable indication for opiates in the palliative care of a patient with known inoperable carcinoma. Mrs Page was noted to be severely dependent, Barthel Index 0, and in conjunction with a probable carcinoma of the bronchus the assessment that she required palliative care and was likely to die in the near future was appropriate.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

6.12 The prescription of the major tranquilliser thioridazine for anxiety was reasonable and appropriate. The prescribing of the sedative/hypnotic drug heminevrin was similarly reasonable although potential problems of sedation from the combination need to be considered. Mrs Page was not in pain but I consider the prescription of oramorph on 28th February to attempt to improve her distress was reasonable. By 2nd March Mrs Page remained very distressed despite prescription of Oramorph, thioridazine and heminevrin. Since the notes reported she was more settled following intramuscular diamorphine and she had been spitting out her oral medication, I would consider it appropriate to prescribe a transdermal fentanyl patch to provide continuing opioid drugs to Mrs Page. The lowest dose patch was administered but it would have been important to be aware of the potential for depression of respiration and/or conscious level that could occur.

6.13 I do not understand why subcutaneous diamorphine and midazolam infusions were commenced on 3rd March when Mrs Page had deteriorated whilst on the fentanyl patch. There is no indication in the notes that Mrs Page was in pain or distressed. The notes describe her as having undergone a rapid deterioration, which could have been due to a number of different causes, including a stroke or an adverse effect of the fentanyl patch. In my opinion the prescription by Dr Barton of subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr was poor practice and potentially very hazardous. I would judge it poor management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam in a frail elderly underweight patient such as Mrs Page who was already receiving transdermal fentanyl. I would expect very clear reasons to support the use of the drugs to be recorded in the medical notes. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and there are no symptoms recorded which suggest the administration of either drug was appropriate.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

6.14 The medical and nursing records relating to Mrs Page's admission to Dryad ward are in my view of adequate quality, although as stated above the reasons for the use of midazolam and diamorphine are not recorded in either the medical or nursing notes.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

6.15 In my opinion the majority of management and prescribing decisions made by medical and nursing staff were appropriate. The exception is the prescription of diamorphine and midazolam on the day of Mrs Page's death. From the information I have seen in the notes it appears that Dr Barton may have commenced the diamorphine and midazolam infusion for non-specific reasons or for non-defined palliative reasons when it was judged she was likely to die in the near future.

Recorded causes of death

6.16 In the absence of a post-mortem the recorded cause of death is reasonable. Mrs Page had a probable carcinoma of the bronchus and experienced a slow deterioration in her general health and functional abilities. It is possible that Mrs Page died from drug induced respiratory depression. However Mrs Page was at high risk of dying from the effects of her probable carcinoma of the bronchus even if she had not received sedative and opiate drugs. Bronchopneumonia

can also occur as a complication of opiate and sedative induced respiratory depression but also in patients deteriorating from malignancy. In the absence of post-mortem, radiological data (chest Xray) or recordings of Mrs Page's respiratory rate I would consider the recorded cause of death was possible. The deterioration on between the 2nd March and 3rd March could have been secondary to the fentanyl patch she received but again could have occurred in the absence of receiving this drug. There are no accurate records of Mrs Page's respiratory rate but significant potentially fatal respiratory depression was likely to have resulted could have resulted from the combination of diamorphine, midazolam and fentanyl.

Duty of care issues

6.17 Medical and nursing staff on Dryad ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care, to monitor Mrs Page and to document the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of care was adequately met except during the last day of her life when the prescription of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mrs Wilkie's death.

Summary

6.18 Mrs Page was a frail elderly lady with probable carcinoma of the bronchus who had been deteriorating during the two weeks prior to admission to Dryad ward. In general I consider the medical and nursing care she received was appropriate and of adequate quality. However I cannot identify a reason for the prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine by Dr Barton on the 3rd March. In my view this was an inappropriate, potentially hazardous prescription. I would consider it highly likely that Mrs Page experienced respiratory depression and profound depression of conscious level from the combination of these two drugs and fentanyl but I cannot exclude other causes for her deterioration and death at this time such as stroke or pneumonia.

Opinion on clinical management at Gosport War Memorial Hospital based on review of five cases presented by Hampshire Police

7.1 My opinion on the five cases I have been asked to review at Gosport War Memorial Hospital must be considered in context. My understanding is that the five cases have been selected by Hampshire Police because of concerns expressed relating to the management of these patients. Therefore my comments should not be interpreted as an opinion on the quality of care in general at Gosport War Memorial Hospital or of the general quality of care by the clinicians involved. My comments also relate to a period 2-4 years ago and the current clinical practice at the hospital may be very different today. An opinion on the quality of care in general at the hospital or of the clinicians would require a systematic review of cases, selected at random or with pre-defined patient characteristics. Examination of selected cases is not an appropriate mechanism to comment on the general quality of care of an institution or individual practitioners.

7.2 However having reviewed the five cases I would consider they raise a number of concerns that merit further examination by independent enquiry. Such enquiries could be made through further police interviews or perhaps more appropriately through mechanisms within the National Health Service, such as the Commission for Health Improvement, and professional medical and nursing bodies such as the General Medical Council or United Kingdom Central Council for Nursery, Midwifery and Health Visiting.

7.3 My principle concerns relate to the following three areas of practice: prescription and administration of subcutaneous infusions of opiate and sedative drugs in patients with non-malignant disease, lack of training and appropriate medical supervision of decisions made by nursing staff, and the level of nursing and non-consultant medical skills on the wards in relation to the management of older people with rehabilitation needs.

7.4 In all five cases subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine and in combination with sedative drugs were administered to older people who were mostly admitted for rehabilitation. One patient with carcinoma of the bronchus was admitted for palliative care. Although intravenous infusion of these drugs are used frequently in intensive care settings, very close monitoring of patients is undertaken to ensure respiratory depression does not occur. Subcutaneous infusion of these drugs is also used in palliative care, but the British National Formulary indicates this route should be used only when the patient is unable to take medicines by mouth, has malignant bowel obstruction or where the patient does not wish to take regular medication (Appendix 2). In only one case were these criteria clearly fulfilled i.e. in Mrs Page who was refusing to take oral medication. Opiate and sedative drugs used were frequently used at excessive doses and in combination with often no indication for dose escalation that took place. There was a failure by medical and nursing staff to recognise or respond to severe adverse effects of depressed respiratory function and conscious level that seemed to have occurred in all five patients. Nursing and medical staff appeared to have little knowledge of the adverse effects of these drugs in older people.

7.5 Review of the cases suggested that the decision to commence and increase the dose of diamorphine and sedative drugs might have been made by nursing staff without appropriate consultation with medical staff. There is a possibility that prescriptions of subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine may have been routinely written up for many older frail patients admitted to Daedalus and Dryad wards, which nurses then had the discretion to commence. This practice if present was highly inappropriate, hazardous to patients and suggests failure of the senior hospital medical and managerial staff to monitor and ~~supervise care on~~ the ward. Routine use of opiate and sedative drug infusions without clear indications for their use would raise concerns that a culture of "involuntary euthanasia" existed on the ward. Closer enquiry into the ward practice, philosophy and individual staff's understanding of these practices would be necessary to establish whether this was the case. Any problems may have been due to inadequate training in management of older patients. It would be important to examine levels of staffing in relation to patient need during this period, as the failure to keep adequate nursing records could have resulted from under-staffing of the ward. Similarly there may have been inadequate senior medical staff input into the wards, and it would be important to examine this in detail, both in terms of weekly patient contact and in time available to lead practice development on the wards. My review of Dr Lord's medical notes and her statement leads me to conclude she is a competent, thoughtful geriatrician who had a considerable clinical workload during the period the above cases took place.

7.6 I consider the five cases raise serious concerns about the general management of older people admitted for rehabilitation on Daedalus and Dryad wards and that the level of skills of nursing and non-consultant medical staff, particularly Dr Barton, were not adequate at the time these patients were admitted.

7.7 Having reviewed the five cases presented to me by Hampshire Police, I consider they raise serious concerns about nursing and medical practice on Daedalus and Dryad wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. In my opinion a review of practice at the institution is necessary, if this has not already taken place. I would recommend that if criminal proceedings do not take place, that these cases are brought to the attention of the General Medical Council and United Kingdom Central Council for Nursery, Midwifery and Health Visiting, in relation to the professional competence of the medical and nursing staff, and the Commission for Health Improvement, in relation to the quality of service provided to older people in the Trust.

APPENDIX 1

Pharmacology of Opiate and Sedative Drugs

Morphine

8.1 Morphine is a potent opiate analgesic considered by many to the 'drug of choice' for the control of acute pain (Therapeutic Drugs Dollery). Recommended starting dosage regimens for a fit adult of 70Kg are for intravenous bolus dosing 2.5mg every 5 min until analgesia achieved with monitoring of the duration of pain and dosing interval, or a loading dose of 5-15mg over 30min than 2,5mg – 5mg every hour. A standard reference text recommends 'morphine doses should be reduced in elderly patients and titrated to provide optimal pain relief with minimal side effects'. Morphine can be used for sedation where sedation and pain relief are indicated, Dollery comments *'it should be noted that morphine is not indicated as a sedative drug for long-term use. Rather the use of morphine is indicated where the requirement for pain relief and sedation coexist such as in patients admitted to intensive care units and other high dependency areas, the morphine dose should be titrated to provide pain relief and an appropriate level of sedation. Frequently other pharmacological agents (e.g.: benzodiazepines) are added to this regimen to increase the level of sedation".*

8.2 Diamorphine

8.3

8.4 **Fentanyl**

8.5 Fentanyl is a transdermal opioid analgesic available as a transdermal patch. The '25' patch releases 25microg/hr.

8.6 The British National Formulary (copy of prescribing in palliative care attached Appendix 2) comments on the use of syringe drivers in prescribing in palliative care that drugs can usually be administered by mouth to control symptoms, and that indications for the parenteral route are: patient unable to take medicines by mouth, where there is malignant bowel obstruction, and where the patient does not wish to take regular medication by mouth, It comments that staff using syringe drivers should be adequately trained and that incorrect use of syringe drivers is a common cause of drug errors.

Heminevrin

Midazolam

8.1 Midazolam is a benzodiazepine sedative drug. It is used as a hypnotic, preoperative medication, sedation for procedures such as dentistry and GO endoscopy, long-term sedation and induction of general anaesthesia. Iot is not licensed for subcutaneous use, but is described in the British National Formulary prescribing in palliative care section as 'suitable for a very restless patient: it is given in a subcutaneous infusion dose of 20-100mg/24 hrs.

8.2 DA standard text describes the use of sedation with midazolam in the intensive care unit setting, and states, "*sedation is most commonly met by a combination of a benzodiazepine and an opioid, and midazolam has generally replaced diazepam in this respect".* It goes on to state, "in critically ill patients, prolonged sedation may follow the use of midazolam infusions as a result of delayed administration". Potentially life threatening adverse effects are described, "Midazolam can cause dose-related CNS depression, respiratory and

cardiovascular depression. There is a wide variation in susceptibility to its effects, the elderly being particularly sensitive. Respiratory depression, respiratory arrest, hypotension and even death have been reported following its use usually during conscious sedation. The elderly are listed as a high-risk group; the elderly are particularly sensitive to midazolam. The dose should be reduced and the drug given slowly intravenously in a diluted form until the desired response is achieved. In drug interactions the following is stated. "*midazolam will also potentiate the central depressant effects of opioids, barbituates, and other sedatives and anaesthetics, and profound and prolonged respiratory depression might result.*

8.3

Hyoscine

8.4 The British National Formulary describes hyoscine hydrobromide as an antagonist (blocking drug) of acetylcholine. It reduces salivary and respiratory secretions and provides a degree of amnesia, sedation and antiemesis (antinausea). IN some patients, especially the elderly, hyoscine may cause the central anticholinergic syndrome (excitement, ataxia, hallucinations, behavioural abnormalities, and drowsiness). The palliative care section describes it as being given in a subcutaneous infusion dose of 0.6-2.4mg/24 hours.

8.5

Use of syringe drivers

8.1 The BNF states 'oral medication is usually satisfactory unless there is severe nausea and vomiting, dysphagia, weakness, or coma in which case parenteral medication may be necessary. In the pain section it comments the non-opioid analgesics aspirin or paracetamol given regularly will often make the use of opioids unnecessary. An opioid such as codeine or dextropropoxyphene alone or in combination with a non-opioid analgesic at adequate dosage may be helpful in the control of moderate pain id non-opioids are not sufficient. If these preparations are not controlling the pain, morphine is the most useful opioid analgesic. Alternatives to morphine are hydromoprhine, oxycodone and transdermal fentanyl. In prescribing morphine it states 'morphine is given as an oral solution or as standard tablets every 4 hour, the initial dose depending largely on the patient's previous treatment. A dose of 5-10mg is enough to replace a weaker analgesic. If the first dose of morphine is no more effective than the previous analgesic it should be increased by 50% the aim being to choose the lowest dose which prevents pain. The dose should be adjusted with careful assessment of the pain and the use of adjuvant analgesics (such as NSAIDs) should also be considered. Although morphine in a dose of 5-10mg is usually adequate there should be no hesitation in increasing it stepwise according to response to 100mg or occasionally up to 500mg or higher if necessary. The BNF comments on the parenteral route '*diamorphine is preferred for injection. The equivalent intramuscular or subcutaneous dose of diamorphine is approximately a third of the oral dose of morphine.*'

8.2 In the chapter on pain relief in 'Drugs and the Older Person' Crome writes on the treatment of acute pain ' *treat the underlying cause and give adequate pain relief. The nature of the painful condition, the response of the patient and the presence of comorbidity will dictate whether to start with a mild analgesic or to go immediately to a more potent drug. In order to avoid the situation that patients remain in pain, "starting low" must be followed by regular re-evaluation with, if necessary, frequent increases in drug dose. The usual method of*

prescribing morphine for chronic pain is to start with standard oral morphine in a dose of 5-10mg every four hours. The dose should be halved in frail older people.

Prescribing for the Elderly

The British National Formulary states in Prescribing for the Elderly section "*The ageing nervous system shows increased susceptibility to many commonly used drugs, such as opioid analgesics, benzodiazepines, antipsychotics and antiparkinsonian drugs, all of which must be used with caution*".

APPENDIX 2

BNF Prescribing in palliative care

ANNEXE 6.

Gosport War Memorial Hospital: CHI Investigation Report

July 2002

Executive summary

CHI has undertaken this investigation as a result concerns expressed by the police and others around the care and treatment of frail older peopl provided by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. This follows polic investigations between 1998 and 2001 into the potential unlawful killing of a patient in 1998. As part of their investigations, the police commissioned expert medical opinion, which was made available to CHI, relating to a total of five patient deaths in 1998. In February 2002, the police decided not to proceed with further investigations.

Based on information gathered during their investigations, the police were sufficiently concerned about the care of older people at Gosport War Memorial Hospital to share their concerns with CHI in August 2001. CHI is grateful to the Hampshire Constabulary for sharing information with us which contributed towards the local and national recommendations CHI makes t improve the care of this vulnerable group of NHS patients.

CHI has conducted a detailed review of the systems in place to ensure good quality patient care. CHI does not have a statutory remit to investigate either the circumstances around any particular death or the conduct of any individual.

Top

Key conclusions

CHI concludes that a number of factors, detailed i the report, contributed to a failure of trust systen to ensure good quality patient care:

- there were insufficient local prescribing

guidelines in place governing the prescriptic of powerful pain relieving and sedative medicines
- the lack of a rigorous, routine review of pharmacy data led to high levels of prescribing on wards caring for older people not being questioned
- the absence of adequate trust wide supervision and appraisal systems meant that poor prescribing practice was not identified
- there was a lack of thorough multidisciplina total patient assessment to determine care needs on admission

CHI also concludes that the trust now has adequate policies and guidelines in place which ai being adhered to governing the prescription and administration of pain relieving medicines to olde patients.

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Key findings

National and local context (Chapter 3)

- Throughout the timeframe covered by the CHI investigation, CHI received evidence of strong leadership, with a shared set of valu at corporate and divisional level in Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The seni management team was well established an together with the trust board, functioned as a cohesive team.
- There was lack of clarity amongst all groups of staff and stakeholders about the focus of care for older people and therefore the aim of the care provided. This confusion had be communicated to patients and relatives, which had led to expectations of rehabilitation which had not been fulfilled.

Arrangements for the prescription, administration review and recording of medicines (Chapter 4)

- CHI has serious concerns regarding the quantity, combination, lack of review and anticipatory prescribing of medicines prescribed to older people on Dryad and Daedalus wards in 1998. A protocol existed in 1998 for palliative care prescribing referred to as the "Wessex guidelines", this was inappropriately applied to patients admitted for rehabilitation.
- Though CHI is unable to determine whether these levels of prescribing contributed to th deaths of any patients, it is clear that had

adequate checking mechanisms existed in the trust, this level of prescribing would hav been questioned.

- CHI welcomes the introduction and adherence to policies regarding the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines. Although the palliative care Wessex guidelines refer to nc physical symptoms of pain, the trust's policies do not include methods of non verb pain assessment and rely on the patient articulating when they are in pain.

Quality of care and the patient experience (Chapt 5)

- Relatives speaking to CHI had some serious concerns about the care their relatives received on Daedalus and Dryad wards between 1998 and 2001. The instances of concern expressed to CHI were at their highest in 1998. Fewer concerns were expressed regarding the quality of care received on Sultan ward.
- Based on CHI's observation work and revie of recent case notes, CHI has no significant concerns regarding the standard of nursing care provided to the patients of Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan ward now.

Staffing arrangements and responsibility for patient care (Chapter 6)

- Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did not have any systems in place to monitor and appraise the performance of clinical assistants. There were no arrangements in place for the adequate supervision of the clinical assistant working on Daedalus and Dryad wards.
- There are now clear accountability and supervisory arrangements in place for trust doctors, nurses and allied health profession staff.

Lessons learnt from complaints (Chapter 7)

- The police investigation, the review of the Health Service Commissioner, the independent review panel and the trust's own pharmacy data did not provide the trigger for the trust to undertake a review c prescribing practices. The trust should have responded earlier to concerns expressed around levels of sedation, which it was awa of in late 1998.
- Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did effect changes in patient care over time as a resul

of patient complaints, including increased medical staffing levels and improved processes for communication with relatives, though this learning was not consolidated until 2001. CHI saw no evidence to suggest that the impact of these changes had been robustly monitored and reviewed.

Clinical governance (Chapter 8)

- The trust responded proactively to the clinical governance agenda and had a robus framework in place with strong corporate leadership.

Top

Recommendations

It is clear from a number of CHI recommendation to the Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Trust (PCT) and the East Hampshire PCT, that continued close and effective working relationships between both PCTs will be essential in order to implement the recommendations in this report.
CHI is aware of the high level of interdependence that already exists between thes two organisations and urges that this continues.
CHI is aware that many of these recommendation will be relevant to emerging PCTs and urges all PCTs to take action where appropriate.

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Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

JULY 2002

CHI

COMMISSION FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT

Investigation into the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust

Gosport War Memorial Hospital

JULY 2002

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- the patients and relatives who contributed either in person, over the phone or in writing. CHI recognises how difficult some of these contacts were for the relatives of those who have died
- staff interviewed by CHI's investigation team (see appendix C) and those who assisted CHI during the course of the investigation. In particular Fiona Cameron, General Manager, Caroline Harrington, Corporate Governance Advisor, Max Millett, Chief Executive (until 31 March 2002) and Ian Piper, Chief Executive of Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Trust (since 1 April 2002)
- staff and patients who welcomed the CHI team on to the wards during observation work
- Detective Superintendent John James, Hampshire Constabulary
- the agencies listed in appendix D who gave their views and submitted relevant documents to the investigation

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Key conclusions

CHI concludes that a number of factors, detailed in the report, contributed to a failure of trust systems to ensure good quality patient care:

- there were insufficient local prescribing guidelines in place governing the prescription of powerful pain relieving and sedative medicines
- the lack of a rigorous, routine review of pharmacy data led to high levels of prescribing on wards caring for older people not being questioned
- the absence of adequate trust wide supervision and appraisal systems meant that poor prescribing practice was not identified
- there was a lack of thorough multidisciplinary total patient assessment to determine care needs on admission

CHI also concludes that the trust now has adequate policies and guidelines in place which are being adhered to governing the prescription and administration of pain relieving medicines to older patients.

Key findings

National and local context (Chapter 3)

- Throughout the timeframe covered by the CHI investigation, CHI received evidence of strong leadership, with a shared set of values at corporate and divisional level in Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The senior management team was well established and, together with the trust board, functioned as a cohesive team.
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Recommendations

It is clear from a number of CHI recommendations to the Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Trust (PCT) and the East Hampshire PCT, that continued close and effective working relationships between both PCTs will be essential in order to implement the recommendations in this report. CHI is aware of the high level of interdependence that already exists between these two organisations and urges that this continues.
CHI is aware that many of these recommendations will be relevant to emerging PCTs and urges all PCTs to take action where appropriate.

Fareham and Gosport/ East Hampshire Primary Care Trust

1. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should work together to build on the many positive aspects of leadership developed by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust in order to develop the provision of care for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The PCTs should ensure an appropriate performance monitoring tool is in place to ensure that any quality of care and performance shortfalls are identified and addressed swiftly.

2. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should, in consultation with local GPs, review the admission criteria for Sultan ward.

3. The East Hampshire PCT and Fareham and Gosport PCT should review all local prescribing guidelines to ensure their appropriateness for the current levels of dependency of the patients on the wards.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should review the provision of pharmacy services to Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards, taking into account the change in casemix and use of these wards in recent years. Consideration should be given to including pharmacy input into regular ward rounds.

5. As a priority, the Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that a system is in place to routinely review and monitor prescribing of all medicines on wards caring for older people. This should include a review of recent diamorphine prescribing on Sultan ward. Consideration must be given to the adequacy of IT support available to facilitate this.

6. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT, in conjunction with the pharmacy department, must ensure that all relevant staff including GPs are trained in the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines for older people.

7. All patient complaints and comments, both informal and formal, should be used at ward level to improve patient care. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must ensure a mechanism is in place to ensure that shared learning is disseminated amongst all staff caring for older people.

8. Fareham and Gosport PCT should lead an initiative to ensure that relevant staff are appropriately trained to undertake swallowing assessments to ensure that there are no delays out of hours.

9. Daytime activities for patients should be increased. The role of the activities coordinator should be revised and clarified, with input from patients, relatives and all therapists in order that activities complement therapy goals.

10. The Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that all local continence management, nutrition and hydration practices are in line with the national standards set out in the *Essence of Care* guidelines.

11. Both PCTs must find ways to continue the staff communication developments made by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

12. Within the framework of the new PALS, the Fareham and Gosport PCT should, as a priority, consult with user groups and consider reviewing specialist advice from national support and patient groups, to determine the best way to improve communication with older patients and their relatives and carers.

13. The provision of out of hours medical cover to Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards should be reviewed. The deputising service and PCTs must work towards an out of hours contract which sets out a shared philosophy of care, waiting time standards, adequate payment and a disciplinary framework.

14. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and the East Hampshire PCT should ensure that appropriate patients are being admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital with appropriate levels of support.

15. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should ensure that arrangements are in place to ensure strong, long term nursing leadership on all wards.

16. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should develop local guidance for GPs working as clinical assistants. This should address supervision and appraisal arrangements, clinical governance responsibilities and training needs.

17. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should ensure that the learning and monitoring of action arising from complaints undertaken through the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust quarterly divisional performance management system is maintained under the new PCT management arrangements.

18. Both PCTs involved in the provision of care for older people should ensure that all staff working on Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards who have not attended customer care and complaints training events do so. Any new training programmes should be developed with patients, relatives and staff to ensure that current concerns and the particular needs of the bereaved are addressed.

19. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must fully embrace the clinical governance developments made and direction set by the trust.

20. All staff must be made aware that the completion of risk and incident reports is a requirement for all staff. Training must be put in place to reinforce the need for rigorous risk management.

21. Clinical governance systems must be put in place to regularly identify and monitor trends revealed by risk reports and to ensure that appropriate action is taken.

22. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should consider a revision of their whistle blowing policies to make it clear that concerns may be raised outside of normal management channels.

Hampshire and Isle of Wight Strategic Health Authority

23. Hampshire and Isle of Wight Strategic Health Authority should use the findings of this investigation to influence the nature of local monitoring of the national service framework for older people.

Department of Health

24. The Department of Health should assist in the promotion of an NHS wide understanding of the various terms used to describe levels of care for older people.

25. The Department of Health should work with the Association of Chief Police Officers and CHI to develop a protocol for sharing information regarding patient safety and potential systems failures within the NHS as early as possible.

1 | Terms of reference and process of investigation

1.1 During the summer of 2001, concerns were raised with CHI about the use of some medicines, particularly analgesia and levels of sedation, and the culture in which care was provided for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. These concerns were also about the responsibility for clinical care and transfer arrangements with other hospitals.

1.2 On 22 October 2001, CHI launched an investigation into the management, provision and quality of healthcare for which Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust was responsible at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. CHI's decision was based on evidence of high risk activity and the likelihood that the possible findings of a CHI investigation would result in lessons for the whole of the NHS.

Terms of reference

1.3 The investigation terms of reference were informed by a chronology of events provided by the trust surrounding the death of one patient. Discussions were also held with the trust, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority and the NHS south east regional office to ensure maximum learning locally and for the NHS.

1.4 The terms of reference agreed on 9 October 2001 are as follows:

The investigation will look at whether, since 1998, there had been a failure of trust systems to ensure good quality patient care. The investigation will focus on the following elements within services for older people (inpatient, continuing and rehabilitative care) at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

i) staffing and accountability arrangements, including out of hours

ii) the guidelines and practices in place at the trust to ensure good quality care and effective performance management

iii) arrangements for the prescription, administration, review and recording of drugs

iv) communication and collaboration between the trust and patients, their relatives and carers and with partner organisations

v) arrangements to support patients and their relatives and carers towards the end of the patient's life

vi) supervision and training arrangements in place to enable staff to provide effective care

In addition, CHI will examine how lessons to improve patient care have been learnt across the trust from patient complaints.

The investigation will also look at the adequacy of the trust's clinical governance arrangements to support inpatient continuing and rehabilitation care for older people.

CHI's investigation team

1.5 CHI's investigation team were:

- Alan Carpenter, Chief Executive, Somerset Coast Primary Care Trust
- Anne Grosskurth, CHI Support Investigations Manger
- Dr Tony Luxton, Consultant Geriatrician, Cambridge City Primary Care Trust
- Julie Miller. CHI Lead Investigations Manager
- Maureen Morgan, Independent Consultant and former Community Trust Nurse Director
- Mary Parkinson, lay member (Age Concern)
- Jennifer Wenborn, Independent Occupational Therapist

1.6 The team was supported by:

- Liz Fradd, CHI Director of Nursing, lead CHI director for the investigation
- Nan Newberry, CHI Senior Analyst
- Ian Horrigan, CHI Analyst
- Kellie Rehill, CHI Investigations Coordinator
- a medical notes review group established by CHI to review anonymised medical notes (see appendix E)
- Dr Barry Tennison, CHI Public Health Adviser

The investigation process

1.7 The investigation consisted of five interrelated parts:

- review and analysis of a range of documents specific to the care of older people at the trust, including clinical governance arrangements, expert witness reports forwarded by the police and relevant national documents (see appendix A for a list of documents reviewed)
- analysis of views received from 36 patients, relatives and friends about care received at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Views were obtained through a range of methods, including meetings, correspondence, telephone calls and a short questionnaire (see appendix B for an analysis of views received)

- a five day visit by CHI's investigation team to Gosport War Memorial Hospital when a total of 59 staff from all groups involved in the care and treatment of older people at the hospital and trust managers were interviewed. CHI also undertook periods of observation on Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards (see appendix C for a list of all staff interviewed)
- interviews with relevant agencies and other NHS organisations, including those representing patients and relatives (see appendix D for a list of organisations interviewed)
- an independent review of anonymised clinical and nursing notes of a random sample of patients who had died on Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards between August 2001 and January 2002. The term of reference for this piece of work, the membership of the CHI team which undertook the work, and a summary of findings are attached at appendices E and F. CHI shared the summary with the Fareham & Gosport PCT in May 2002

2 | Background to the investigation

Events surrounding the CHI investigation

Police investigations

2.1 A relative of a 91 year old patient who died in August 1998 on Daedalus ward made a complaint to the trust about her care and treatment. The police were contacted in September 1998 with allegations that this patient had been unlawfully killed. A range of issues were identified by the police in support of the allegation and expert advice sought. Following an investigation, documents were referred to the Crown Prosecution Service in November 1998 and again in February 1999. The Crown Prosecution Service responded formally in March 1999 indicating that, in their view, there was insufficient evidence to prosecute any staff for manslaughter or any other offence.

2.2 Following further police investigation, in August 2001, the Crown Prosecution Service advised that there was insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction against any member of staff.

2.3 Local media coverage in March 2001 resulted in 11 other families raising concerns about the circumstances of their relatives' deaths in 1997 and 1998. The police decided to refer four of these deaths for expert opinion to determine whether or not a further, more extensive investigation was appropriate. Two expert reports were received in December 2001 which were made available to CHI. These reports raised very serious clinical concerns regarding prescribing practices in the trust in 1998.

2.4 In February 2002, the police decided that a more intensive police investigation was not an appropriate course of action. In addition to CHI, the police have referred the expert reports to the General Medical Council, the United Kingdom Central Council (after 1 April 2002, the Nursing and Midwifery Council), the trust, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and East Hampshire Health Authority and the NHS south east regional office.

2.5 The police made the trust aware of potential issues around diamorphine usage in December 1998, and were sent the expert witness reports in February 2002.

Action taken by professional regulatory bodies

2.6 The General Medical Council is currently reviewing whether any action against any individual doctor is warranted under its fitness to practice procedures.

2.7 The Nursing and Midwifery Council are considering whether there are any issues of professional misconduct in relation to any of the nurses referred to in police documentation.

Complaints to the trust

2.8 There have been 10 complaints to the trust concerning patients treated on Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards since 1998. Three complaints between August and December 1998 raised concerns which included pain management, the use of diamorphine and levels of sedation on Daedalus and Dryad wards, including the complaint which triggered the initial police investigation. This complaint was not pursued through the NHS complaints procedure.

Action taken by the health authority

2.9 In the context of this investigation, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and East Hampshire Health Authority had two responsibilities. Firstly, as the statutory body responsible for commissioning NHS services for local people in 1998 and, secondly, as the body through which GPs were permitted to practice. Some of the care provided to patients at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, as in community hospitals throughout the NHS, is delivered by GPs on hospital premises.

2.10 In June 2001, the health authority voluntary local procedure for the identification and support of primary care medical practitioners whose practice is giving cause for concern reviewed the prescribing practice of one local GP. No concerns were found. This was communicated to the trust.

2.11 In July 2001, the chief executive of the health authority asked CHI for advice in obtaining a source of expertise in order to reestablish public confidence in the services for older people in Gosport. This was at the same time as the police contacted CHI.

2.12 Following receipt of the police expert witness reports in February 2002, the health authority sought local changes in relation to the prescription of certain painkillers and sedatives (opiates and benzodiazepines) in general practice.

Action taken by the NHS south east regional office

2.13 For the period of the investigation, the NHS regional offices were responsible for the strategic and performance management of the NHS, including trusts and health authorities. The NHS south east regional office had information available expressing concerns around prescribing levels at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Information included a report by the Health Service Ombudsman and serious untoward incident reports forwarded by the trust in April and July 2001 in response to media articles about the death of a patient at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.
The health authority and NHS south east regional office met to discuss these issues on 6 April 2001.

3 | National and local context

National context

3.1 The standard of NHS care for older people has long caused concern. A number of national reports, including the NHS Plan and the Standing Nursing and Midwifery Committee's 2001 annual report found aspects of care to be deficient. National concerns raised include: an inadequate and demoralised workforce, poor care environments, lack of seamless care within the NHS and ageism. The NHS Plan's section *Dignity, security and independence in old age*, published in July 2000, outlined the government's plans for the care of older people, detailed in the national service framework.

3.2 The national service framework for older people was published in March 2001 and sets standards of care for older people in all care settings. It aims to ensure high quality of care and treatment, regardless of age. Older people are to be treated as individuals with dignity and respect. The framework places special emphasis on the involvement of older patients and their relatives in the care process, including care planning.

3.3 National standards called *Essence of Care*, published by the Department of Health in 2001, provide standards for assessing nursing practice against fundamental aspects of care such as nutrition, preventing pressure sores and privacy and dignity. These are designed to act as an audit tool to ensure good practice and have been widely disseminated across the NHS.

Trust background

3.4 Gosport War Memorial Hospital was part of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust between April 1994 and April 2002. The hospital is situated on the Gosport peninsula and has 113 beds. Together with outpatient services and a day hospital, there are beds for older people and maternity services. The hospital does not admit patients who are acutely ill and it has neither an A&E nor intensive care facilities. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust provided a range of community and hospital based services for the people of Portsmouth, Fareham, Gosport and surrounding areas. These services included mental health (adult and elderly), community paediatrics, elderly medicine, learning disabilities and psychology.

3.5 The trust was one of the largest community trusts in the south of England and employed almost 5,000 staff. In 2001/2002 the trust had a budget in excess of £100 million and over 20% of income spent on its largest service, elderly medicine. All the trust's financial targets were met in 2000/2001.

Move towards the primary care trust

3.6 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust was dissolved on 31 March 2002. Services have been transferred to local primary care trusts (PCTs), including Fareham and Gosport PCT, which became operational as a level four PCT in April 2002. Arrangements have been made for each PCT to host provider services on a district wide basis but each PCT retains responsibility for commissioning its share of district wide services from the host PCT. Fareham and Gosport PCT will manage many of the staff, premises and facilities of a number of sites, including the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Medical staff involved in the care of older people, including those working at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, are now employed by the East Hampshire PCT.

Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust strategic management

3.7 The trust board consisted of a chair, five non executive directors, the chief executive, the executive directors of operations, medicine, nursing and finance and the personnel director. The trust was organised into six divisions, two of which are relevant to this investigation. The Fareham and Gosport division, which managed the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, and the department of medicine for elderly people.

3.8 CHI heard that the trust was well regarded in the local health community and had developed constructive links with the health authority and local primary care groups (PCGs). For example, in the lead up to the formation of the new PCT, Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust's director of operations worked for two days each week for the East Hampshire PCT. Other examples included the joint work of the PCG and the trust on the development of intermediate care and clinical governance. High regard and respect for trust staff was also commented on by the local medical committee, Unison and the Royal College of Nursing.

Local services for older people

3.9 Before April 2002, access to medical beds for older people in Portsmouth (which included acute care, rehabilitation and continuing care) was managed through the department of medicine for elderly people which was managed by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. Some of the beds were located in community hospitals such as the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, where the day to day general management of the hospital was the responsibility of the locality divisions of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The Fareham and Gosport division of the trust fulfilled this role at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

3.10 The department of medicine for elderly people has now transferred to East Hampshire PCT. The nursing staff of the wards caring for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital are now employed by the Fareham and Gosport PCT. Management of all services for older people has now transferred to the East Hampshire PCT.

3.11 General acute services were, and remain, based at Queen Alexandra and St Mary's hospitals, part of the Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, the local acute trust. Though an unusual arrangement, a precedent for this model of care existed, for example in Southampton Community NHS Trust.

3.12 Until August 2001, the Royal Hospital Haslar, a Ministry of Defence military hospital on the Gosport peninsula, also provided acute medical care to civilians, many of whom were older people, as well as military staff.

Service performance management

3.13 Divisional management at Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust was well defined, with clear systems for reporting and monitoring. The quarterly divisional review was the principal tool for the performance management of the Fareham and Gosport division. The review considered regular reports on clinical governance, complaints and risk. Fareham and Gosport division was led by a general manager, who reported to the operational director. Leadership at Fareham and Gosport divisional level was strong with clear accounting structures to corporate and board level.

Inpatient services for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital 1998-2002

3.14 Gosport War Memorial Hospital provides continuing care, rehabilitation, day hospital and outpatient services for older people and was managed by the Fareham and Gosport division. In November 2000, as a result of local developments to develop intermediate and rehabilitation services in the community, there was a change in the use of beds at the hospital to provide additional rehabilitation beds.

3.15 In 1998, three wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital admitted older patients for general medical care: Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan. This is still the case in 2002.

Figure 3.1 Inpatient provision at Gosport War Memorial Hospital by ward

Ward	1998	2002
Dryad	20 continuing care beds. Patients admitted under the care of a consultant, with some day to day care provided by a clinical assistant.	20 continuing care beds for frail elderly patients and slow stream rehabilitation. Patients admitted under the care of a consultant. Day to day care is provided by a staff grade doctor.
Daedalus	16 continuing care beds and 8 for slow stream rehabilitation. Patients admitted under the care of a consultant, some day to day care provided by a clinical assistant.	24 rehabilitation beds: 8 general, 8 fast and 8 slow stream (since November 2000). Patients admitted under the care of a consultant. Day to day care provided by a staff grade doctor.
Sultan	24 GP beds with care managed by patients' own GPs. Patients were not exclusively older patients; care could include rehabilitation and respite care. A ward manager (or sister) managed the ward, which was staffed by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust staff.	The situation is the same as in 1998, except that the nursing staff are now employed by Fareham and Gosport PCT.

Admission criteria

3.13 The current criteria for admission to both Dryad and Daedalus wards are that the patient must be over 65 and be registered with a GP within the Gosport PCG (now a part of Fareham and Gosport PCT). In addition, Dryad patients must have a Barthel score of under 4/20 and require specialist medical and nursing intervention. The Barthel score is a validated tool used to measure physical disability. Daedalus patients must need multidisciplinary rehabilitation, for example following a stroke.

3.14 There was, and still is, a comprehensive list of admission criteria for Sultan ward developed in 1999, all of which must be met prior to admission. The criteria state that patients must not be medically unstable and no intravenous lines must be in situ.

Elderly mental health

3.15 Although not part of the CHI investigation, older patients are also cared for on Mulberry ward, a 40 bed assessment unit comprising Collingwood and Ark Royal wards. Patients admitted to this ward are under the care of a consultant in elderly mental health.

Terminology

3.16 CHI found considerable confusion about the terminology describing the various levels of care for older people in written information and in interviews with staff. For example, the terms stroke rehab, slow stream rehab, very slow stream rehab, intermediate and continuing care were all used. CHI was not aware of any common local definition for these terms in use at the trust or of any national definitions. CHI stakeholder work confirmed that this confusion extended to patients and relatives in terms of their expectations of the type of care received.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Throughout the timeframe covered by the CHI investigation, CHI received evidence of strong leadership, with a shared set of values at corporate and divisional level in Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The senior management team was well established and, together with the trust board, functioned as a cohesive team. The chief executive was accessible to and well regarded by staff both within the trust and in the local health economy. Good links had been developed with local PCGs.

2. The case note review undertaken by CHI confirmed that the admission criteria for both Dryad and Daedalus wards were being adhered to over recent months and that patients were being appropriately admitted. However, CHI found examples of some recent patients who had been admitted to Sultan ward with more complex needs than stipulated in the admission criteria that may have compromised patient care.

3. There was lack of clarity amongst all groups of staff and stakeholders about the focus of care for older people and therefore the aim of the care provided. This confusion had been communicated to patients and relatives, which had led to expectations of rehabilitation that had not been fulfilled.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should work together to build on the many positive aspects of leadership developed by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust in order to develop the provision of care for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The PCTs should ensure an appropriate performance monitoring tool is in place to ensure that any quality of care and performance shortfalls are identified and addressed swiftly.

2. Hampshire and Isle of Wight strategic health authority should use the findings of this investigation to influence the nature of local monitoring of the national service framework for older people.

3. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should, in consultation with local GPs, review the admission criteria for Sultan ward.

4. The Department of Health should assist in the promotion of an NHS wide shared understanding of the various terms used to describe levels of care for older people.

4 | Arrangements for the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines

Police inquiry and expert witness reports

4.1 CHI's terms of reference for its investigation in part reflected those of the earlier preliminary inquiry by the police, whose reports were made available to CHI.

4.2 Police expert witnesses reviewed the care of five patients who died in 1998 and made general comments in the reports about the systems in place at the trust to ensure effective clinical leadership and patient management on the wards. The experts' examination of the use of medicines in Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards led to significant concern about three medicines, the amounts which had been prescribed, the combinations in which they were used and the method of their delivery. In summary:

- there was no evidence of trust policy to ensure the appropriate prescription and dose escalation of strong opiate analgesia as the initial response to pain. It was the view of the police expert witnesses that a more reasonable response would have been the prescription of mild to moderate medicine initially with appropriate review in the event of further pain followed up
- there was inappropriate combined subcutaneous administration of diamorphine, midazolam and haloperidol, which could carry a risk of excessive sedation and respiratory depression in older patients, leading to death
- there were no clear guidelines available to staff to prevent assumptions being made by clinical staff that patients had been admitted for palliative, rather than rehabilitative care
- there was a failure to recognise potential adverse effects of prescribed medicines by clinical staff
- clinical managers failed to routinely monitor and supervise care on the ward

It is important to emphasise that these reports were not produced for this CHI investigation and CHI cannot take any responsibility for their accuracy. Whilst the reports provided CHI with very useful information, CHI has relied on its own independent scrutiny of data and information gathered during the investigation to reach the conclusions in this chapter.

Medicine usage

4.3 In order to determine the levels of prescribing at the trust between 1998 and 2001, CHI requested a breakdown from the trust of usage of diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam for Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards. Data was also requested on the method of drug delivery. The data relates to medicines issued from the pharmacy and does not include any wastage, nor can it verify the quantity of medicines administered to each patient. As the data does not offer any breakdown of casemix, it is not possible to determine how complex the needs of patients were in each year. Staff speaking to CHI described an increase in the numbers of sicker patients in recent years. A detailed breakdown of medicines issued to each ward is attached at appendix I.

4.4 The experts commissioned by the police had serious concerns about the level of use of these three medicines (diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam) and the apparent practice of anticipatory prescribing. CHI shares this view and believes the use and combination of medicines used in 1998 was excessive and outside normal practice. The following figures indicate the use of each medicine by ward and year, plotted alongside the number patients treated (finished consultant episodes).

4.5 The trust's own data, provided to CHI during the site visit week, illustrates a marked decline in the usage of diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam in recent years. This decline has been most pronounced on Dryad ward and is against a rise in FCEs during the same timeframe. The trust's data demonstrates that usage of each of these medicines peaked in 1998/99. On Sultan ward, the use of haloperidol and midazolam have also declined in recent years with a steady increase in FCEs. Diamorphine use, after declining dramatically in 1999/00, showed an increase in 2000/01.

Medicine issued 1997/1998–2000/2001 according to the number of finished consultant episodes per ward, based on information provided by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust (see appendices H and I)

Figure 4.1 Diamorphine use – Daedalus ward



Figure 4.2 Haloperidol use – Daedalus ward



Figure 4.3 Midazolam use – Daedalus ward



Figure 4.4 Diamorphine use – Dryad ward



Figure 4.5 Haloperidol use – Dryad ward



Figure 4.6 Midazolam use – Dryad ward



Figure 4.7 Diamorphine use – Sultan ward



Figure 4.8 Haloperidol use – Sultan ward



Figure 4.9 Midazolam use – Sultan ward



Assessment and management of pain

4.6 Part of the individual total assessment of each patient includes an assessment of any pain they may be experiencing and how this is to be managed. In 1998, the trust did not have a policy for the assessment and management of pain. This was introduced in April 2001, in collaboration with Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, and is due for review in 2003. The stated purpose of the document was to identify mechanisms to ensure that all patients have early and effective management of pain or distress. The policy placed responsibility for ensuring that pain management standards are implemented in every clinical setting and sets out the following:

- the prescription must be written by medical staff following diagnosis of type(s) of pain and be appropriate given the current circumstances of the patient
- if the prescription states that medication is to be administered by continuous infusion (syringe driver), the rationale for this decision must be clearly documented
- all prescriptions for drugs administered via a syringe driver must be written on a prescription sheet designed for this purpose

4.7 CHI has also seen evidence of a pain management cycle chart and an 'analgesic ladder'. The analgesic ladder indicates the drug doses for different levels and types of pain, how to calculate opiate doses, gives advice on how to evaluate the effects of analgesia and how to observe for any side effects. Nurses interviewed by CHI demonstrated a good understanding of pain assessment tools and the use of the analgesic ladder.

4.8 CHI was told by some nursing staff that following the introduction of the policy, it took longer for some patients to become pain free and that medical staff were apprehensive about prescribing diamorphine. Nurses also spoke of a reluctance of some patients to take pain relief. CHI's case note review concluded that two of the 15 patients reviewed were not prescribed adequate pain relief for part of their stay in hospital.

4.9 Many staff interviewed referred to the "Wessex guidelines". This is a booklet called *Palliative care handbook guidelines on clinical management* drawn up by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, the Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust and a local hospice, in association with the Wessex palliative care units. These guidelines were in place in 1998. Although the section on pain focuses on patients with cancer, there is a clear highlighted statement in the guidelines that states "all pains have a significant psychological component, and fear, anxiety and depression will all lower the pain threshold".

4.10 The Wessex guidelines are comprehensive and include detail. in line with British National Formulary recommendations, on the use, dosage, and side effects of medicines commonly used in palliative care. The guidelines are not designed for a rehabilitation environment.

4.11 CHI's random case note review of 15 recent admissions concluded that the pain assistance and management policy is being adhered to. CHI was told by staff of the previous practice of anticipatory prescribing of palliative opiates. As a result of the pain and assessment policy, this practice has now stopped.

Prescription writing policy

4.12 This policy was produced jointly with the Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust in March 1998. The policy covered the purpose, scope, responsibilities and requirements for prescription writing, medicines administered at nurses' discretion and controlled drugs. A separate policy covers the administration of intravenous medicines.

4.13 The policy has a section on verbal prescription orders, including telephone orders, in line with UKCC guidelines. CHI understands that arrangements such as these are common practice in GP led wards and work well on the Sultan ward, with arrangements in place for GPs to sign the prescription within 12 hours. These arrangements were also confirmed by evidence found in CHI's case note review.

Administration of medicines

4.14 Medicines can be administered in a number of ways, for example, orally in tablet or liquid form, by injection and via a syringe driver. Some of the medicines used in the care of older people can be delivered by a syringe driver, which delivers a continuous subcutaneous infusion of medication. Syringe drivers can be an entirely appropriate method of medicine administration that provides good control of symptoms with little discomfort or inconvenience to the patient. Guidance for staff on prescribing via syringe drivers is contained within the trust's policy for assessment and management of pain. The policy states that all prescriptions for continuous infusion must be written on a prescription sheet designed for this purpose.

4.15 Evidence from CHI's case note review demonstrated good documented examples of communication with both patients and relatives over medication and the use of syringe drivers and the application of the trust's policy.

4.16 Information provided by the trust indicates that only two qualified nurses from Sultan ward had taken part in a syringe driver course in 1999. Five nurses had also completed a drugs competencies course. No qualified nurses from Dryad or Daedalus ward had taken part in either course between 1998 and 2001. Some nursing and healthcare support staff spoke of receiving syringe driver information and training from a local hospice.

Role of nurses in medicines administration

4.17 Registered nurses are regulated by the Nursing and Midwifery Council, a new statutory body which replaced the United Kingdom Central Council on 1 April 2002. Registered nurses must work within their code of professional conduct (UKCC, June 1992). The scope of professional practice clarified the way in which registered nurses are personally accountable for their own clinical practice and for care they provide to patients. The standards for the administration of medicines (UKCC, October 1992) details what is expected of nurses carrying out this function.

4.18 Underpinning all of the regulations that govern nursing practice, is the requirement that nurses act in the best interest of their patients at all times. This could include challenging the prescribing of other clinical staff.

Review of medicines

4.19 The regular ward rounds and multidisciplinary meetings should include a review of medication by senior staff, which is recorded in the patient's case notes. CHI recognises the complexity of multidisciplinary meetings. Despite this, a process should be found to ensure that effective and regular reviews of patient medication take place by senior clinicians and pharmacy staff.

Structure of pharmacy

4.20 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust has a service level agreement for pharmacy services with the local acute trust, Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust. An E grade pharmacist manages the contract locally and the service provided by a second pharmacist, who is the lead for older peoples' services. Pharmacists speaking to CHI spoke of a remote relationship between the community hospitals and the main pharmacy department at Queen Alexandra Hospital, together with an increasing workload. Pharmacy staff were confident that ward pharmacists would now challenge large doses written up by junior doctors but stressed the need for a computerised system which would allow clinician specific records. There are some recent plans to put the trust's *A compendium of drug therapy guidelines* on the intranet, although this is not easily available to all staff.

4.21 Pharmacy training for non pharmacy staff was described as "totally inadequate" and not taken seriously. Nobody knew of any training offered to clinical assistants.

4.22 There were no systems in place in 1998 for the routine review of pharmacy data which could have alerted the trust to any unusual or excessive patterns of prescribing, although the prescribing data was available for analysis.

KEY FINDINGS

1. CHI has serious concerns regarding the quantity, combination, lack of review and anticipatory prescribing of medicines prescribed to older people on Dryad and Daedalus wards in 1998. A protocol existed in 1998 for palliative care prescribing (the "Wessex guidelines") but this was inappropriately applied to patients admitted for rehabilitation.

2. Though CHI is unable to determine whether these levels of prescribing contributed to the deaths of any patients, it is clear that had adequate checking mechanisms existed in the trust, this level of prescribing would have been questioned.

3. The usage of diamorphine, midazolam and haloperidol has declined in recent years, reinforced by trust staff interviewed by CHI and by CHI's own review of recent case notes. Nursing staff interviewed confirmed the decreased use of both diamorphine and the use of syringe drivers since 1998.

4. CHI found some evidence to suggest a recent reluctance amongst clinicians to prescribe sufficient pain relieving medication. Despite this, diamorphine usage on Sultan ward 2000/2001 showed a marked increase.

5. CHI welcomes the introduction and adherence to policies regarding the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines. Anticipatory prescribing is no longer evident on these wards. Although the palliative care Wessex guidelines refer to non physical symptoms of pain, the trust's policies do not include methods of non verbal pain assessment and rely on the patient articulating when they are in pain.

6. CHI found little evidence to suggest that thorough individual total patient assessments were being made by multidisciplinary teams in 1998. CHI's case note review concluded that this approach to care had been developed in recent years.

7. Pharmacy support to the wards in 1998 was inadequate. The trust was able to produce pharmacy data in 2002 relating to 1998. A system should have been in place to review and monitor prescribing at ward level, using data such as this as a basis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As a priority, the Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that a system is in place to routinely review and monitor prescribing of all medicines on wards caring for older people. This should include a review of recent diamorphine prescribing on Sultan ward. Consideration must be given to the adequacy of IT support available to facilitate this.

2. The East Hampshire PCT and Fareham and Gosport PCT should review all local prescribing guidelines to ensure their appropriateness for the current levels of dependency of the patients on the wards.

3. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should review the provision of pharmacy services to Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards, taking into account the change in casemix and use of these wards in recent years. Consideration should be given to including pharmacy input into regular ward rounds.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT, in conjunction with the pharmacy department, must ensure that all relevant staff including GPs are trained in the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines for older people.

5 | Quality of care and the patient experience

Introduction

5.1 This chapter details CHI's findings following contact with patients and relatives. This needs to be put into the context of the 1,725 finished consultant episodes for older patients admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital between April 1998 and March 2001. Details of the methods used to gain an insight into the patient experience and of the issues raised with CHI are contained in appendix B.

Patient expeience

5.2 As with all patients being cared for when they are sick and vulnerable, it is important to treat each person as a whole. For this reason, the total holistic assessment of patients is critical to high quality individual care tailored to each patient's specific needs. The following sections are key elements (though not an exhaustive list) of total assessments which were reported to CHI by stakeholders.

5.3 CHI examined in detail the experience of older patients admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital between 1998 and 2001 and that of their relatives and carers. This was carried out in two ways. Firstly, stakeholders were invited, through local publicity, to make contact with CHI. The police also wrote to relatives who had expressed concern to them informing them of CHI's investigation. Views were invited in person, in writing, over the telephone and by questionnaire. A total of 36 patients and relatives contacted CHI during the investigation.

5.4 Secondly, CHI made a number of observation visits, including at night, to Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards during the site visit week in January 2002. Some of the visits were unannounced. Mealtimes, staff handovers, ward rounds and medicine rounds were observed.

Stakeholder views

5.5 The term stakeholder is used by CHI to define a range of people that are affected by, or have an interest in, the services offered by an organisation. CHI heard of a range of both positive and less positive experiences, of the care of older people. The most frequently raised concerns with CHI were: the use of medicines, the attitude of staff, continence management, the use of patients' own clothing, transfer arrangements between hospitals and nutrition and fluids. More detail on each of these areas is given below.

5.6 Relatives expressed concern around a perceived lack of nutrition and fluids as patients neared the end of their lives: "no water and fluids for last four days of life". Comments were also raised about unsuitable, unappetising food and patients being left to eat without assistance. A number of stakeholders commented on untouched food being cleared away without patients being given assistance to eat.

5.7 Following comments by stakeholders, CHI reviewed the trust policy for nutrition and fluids. The trust conducted a trust wide audit of minimum nutritional standards between October 1997 and March 1998, as part of the five year national strategy *Feeding People*. The trust policy, *Prevention and management of malnutrition* (2000), included the designation of an appropriately trained lead person in each clinical area, who would organise training programmes for staff and improve documentation to ensure full compliance. The standards state:

- all patients must have a nutritional risk assessment on admission
- registered nurses must plan, implement and oversee nutritional care and refer to an appropriate professional as necessary
- all staff must ensure that documented evidence supports the continuity of patient care and clinical practice
- all clinical areas should have a nominated nutritional representative who attends training/updates and is a resource for colleagues
- systems should be in place to ensure that staff have the required training to implement and monitor the *Feeding People* standards

5.8 A second trust audit in 2000 concluded that, overall, the implementation of the *Feeding People* standards had been "very encouraging". However, there were concerns about the lack of documentation and a sense of complacency as locally written protocols had not been produced throughout the service.

5.9 CHI's review of recent case notes concluded that appropriate recording of patient intake and output was taking place. CHI was concerned that nurses appeared unable to make swallowing assessments out of hours; this could lead to delays in receiving nutrition over weekends, for example, when speech and language therapy staff were not available.

5.10 Continence management is an important aspect of the care of older people, the underlying objective is to promote or sustain continence as part of the holistic management of care, this includes maintaining skin integrity (prevention of pressure sores). Where this is not possible, a range of options including catheterisation are available and it is imperative that these are discussed with patients, relatives and carers. Some stakeholders raised concerns regarding the 'automatic' catheterisation of patients on admission to the War Memorial. "They seem to catheterise everyone. My husband was not incontinent; the nurse said it was done mostly to save time". Relatives also spoke of patients waiting for long periods of time to be helped to the toilet or for help in using the commode.

5.11 CHI's review of recent case notes found no evidence of inappropriate catheterisation of patients in recent months.

5.12 The use of pain relieving medicines and the use of syringe drivers to administer them was commented on by a number of relatives. One relative commented that her mother "certainly was not in pain prior to transfer to the War Memorial". Although a number of relatives confirmed that staff did speak to them before medication was delivered by a syringe driver, CHI also received comments that families would have liked more information: "Doctors should disclose all drugs, why [they are being used] and what the side effects are. There should be more honesty".

5.13 Many relatives were distressed about patients who were not dressed in their own clothes, even when labelled clothes had been provided by their families. "They were never in their own clothes". Relatives also thought patients being dressed in other patients' clothes was a potential cross infection risk. The trust did apologise to families who had raised this as a complaint and explained the steps taken by wards to ensure patients were dressed in their own clothes. This is an important means by which patients' dignity can be maintained.

5.14 Concern was expressed regarding the physical transfer of patients from one hospital to another. Amongst concerns were lengthy waits prior to transfer, inadequate clothing and covering during the journey and the methods used to transfer patients. One person described their relative as being "carried on nothing more than a sheet". CHI learnt that this instance was acknowledged by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, who sought an apology from the referring hospital, which did not have the appropriate equipment available.

5.15 Though there were obvious concerns regarding the transfer of patients, during the period of the investigation, the Hampshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust, who were responsible for patient transfers between hospitals, received no complaints relating to the transfer of patients to and from the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

5.16 Comments about the attitude of staff ranged from the very positive "Everyone was so kind and caring towards him in both Daedalus and Dryad wards" and "I received such kindness and help from all the staff at all times" to the less positive "I was made to feel an inconvenience because we asked questions" and "I got the feeling she had dementia and her feelings didn't count".

Outcome of CHI observation work

5.17 CHI spent time on Dryad, Sultan and Daedalus wards throughout the week of 7 January 2002 to observe the environment in which care was given, the interactions between staff and patients and between staff. Ward staff were welcoming, friendly and open. Although CHI observed a range of good patient experiences *this only provides a* 'snap shot' during the site visit and may not be fully representative. However, many of the positive aspects of patient care observed were confirmed by CHI's review of recent patient notes.

Ward environment

5.18 All wards were built during the 1991 expansion of the hospital and are modern, welcoming and bright. This view was echoed by stakeholders, who were complimentary about the décor and patient surroundings. Wards were tidy, clean and fresh smelling.

5.19 Day rooms are pleasant and Daedalus ward has direct access to a well designed garden suitable for wheelchair users. The garden is paved with a variety of different textures to enable patients to practice mobility. There is limited storage space in Daedalus and Dryad wards and, as a result, the corridors had become cluttered with equipment. This can be problematic for patients using walking aids. Daedalus ward has an attractive, separate single room for independent living assessment with its own sink and wardrobe.

5.20 CHI saw staff address patients by name in a respectful and encouraging way and saw examples of staff helping patients with dressing and holding friendly conversations. The staff handovers observed were well conducted, held away from the main wards areas and relevant information about patient care was exchanged appropriately.

5.21 Mealtimes were well organised with patients given a choice of menu options and portion size. Patients who needed help to eat and drink were given assistance. There appeared to be sufficient staff to serve meals, and to note when meals were not eaten. CHI did not observe any meals returned untouched. Healthcare support workers told CHI that they were responsible for making a note when meals were not eaten.

5.22 There are day rooms where patients are able to watch the television and large print books, puzzles and current newspapers are provided. CHI saw little evidence of social activities taking place, although some patients did eat together in the day room. Bells to call assistance are situated by patients' beds, but are less accessible to patients in the day rooms. The wards have an activities coordinator, although the impact of this post has been limited.

5.23 Daedalus ward has a communication book by each bed for patients and relatives to make comments about day to day care. This is a two way communication process which, for example, allows therapy staff to ask relatives for feedback on progress and enables relatives to ask for an appointment with the consultant.

5.24 CHI observed two medicine rounds, both of which were conducted in an appropriate way with two members of staff jointly identifying the patient and checking the prescription sheet. One member of staff handed out the medicines while the other oversaw the patients as medicines are taken. Medicines are safely stored on the wards in locked cupboards.

Communication with patients, relatives and carers

The trust had an undated user involvement service development framework, which sets out the principles behind effective user involvement within the national policy framework described in the NHS Plan. It is unclear from the framework who was responsible for taking the work forward and within what time frame. Given the dissolution of the trust, a decision was taken not to establish a trust wide Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS), a requirement of the NHS Plan. However, work was started by the trust to look at a possible future PALS structure for the Fareham and Gosport PCT.

The Health Advisory Service *Standards for health and social care services for older people* (2000) states that "each service should have a written information leaflet or guide for older people who use the service. There should be good information facilities in inpatient services for older people, their relatives and carers". CHI saw a number of separate information leaflets provided for patients and relatives during the site visit.

The trust used patient surveys, given to patients on discharge, as part of its patient involvement framework, although the response rate was unknown. Issues raised by patients in completed surveys were addressed by action plans discussed at clinical managers meetings. Ward specific action plans were distributed to ward staff. CHI noted, for example, that as a result of patient comments regarding unacceptable ward temperatures, thermometers were purchased to address the problem. CHI could find no evidence to suggest that the findings from patient surveys were shared across the trust.

Support towards the end of life

Staff referred to the Wessex palliative care guidelines, which are used on the wards and address breaking bad news and communicating with the bereaved. Many clinical staff, at all levels spoke of the difficulty in managing patient and relative expectations following discharge from the acute sector. "They often painted a rosier picture than justified". Staff spoke of the closure of the Royal Haslar acute beds leading to increased pressure on Queen Alexandra and St Mary's hospitals to "discharge patients too quickly to Gosport War Memorial Hospital". Staff were aware of increased numbers of medically unstable patients being transferred in recent years.

Both patients and relatives have access to a hospital chaplain, who has links to representatives of other faiths. The trust had a leaflet for relatives *Because we care* which talks about registering the death, bereavement and grieving. The hospital has a designated manager to assist relatives through the practical necessities following a death.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Relatives speaking to CHI had some serious concerns about the care their relatives received on Daedalus and Dryad wards between 1998 and 2001. The instances of concern expressed to CHI were at their highest in 1998. Fewer concerns were expressed regarding the quality of care received on Sultan ward.

2. Based on CHI's observation work and review of recent case notes, CHI has no significant concerns regarding the standard of nursing care provided to the patients of Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan ward now.

3. The ward environments and patient surroundings are good.

4. Some notable steps had been taken on Daedalus ward to facilitate communication between patients and their relatives with ward staff.

5. CHI was concerned, following the case note review, of the inability of any ward staff to undertake swallowing assessments as required. This is an area of potential risk for patients whose swallowing reflex may have been affected, for example, by a stroke.

6. Opportunities for patients to engage in daytime activities in order to encourage orientation and promote confidence are limited.

7. The trust had a strong theoretical commitment to patient and user involvement.

8. There are systems in place to support patients and relatives towards the end of the patient's life and following bereavement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All patient complaints and comments, both informal and formal, should be used at ward level to improve patient care. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must ensure a mechanism is in place to ensure that shared learning is disseminated amongst all staff caring for older people.

2. Fareham and Gosport PCT should lead an initiative to ensure that relevant staff are appropriately trained to undertake swallowing assessments to ensure that there are no delays out of hours.

3. Daytime activities for patients should be increased. The role of the activities coordinator should be revised and clarified, with input from patients, relatives and all therapists in order that activities complement therapy goals.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that all local continence management, nutrition and hydration practices are in line with the national standards set out in the *Essence of Care* guidelines.

5. Within the framework of the new PALS, the Fareham and Gosport PCT should, as a priority, consult with user groups and consider reviewing specialist advice from national support and patient groups, to determine the best way to improve communication with older patients and their relatives and carers.

6 | Staffing arrangements and responsibility for patient care

Responsibility for patient care

6.1 Patient care on Daedalus and Dryad wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital for the period of the CHI investigation was provided by consultant led teams. A multidisciplinary, multiprofessional team of appropriately trained staff best meets the complex needs of these vulnerable patients. This ensures that the total needs of the patient are considered and are reflected in a care plan, which is discussed with the patient and their relatives and is understood by every member of the team.

Medical responsibility

6.2 For the period covered by the CHI investigation, medical responsibility for the care of older people in Daedalus and Dryad wards lay with the named consultant of each patient. This is still the case today. All patients on both wards are admitted under the care of a consultant. Since 1995, there has been a lead consultant for the department of medicine for elderly people who held a two session contract (one session equates to half a day per week) for undertaking lead consultant responsibilities. These responsibilities included overall management of the department and the development of departmental objectives. The lead consultant is not responsible for the clinical practice of individual doctors. The post holder does not undertake any clinical sessions on the War Memorial site. The job description for the post, outlines 12 functions and states that the post is a major challenge for "a very part time role".

6.3 Since 2000, two department of elderly medicine consultants provide a total of 10 sessions of consultant cover on Dryad and Daedalus wards per week. Since September 2000, day to day medical support has been provided by a staff grade physician who was supervised by both consultants. Until July 2000, a clinical assistant provided additional medical support. Both consultants currently undertake a weekly ward round with the staff grade doctor. In 1998, there was a fortnightly ward round on Daedalus ward. On Dryad, ward rounds were scheduled fortnightly, though occurred less frequently.

6.4 CHI feels that the staff grade post is a pivotal, potentially isolated post, due to the distance of Gosport War Memorial Hospital from the main department of medicine for elderly people based at Queen Alexandra Hospital, no full time support from medical colleagues on the wards and a difficulty in attending departmental meetings. In 2001, the trust identified the risk of professional isolation and lack of support at Gosport War Memorial Hospital as a reason not to appoint a locum consultant.

Figure 6.1 Line management accountabilities



(*---------- this line indicates managerial accountability and not clinical accountability)

General practice role and accountability

6.5 Local GPs worked at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital in three capacities during the period under investigation: as clinical assistants employed by the trust, as the clinicians admitting and caring for patients on the GP ward (Sultan) and as providers of out of hours medical support to all patients on each of the three wards.

Clinical assistant role

6.6 Clinical assistants are usually GPs employed and paid by trusts, largely on a part time basis, to provide medical support on hospital wards. Clinical assistants have been a feature of community hospitals within the NHS for a number of years. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust employed a number of such GPs in this capacity in each of their community hospitals. Clinical assistants work as part of a consultant led team and have the same responsibilities as hospital doctors to prescribe medication, write in the medical record and complete death certificates. Clinical assistants should be accountable to a named consultant.

6.7 From 1994 until the resignation of the post holder in July 2000, a clinical assistant was employed for five sessions at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The fees for this post were in line with national rates. The job description clearly states that the clinical assistant was accountable to "named consultant physicians in geriatric medicine". The post holder was responsible for arranging cover for annual leave and any sickness absence with practice partners. The trust and the practice partners did not have a contract for this work. The job description does state that the post is subject to the terms and conditions of hospital medical and dental staff. Therefore, any concerns over the performance of any relevant staff could be pursued through the trust's disciplinary processes. CHI could find no evidence to suggest that this option was considered at the time of the initial police investigation in 1998.

Appraisal and supervision of clinical assistants

6.8 CHI is not aware of any trust systems in place to monitor or appraise the performance of clinical assistants in 1998. This lack of monitoring is still common practice within the NHS. The consultants admitting patients to Dryad and Daedalus wards, to whom the clinical assistant was accountable, had no system for supervising the practice of the clinical assistant, including any review of prescribing. CHI found no evidence of any formal lines of communication regarding policy development, guidelines and workload. Staff interviewed commented on the long working hours of the clinical assistant, in excess of the five contracted sessions.

6.9 CHI is aware of work by the Department of Health on GP appraisal which will cover GPs working as clinical assistants and further work to develop guidance on disciplinary procedures.

Sultan ward

6.10 Medical responsibility for patients on Sultan ward lay with the admitting GP throughout the period of the CHI investigation. The trust issued admitting GPs with a contract for working on trust premises, which clearly states "you will take full clinical responsibility for the patients under your care". CHI was told that GPs visit their patients regularly as well as when requested by nursing staff. This is a common arrangement in community hospitals throughout the NHS. GPs had no medical accountablity framework within the trust.

6.11 GPs managing their own patients on Sultan ward could be subject to the health authority's voluntary process for dealing with doctors whose performance is giving cause for concern. However, this procedure can only be used in regard to their work as a GP, and not any contracted work performed in the trust as a clinical assistant. Again, this arrangement is common throughout the NHS.

Out of hours cover provided by GPs

6.12 Between the hours of 8.30am and 5.00pm on weekdays, hospital doctors employed by the trust manage the care of all patients on Dryad and Daedalus wards. Out of hours medical cover, including weekends and bank holidays, is provided by a local GP practice from 5.00pm to 11.00pm, after which, between 11.00pm and 8.30am, nursing staff call on either the patient's practice or Healthcall, a local deputising service for medical input. If an urgent situation occurs out of hours, staff call 999 for assistance.

6.13 Some staff interviewed by CHI expressed concern about long waits for the deputising service, CHI heard that waiting times for Healthcall to attend a patient could sometimes take between three and five hours. However, evidence provided by Healthcall contradicts this. Nurses expressed concern over Healthcall GPs' reluctance to 'interfere' with the prescribing of admitting GPs on Sultan and Dryad wards. The contract with Healthcall is managed by a local practice.

Appraisal of hospital medical staff

6.14 Since April 2000, all NHS employers have been contractually required to carry out annual appraisals, covering both clinical and non clinical aspects of their jobs. All doctors interviewed by CHI who currently work for the trust, including the medical director, who works five sessions in the department of medicine for elderly people, have regular appraisals. Those appraising the work of other doctors have been trained to do so.

Nursing responsibility

6.15 All qualified nurses are personally accountable for their own clinical practice. Their managers are responsible for implementing systems and environments that promote high quality nursing care.

6.16 On each ward, a G grade clinical manager, who reports to a senior H grade nurse, manages the ward nurses. The H grade nurse covers all wards caring for older people and was managed by the general manager for the Fareham and Gosport division. The general manager reported to both the director of nursing and the operations director. An accountability structure such as this is not unusual in a community hospital. The director of nursing was ultimately accountable for the standard of nursing practice within the hospital.

Nursing supervision

6.17 Clinical supervision for nurses was recommended by the United Kingdom Central Council in 1996 and again in the national nursing strategy, *Making a difference*, in 1999. It is a system through which qualified nurses can maintain lifelong development and enhancement of their professional skills through reflection, exploration of practice and identification of issues that need to be addressed. Clinical supervision is not a

managerial activity, but provides an opportunity to reflect and improve on practice in a non judgemental environment. Clinical supervision is a key factor in professional self regulation.

6.18 The trust has been working to adopt a model of clinical supervision for nurses for a number of years and received initial assistance from the Royal College of Nursing to develop the processes. As part of the trust's clinical nursing development programme, which ran between January 1999 and December 2000, nurses caring for older people were identified to lead the development of clinical supervision on the wards.

6.19 Many of the nurses interviewed valued the principles of reflective practice as a way in which to improve their own skills and care of patients. The H grade senior nurse coordinator post, appointed in November 2000, was a specific trust response to an acknowledged lack of nursing leadership at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

Teamworking

6.20 Caring for older people involves input from many professionals who must coordinate their work around the needs of the patient. Good teamwork provides the cornerstone of high quality care for those with complex needs. Staff interviewed by CHI spoke of teamwork, although in several instances this was uniprofessional, for example a nursing team. CHI observed a multidisciplinary team meeting on Daedalus ward, which was attended by a consultant, a senior ward nurse, a physiotherapist and an occupational therapist. No junior staff were present. Hospital staff described input from social services as good when available, though this was not always the case.

6.21 Regular ward meetings are held on Sultan and Daedalus wards. Arrangements are less clear on Dryad ward, possibly due to the long term sickness of senior ward staff.

6.22 Arrangements for multidisciplinary team meetings on Dryad and Sultan wards are less well established. Occupational therapy staff reported some progress towards multidisciplinary goal setting for patients, but were hopeful of further development.

Allied health professional structures

6.23 Allied health professionals are a group of staff which include occupational therapists, dieticians, speech and language therapists and physiotherapists. The occupational therapy structure is in transition from a traditional site based service to a defined clinical specialty service (such as stroke rehabilitation) in the locality. Staff explained that this system enables the use of specialist clinical skills and ensures continuity of care of patients, as one occupational therapist follows the patient throughout hospital admission(s) and at home. Occupational therapists talking to CHI described a good supervision structure, with supervision contracts and performance development plans in place.

6.24 Physiotherapy services are based within the hospital. The physiotherapy team sees patients from admission right through to home treatment. Physiotherapists described good levels of training and supervision and involvement in Daedalus ward's multidisciplinary team meetings.

6.25 Speech and language therapists also reported participation in multidisciplinary team meetings on Daedalus ward. Examples were given to CHI of well developed in service training opportunities and professional development, such as discussion groups and clinical observation groups.

6.26 The staffing structure in dietetics consists of one full time dietitian based at St James Hospital. Each ward has a nurse with lead nutrition responsibilities able to advise colleagues.

Workforce and service planning

6.27 In November 2000, in preparation for the change of use of beds in Dryad and Daedalus wards from continuing care to intermediate care, the trust undertook an undated resource requirement analysis and identified three risk issues:

- consultant cover
- medical risk with a change in patient group and the likelihood of more patients requiring specialist intervention. The trust believed that the introduction of automated defibrillators would go some way to resolve this. The paper also spoke of "the need for clear protocols...within which medical cover can be obtained out of hours"
- the trust identified a course for qualified nursing staff, ALERT, which demonstrates a technique for quickly assessing any changes in a patients condition in order to provide an early warning of any deterioration

6.28 Despite this preparation, several members of staff expressed concern to CHI regarding the complex needs of many patients cared for at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital and spoke of a system under pressure due to nurse shortages and high sickness levels. Concerns were raised formally with the trust in early 2000 around the increased workload and complexity of patients. This was acknowledged in a letter by the medical director. CHI found no evidence of a systematic attempt to review or seek solutions to the evolving casemix, though a full time staff grade doctor was in post by September 2002 to replace and increase the previous five sessions of clinical assistant cover.

Access to specialist advice

6.29 Older patients are admitted to Gosport War Memorial Hospital with a wide variety of physical and mental health conditions, such as strokes, cancers and dementia. Staff demonstrated good examples of systems in place to access expert opinion and assistance.

6.30 There are supportive links with palliative care consultants, consultant psychiatrists and oncologists. The lead consultant for elderly mental health reported close links with the three wards, with patients either given support on the ward or transfer to an elderly mental health bed. There are plans for a nursing rotation

programme between the elderly medicine and elderly mental health wards. Staff spoke of strong links with the local hospice and Macmillan nurses. Nurses gave recent examples of joint training events with the hospice.

6.31 CHI's audit of recent case notes indicated that robust systems are in place for both specialist medical advice and therapeutic support.

Staff welfare

6.32 Since its creation in 1994, the trust developed as a caring employer, demonstrated by support for further education, flexible working hours and a ground breaking domestic violence policy that has won national recognition. The hospital was awarded Investors in People status in 1998. Both trust management and staff side representatives talking to CHI spoke of a constructive and supportive relationship.

6.33 However, many staff, at all levels in the organisation, spoke of the stress and low morale caused by the series of police investigations and the referrals to the General Medical Council, the United Kingdom Central Council and the CHI investigation. Trust managers told CHI they encouraged staff to use the trust's counselling service and support sessions for staff were organised. Not all staff speaking to CHI considered that they had been supported by the trust, particularly those working at a junior level, "I don't feel I've had the support I should have had before and during the police investigation – others feel the same".

Staff communication

6.34 Most staff interviewed by CHI spoke of good internal communications, and were well informed about the transfer of services to PCTs. The trust used newsletters to inform staff of key developments. An intranet is being developed by the Fareham and Gosport PCT to facilitate communication with staff.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did not have any systems in place to monitor and appraise the performance of clinical assistants. There were no arrangements in place for the adequate supervision of the clinical assistant working on Daedalus and Dryad wards. It was not made clear to CHI how GPs working as clinical assistants and admitting patients to Sultan wards are included in the development of trust procedures and clinical governance arrangements.

2. There are now clear accountability and supervisory arrangements in place for trust doctors, nurses and allied health professional staff. Currently, there is effective nursing leadership on Daedalus and Sultan wards, this is less evident on Dryad ward. CHI was concerned regarding the potential for professional isolation of the staff grade doctor.

3. Systems are now in place to ensure that appropriate specialist medical and therapeutic advice is available for patients. Some good progress has been made towards multidisciplinary team working which should be developed.

4. There was a planned approach to the service development in advance of the change in use of beds in 2000. The increasing dependency of patients and resulting pressure on the service, whilst recognised by the trust, was neither monitored nor reviewed as the changes were implemented and the service developed.

5. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust should be congratulated for its progress towards a culture of reflective nursing practice.

6. The trust has a strong staff focus, with some notable examples of good practice. Despite this, CHI found evidence to suggest that not all staff felt adequately supported during the police and other recent investigations.

7. Out of hours medical cover for the three wards out of hours is problematic and does not reflect current levels of patient dependency.

8. There are systems in place to support patients and relatives towards the end of the patient's life and following bereavement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should develop local guidance for GPs working as clinical assistants. This should address supervision and appraisal arrangemnts, clinical governance responsibilities and trianing needs.

2. The provision of out of hours medical cover to Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards should be reviewed. The deputising service and PCTs must work towards an out of hours contract which sets out a shared philosophy of care, waiting time standards, adequate payment and a disciplinary framework.

3. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should ensure that appropriate patients are being admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital with appropriate levels of support.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should ensure that arrangements are in place to ensure strong, long term nursing leadership on all wards.

5. Both PCTs must find ways to continue the staff communication developments made by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

7 | Lessons learnt from complaints

7.1 A total of 129 complaints were made regarding the provision of elderly medicine since 1 April 1997. These complaints include care provided in other community hospitals as well as that received on the acute wards of St Mary's and Queen Alexandra hospitals. CHI was told that the three wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital had received over 400 letters of thanks during the same period.

7.2 Ten complaints were made surrounding the care and treatment of patients on Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards between 1998 and 2002. A number raised concerns regarding the use of medicines, especially the levels of sedation administered prior to death, the use of syringe drivers and communication with relatives. Three complaints in the last five months of 1998 expressed concern regarding pain management, the use of diamorphine and levels of sedation. The clinical care, including a review of prescription charts, of two of these three patients, was considered by the police expert witnesses.

External review of complaints

7.3 One complaint was referred to the Health Services Commissioner (Ombudsman) in May 2000. The medical adviser found that the choice of pain relieving drugs was appropriate in terms of medicines, doses and administration. A complaint in January 2000 was referred to an independent review panel, which found that drug doses, though high, were appropriate, as was the clinical management of the patient. Although the external assessment of these two complaints revealed no serious clinical concerns, both the Health Services Commissioner and the review panel commented on the need for the trust to improve its communication with relatives towards the end of a patient's life.

Complaint handling

7.4 The trust had a policy for handling patient related complaints produced in 1997 and reviewed in 2000, based on national guidance *Complaints: guidance on the implementation of the NHS complaints procedure*. A leaflet for patients detailing the various stages of the complaints procedure was produced, which indicated the right to request an independent review if matters were not satisfactorily resolved together with the address of the Health Service Commissioner. This leaflet was not freely available on the wards during CHI's visit.

7.5 Both the trust and the local community health council (CHC) described a good working relationship. The CHC regretted, however, that their resources since November 2000 had prevented them from offering the level of advice and active support to trust complainants they would have wished. The CHC did continue to support complainants who had contacted them before November 2000. New contacts were provided with a "self help" pack.

7.6 CHI found that letters to complainants in response to their complaints did not always include an explanation of the independent review stage, although this is outlined in the leaflet mentioned above, which is sent to complainants earlier in the process. The 2000 update of the complaints policy stated that audit standards for complaints handling were good with at least 80% of complainants satisfied with complaint handling and 100% of complaints resolved within national performance targets. The chief executive responded to all written complaints. Staff interviewed by CHI valued the chief executive's personal involvement in complaint resolution and correspondence. Letters to patients and relatives sent by the trust reviewed by CHI were thorough and sensitive. The trust adopted an open response to complaints and apologised for any shortcomings in its services.

7.7 Once the police became involved in the initial complaint in 1998, the trust ceased its internal investigation processes. CHI found no evidence in agendas and minutes that the trust board were formally made aware of police involvement. Senior trust managers told CHI that the trust would have commissioned a full internal investigation without question if the police investigation had not begun. In CHI's view, police involvement did not preclude full internal clinical investigation. CHI was told that neither the doctor nor portering staff involved in the care and transfer of the patient whose care was the subject of the initial police investigation were asked for statements during the initial complaint investigation.

Trust learning regarding prescribing

7.8 Action was taken to develop and improve trust policies around prescribing and pain management (as detailed in chapter 4). In addition, CHI learnt that external clinical advice sought by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust in September 1999, during the course of a complaint resolution, suggested that the prescribing of diamorphine with dose ranges from 20mg to 200mg a day was poor practice and "could indeed lead to a serious problem". This comment was made by the external clinical assessor in regard to a patient given doses ranging from 20mg to 40mg per day.

7.9 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust correspondence states that there was an agreed protocol for the prescription of diamorphine for a syringe driver with doses ranging between 20mg and 200mg a day. CHI understands this protocol to be the Wessex guidelines. Further correspondence in October 1999, indicated that a doctor working on the wards requested a trust policy on the prescribing of opiates in community hospitals.

7.10 A draft protocol for the prescription and administration of diamorphine by subcutaneous infusion was piloted on Dryad ward in 1999 and discussed at the trust's Medicines and Prescribing Committee in February and April 2000 following consultation with palliative care consultants. This guidance was eventually incorporated into the joint Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust policy for the assessment and management of pain which was introduced in April 2001.

Other trust lessons

7.11 Lessons around issues other than prescribing have been learnt by the trust, though the workshop to draw together this learning was not held until early 2001 when the themes discussed were communication with relatives, staff attitudes and fluids and nutrition. Action taken by the trust since the series of complaints in 1998 are as follows:

- an increase in the frequency of consultant ward rounds on Daedalus ward, from fortnightly to weekly from February 1999
- the appointment of a full time staff grade doctor in September 2000 which increased medical cover following the resignation of the clinical assistant
- piloting pain management charts and prescribing guidance approved in April 2001. Nursing documentation is currently under review, with nurse input
- one additional consultant session began in 2000, following a district wide initiative with local PCGs around intermediate care
- nursing documentation now clearly identifies prime family contacts and next of kin information to ensure appropriate communication with relatives
- all conversations with families are now documented in the medical record. CHI's review of recent anonymised case notes demonstrated frequent and clear communication between relatives and clinical staff

7.12 Comments recorded in this workshop were echoed by staff interviewed by CHI, such as the difficultly in building a rapport with relatives when patients die a few days after transfer, the rising expectations of relatives and the lack of control Gosport War Memorial staff have over information provided to patients and relatives prior to transfer regarding longer term prognosis.

Monitoring and trend identification

7.13 A key action identified in the 2000/2001 clinical governance action plan was a strengthening of trust systems to ensure that actions following complaints were implemented. Until the dissolution of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, actions were monitored through the divisional review process, the clinical governance panel and trust board. A trust database was introduced in 1999 to record and track complaint trends. An investigations officer was also appointed in order to improve factfinding behind complaints. This has improved the quality of complaint responses.

7.14 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust offered specific training in complaints handling, customer care and loss, death and bereavement, which many staff interviewed by CHI were aware of and had attended.

KEY FINDINGS

1. The police investigation, the review of the Health Service Commissioner, the independent review panel and the trust's own pharmacy data did not provide the trigger for the trust to undertake an review of prescribing practices. The trust should have responded earlier to concerns expressed around levels of sedation which it was aware of in late 1998.

2. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did effect changes in patient care over time as a result of patient complaints, including increased medical staffing levels and improved processes for communication with relatives, though this learning was not consolidated until 2001. CHI saw no evidence to suggest that the impact of these changes had been robustly monitored and reviewed.

3. Though Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did begin to develop a protocol for the prescription and administration of diamorphine by syringe driver in 1999, the delay in finalising this protocol in April 2001, as part of the policy for the assessment and management of pain, was unacceptable.

4. There has been some, but not comprehensive, training of all staff in handling patient complaints and communicating with patients and carers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department of Health should work with the Association of Chief Police Officers and CHI to develop a protocol for sharing information regarding patient safety and potential systems failures within the NHS as early as possible.

2. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should ensure that the learning and monitoring of action arising from complaints undertaken through the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust quarterly divisional performance management system is maintained under the new PCT management arrangements.

3. Both PCTs involved in the provision of care for older people should ensure that all staff working on Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards who have not attended customer care and complaints training events do so. Any new training programmes should be developed with patients, relatives and staff to ensure that current concerns and the particular needs of the bereaved are addressed.

8 | Clinical governance

Introduction

8.1 *Clinical governance is about making sure that health services have systems in* place to provide patients with high standards of care. The Department of Health document *A First Class Service* defines clinical governance as "a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish".

8.2 CHI has not conducted a clinical governance review of the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust but has looked at how trust clinical governance systems supported the delivery of continuing and rehabilitative inpatient care for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. This chapter sets out the framework and structure adopted by the trust between 1998 and 2002 to deliver the clinical governance agenda and details those areas most relevant to the terms of reference for *this investigation: risk* management and the systems in place to enable staff to raise concerns.

Clinical governance structures

8.3 The trust reacted swiftly to the principles of clinical governance outlined by the Department of Health in *A First Class Service* by devising an appropriate management framework. In September 1998, a paper outlining how the trust planned to develop a system for clinical governance was shared widely across the trust and aimed to include as many staff as possible. Most staff interviewed by CHI were aware of the principles of clinical governance and were able to demonstrate how it related to them in their individual roles. Understanding of some specific aspects, particularly risk management and audit, was patchy.

8.4 The medical director took lead responsibility for clinical governance and chaired the clinical governance panel, a sub committee of the trust board. A clinical governance reference group, whose membership included representatives from each clinical service, professional group, non executive directors and the chair of the community health council, supported the clinical governance panel. Each clinical service also had its own clinical governance committee. This structure had been designed to enable each service to take clinical governance forward into whichever PCT it found itself in after April 2002. Since February 2000, the trust used the divisional review process to monitor clinical governance developments.

8.5 The service specific clinical governance committees were led by a designated clinician and included wide clinical and professional representation. Baseline assessments were carried out in each specialty and responsive action plans produced. The medical director and clinical governance manager attended divisional review meetings and reported key issues back to the clinical governance panel.

8.6 District Audit carried out an audit of the trust's clinical governance arrangements in 1998/1999. The report, dated December 1999, states that the trust had fully complied with requirements to establish a framework for clinical governance. The report also referred to the trust's document, *Improving quality – steps towards a first class service*, which was described as "of a high standard and reflected a sound understanding of clinical governance and quality assurance".

8.7 Whilst commenting favourably on the framework, the District Audit review also noted the following:

- the process for gathering user views should be more focused and the process strengthened
- the trust needed to ensure that in some areas, strategy, policy and procedure is fed back to staff and results in changed/improved practice. Published protocols were not always implemented by staff; results of clinical audit were not always implemented and reaudited; lessons learnt from complaints and incidents not always used to change practice and that research and development did not always lead to change in practice
- more work needed to be done with clinical staff on openness and the support of staff alerting senior management of poor performance

8.8 Following the review, the trust drew up a trust wide action plan (December 1999) which focused on widening the involvement and feedback from nursing, clinical and support staff regarding trust protocols and procedures, and on making greater use of research and development, clinical audit, complaints, incidents and user views to lead to changes in practice. CHI was told of a link nurse programme to take elements of this work forward.

Risk management

8.9 A trust risk management group was established in 1995 to develop and oversee the implementation of the trust's risk management strategy, to provide a forum in which risks could be evaluated and prioritised and to monitor the effectiveness of actions taken to manage risks. The group had links with other trust groups such as the clinical and service audit group, the board and the nursing clinical governance committee. Originally the finance director had joint responsibility for strategic risk with the quality manager; this was changed in the 2000/2003 strategy when the medical director became the designated lead for clinical risk. The trust achieved the clinical negligence scheme for trusts (CNST) level one in 1999. A decision was taken not to pursue the level two standard assessment due to dissolution of the trust in 2002.

8.10 The trust introduced an operational policy for recording and reviewing risk events in 1994. New reporting forms were introduced in April 2000 following a review of the assessment systems for clinical and non clinical risk. The same trust policy was used to report clinical and non clinical risks and accidents. All events were recorded in the trust's risk event database (CAREKEY). This reporting system was also used for near misses and medication errors. Nursing and support staff interviewed demonstrated a good knowledge of the risk reporting system, although CHI was less confident that medical staff regularly identified and reported risks. CHI was told that risk forms were regularly submitted by wards in the event of staff shortages. Staff shortage was not one of the trust's risk event definitions.

8.11 The clinical governance development plan for 2001/2002 stated that the focus for risk management in 2000/2001 was the safe transfer of services to successor organisations, with the active involvement of PCTs and PCGs in the trust's risk management group. Meetings were held with each successor organisation to agree future arrangements for areas such as risk event reporting, health and safety, infection control and medicines management.

Raising concerns

8.12 The trust had a whistle blowing policy dated February 2001. The Public Interest Disclosure Act became law in July 1999. The policy sets out the process staff should follow if they wished to raise a concern about the care or safety of a patient "that cannot be resolved by the appropriate procedure". NHS guidance requires systems to enable concerns to be raised outside the usual management chain. Most staff interviewed were clear about how to raise concerns within their own line management structure and were largely confident of receiving support and an appropriate response. Fewer staff were aware of the trust's whistle blowing policy.

Clinical audit

8.13 CHI was given no positive examples of changes in patient care or prescribing as a result of clinical audit outcomes. Despite a great deal of work on revising and creating policies to support good prescribing and pain management, there was no planned audit of outcome.

8.14 CHI was made aware of two trust audits of medicines since 1998. In 1999, a review of the use of neuroleptic medicines, which includes tranquillisers such as haloperidol, within all trust elderly care continuing care wards concluded that neuroleptic medicines were not being over prescribed. The same review revealed "the weekly medical review of medication was not necessarily recorded in the medical notes". The findings of this audit and the accompanying action plan, which included guidance on completing the prescription chart correctly, was circulated to all staff on Daedalus and Dryad wards. A copy was not sent to Sultan ward. There was a reaudit in late 2001 which concluded that overall use of neuroleptic medicines in continuing care wards remained appropriate.

8.15 More recently, the Fareham and Gosport PCT has undertaken a basic audit based on the prescription sheets and medical records of patients cared for on Sultan, Dryad and Daedalus wards during two weeks in June 2002. The trust concluded "that the current prescriping of opiates, major tranquilisers and hyocine was within British National Formulary guidelines." No patients were prescribed midazolam during the audit timeframe.

KEY FINDINGS

1. The trust responded proactively to the clinical governance agenda and had a robust framework in place with strong corporate leadership.

2. Although a system was in place to record risk events, understanding of clinical risk was not universal. The trust had a whistle blowing policy, but not all staff were aware of it. The policy did not make it sufficiently clear that staff could raise concerns outside of the usual management channels if they wished.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must fully embrace the clinical governance developments made and direction set by the trust.

2. All staff must be made aware that the completion of risk and incident reports is a requirement for all staff. Training must be put in place to reinforce the need for rigorous risk management.

3. Clinical governance systems must be put in place to regularly identify and monitor trends revealed by risk reports and to ensure that appropriate action is taken.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should consider a revision of their whistle blowing policies to make it clear that concerns may be raised outside of normal management channels.

APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX B

Views from patients and relatives/friends

METHODS OF OBTAINING VIEWS

i. The investigation sought to establish the views of people who had experience of services for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital since 1998.

ii. CHI sought to obtain views about the service through a range of methods. People were invited to:

- meet with members of the investigation team
- fill in a short questionnaire
- write to the investigation team
- contact by telephone or email

iii. In November 2001, information was distributed about the CHI investigation at Gosport War Memorial Hospital to stakeholders, voluntary organisations and statutory stakeholders. This information included posters advertising stakeholder events, information leaflets about the investigation, questionnaires and general CHI information leaflets. Press releases were issued in local newspapers and radio stations. The Hampshire Constabulary agreed to forward CHI contact details to families who had previously expressed their concerns to them.

iv. The written information was distributed to a large group of potential stakeholders. In total 36 stakeholders and 59 voluntary organisations will have received the above information. These people included:

- Motor Neurone Disease Association, Alzheimer's Society, League of Friends and other community groups such as the Gosport Stroke Club and Age Concern
- Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Community Health Council, Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority, local medical committee, members of parliament, nursing homes, Portsmouth social services and Fareham and Gosport primary care groups

STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES

i. CHI received the following responses from patients, relatives, carers, friends and voluntary organisations.

Letters	Questionnaires	Telephone interviews	*Stakeholder interviews
7	2	10	17

(*stakeholders were counted according to the number of attendees and not based on number of interviews)

ii. A number of people who contacted CHI did so using more than one method. In these cases any other form of submitted evidence, was incorporated as part of the stakeholders contact.

Figure B.1 Concerns about care raised by stakeholders by ward and date

	Dryad	Daedalus	Sultan	GWMH	TOTAL
1998		8		2	10
1999	1	5			6
2000		3	3	1	7
2001		1		1	2
GWMH				2	2
TOTAL	1	17	3	6	27

GWMH – Gosport War Memorial Hospital

ANALYSIS OF VIEWS RECEIVED

i. During the CHI investigation stakeholder views highlighted both positive and less positive experiences of patient care.

Positive experiences

ii. CHI received nine letters from stakeholders commenting on the satisfaction of the care that the patients received and highlighting the excellent level of care and kindness demonstrated by the staff. This was also supported by 400 letters of thanks and donations received by the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The most frequently recurring positive comments from stakeholders were about staff attitude (five responses) and the environment (five responses). Other positive feedback was received about access to services, transfer, prescribing, end of life arrangements, communication and complaints.

iii. The overall analysis of the stakeholder comments indicated that staff attitude and the environment were most highly commended. Examples of staff attitude included comments such as, "one lovely nurse on Dryad went to say hello to every patient even before she got her coat off" and "as a whole the ward was lovely and there was no complaints against the staff". The environment was described as being tidy and clean with good decor. Another comment recognised the ward's attention to maintaining patient dignity with curtains been drawn reducing attention to the patient. One stakeholder commented on the positive experience they had when dealing with the trust concerning a complaint they had made.

Less positive experiences

iv. A number of less positive experiences of patients/friends and relatives were shared with CHI by stakeholders. The following table outlines the most frequently recurring negative comments that corresponded with CHI's terms of reference.

Figure B.2 Less positive views of patient and relative/friend experiences

View	Frequency of responses
Communication with relatives/carers/friends	14
Patient transfer	10
Nutrition and fluids	11
Prescription of medicines	9
Continence management, catheritisation	8
Staff attitude	8
End of life communication with:	
patients	4
relatives/carers/friends	6
Humanity of care ie access to buzzer, clothing	8

v. Patient transfer. Contacts commented on the state of the patient's health before and during the transfer. Other stakeholders mentioned the time that it took to transfer the patient and also highlighted the inappropriate method of transporting the patient.

vi. Nutrition and fluids. Stakeholders highlighted a lack of help in feeding patients. They commented on how dehydrated the patients appeared and the lack of positive communication between the relative/carer and the staff to overcome the relative/carer's concern about the level of nutrition and fluids.

vii. Humanity of care.

- incontinence management – stakeholders felt that there was limited help with patients that needed to use the toilet
- attitude of staff – stakeholders commented on staff attitude, mentioning the length of time it took for staff to respond. Other comments related to the basic lack of care for patients in their last few days
- provision of bells – stakeholders observed that the bells were often out of the patients reach
- management of clothing – stakeholders commented that the patients were never in their own clothes

viii. Arrangements for the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines. The majority of concerns were around the prescribing of diamorphine. Others centred on those authorised to prescribe the medication to the patient and how this was communicated to the relatives/carer.

ix. Communication and collaboration between the trust and patients, their relatives and carers and with partner organisations. Interviewees indicated a lack of staff contact with the relatives/carers about the condition of the patient and the patient's care plan. Other interviewees commented on how some of the staff were not approachable. One interviewee referred to the absence of lay terms to describe a patient's condition, making it difficult to understand the patient's status of health.

x. Arrangements to support patients and their relatives and carers towards the end of the patient's life. Stakeholders mainly thought that there was a lack of communication from the staff after their relative had died.

xi. Three of the contacts had made complaints to the trust through the NHS complaints procedure. All were dissatisfied about the trust response.

APPENDIX C

Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust staff and non executive directors interviewed by CHI

- Baldacchino, L, Health Care Support Worker
- Banks, Dr V, Lead Consultant
- Code A
- Barker, M, Enrolled Nurse
- Code A
- Brind, S, Occupational Therapist
- Cameron, F, General Manager
- Carroll, P, Occupational Therapist
- Clasby, J, Senior Nurse
- Crane, R, Senior Dietician
- Day, G, Senior Staff Nurse
- Douglas, T, Staff Nurse
- Dunleavy, J, Staff Nurse
- Dunleavy, S, Physiotherapist
- Goode, P, Health Care Support Worker
- Hair, Revd J, Chaplain
- Hallman, S, Senior Staff Nurse (until 11 September 2000)
- Code A
- Haste, A, Clinical Manager
- Hooper, B, Project Director
- Humphrey, L, Quality Manager
- Hunt, D, Staff Nurse (until 6 January 2002)
- Jarrett, Dr D, Lead Consultant
- Joice, C, Staff Nurse (until 4 October 1999)
- Jones, J, Corporate Risk Advisor
- Jones, T, Ward Clerk
- King, P, Personnel Director
- King, S, Clinical Risk Advisor
- Landy, S, Senior Staff Nurse
- Langdale, H, Health Care Support Worker
- Law, D, Patient Affairs Manager

- Lee, D, Complaints Convenor & Non Executive Director
- Lock, J, Sister (retired 1999)
- Loney, M, Porter
- Lord, Dr A, Lead Consultant
- Mann, K, Senior Staff Nurse
- Melrose, B, Project Manager – Complaints
- Millett, M, Chief Executive (until 31 March 2002)
- Monk, A, Chairman
- Nelson, S, Staff Nurse
- Code A
- O'Dell, J, Practice Development Facilitator
- Parvin, J, Senior Personnel Manager
- Peach, J, Service Manager
- Peagram, L, Physiotherapy Assistant
- Pease, Y, Staff Nurse
- Phillips, C, Speech & Language Therapist
- Piper, I, Operational Director
- Qureshi, Dr L, Consultant
- Ravindrance, Dr A, Consultant
- Reid, Dr I, Medical Director
- Robinson, B, Deputy General Manager
- Scammel, T, Senior Nurse Coordinator
- Taylor, J, Senior Nurse
- Thomas, Dr E, Nursing Director
- Thorpe, M, Health Care Support Worker
- Tubbin, A, Senior Staff Nurse
- Walker, F, Senior Staff Nurse
- Wells, P, District Nurse
- Wigfall, M, Enrolled Nurse
- Wilkins, P, Senior Staff Nurse
- Williams, J, Nurse Consultant
- Wilson, A, Senior Staff Nurse
- Wood, A, Finance Director
- Woods, L, Staff Nurse
- Yikona, Dr J, Staff Grade Physician

CHI is grateful to Caroline Harrington for scheduling interviews.

APPENDIX D

Meetings or telephone interviews with external agencies with an involvement in elderly care at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

- Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust

  Jill Angus, Clinical Discharge Coordinator

  Wendy Peckham, Discharge Planner for Medicine

  Clare Bownass, Ward Sister

  Sonia Baryschpolec, Staff Nurse

  Sam Page, Bed Manager, Royal Haslar Hospital

  Sally Clark, Patient Transport Manager

  Julie Sprack, Senior Nurse

  Jeff Watling, Chief Pharmacist

  Vanessa Lawrence, Pharmacist

- Hampshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust

  Alan Lyford, Patient Transport Service Manager

- Isle of Wight, Portsmouth & South East Hampshire Health Authority

  Penny Humphris, Chief Executive

  Dr Peter Old, Director of Public Health

  Nicky Pendleton, Progamme Lead for Elderly Care Services

- NHS Executive south east regional office

  Dr Mike Gill, Regional Director of Public Health

  Dr David Percy, Director of Education and Training

  Harriet Boereboom, Performance Manager

- Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Community Health Council

  Joyce Knight, Chairman

  Christine Wilkes, Vice Chair

  Margaret Lovell, Chief Officer

- Hampshire Constabulary

  Detective Superintendent John James

- **Portsmouth Social Services**

  Sarah Mitchell, Assistant Director (Older People)

  Helen Loten, Commissioning and Development Manager

- **Hampshire Social Services**

  Tony Warns, Service Manager for Adults

- **Alverstoke House Nursing and Residential Care Home**

  Sister Rose Cook, Manager

- **Glen Heathers Nursing and Residential Care Home**

  John Perkins, Manager

Other

- **League of Friends**

  Mary Tyrell, Chair

  Geoff Rushton, Former Treasurer

- **Motor Neurone Disease Association**

  Mrs Fitzpatrick

- **Members of Parliament**

  Peter Viggers, MP for Gosport

  Sydney Rapson, MP for Portsmouth North

- **Primary Care Groups**

  John Kirtley, Chief Executive, Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Groups

  Dr Pennells, Chairperson, Gosport Primary Care Groups

- **Portsmouth Local Medical Committee**

  Dr Stephen McKenning, Chairman

- **Gosport War Memorial Hospital medical committee**

  Dr Warner, Chairman

- **Local representative for the Royal College of Nursing**

  Betty Woodland, Steward

  Steve Barnes, RCN Officer

- Local representative for Unison

  Patrick Carroll, Branch Chair

- Local general practitioners

  Dr J Barton, Knapman Practice

  Dr P Beasley, Knapman Practice

  Dr S Brook, Knapman Practice

APPENDIX E

Medical case note review team: terms of reference and membership

Terms of reference for the medical notes review group to support the CHI investigation at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

PURPOSE

The group has been established to review the clinical notes of a random selection of recently deceased older patients at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital in order to inform the CHI investigation. With reference to CHI's investigation terms of reference and the expert witness reports prepared for the police by Dr Munday and Professor Ford, this review will address the following:

(i) the prescription, administration, review and recording of drugs

(ii) the use and application of the trust's policies on the assessment and management of pain, prescription writing and administration of IV drugs

(iii) the quality of nursing care towards the end of life

(iv) the recorded cause of death

METHOD

The group will review 15 anonymised clinical notes supplied by the trust, followed by a one day meeting at CHI in order to produce a written report to inform the CHI investigation. The group will reach its conclusions by 31 March 2002 at the latest.

MEMBERSHIP

- Dr Tony Luxton, Geriatrician
  Cambridge City PCT
  (CHI doctor team member and chair of the group)
- Maureen Morgan, Independent Management Consultant
  (CHI nurse member)
- Professor Gary Ford, Professor of Pharmacology of Old Age
  University of Newcastle and Freeman Hospital
- Dr Keith Munday, Consultant Geriatrician
  Frimley Park Hospital
- Annette Goulden, Deputy Director of Nursing
  NHS Trent regional office and formerly
  Department of Health Nursing Officer for elderly care

FINDINGS OF GROUP

The findings of the group will be shared with:

(i) the CHI Gosport investigation team

(ii) CHI's Nurse Director and Medical Director and other CHI staff as appropriate

(iii) the trust

(iv) relatives of the deceased (facilitated by the trust) if requested, on an individual basis

The final report of the group will be subject to the rules of disclosure applying to CHI investigation reports.

APPENDIX F

Report of the Gosport investigation medical notes review group

PURPOSE

CHI undertook a review of the anonymised medical notes of a random selection of 15 patients who had died between 1 August 2001 and 31 January 2002 on Daedalus, Dryad or Sultan wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

CHI's intention for this piece of work was to determine whether the policies and systems put in place by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust since the events of 1998, to address prescribing practices are being implemented and are impacting on the quality of care patients are now receiving. CHI's review also considered the nursing notes for each patient and looked at the quality of nursing care as documented in the notes. Finally, the review considered whether the cause of death recorded in the notes was appropriate.

METHODOLOGY

The group received 15 sets of anonymised medical notes from the trust, which related to the last admission of 15 patients. Five patients were randomly selected from each of the following wards: Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan. A total of 49 patients had died whilst on these wards during the sample timeframe.

FINDINGS

(i) *Use of medicines*

Prescription

The group considered that the volume and combination of medicines used was appropriate for this group of patients and was in line with accepted good practice and British National Formulary guidelines. Single prescription, PRN and syringe driver prescribing was acceptable. There was no evidence of anticipatory prescribing.

The case notes suggested that the use of the trust's 'analgesic ladder' to incrementally increase and decrease pain relief in accordance to need was being followed. The group saw no evidence to suggest that patients had been prescribed large amounts of pain relief, such as diamorphine on admission where this was not necessary. Co-codamol had been prescribed in a number of cases as an initial analgesic, with progression to alternative medicines as and when more pain relief was needed. The use of the analgesic ladder was less evident in Sultan ward.

However, in two cases, the group saw evidence of unacceptable breakthrough pain, and six hourly rather than four hourly prescriptions, which could have allowed this to happen. There was also some evidence of the simultaneous prescribing of co-codamol and fentanyl, which was not thought by the group to be the most effective combination of medicines.

Administration

Syringe drivers had been used to deliver medication to six of the patients reviewed. Appropriate use of syringe drivers as a method of medicine administration was observed, with documented discussions with families before use.

Appropriate administration of medicines by nursing staff was evident. Prescriptions issued over the telephone by GPs on Sultan ward were appropriately completed in accordance with trust policy.

Review and recording of medicines

Evidence of consistent review of medication was seen, with evidence to suggest that patients and relatives were involved in helping to determine levels of pain. Nursing staff had appropriately administered medicines in line with medical staff prescriptions. Prescription sheets had been completed adequately on all three wards. Generally, record keeping around prescribing was clear and consistent, though this was not as clear on Sultan ward.

Based on the medical notes reviewed, the group agreed that the trust's policies on the assessment and management of pain, prescription writing and administration of IV drugs were being adhered to.

(ii) *Quality of nursing care towards the end of life*

The team found a consistently reasonable standard of care given to all patients they reviewed. The quality of nursing notes was generally adequate, although not always of consistent quality. There was some evidence to suggest a task oriented approach to care with an over emphasis on the completion of paperwork. This left an impression of a sometimes disjointed rather than integrated individual holistic assessment of the patient. The team saw some very good, detailed care plans and as well as a number of incidences where no clear agreed care plan was evident.

The team was concerned that swallowing assessments for patients with dysphagia had been delayed over a weekend because of the lack of availability of suitably trained nursing staff. Nurses could be trained to undertake this role in order not to compromise patient nutrition. Despite this, the trust's policies regarding fluid and nutrition were generally being adhered to. Though based on the nursing notes, a number of patients had only been weighed once, on admission.

There was evidence of therapy input, but this had not always been incorporated into care plans and did not always appear comprehensive. There was some concern that despite patients being assessed as at risk of pressure sores, it was not clear how this had been managed for some patients.

There was thorough, documented evidence to suggest that comprehensive discussions were held with relatives and patients towards the end of the patient's life. Do not attempt resuscitation decisions were clearly stated in the medical records.

Recorded cause of death

The group found no cause for concerns regarding any of the stated causes of death.

GENERAL COMMENTS

Admission criteria

The team considered that the admission criteria for Daedalus and Dryad wards was being adhered to. However there were examples of patients admitted to Sultan ward who were more dependent than the admission criteria stipulates. There is also an issue regarding patients who initially meet the admission criteria for Sultan ward who then develop complications and become more acutely sick.

Elderly medicine consultant input and access to specialist advice

Patients on Daedalus and Dryad wards received regular, documented review by consultant staff. There was clear evidence of specialist input, from mental health physicians, therapists and medical staff from the acute sector.

Out of hours cover

There was little evidence of out of hours input into the care of patients reviewed by CHI, though the team formed the view that this had been appropriate and would indicate that the general management of patients during regular hours was therefore of a good standard.

APPENDIX G

An explanation of the dissolution of services into the new primary care trusts

Figure G.1 Arrangements for hosting clinical services

Department	Portsmouth City PCT	East Hampshire PCT	Fareham & Gosport PCT	West Hampshire NHS Trust
Elderly medicine		•		
Elderly mental health		•		
Community paediatrics	•			
Adult mental health services	• For Portsmouth patients			• For Hampshire patients
Learning disability services			•	
Substance misuse	•			
Clinical pyschology	•			
Primary care counselling				•
Specialist family planning	•			
Palliative care		•		

(Source: *Local health, local decisions*, consultation document, September 2001, NHS Executive South East Regional Office, Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority and Southampton and South West Health Authority)

APPENDIX H

Patient throughput data 1997/1998 – 2000/2001

Figure H.1 Throughput data 1997/1998 – 2000/2001

Financial year	Ward	Finished consultant episodes
1997/1998	Daedalus	97
1997/1998	Dryad	72
1997/1998	Sultan	287
	Total	456
1998/1999	Daedalus	121
1998/1999	Dryad	76
1998/1999	Sultan	306
	Total	503
1999/2000	Daedalus	110
1999/2000	Dryad	131
1999/2000	Sultan	402
	Total	643
2000/2001	Daedalus	113
2000/2001	Dryad	86
2000/2001	Sultan	380
	Total	579

(Source: 1997/1998 – trust ward based discharge data, 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 – trust patient administration system (PAS) data).

APPENDIX I

Breakdown of medication in Dryad, Sultan and Daedalus wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

Figure I.1 Summary of medicine usage 1997/1998-2000/2001 (Mar 2002)

Drug	Ward	Dose	Pack	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	5mg	5	0	5	0	3
	Dryad	5mg	5	0	0	0	6
	Sultan	5mg	5	6	5	0	10
	Total			6	10	0	19
Diamorphine via syringe driver	Sultan	5mg	1	0	10	0	0
	Total			0	10	0	0
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	10mg	5	21	34	27	19
	Dryad	10mg	5	40	57	56	20
	Sultan	10mg	5	67	36	24	35
	Total			128	127	107	74
Diamorphine via syringe driver	Dryad	10mg	1	0	17	0	0
	Sultan	10mg	1	0	20	0	0
	Total			0	37	0	0
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	30mg	5	16	27	15	7
	Dryad	30mg	5	34	51	40	4
	Sultan	30mg	5	67	43	14	31
	Total			117	121	69	42
Diamorphine via syringe driver	Dryad	30mg	1	0	5	0	0
	Total			0	5	0	0
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	100mg	5	2	11	1	2
	Dryad	100mg	5	12	13	2	0
	Sultan	100mg	5	20	27	0	31
	Total			34	51	3	33

Drug	Ward	Dose	Pack	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	500mg	5	0	1	0	0
	Dryad	500mg	5	0	2	0	0
	Sultan	500mg	5	1	1	0	4
	Total			1	4	0	4
Haloperidol injection	Daedalus	5mg/5ml	10	0	3	0	0
	Dryad	5mg/5ml	10	1	1	0	0
	Sultan	5mg/5ml	10	43	15	6	0
	Total			44	19	6	0
Haloperidol injection	Daedalus	5mg/5ml	5	0	0	0	4
	Dryad	5mg/5ml	5	0	0	0	1
	Sultan	5mg/5ml	5	0	0	0	16
	Total			0	0	0	21
Midazolam	Daedalus	10mg/2ml	10	37	51	39	17
	Dryad	10mg/2ml	10	75	108	75	19
	Sultan	10mg/2ml	10	21	9	2	11
	Total			133	168	116	47

(Source: Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust)

Dose: a single measured quantity of medicine

Pack: a collection of single doses, the packaging in which medicines are dispatched from the pharmacy

APPENDIX J

Glossary

accountability responsibility, in the sense of being called to account for something.

action plan an agreed plan of action and timetable that makes improvements to services.

acute care/ trust/hospital short term (as opposed to chronic, which means long term).
Acute care refers to medical and surgical treatment involving doctors and other medical staff in a hospital setting.
Acute hospital refers to a hospital that provides surgery, investigations, operations, serious and other treatments, usually in a hospital setting.

allied health professionals professionals regulated by the Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine (new Health Professions Council). This includes professions working in health, social care, education, housing and other sectors. The professions are art therapists, music therapists and drama therapists, prosthetists and orthotists, dieticians, orthoptists, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, biomedical scientists, speech and language therapists, radiographers, chiropodists and podiatrists, ambulance workers and clinical scientists. Also called professionals allied to or supplementary to medicine.

analgesia medicines prescribed to reduce pain.

anticipatory prescribing to prescribe a drug or other remedy in advance.

antipsychotics A group of medicines used to treat psychosis (conditions such as schizophrenia) and sometimes used to calm agitation. Examples include haloperidol. Also called major tranquillisers or neuroleptics.

appraisal an assessment or estimate of the worth, value or quality of a person or service or thing.

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) an association whose members hold the rank of Chief Constable, deputy Chief Constable or Assistant Chief Constable or their equivalents. They provide a professional opinion to the Government and appropriate organisations.

audit, clinical audit an examination of records to check their accuracy. Often used to describe an examination of financial accounts in a business.
In clinical audit those involved in providing services assess the quality of care. Results of a process or intervention are assessed, compared with a preexisting standard, changed where necessary, and then reassessed.

Barthel score a validated tool used to measure physical disability.

benzodiazepines a diverse group of medicines used for a range of purposes. Some reduce anxiety, others are used as sleeping tablets. Some, such as *midazolam*, act as strong sedatives and can be accompanied by memory loss whilst the medicine is active.

British National Formulary publication that provides information on the selection and use of medicines for healthcare professionals.

carers people who look after their relatives and friends on an unpaid, voluntary basis often in place of paid care workers.

casemix the variety and range of different types of patients treated by a given health professional or team.

catheter a hollow tube passed into the bladder to remove urine.

catheterisation use of a catheter.

CHI see Commission for Health Improvement.

clinical any treatment provided by a healthcare professional. This will include, doctors, nurses, AHPs etc. Non clinical relates to management, administration, catering, portering etc.

clinical assistant usually GPs, employed and paid by a trust, largely on a part time basis, to provide medical support on hospital wards and other departments.

clinical governance refers to the quality of health care offered within an organisation.
The Department of Health document *A First Class Service* defines clinical governance as "a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish." It's about making sure that health services have systems in place to provide patients with high standards of care.

clinical governance review a review of the policies, systems and processes used by an organisation to deliver high quality health care to patients. The review looks at the way these policies work in practice (a health check for a health organisation).

clinical oncologist a doctor who specialises in the treatment of cancer patients, particularly through the use of radiotherapy, but who may also use chemotherapy.

clinical risk management understanding the various levels of risk attached to each form of treatment and systematically taking steps to ensure that the risks are minimised.

clinician/clinical staff a fully trained health professional – doctor, nurse, therapist, technician etc.

clinical negligence scheme for trusts (CNST) an 'insurance' scheme for assessing a trust's arrangements to minimise clinical risk which can offset costs of insurance against claims of negligence. Successfully gaining CNST 'standards' (to level one, two, three) reduces the premium that the trust must pay.

Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) independent national body (covering England and Wales) to support and oversee the quality of clinical governance in NHS clinical services.

co-codamol a medicine consisting of paracetamol and codeine phosphate, used for the relief of mild to moderate pain.

community care health and social care provided by health care professionals, usually outside hospital and often in the patient's own homes.

community health council (CHC) a statutory body sometimes referred to as the patients' friend. CHCs represent the public interest in the NHS and have a statutory right to be consulted on health service changes in their area.

consultant a fully trained specialist in a branch of medicine who accepts total responsibility for specialist patient care. (For training posts in medicine see specialist registrar, senior house officer and preregistration house officer.)

continence management The practice of promoting or sustaning the ability to control urination and defecation.

continuing care a long period of treatment for patients whose recovery will be limited.

defibrillator a piece of equipment which sends an electric current through the heart to restore the heart beat.

diamorphine A medicine used to relieve severe pain.

do not attempt resuscitation (DNAR) or do not resuscitate (DNR) an instruction, which says that if a patient's health suddenly deteriorates to near death, no special measures will be taken to revive their heart. This instruction should be agreed between the patient and doctor or if a patient is not conscious, then with their closest relative.

dysphagia difficulty swallowing.

fentanyl a medicine prescribed to patients who require control of existing pain.

finished consultant episode (FCE) a period of continuous consultant treatment under a specific consultant. If a patient is transferred from one consultant to another it will be counted as two FCEs.

formulary a list of preferred medicinal drugs which are routinely available in a hospital or GP surgery.

General Medical Council (GMC) the professional body for medical doctors which licenses them to practice.

general practitioner (GP) a family doctor, usually patients' first point of contact with the health service.

geriatrician a doctor who specialises in diagnosis and treatment of diseases affecting older people.

haloperidol see antipsychotics.

health authority (HA) statutory NHS body responsible for assessing the health needs of the local population, commissioning health services to meet those needs and working with other organisations to build healthy local communities.

health community or health economy all organisations with an interest in health in one area including the community health councils, and voluntary and statutory organisations.

Health Service Ombudsman investigates complaints about failures in NHS hospitals or community health services, about care and treatment, and about local NHS family doctor, dental, pharmacy or optical services. Anyone may refer a complaint but normally only if a full investigation through the NHS complaints system has been carried out first.

holistic a method of medical care in which patients are treated as a whole and which takes into account their physical and mental state as well as social background rather than just treating the disease alone.

hyocine a medicine to relieve nausea and sickness.

Improving Working Lives a Department of Health initiative launched in 1999. It includes standards for developing modern employment services, putting in place work/life balance schemes and involving and developing staff.

incident reporting system a system which requires clinical staff to report all matters relating to patient care where there has been a special problem.

independent review stage two of the formal NHS complaints procedure, it consists of a panel, usually three members, who look at the issues surrounding a complaint.

intermediate care a short period (normally no longer than six weeks) of intensive rehabilitation and treatment to enable patients to return home following hospitalisation, or to prevent admission to long term residential care; or intensive care at home to prevent unnecessary hospital admission.

intranet an organisation's own internal internet which is usually private.

investigation – by CHI an in depth examination of an organisation where a serious problem has been identified.

Investors in People a national quality standard which sets a level of good practice for improving an organisation's performance through its people.

lay member a person from outside the NHS who brings an independent voice to CHI's work.

local medical committee (LMC) a group of local GPs, elected by the entire local GP population who meet with the health authority to help plan resources and inform decisions.

locum a temporary practitioner who stands in for the permanent one.

medical the branches of medicine concerned with treatment through careful use of medicines as opposed to (surgical) operations.

medical director the term usually used for a doctor at trust board level (a statutory post) responsible for all issues relating to doctors and medical and surgical issues throughout the trust.

midazolam see benzodiazepines.

multidisciplinary from different professional backgrounds within healthcare (e.g. nurse, consultant, physiotherapist) concerned with the treatment and care of patients.

multidisciplinary meetings meetings involving people from different professional backgrounds.

multiprofessional from different professional backgrounds, within and outside of healthcare (e.g. nurse, consultant, social worker) concerned with the care or welfare of people.

National Service Framework (NSF) guidelines for the health service from the Department of Health on how to manage and treat specific conditions, or specific groups of patients e.g. Coronary Heart Disease, Mental Health, NSF for older people. Their implementation across the NHS is monitored by CHI.

neuroleptic see antipsychotics.

neurology a branch of medicine concerned with medical treatment of disorders of the nervous system.

NHS regional office

NHS trust a self governing body in the NHS, which provides health care services. They employ a full range of health care professionals including doctors, nurses, dieticians, physiotherapists etc.

Nursing and Midwifery Council The Nursing Midwifery Council (NMC) is an organisation set up by Parliament to ensure nurses, midwives and health visitors provide appropriate standards of care to their patients and clients. All qualified nurses, midwives and health visitors are required to be members of the NMC in order to practice.

nursing director the term usually used for a nurse at trust board level responsible for the professional lead on all issues relating to nurses and nursing throughout the trust.

occupational therapist a trained professional (an allied health professional) who works with patients to assess and develop daily living skills and social skills.

ombudsman see national health service ombudsman above.

opiates a group of medicines containing or derived from opium, that act to relieve severe pain or induce sleep.

opioid a description applied to medicines that cause similar effects in the body to opiates.

outpatient services provided for patients who do not stay overnight in hospital.

pain management a particular type of treatment that concentrates on managing a patient's pain – rather than seeking to cure their underlying condition – and complements their treatment plan.

palliative a term applied to the treatment of incurable diseases, in which the aim is to mitigate the sufferings of the patient, not to effect a cure.

palliative care care for people with chronic or life threatening conditions from which they will not recover. It concentrates on symptom control and family support to help people have as much independence and quality of life as is possible.

patient administration system (PAS) a networked information system used in NHS trusts to record information and inpatient and outpatient activity.

patient advice and liaison service (PALS) a new service proposed in the July 2000 NHS plan due to be in place by 2002, that will offer patients an avenue to seek advice or complain about their hospital care.

patient centred care a system of care or treatment is organised around the needs of the patient.

patient involvement the amount of participation that a patient (or patients) can have in their care or treatment. It is often used to describe how patients can change, or have a say in the way that a service is provided or planned.

primary care family health services provided by GPs, dentists, pharmacists, opticians, and others such as community nurses, physiotherapists and some social workers.

PCG Organisations now almost completely replaced by primary care trusts. Set up in 1997, PCGs were new organisations (technically Health Authority committees) that brought together all primary care practices in a particular area. PCGs were led by primary care professionals but with lay and social services representation. PCGs were expected to develop local primary health care services and work to improve the health of their populations. Some PCGs additionally took responsibility for commissioning secondary care services.

PCT Organisations that bring together all primary care practices in an area. PCTs are diverse and complex organisations. Unlike PCGs, which came before them, they are independent NHS bodies with greater responsibilities and

powers. They were set up in response to the Department of Health's *Shifting the Balance of Power* and took over many health authority functions. PCTs are responsible for

- improving the health of their population
- integrating and developing primary care services
- directly providing community health services
- commissioning secondary care services

PCTs are increasingly working with other PCTs, local government partners, the voluntary sector, within clinical networks and with 'shared service organisations' in order to fulfil their roles.

level four PCT brings together commissioning of secondary care services and primary care development with the provision of community health services. They are able to commission and provide services, run community health services, employ the necessary staff, and own property.

PRN (Pro re nata) prescribing medication as and when required.

protocol a policy or strategy which defines appropriate action.

psychiatrist a doctor who specialises in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health problems.

regional office see NHS regional office above.

rehabilitation the treatment of residual illness or disability which includes a whole range of exercise and therapies with the aim of increasing a patient's independence.

resuscitation a range of procedures used when someone has suddenly become seriously ill in a way that threatens their life.

risk assessment an examination of the risks associated with a particular service or procedure.

risk management understanding the various risks involved and systematically taking steps to ensure that the risks are minimized.

Royal College of Nursing (RCN) the world's largest professional union of nurses. Run by nurses, it campaigns on the part of the profession, provides higher education and promotes research, quality and practice development through the RCN institute.

sensory disabilities people who have problems hearing, seeing, smelling or with touch.

specialist a clinician most able to progress a patient's diagnosis and treatment or to refer a patient when appropriate.

speech and language therapist professionally trained person who assists, diagnoses and treats the whole spectrum of acquired or developmental communication disorders.

staff grade a full qualified doctor who is neither a General Practitioner nor a consultant.

staff grade doctors doctors who have completed their training but do not have the qualifications to enable them to progress to consultant level. Also called trust grade doctors.

stakeholders a range of people and organisations that are affected by, or have an interest in, the services offered by an organisation. In the case of hospital trusts, it includes patients, carers, staff, unions, voluntary organisations, community health councils, social services, health authorities, GPs, primary care groups and trusts in England, local health groups in Wales.

statutory/statute refers to legislation passed by Parliament.

strategic health authority organisations that will replace health authorities and some functions of Department of Health regional offices in 2002. Unlike current health authorities, they will not be involved in commissioning services from the NHS. Instead they will performance manage PCTs and NHS trusts and lead strategic developments in the NHS. Full details of the planned changes are in the Department of Health document, Shifting the Balance of Power, July 2001.

strategy a long term plan for success.

subcutaneous beneath the skin.

swallowing assessments the technique to access the ability of the patient to swallow safely.

syringe driver a device to ensure that a syringe releases medicine over a defined length of time into the body.

terminal care care given in the last weeks of life.

terms of reference the rules by which a committee or group does its work.

trust board a group of about 12 people who are responsible for major strategy and policy decisions in each NHS trust. Typically comprises a lay chairman, five lay members, the trust chief executive and directors.

Unison Britain's biggest trade union. Members are people working in the public services.

United Kingdom Central Council (UKCC) on 1 April 2002 the UKCC ceased to exist. Its successor body is The Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). Its purpose was to protect the public through establishing and monitoring professional standards.

ward round A regular review of each patient conducted by a consultant, often accompanied by nursing, pharmacy and therapy staff.

Wessex palliative care guidelines local guidance to help GPs, community nurses and hospital staff as well as specialist palliative care teams. It provides a checklist for management of common problems in palliative care, with some information on medical treatment. It is not a comprehensive textbook.

whistle blowing the act of informing a designated person in an organisation that patients are at risk (in the eyes of the person blowing the whistle). This also includes systems and processes that indirectly affect patient care.

whistle blowing policy a plan of action for a person to inform on someone or to put a stop to something.

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

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Gosport War Memorial Hospital: CHI Investigation Report

July 2002

Executive summary

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Based on information gathered during their investigations, the police were sufficiently concerned about the care of older people at Gosport War Memorial Hospital to share their concerns with CHI in August 2001. CHI is grateful to the Hampshire Constabulary for sharing information with us which contributed towards the local and national recommendations CHI makes t improve the care of this vulnerable group of NHS patients.

CHI has conducted a detailed review of the systems in place to ensure good quality patient care. CHI does not have a statutory remit to investigate either the circumstances around any particular death or the conduct of any individual.

Top

Key conclusions

CHI concludes that a number of factors, detailed i the report, contributed to a failure of trust systen to ensure good quality patient care:

- there were insufficient local prescribing

guidelines in place governing the prescriptic of powerful pain relieving and sedative medicines
- the lack of a rigorous, routine review of pharmacy data led to high levels of prescribing on wards caring for older people not being questioned
- the absence of adequate trust wide supervision and appraisal systems meant that poor prescribing practice was not identified
- there was a lack of thorough multidisciplina total patient assessment to determine care needs on admission

CHI also concludes that the trust now has adequate policies and guidelines in place which ai being adhered to governing the prescription and administration of pain relieving medicines to olde patients.

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Key findings

National and local context (Chapter 3)

- Throughout the timeframe covered by the CHI investigation, CHI received evidence of strong leadership, with a shared set of valu at corporate and divisional level in Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The seni management team was well established an together with the trust board, functioned as a cohesive team.
- There was lack of clarity amongst all groups of staff and stakeholders about the focus of care for older people and therefore the aim of the care provided. This confusion had be communicated to patients and relatives, which had led to expectations of rehabilitation which had not been fulfilled.

Arrangements for the prescription, administration review and recording of medicines (Chapter 4)

- CHI has serious concerns regarding the quantity, combination, lack of review and anticipatory prescribing of medicines prescribed to older people on Dryad and Daedalus wards in 1998. A protocol existed in 1998 for palliative care prescribing referred to as the "Wessex guidelines", this was inappropriately applied to patients admitted for rehabilitation.
- Though CHI is unable to determine whether these levels of prescribing contributed to th deaths of any patients, it is clear that had

adequate checking mechanisms existed in the trust, this level of prescribing would hav been questioned.

- CHI welcomes the introduction and adherence to policies regarding the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines. Although the palliative care Wessex guidelines refer to nc physical symptoms of pain, the trust's policies do not include methods of non verb pain assessment and rely on the patient articulating when they are in pain.

Quality of care and the patient experience (Chapt 5)

- Relatives speaking to CHI had some serious concerns about the care their relatives received on Daedalus and Dryad wards between 1998 and 2001. The instances of concern expressed to CHI were at their highest in 1998. Fewer concerns were expressed regarding the quality of care received on Sultan ward.
- Based on CHI's observation work and revie of recent case notes, CHI has no significant concerns regarding the standard of nursing care provided to the patients of Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan ward now.

Staffing arrangements and responsibility for patient care (Chapter 6)

- Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did not have any systems in place to monitor and appraise the performance of clinical assistants. There were no arrangements in place for the adequate supervision of the clinical assistant working on Daedalus and Dryad wards.
- There are now clear accountability and supervisory arrangements in place for trust doctors, nurses and allied health profession staff.

Lessons learnt from complaints (Chapter 7)

- The police investigation, the review of the Health Service Commissioner, the independent review panel and the trust's own pharmacy data did not provide the trigger for the trust to undertake a review c prescribing practices. The trust should have responded earlier to concerns expressed around levels of sedation, which it was awa of in late 1998.
- Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did effect changes in patient care over time as a resul

of patient complaints, including increased medical staffing levels and improved processes for communication with relatives, though this learning was not consolidated until 2001. CHI saw no evidence to suggest that the impact of these changes had been robustly monitored and reviewed.

Clinical governance (Chapter 8)

- The trust responded proactively to the clinical governance agenda and had a robus framework in place with strong corporate leadership.

Top

Recommendations

It is clear from a number of CHI recommendation to the Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Trust (PCT) and the East Hampshire PCT, that continued close and effective working relationships between both PCTs will be essential in order to implement the recommendations in this report.
CHI is aware of the high level of interdependence that already exists between thes two organisations and urges that this continues.
CHI is aware that many of these recommendation will be relevant to emerging PCTs and urges all PCTs to take action where appropriate.

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investigation

Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

JULY 2002

CHI
COMMISSION FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT

Investigation into the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust

Gosport War Memorial Hospital

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- the patients and relatives who contributed either in person, over the phone or in writing. CHI recognises how difficult some of these contacts were for the relatives of those who have died
- staff interviewed by CHI's investigation team (see appendix C) and those who assisted CHI during the course of the investigation. In particular Fiona Cameron, General Manager, Caroline Harrington, Corporate Governance Advisor, Max Millett, Chief Executive (until 31 March 2002) and Ian Piper, Chief Executive of Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Trust (since 1 April 2002)
- staff and patients who welcomed the CHI team on to the wards during observation work
- Detective Superintendent John James, Hampshire Constabulary
- the agencies listed in appendix D who gave their views and submitted relevant documents to the investigation

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Key conclusions

CHI concludes that a number of factors, detailed in the report, contributed to a failure of trust systems to ensure good quality patient care:

- there were insufficient local prescribing guidelines in place governing the prescription of powerful pain relieving and sedative medicines
- the lack of a rigorous, routine review of pharmacy data led to high levels of prescribing on wards caring for older people not being questioned
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- there was a lack of thorough multidisciplinary total patient assessment to determine care needs on admission

CHI also concludes that the trust now has adequate policies and guidelines in place which are being adhered to governing the prescription and administration of pain relieving medicines to older patients.

Key findings

National and local context (Chapter 3)

- Throughout the timeframe covered by the CHI investigation, CHI received evidence of strong leadership, with a shared set of values at corporate and divisional level in Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The senior management team was well established and, together with the trust board, functioned as a cohesive team.
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Recommendations

It is clear from a number of CHI recommendations to the Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Trust (PCT) and the East Hampshire PCT, that continued close and effective working relationships between both PCTs will be essential in order to implement the recommendations in this report. CHI is aware of the high level of interdependence that already exists between these two organisations and urges that this continues.
CHI is aware that many of these recommendations will be relevant to emerging PCTs and urges all PCTs to take action where appropriate.

Fareham and Gosport/ East Hampshire Primary Care Trust

1. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should work together to build on the many positive aspects of leadership developed by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust in order to develop the provision of care for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The PCTs should ensure an appropriate performance monitoring tool is in place to ensure that any quality of care and performance shortfalls are identified and addressed swiftly.

2. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should, in consultation with local GPs, review the admission criteria for Sultan ward.

3. The East Hampshire PCT and Fareham and Gosport PCT should review all local prescribing guidelines to ensure their appropriateness for the current levels of dependency of the patients on the wards.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should review the provision of pharmacy services to Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards, taking into account the change in casemix and use of these wards in recent years. Consideration should be given to including pharmacy input into regular ward rounds.

5. As a priority, the Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that a system is in place to routinely review and monitor prescribing of all medicines on wards caring for older people. This should include a review of recent diamorphine prescribing on Sultan ward. Consideration must be given to the adequacy of IT support available to facilitate this.

6. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT, in conjunction with the pharmacy department, must ensure that all relevant staff including GPs are trained in the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines for older people.

7. All patient complaints and comments, both informal and formal, should be used at ward level to improve patient care. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must ensure a mechanism is in place to ensure that shared learning is disseminated amongst all staff caring for older people.

8. Fareham and Gosport PCT should lead an initiative to ensure that relevant staff are appropriately trained to undertake swallowing assessments to ensure that there are no delays out of hours.

9. Daytime activities for patients should be increased. The role of the activities coordinator should be revised and clarified, with input from patients, relatives and all therapists in order that activities complement therapy goals.

10. The Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that all local continence management, nutrition and hydration practices are in line with the national standards set out in the *Essence of Care* guidelines.

11. Both PCTs must find ways to continue the staff communication developments made by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

12. Within the framework of the new PALS, the Fareham and Gosport PCT should, as a priority, consult with user groups and consider reviewing specialist advice from national support and patient groups, to determine the best way to improve communication with older patients and their relatives and carers.

13. The provision of out of hours medical cover to Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards should be reviewed. The deputising service and PCTs must work towards an out of hours contract which sets out a shared philosophy of care, waiting time standards, adequate payment and a disciplinary framework.

14. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and the East Hampshire PCT should ensure that appropriate patients are being admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital with appropriate levels of support.

15. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should ensure that arrangements are in place to ensure strong, long term nursing leadership on all wards.

16. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should develop local guidance for GPs working as clinical assistants. This should address supervision and appraisal arrangements, clinical governance responsibilities and training needs.

17. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should ensure that the learning and monitoring of action arising from complaints undertaken through the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust quarterly divisional performance management system is maintained under the new PCT management arrangements.

18. Both PCTs involved in the provision of care for older people should ensure that all staff working on Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards who have not attended customer care and complaints training events do so. Any new training programmes should be developed with patients, relatives and staff to ensure that current concerns and the particular needs of the bereaved are addressed.

19. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must fully embrace the clinical governance developments made and direction set by the trust.

20. All staff must be made aware that the completion of risk and incident reports is a requirement for all staff. Training must be put in place to reinforce the need for rigorous risk management.

21. Clinical governance systems must be put in place to regularly identify and monitor trends revealed by risk reports and to ensure that appropriate action is taken.

22. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should consider a revision of their whistle blowing policies to make it clear that concerns may be raised outside of normal management channels.

Hampshire and Isle of Wight Strategic Health Authority

23. Hampshire and Isle of Wight Strategic Health Authority should use the findings of this investigation to influence the nature of local monitoring of the national service framework for older people.

Department of Health

24. The Department of Health should assist in the promotion of an NHS wide understanding of the various terms used to describe levels of care for older people.

25. The Department of Health should work with the Association of Chief Police Officers and CHI to develop a protocol for sharing information regarding patient safety and potential systems failures within the NHS as early as possible.

1 | Terms of reference and process of investigation

1.1 During the summer of 2001, concerns were raised with CHI about the use of some medicines, particularly analgesia and levels of sedation, and the culture in which care was provided for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. These concerns were also about the responsibility for clinical care and transfer arrangements with other hospitals.

1.2 On 22 October 2001, CHI launched an investigation into the management, provision and quality of healthcare for which Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust was responsible at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. CHI's decision was based on evidence of high risk activity and the likelihood that the possible findings of a CHI investigation would result in lessons for the whole of the NHS.

Terms of reference

1.3 The investigation terms of reference were informed by a chronology of events provided by the trust surrounding the death of one patient. Discussions were also held with the trust, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority and the NHS south east regional office to ensure maximum learning locally and for the NHS.

1.4 The terms of reference agreed on 9 October 2001 are as follows:

The investigation will look at whether, since 1998, there had been a failure of trust systems to ensure good quality patient care. The investigation will focus on the following elements within services for older people (inpatient, continuing and rehabilitative care) at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

i) staffing and accountability arrangements, including out of hours

ii) the guidelines and practices in place at the trust to ensure good quality care and effective performance management

iii) arrangements for the prescription, administration, review and recording of drugs

iv) communication and collaboration between the trust and patients, their relatives and carers and with partner organisations

v) arrangements to support patients and their relatives and carers towards the end of the patient's life

vi) supervision and training arrangements in place to enable staff to provide effective care

In addition, CHI will examine how lessons to improve patient care have been learnt across the trust from patient complaints.

The investigation will also look at the adequacy of the trust's clinical governance arrangements to support inpatient continuing and rehabilitation care for older people.

CHI's investigation team

1.5 CHI's investigation team were:

- Alan Carpenter, Chief Executive, Somerset Coast Primary Care Trust
- Anne Grosskurth, CHI Support Investigations Manger
- Dr Tony Luxton, Consultant Geriatrician, Cambridge City Primary Care Trust
- Julie Miller, CHI Lead Investigations Manager
- Maureen Morgan, Independent Consultant and former Community Trust Nurse Director
- Mary Parkinson, lay member (Age Concern)
- Jennifer Wenborn, Independent Occupational Therapist

1.6 The team was supported by:

- Liz Fradd, CHI Director of Nursing, lead CHI director for the investigation
- Nan Newberry, CHI Senior Analyst
- Ian Horrigan, CHI Analyst
- Kellie Rehill, CHI Investigations Coordinator
- a medical notes review group established by CHI to review anonymised medical notes (see appendix E)
- Dr Barry Tennison, CHI Public Health Adviser

The investigation process

1.7 The investigation consisted of five interrelated parts:

- review and analysis of a range of documents specific to the care of older people at the trust, including clinical governance arrangements, expert witness reports forwarded by the police and relevant national documents (see appendix A for a list of documents reviewed)
- analysis of views received from 36 patients, relatives and friends about care received at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Views were obtained through a range of methods, including meetings, correspondence, telephone calls and a short questionnaire (see appendix B for an analysis of views received)

- a five day visit by CHI's investigation team to Gosport War Memorial Hospital when a total of 59 staff from all groups involved in the care and treatment of older people at the hospital and trust managers were interviewed. CHI also undertook periods of observation on Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards (see appendix C for a list of all staff interviewed)
- interviews with relevant agencies and other NHS organisations, including those representing patients and relatives (see appendix D for a list of organisations interviewed)
- an independent review of anonymised clinical and nursing notes of a random sample of patients who had died on Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards between August 2001 and January 2002. The term of reference for this piece of work, the membership of the CHI team which undertook the work, and a summary of findings are attached at appendices E and F. CHI shared the summary with the Fareham & Gosport PCT in May 2002

2 | Background to the investigation

Events surrounding the CHI investigation

Police investigations

2.1 A relative of a 91 year old patient who died in August 1998 on Daedalus ward made a complaint to the trust about her care and treatment. The police were contacted in September 1998 with allegations that this patient had been unlawfully killed. A range of issues were identified by the police in support of the allegation and expert advice sought. Following an investigation, documents were referred to the Crown Prosecution Service in November 1998 and again in February 1999. The Crown Prosecution Service responded formally in March 1999 indicating that, in their view, there was insufficient evidence to prosecute any staff for manslaughter or any other offence.

2.2 Following further police investigation, in August 2001, the Crown Prosecution Service advised that there was insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction against any member of staff.

2.3 Local media coverage in March 2001 resulted in 11 other families raising concerns about the circumstances of their relatives' deaths in 1997 and 1998. The police decided to refer four of these deaths for expert opinion to determine whether or not a further, more extensive investigation was appropriate. Two expert reports were received in December 2001 which were made available to CHI. These reports raised very serious clinical concerns regarding prescribing practices in the trust in 1998.

2.4 In February 2002, the police decided that a more intensive police investigation was not an appropriate course of action. In addition to CHI, the police have referred the expert reports to the General Medical Council, the United Kingdom Central Council (after 1 April 2002, the Nursing and Midwifery Council), the trust, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and East Hampshire Health Authority and the NHS south east regional office.

2.5 The police made the trust aware of potential issues around diamorphine usage in December 1998, and were sent the expert witness reports in February 2002.

Action taken by professional regulatory bodies

2.6 The General Medical Council is currently reviewing whether any action against any individual doctor is warranted under its fitness to practice procedures.

2.7 The Nursing and Midwifery Council are considering whether there are any issues of professional misconduct in relation to any of the nurses referred to in police documentation.

Complaints to the trust

2.8 There have been 10 complaints to the trust concerning patients treated on Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards since 1998. Three complaints between August and December 1998 raised concerns which included pain management, the use of diamorphine and levels of sedation on Daedalus and Dryad wards, including the complaint which triggered the initial police investigation. This complaint was not pursued through the NHS complaints procedure.

Action taken by the health authority

2.9 In the context of this investigation, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and East Hampshire Health Authority had two responsibilities. Firstly, as the statutory body responsible for commissioning NHS services for local people in 1998 and, secondly, as the body through which GPs were permitted to practice. Some of the care provided to patients at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, as in community hospitals throughout the NHS, is delivered by GPs on hospital premises.

2.10 In June 2001, the health authority voluntary local procedure for the identification and support of primary care medical practitioners whose practice is giving cause for concern reviewed the prescribing practice of one local GP. No concerns were found. This was communicated to the trust.

2.11 In July 2001, the chief executive of the health authority asked CHI for advice in obtaining a source of expertise in order to reestablish public confidence in the services for older people in Gosport. This was at the same time as the police contacted CHI.

2.12 Following receipt of the police expert witness reports in February 2002, the health authority sought local changes in relation to the prescription of certain painkillers and sedatives (opiates and benzodiazepines) in general practice.

Action taken by the NHS south east regional office

2.13 For the period of the investigation, the NHS regional offices were responsible for the strategic and performance management of the NHS, including trusts and health authorities. The NHS south east regional office had information available expressing concerns around prescribing levels at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Information included a report by the Health Service Ombudsman and serious untoward incident reports forwarded by the trust in April and July 2001 in response to media articles about the death of a patient at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.
The health authority and NHS south east regional office met to discuss these issues on 6 April 2001.

3 | National and local context

National context

3.1 The standard of NHS care for older people has long caused concern. A number of national reports, including the NHS Plan and the Standing Nursing and Midwifery Committee's 2001 annual report found aspects of care to be deficient. National concerns raised include: an inadequate and demoralised workforce, poor care environments, lack of seamless care within the NHS and ageism. The NHS Plan's section *Dignity, security and independence in old age*, published in July 2000, outlined the government's plans for the care of older people, detailed in the national service framework.

3.2 The national service framework for older people was published in March 2001 and sets standards of care for older people in all care settings. It aims to ensure high quality of care and treatment, regardless of age. Older people are to be treated as individuals with dignity and respect. The framework places special emphasis on the involvement of older patients and their relatives in the care process, including care planning.

3.3 National standards called *Essence of Care*, published by the Department of Health in 2001, provide standards for assessing nursing practice against fundamental aspects of care such as nutrition, preventing pressure sores and privacy and dignity. These are designed to act as an audit tool to ensure good practice and have been widely disseminated across the NHS.

Trust background

3.4 Gosport War Memorial Hospital was part of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust between April 1994 and April 2002. The hospital is situated on the Gosport peninsula and has 113 beds. Together with outpatient services and a day hospital, there are beds for older people and maternity services. The hospital does not admit patients who are acutely ill and it has neither an A&E nor intensive care facilities. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust provided a range of community and hospital based services for the people of Portsmouth, Fareham, Gosport and surrounding areas. These services included mental health (adult and elderly), community paediatrics, elderly medicine, learning disabilities and psychology.

3.5 The trust was one of the largest community trusts in the south of England and employed almost 5,000 staff. In 2001/2002 the trust had a budget in excess of £100 million and over 20% of income spent on its largest service, elderly medicine. All the trust's financial targets were met in 2000/2001.

Move towards the primary care trust

3.6 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust was dissolved on 31 March 2002. Services have been transferred to local primary care trusts (PCTs), including Fareham and Gosport PCT, which became operational as a level four PCT in April 2002. Arrangements have been made for each PCT to host provider services on a district wide basis but each PCT retains responsibility for commissioning its share of district wide services from the host PCT. Fareham and Gosport PCT will manage many of the staff, premises and facilities of a number of sites, including the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Medical staff involved in the care of older people, including those working at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, are now employed by the East Hampshire PCT.

Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust strategic management

3.7 The trust board consisted of a chair, five non executive directors, the chief executive, the executive directors of operations, medicine, nursing and finance and the personnel director. The trust was organised into six divisions, two of which are relevant to this investigation. The Fareham and Gosport division, which managed the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, and the department of medicine for elderly people.

3.8 CHI heard that the trust was well regarded in the local health community and had developed constructive links with the health authority and local primary care groups (PCGs). For example, in the lead up to the formation of the new PCT, Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust's director of operations worked for two days each week for the East Hampshire PCT. Other examples included the joint work of the PCG and the trust on the development of intermediate care and clinical governance. High regard and respect for trust staff was also commented on by the local medical committee, Unison and the Royal College of Nursing.

Local services for older people

3.9 Before April 2002, access to medical beds for older people in Portsmouth (which included acute care, rehabilitation and continuing care) was managed through the department of medicine for elderly people which was managed by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. Some of the beds were located in community hospitals such as the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, where the day to day general management of the hospital was the responsibility of the locality divisions of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The Fareham and Gosport division of the trust fulfilled this role at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

3.10 The department of medicine for elderly people has now transferred to East Hampshire PCT. The nursing staff of the wards caring for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital are now employed by the Fareham and Gosport PCT. Management of all services for older people has now transferred to the East Hampshire PCT.

3.11 General acute services were, and remain, based at Queen Alexandra and St Mary's hospitals, part of the Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, the local acute trust. Though an unusual arrangement, a precedent for this model of care existed, for example in Southampton Community NHS Trust.

3.12 Until August 2001, the Royal Hospital Haslar, a Ministry of Defence military hospital on the Gosport peninsula, also provided acute medical care to civilians, many of whom were older people, as well as military staff.

Service performance management

3.13 Divisional management at Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust was well defined, with clear systems for reporting and monitoring. The quarterly divisional review was the principal tool for the performance management of the Fareham and Gosport division. The review considered regular reports on clinical governance, complaints and risk. Fareham and Gosport division was led by a general manager, who reported to the operational director. Leadership at Fareham and Gosport divisional level was strong with clear accounting structures to corporate and board level.

Inpatient services for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital 1998-2002

3.14 Gosport War Memorial Hospital provides continuing care, rehabilitation, day hospital and outpatient services for older people and was managed by the Fareham and Gosport division. In November 2000, as a result of local developments to develop intermediate and rehabilitation services in the community, there was a change in the use of beds at the hospital to provide additional rehabilitation beds.

3.15 In 1998, three wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital admitted older patients for general medical care: Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan. This is still the case in 2002.

Figure 3.1 Inpatient provision at Gosport War Memorial Hospital by ward

Ward	1998	2002
Dryad	20 continuing care beds. Patients admitted under the care of a consultant, with some day to day care provided by a clinical assistant.	20 continuing care beds for frail elderly patients and slow stream rehabilitation. Patients admitted under the care of a consultant. Day to day care is provided by a staff grade doctor.
Daedalus	16 continuing care beds and 8 for slow stream rehabilitation. Patients admitted under the care of a consultant, some day to day care provided by a clinical assistant.	24 rehabilitation beds: 8 general, 8 fast and 8 slow stream (since November 2000). Patients admitted under the care of a consultant. Day to day care provided by a staff grade doctor.
Sultan	24 GP beds with care managed by patients' own GPs. Patients were not exclusively older patients; care could include rehabilitation and respite care. A ward manager (or sister) managed the ward, which was staffed by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust staff.	The situation is the same as in 1998, except that the nursing staff are now employed by Fareham and Gosport PCT.

Admission criteria

3.13 The current criteria for admission to both Dryad and Daedalus wards are that the patient must be over 65 and be registered with a GP within the Gosport PCG (now a part of Fareham and Gosport PCT). In addition, Dryad patients must have a Barthel score of under 4/20 and require specialist medical and nursing intervention. The Barthel score is a validated tool used to measure physical disability. Daedalus patients must need multidisciplinary rehabilitation, for example following a stroke.

3.14 There was, and still is, a comprehensive list of admission criteria for Sultan ward developed in 1999, all of which must be met prior to admission. The criteria state that patients must not be medically unstable and no intravenous lines must be in situ.

Elderly mental health

3.15 Although not part of the CHI investigation, older patients are also cared for on Mulberry ward, a 40 bed assessment unit comprising Collingwood and Ark Royal wards. Patients admitted to this ward are under the care of a consultant in elderly mental health.

Terminology

3.16 CHI found considerable confusion about the terminology describing the various levels of care for older people in written information and in interviews with staff. For example, the terms stroke rehab, slow stream rehab, very slow stream rehab, intermediate and continuing care were all used. CHI was not aware of any common local definition for these terms in use at the trust or of any national definitions. CHI stakeholder work confirmed that this confusion extended to patients and relatives in terms of their expectations of the type of care received.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Throughout the timeframe covered by the CHI investigation, CHI received evidence of strong leadership, with a shared set of values at corporate and divisional level in Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The senior management team was well established and, together with the trust board, functioned as a cohesive team. The chief executive was accessible to and well regarded by staff both within the trust and in the local health economy. Good links had been developed with local PCGs.

2. The case note review undertaken by CHI confirmed that the admission criteria for both Dryad and Daedalus wards were being adhered to over recent months and that patients were being appropriately admitted. However, CHI found examples of some recent patients who had been admitted to Sultan ward with more complex needs than stipulated in the admission criteria that may have compromised patient care.

3. There was lack of clarity amongst all groups of staff and stakeholders about the focus of care for older people and therefore the aim of the care provided. This confusion had been communicated to patients and relatives, which had led to expectations of rehabilitation that had not been fulfilled.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should work together to build on the many positive aspects of leadership developed by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust in order to develop the provision of care for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The PCTs should ensure an appropriate performance monitoring tool is in place to ensure that any quality of care and performance shortfalls are identified and addressed swiftly.

2. Hampshire and Isle of Wight strategic health authority should use the findings of this investigation to influence the nature of local monitoring of the national service framework for older people.

3. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should, in consultation with local GPs, review the admission criteria for Sultan ward.

4. The Department of Health should assist in the promotion of an NHS wide shared understanding of the various terms used to describe levels of care for older people.

4 | Arrangements for the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines

Police inquiry and expert witness reports

4.1 CHI's terms of reference for its investigation in part reflected those of the earlier preliminary inquiry by the police, whose reports were made available to CHI.

4.2 Police expert witnesses reviewed the care of five patients who died in 1998 and made general comments in the reports about the systems in place at the trust to ensure effective clinical leadership and patient management on the wards. The experts' examination of the use of medicines in Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards led to significant concern about three medicines, the amounts which had been prescribed, the combinations in which they were used and the method of their delivery. In summary:

- there was no evidence of trust policy to ensure the appropriate prescription and dose escalation of strong opiate analgesia as the initial response to pain. It was the view of the police expert witnesses that a more reasonable response would have been the prescription of mild to moderate medicine initially with appropriate review in the event of further pain followed up
- there was inappropriate combined subcutaneous administration of diamorphine, midazolam and haloperidol, which could carry a risk of excessive sedation and respiratory depression in older patients, leading to death
- there were no clear guidelines available to staff to prevent assumptions being made by clinical staff that patients had been admitted for palliative, rather than rehabilitative care
- there was a failure to recognise potential adverse effects of prescribed medicines by clinical staff
- clinical managers failed to routinely monitor and supervise care on the ward

It is important to emphasise that these reports were not produced for this CHI investigation and CHI cannot take any responsibility for their accuracy. Whilst the reports provided CHI with very useful information, CHI has relied on its own independent scrutiny of data and information gathered during the investigation to reach the conclusions in this chapter.

Medicine usage

4.3 In order to determine the levels of prescribing at the trust between 1998 and 2001, CHI requested a breakdown from the trust of usage of diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam for Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards. Data was also requested on the method of drug delivery. The data relates to medicines issued from the pharmacy and does not include any wastage, nor can it verify the quantity of medicines administered to each patient. As the data does not offer any breakdown of casemix, it is not possible to determine how complex the needs of patients were in each year. Staff speaking to CHI described an increase in the numbers of sicker patients in recent years. A detailed breakdown of medicines issued to each ward is attached at appendix I.

4.4 The experts commissioned by the police had serious concerns about the level of use of these three medicines (diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam) and the apparent practice of anticipatory prescribing. CHI shares this view and believes the use and combination of medicines used in 1998 was excessive and outside normal practice. The following figures indicate the use of each medicine by ward and year, plotted alongside the number patients treated (finished consultant episodes).

4.5 The trust's own data, provided to CHI during the site visit week, illustrates a marked decline in the usage of diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam in recent years. This decline has been most pronounced on Dryad ward and is against a rise in FCEs during the same timeframe. The trust's data demonstrates that usage of each of these medicines peaked in 1998/99. On Sultan ward, the use of haloperidol and midazolam have also declined in recent years with a steady increase in FCEs. Diamorphine use, after declining dramatically in 1999/00, showed an increase in 2000/01.

Medicine issued 1997/1998-2000/2001 according to the number of finished consultant episodes per ward, based on information provided by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust (see appendices H and I)

Figure 4.1 Diamorphine use – Daedalus ward



Figure 4.2 Haloperidol use – Daedalus ward



Figure 4.3 Midazolam use – Daedalus ward



Figure 4.4 Diamorphine use – Dryad ward



Figure 4.5 Haloperidol use – Dryad ward



Figure 4.6 Midazolam use – Dryad ward



Figure 4.7 Diamorphine use – Sultan ward



Figure 4.8 Haloperidol use – *Sultan ward*



Figure 4.9 Midazolam use – Sultan ward



Assessment and management of pain

4.6 Part of the individual total assessment of each patient includes an assessment of any pain they may be experiencing and how this is to be managed. In 1998, the trust did not have a policy for the assessment and management of pain. This was introduced in April 2001, in collaboration with Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, and is due for review in 2003. The stated purpose of the document was to identify mechanisms to ensure that all patients have early and effective management of pain or distress. The policy placed responsibility for ensuring that pain management standards are implemented in every clinical setting and sets out the following:

- the prescription must be written by medical staff following diagnosis of type(s) of pain and be appropriate given the current circumstances of the patient
- if the prescription states that medication is to be administered by continuous infusion (syringe driver), the rationale for this decision must be clearly documented
- all prescriptions for drugs administered via a syringe driver must be written on a prescription sheet designed for this purpose

4.7 CHI has also seen evidence of a pain management cycle chart and an 'analgesic ladder'. The analgesic ladder indicates the drug doses for different levels and types of pain, how to calculate opiate doses, gives advice on how to evaluate the effects of analgesia and how to observe for any side effects. Nurses interviewed by CHI demonstrated a good understanding of pain assessment tools and the use of the analgesic ladder.

4.8 CHI was told by some nursing staff that following the introduction of the policy, it took longer for some patients to become pain free and that medical staff were apprehensive about prescribing diamorphine. Nurses also spoke of a reluctance of some patients to take pain relief. CHI's case note review concluded that two of the 15 patients reviewed were not prescribed adequate pain relief for part of their stay in hospital.

4.9 Many staff interviewed referred to the "Wessex guidelines". This is a booklet called *Palliative care handbook guidelines on clinical management* drawn up by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, the Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust and a local hospice, in association with the Wessex palliative care units. These guidelines were in place in 1998. Although the section on pain focuses on patients with cancer, there is a clear highlighted statement in the guidelines that states "all pains have a significant psychological component, and fear, anxiety and depression will all lower the pain threshold".

4.10 The Wessex guidelines are comprehensive and include detail, in line with British National Formulary recommendations, on the use, dosage, and side effects of medicines commonly used in palliative care. The guidelines are not designed for a rehabilitation environment.

4.11 CHI's random case note review of 15 recent admissions concluded that the pain assistance and management policy is being adhered to. CHI was told by staff of the previous practice of anticipatory prescribing of palliative opiates. As a result of the pain and assessment policy, this practice has now stopped.

Prescription writing policy

4.12 This policy was produced jointly with the Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust in March 1998. The policy covered the purpose, scope, responsibilities and requirements for prescription writing, medicines administered at nurses' discretion and controlled drugs. A separate policy covers the administration of intravenous medicines.

4.13 The policy has a section on verbal prescription orders, including telephone orders, in line with UKCC guidelines. CHI understands that arrangements such as these are common practice in GP led wards and work well on the Sultan ward, with arrangements in place for GPs to sign the prescription within 12 hours. These arrangements were also confirmed by evidence found in CHI's case note review.

Administration of medicines

4.14 Medicines can be administered in a number of ways, for example, orally in tablet or liquid form, by injection and via a syringe driver. Some of the medicines used in the care of older people can be delivered by a syringe driver, which delivers a continuous subcutaneous infusion of medication. Syringe drivers can be an entirely appropriate method of medicine administration that provides good control of symptoms with little discomfort or inconvenience to the patient. Guidance for staff on prescribing via syringe drivers is contained within the trust's policy for assessment and management of pain. The policy states that all prescriptions for continuous infusion must be written on a prescription sheet designed for this purpose.

4.15 Evidence from CHI's case note review demonstrated good documented examples of communication with both patients and relatives over medication and the use of syringe drivers and the application of the trust's policy.

4.16 Information provided by the trust indicates that only two qualified nurses from Sultan ward had taken part in a syringe driver course in 1999. Five nurses had also completed a drugs competencies course. No qualified nurses from Dryad or Daedalus ward had taken part in either course between 1998 and 2001. Some nursing and healthcare support staff spoke of receiving syringe driver information and training from a local hospice.

Role of nurses in medicines administration

4.17 Registered nurses are regulated by the Nursing and Midwifery Council, a new statutory body which replaced the United Kingdom Central Council on 1 April 2002. Registered nurses must work within their code of professional conduct (UKCC, June 1992). The scope of professional practice clarified the way in which registered nurses are personally accountable for their own clinical practice and for care they provide to patients. The standards for the administration of medicines (UKCC, October 1992) details what is expected of nurses carrying out this function.

4.18 Underpinning all of the regulations that govern nursing practice, is the requirement that nurses act in the best interest of their patients at all times. This could include challenging the prescribing of other clinical staff.

Review of medicines

4.19 The regular ward rounds and multidisciplinary meetings should include a review of medication by senior staff, which is recorded in the patient's case notes. CHI recognises the complexity of multidisciplinary meetings. Despite this, a process should be found to ensure that effective and regular reviews of patient medication take place by senior clinicians and pharmacy staff.

Structure of pharmacy

4.20 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust has a service level agreement for pharmacy services with the local acute trust, Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust. An E grade pharmacist manages the contract locally and the service provided by a second pharmacist, who is the lead for older peoples' services. Pharmacists speaking to CHI spoke of a remote relationship between the community hospitals and the main pharmacy department at Queen Alexandra Hospital, together with an increasing workload. Pharmacy staff were confident that ward pharmacists would now challenge large doses written up by junior doctors but stressed the need for a computerised system which would allow clinician specific records. There are some recent plans to put the trust's *A compendium of drug therapy guidelines* on the intranet, although this is not easily available to all staff.

4.21 Pharmacy training for non pharmacy staff was described as "totally inadequate" and not taken seriously. Nobody knew of any training offered to clinical assistants.

4.22 There were no systems in place in 1998 for the routine review of pharmacy data which could have alerted the trust to any unusual or excessive patterns of prescribing, although the prescribing data was available for analysis.

KEY FINDINGS

1. CHI has serious concerns regarding the quantity, combination, lack of review and anticipatory prescribing of medicines prescribed to older people on Dryad and Daedalus wards in 1998. A protocol existed in 1998 for palliative care prescribing (the "Wessex guidelines") but this was inappropriately applied to patients admitted for rehabilitation.

2. Though CHI is unable to determine whether these levels of prescribing contributed to the deaths of any patients, it is clear that had adequate checking mechanisms existed in the trust, this level of prescribing would have been questioned.

3. The usage of diamorphine, midazolam and haloperidol has declined in recent years, reinforced by trust staff interviewed by CHI and by CHI's own review of recent case notes. Nursing staff interviewed confirmed the decreased use of both diamorphine and the use of syringe drivers since 1998.

4. CHI found some evidence to suggest a recent reluctance amongst clinicians to prescribe sufficient pain relieving medication. Despite this, diamorphine usage on Sultan ward 2000/2001 showed a marked increase.

5. CHI welcomes the introduction and adherence to policies regarding the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines. Anticipatory prescribing is no longer evident on these wards. Although the palliative care Wessex guidelines refer to non physical symptoms of pain, the trust's policies do not include methods of non verbal pain assessment and rely on the patient articulating when they are in pain.

6. CHI found little evidence to suggest that thorough individual total patient assessments were being made by multidisciplinary teams in 1998. CHI's case note review concluded that this approach to care had been developed in recent years.

7. Pharmacy support to the wards in 1998 was inadequate. The trust was able to produce pharmacy data in 2002 relating to 1998. A system should have been in place to review and monitor prescribing at ward level, using data such as this as a basis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As a priority, the Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that a system is in place to routinely review and monitor prescribing of all medicines on wards caring for older people. This should include a review of recent diamorphine prescribing on Sultan ward. Consideration must be given to the adequacy of IT support available to facilitate this.

2. The East Hampshire PCT and Fareham and Gosport PCT should review all local prescribing guidelines to ensure their appropriateness for the current levels of dependency of the patients on the wards.

3. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should review the provision of pharmacy services to Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards, taking into account the change in casemix and use of these wards in recent years. Consideration should be given to including pharmacy input into regular ward rounds.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT, in conjunction with the pharmacy department, must ensure that all relevant staff including GPs are trained in the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines for older people.

5 | Quality of care and the patient experience

Introduction

5.1 This chapter details CHI's findings following contact with patients and relatives. This needs to be put into the context of the 1,725 finished consultant episodes for older patients admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital between April 1998 and March 2001. Details of the methods used to gain an insight into the patient experience and of the issues raised with CHI are contained in appendix B.

Patient expeience

5.2 As with all patients being cared for when they are sick and vulnerable, it is important to treat each person as a whole. For this reason, the total holistic assessment of patients is critical to high quality individual care tailored to each patient's specific needs. The following sections are key elements (though not an exhaustive list) of total assessments which were reported to CHI by stakeholders.

5.3 CHI examined in detail the experience of older patients admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital between 1998 and 2001 and that of their relatives and carers. This was carried out in two ways. Firstly, stakeholders were invited, through local publicity, to make contact with CHI. The police also wrote to relatives who had expressed concern to them informing them of CHI's investigation. Views were invited in person, in writing, over the telephone and by questionnaire. A total of 36 patients and relatives contacted CHI during the investigation.

5.4 Secondly, CHI made a number of observation visits, including at night, to Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards during the site visit week in January 2002. Some of the visits were unannounced. Mealtimes, staff handovers, ward rounds and medicine rounds were observed.

Stakeholder views

5.5 The term stakeholder is used by CHI to define a range of people that are affected by, or have an interest in, the services offered by an organisation. CHI heard of a range of both positive and less positive experiences, of the care of older people. The most frequently raised concerns with CHI were: the use of medicines, the attitude of staff, continence management, the use of patients' own clothing, transfer arrangements between hospitals and nutrition and fluids. More detail on each of these areas is given below.

5.6 Relatives expressed concern around a perceived lack of nutrition and fluids as patients neared the end of their lives: "no water and fluids for last four days of life". Comments were also raised about unsuitable, unappetising food and patients being left to eat without assistance. A number of stakeholders commented on untouched food being cleared away without patients being given assistance to eat.

5.7 Following comments by stakeholders, CHI reviewed the trust policy for nutrition and fluids. The trust conducted a trust wide audit of minimum nutritional standards between October 1997 and March 1998, as part of the five year national strategy *Feeding People*. The trust policy, *Prevention and management of malnutrition* (2000), included the designation of an appropriately trained lead person in each clinical area, who would organise training programmes for staff and improve documentation to ensure full compliance. The standards state:

- all patients must have a nutritional risk assessment on admission
- registered nurses must plan, implement and oversee nutritional care and refer to an appropriate professional as necessary
- all staff must ensure that documented evidence supports the continuity of patient care and clinical practice
- all clinical areas should have a nominated nutritional representative who attends training/updates and is a resource for colleagues
- systems should be in place to ensure that staff have the required training to implement and monitor the *Feeding People* standards

5.8 A second trust audit in 2000 concluded that, overall, the implementation of the *Feeding People* standards had been "very encouraging". However, there were concerns about the lack of documentation and a sense of complacency as locally written protocols had not been produced throughout the service.

5.9 CHI's review of recent case notes concluded that appropriate recording of patient intake and output was taking place. CHI was concerned that nurses appeared unable to make swallowing assessments out of hours; this could lead to delays in receiving nutrition over weekends, for example, when speech and language therapy staff were not available.

5.10 Continence management is an important aspect of the care of older people, the underlying objective is to promote or sustain continence as part of the holistic management of care, this includes maintaining skin integrity (prevention of pressure sores). Where this is not possible, a range of options including catheterisation are available and it is imperative that these are discussed with patients, relatives and carers. Some stakeholders raised concerns regarding the 'automatic' catheterisation of patients on admission to the War Memorial. "They seem to catheterise everyone. My husband was not incontinent; the nurse said it was done mostly to save time". Relatives also spoke of patients waiting for long periods of time to be helped to the toilet or for help in using the commode.

5.11 CHI's review of recent case notes found no evidence of inappropriate catheterisation of patients in recent months.

5.12 The use of pain relieving medicines and the use of syringe drivers to administer them was commented on by a number of relatives. One relative commented that her mother "certainly was not in pain prior to transfer to the War Memorial". Although a number of relatives confirmed that staff did speak to them before medication was delivered by a syringe driver, CHI also received comments that families would have liked more information: "Doctors should disclose all drugs, why [they are being used] and what the side effects are. There should be more honesty".

5.13 Many relatives were distressed about patients who were not dressed in their own clothes, even when labelled clothes had been provided by their families. "They were never in their own clothes". Relatives also thought patients being dressed in other patients' clothes was a potential cross infection risk. The trust did apologise to families who had raised this as a complaint and explained the steps taken by wards to ensure patients were dressed in their own clothes. This is an important means by which patients' dignity can be maintained.

5.14 Concern was expressed regarding the physical transfer of patients from one hospital to another. Amongst concerns were lengthy waits prior to transfer, inadequate clothing and covering during the journey and the methods used to transfer patients. One person described their relative as being "carried on nothing more than a sheet". CHI learnt that this instance was acknowledged by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, who sought an apology from the referring hospital, which did not have the appropriate equipment available.

5.15 Though there were obvious concerns regarding the transfer of patients, during the period of the investigation, the Hampshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust, who were responsible for patient transfers between hospitals, received no complaints relating to the transfer of patients to and from the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

5.16 Comments about the attitude of staff ranged from the very positive "Everyone was so kind and caring towards him in both Daedalus and Dryad wards" and "I received such kindness and help from all the staff at all times" to the less positive "I was made to feel an inconvenience because we asked questions" and "I got the feeling she had dementia and her feelings didn't count".

Outcome of CHI observation work

5.17 CHI spent time on Dryad, Sultan and Daedalus wards throughout the week of 7 January 2002 to observe the environment in which care was given, the interactions between staff and patients and between staff. Ward staff were welcoming, friendly and open. Although CHI observed a range of good patient experiences this only provides a 'snap shot' during the site visit and may not be fully representative. However, many of the positive aspects of patient care observed were confirmed by CHI's review of recent patient notes.

Ward environment

5.18 All wards were built during the 1991 expansion of the hospital and are modern, welcoming and bright. This view was echoed by stakeholders, who were complimentary about the décor and patient surroundings. Wards were tidy, clean and fresh smelling.

5.19 Day rooms are pleasant and Daedalus ward has direct access to a well designed garden suitable for wheelchair users. The garden is paved with a variety of different textures to enable patients to practice mobility. There is limited storage space in Daedalus and Dryad wards and, as a result, the corridors had become cluttered with equipment. This can be problematic for patients using walking aids. Daedalus ward has an attractive, separate single room for independent living assessment with its own sink and wardrobe.

5.20 CHI saw staff address patients by name in a respectful and encouraging way and saw examples of staff helping patients with dressing and holding friendly conversations. The staff handovers observed were well conducted, held away from the main wards areas and relevant information about patient care was exchanged appropriately.

5.21 Mealtimes were well organised with patients given a choice of menu options and portion size. Patients who needed help to eat and drink were given assistance. There appeared to be sufficient staff to serve meals, and to note when meals were not eaten. CHI did not observe any meals returned untouched. Healthcare support workers told CHI that they were responsible for making a note when meals were not eaten.

5.22 There are day rooms where patients are able to watch the television and large print books, puzzles and current newspapers are provided. CHI saw little evidence of social activities taking place, although some patients did eat together in the day room. Bells to call assistance are situated by patients' beds, but are less accessible to patients in the day rooms. The wards have an activities coordinator, although the impact of this post has been limited.

5.23 Daedalus ward has a communication book by each bed for patients and relatives to make comments about day to day care. This is a two way communication process which, for example, allows therapy staff to ask relatives for feedback on progress and enables relatives to ask for an appointment with the consultant.

5.24 CHI observed two medicine rounds, both of which were conducted in an appropriate way with two members of staff jointly identifying the patient and checking the prescription sheet. One member of staff handed out the medicines while the other oversaw the patients as medicines are taken. Medicines are safely stored on the wards in locked cupboards.

Communication with patients, relatives and carers

The trust had an undated user involvement service development framework, which sets out the principles behind effective user involvement within the national policy framework described in the NHS Plan. It is unclear from the framework who was responsible for taking the work forward and within what time frame. Given the dissolution of the trust, a decision was taken not to establish a trust wide Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS), a requirement of the NHS Plan. However, work was started by the trust to look at a possible future PALS structure for the Fareham and Gosport PCT.

The Health Advisory Service *Standards for health and social care services for older people* (2000) states that "each service should have a written information leaflet or guide for older people who use the service. There should be good information facilities in inpatient services for older people, their relatives and carers". CHI saw a number of separate information leaflets provided for patients and relatives during the site visit.

The trust used patient surveys, given to patients on discharge, as part of its patient involvement framework, although the response rate was unknown. Issues raised by patients in completed surveys were addressed by action plans discussed at clinical managers meetings. Ward specific action plans were distributed to ward staff. CHI noted, for example, that as a result of patient comments regarding unacceptable ward temperatures, thermometers were purchased to address the problem. CHI could find no evidence to suggest that the findings from patient surveys were shared across the trust.

Support towards the end of life

Staff referred to the Wessex palliative care guidelines, which are used on the wards and address breaking bad news and communicating with the bereaved. Many clinical staff, at all levels spoke of the difficulty in managing patient and relative expectations following discharge from the acute sector. "They often painted a rosier picture than justified". Staff spoke of the closure of the Royal Haslar acute beds leading to increased pressure on Queen Alexandra and St Mary's hospitals to "discharge patients too quickly to Gosport War Memorial Hospital". Staff were aware of increased numbers of medically unstable patients being transferred in recent years.

Both patients and relatives have access to a hospital chaplain, who has links to representatives of other faiths. The trust had a leaflet for relatives *Because we care* which talks about registering the death, bereavement and grieving. The hospital has a designated manager to assist relatives through the practical necessities following a death.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Relatives speaking to CHI had some serious concerns about the care their relatives received on Daedalus and Dryad wards between 1998 and 2001. The instances of concern expressed to CHI were at their highest in 1998. Fewer concerns were expressed regarding the quality of care received on Sultan ward.

2. Based on CHI's observation work and review of recent case notes, CHI has no significant concerns regarding the standard of nursing care provided to the patients of Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan ward now.

3. The ward environments and patient surroundings are good.

4. Some notable steps had been taken on Daedalus ward to facilitate communication between patients and their relatives with ward staff.

5. CHI was concerned, following the case note review, of the inability of any ward staff to undertake swallowing assessments as required. This is an area of potential risk for patients whose swallowing reflex may have been affected, for example, by a stroke.

6. Opportunities for patients to engage in daytime activities in order to encourage orientation and promote confidence are limited.

7. The trust had a strong theoretical commitment to patient and user involvement.

8. There are systems in place to support patients and relatives towards the end of the patient's life and following bereavement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All patient complaints and comments, both informal and formal, should be used at ward level to improve patient care. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must ensure a mechanism is in place to ensure that shared learning is disseminated amongst all staff caring for older people.

2. Fareham and Gosport PCT should lead an initiative to ensure that relevant staff are appropriately trained to undertake swallowing assessments to ensure that there are no delays out of hours.

3. Daytime activities for patients should be increased. The role of the activities coordinator should be revised and clarified, with input from patients, relatives and all therapists in order that activities complement therapy goals.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT must ensure that all local continence management, nutrition and hydration practices are in line with the national standards set out in the *Essence of Care* guidelines.

5. Within the framework of the new PALS, the Fareham and Gosport PCT should, as a priority, consult with user groups and consider reviewing specialist advice from national support and patient groups, to determine the best way to improve communication with older patients and their relatives and carers.

6 | Staffing arrangements and responsibility for patient care

Responsibility for patient care

6.1 Patient care on Daedalus and Dryad wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital for the period of the CHI investigation was provided by consultant led teams. A multidisciplinary, multiprofessional team of appropriately trained staff best meets the complex needs of these vulnerable patients. This ensures that the total needs of the patient are considered and are reflected in a care plan, which is discussed with the patient and their relatives and is understood by every member of the team.

Medical responsibility

6.2 For the period covered by the CHI investigation, medical responsibility for the care of older people in Daedalus and Dryad wards lay with the named consultant of each patient. This is still the case today. All patients on both wards are admitted under the care of a consultant. Since 1995, there has been a lead consultant for the department of medicine for elderly people who held a two session contract (one session equates to half a day per week) for undertaking lead consultant responsibilities. These responsibilities included overall management of the department and the development of departmental objectives. The lead consultant is not responsible for the clinical practice of individual doctors. The post holder does not undertake any clinical sessions on the War Memorial site. The job description for the post, outlines 12 functions and states that the post is a major challenge for "a very part time role".

6.3 Since 2000, two department of elderly medicine consultants provide a total of 10 sessions of consultant cover on Dryad and Daedalus wards per week. Since September 2000, day to day medical support has been provided by a staff grade physician who was supervised by both consultants. Until July 2000, a clinical assistant provided additional medical support. Both consultants currently undertake a weekly ward round with the staff grade doctor. In 1998, there was a fortnightly ward round on Daedalus ward. On Dryad, ward rounds were scheduled fortnightly, though occurred less frequently.

6.4 CHI feels that the staff grade post is a pivotal, potentially isolated post, due to the distance of Gosport War Memorial Hospital from the main department of medicine for elderly people based at Queen Alexandra Hospital, no full time support from medical colleagues on the wards and a difficulty in attending departmental meetings. In 2001, the trust identified the risk of professional isolation and lack of support at Gosport War Memorial Hospital as a reason not to appoint a locum consultant.

Figure 6.1 Line management accountabilities



(*---------- this line indicates managerial accountability and not clinical accountability)

General practice role and accountability

6.5 Local GPs worked at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital in three capacities during the period under investigation: as clinical assistants employed by the trust, as the clinicians admitting and caring for patients on the GP ward (Sultan) and as providers of out of hours medical support to all patients on each of the three wards.

Clinical assistant role

6.6 Clinical assistants are usually GPs employed and paid by trusts, largely on a part time basis, to provide medical support on hospital wards. Clinical assistants have been a feature of community hospitals within the NHS for a number of years. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust employed a number of such GPs in this capacity in each of their community hospitals. Clinical assistants work as part of a consultant led team and have the same responsibilities as hospital doctors to prescribe medication, write in the medical record and complete death certificates. Clinical assistants should be accountable to a named consultant.

6.7 From 1994 until the resignation of the post holder in July 2000, a clinical assistant was employed for five sessions at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The fees for this post were in line with national rates. The job description clearly states that the clinical assistant was accountable to "named consultant physicians in geriatric medicine". The post holder was responsible for arranging cover for annual leave and any sickness absence with practice partners. The trust and the practice partners did not have a contract for this work. The job description does state that the post is subject to the terms and conditions of hospital medical and dental staff. Therefore, any concerns over the performance of any relevant staff could be pursued through the trust's disciplinary processes. CHI could find no evidence to suggest that this option was considered at the time of the initial police investigation in 1998.

Appraisal and supervision of clinical assistants

6.8 CHI is not aware of any *trust systems in place* to monitor or appraise the performance of clinical assistants in 1998. This lack of monitoring is still common practice within the NHS. The consultants admitting patients to Dryad and Daedalus wards, to whom the clinical assistant was accountable, had no system for supervising the practice of the clinical assistant, including any review of prescribing. CHI found no evidence of any formal lines of communication regarding policy development, guidelines and workload. Staff interviewed commented on the long working hours of the clinical assistant, in excess of the five contracted sessions.

6.9 CHI is aware of work by the Department of Health on GP appraisal which will cover GPs working as clinical assistants and further work to develop guidance on disciplinary procedures.

Sultan ward

6.10 Medical responsibility for patients on Sultan ward lay with the admitting GP throughout the period of the CHI investigation. The trust issued admitting GPs with a contract for working on trust premises, which clearly states "you will take full clinical responsibility for the patients under your care". CHI was told that GPs visit their patients regularly as well as when requested by nursing staff. This is a common arrangement in community hospitals throughout the NHS. GPs had no medical accountablity framework within the trust.

6.11 GPs managing their own patients on Sultan ward could be subject to the health authority's voluntary process for dealing with doctors whose performance is giving cause for concern. However, this procedure can only be used in regard to their work as a GP, and not any contracted work performed in the trust as a clinical assistant. Again, this arrangement is common throughout the NHS.

Out of hours cover provided by GPs

6.12 Between the hours of 8.30am and 5.00pm on weekdays, hospital doctors employed by the trust manage the care of all patients on Dryad and Daedalus wards. Out of hours medical cover, including weekends and bank holidays, is provided by a local GP practice from 5.00pm to 11.00pm, after which, between 11.00pm and 8.30am, nursing staff call on either the patient's practice or Healthcall, a local deputising service for medical input. If an urgent situation occurs out of hours, staff call 999 for assistance.

6.13 Some staff interviewed by CHI expressed concern about long waits for the deputising service, CHI heard that waiting times for Healthcall to attend a patient could sometimes take between three and five hours. However, evidence provided by Healthcall contradicts this. Nurses expressed concern over Healthcall GPs' reluctance to 'interfere' with the prescribing of admitting GPs on Sultan and Dryad wards. The contract with Healthcall is managed by a local practice.

Appraisal of hospital medical staff

6.14 Since April 2000, all NHS employers have been contractually required to carry out annual appraisals, covering both clinical and non clinical aspects of their jobs. All doctors interviewed by CHI who currently work for the trust, including the medical director, who works five sessions in the department of medicine for elderly people, have regular appraisals. Those appraising the work of other doctors have been trained to do so.

Nursing responsibility

6.15 All qualified nurses are personally accountable for their own clinical practice. Their managers are responsible for implementing systems and environments that promote high quality nursing care.

6.16 On each ward, a G grade clinical manager, who reports to a senior H grade nurse, manages the ward nurses. The H grade nurse covers all wards caring for older people and was managed by the general manager for the Fareham and Gosport division. The general manager reported to both the director of nursing and the operations director. An accountability structure such as this is not unusual in a community hospital. The director of nursing was ultimately accountable for the standard of nursing practice within the hospital.

Nursing supervision

6.17 Clinical supervision for nurses was recommended by the United Kingdom Central Council in 1996 and again in the national nursing strategy, *Making a difference*, in 1999. It is a system through which qualified nurses can maintain lifelong development and enhancement of their professional skills through reflection, exploration of practice and identification of issues that need to be addressed. Clinical supervision is not a

managerial activity, but provides an opportunity to reflect and improve on practice in a non judgemental environment. Clinical supervision is a key factor in professional self regulation.

6.18 The trust has been working to adopt a model of clinical supervision for nurses for a number of years and received initial assistance from the Royal College of Nursing to develop the processes. As part of the trust's clinical nursing development programme, which ran between January 1999 and December 2000, nurses caring for older people were identified to lead the development of clinical supervision on the wards.

6.19 Many of the nurses interviewed valued the principles of reflective practice as a way in which to improve their own skills and care of patients. The H grade senior nurse coordinator post, appointed in November 2000, was a specific trust response to an acknowledged lack of nursing leadership at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

Teamworking

6.20 Caring for older people involves input from many professionals who must coordinate their work around the needs of the patient. Good teamwork provides the cornerstone of high quality care for those with complex needs. Staff interviewed by CHI spoke of teamwork, although in several instances this was uniprofessional, for example a nursing team. CHI observed a multidisciplinary team meeting on Daedalus ward, which was attended by a consultant, a senior ward nurse, a physiotherapist and an occupational therapist. No junior staff were present. Hospital staff described input from social services as good when available, though this was not always the case.

6.21 Regular ward meetings are held on Sultan and Daedalus wards. Arrangements are less clear on Dryad ward, possibly due to the long term sickness of senior ward staff.

6.22 Arrangements for multidisciplinary team meetings on Dryad and Sultan wards are less well established. Occupational therapy staff reported some progress towards multidisciplinary goal setting for patients, but were hopeful of further development.

Allied health professional structures

6.23 Allied health professionals are a group of staff which include occupational therapists, dieticians, speech and language therapists and physiotherapists. The occupational therapy structure is in transition from a traditional site based service to a defined clinical specialty service (such as stroke rehabilitation) in the locality. Staff explained that this system enables the use of specialist clinical skills and ensures continuity of care of patients, as one occupational therapist follows the patient throughout hospital admission(s) and at home. Occupational therapists talking to CHI described a good supervision structure, with supervision contracts and performance development plans in place.

6.24 Physiotherapy services are based within the hospital. The physiotherapy team sees patients from admission right through to home treatment. Physiotherapists described good levels of training and supervision and involvement in Daedalus ward's multidisciplinary team meetings.

6.25 Speech and language therapists also reported participation in multidisciplinary team meetings on Daedalus ward. Examples were given to CHI of well developed in service training opportunities and professional development, such as discussion groups and clinical observation groups.

6.26 The staffing structure in dietetics consists of one full time dietitian based at St James Hospital. Each ward has a nurse with lead nutrition responsibilities able to advise colleagues.

Workforce and service planning

6.27 In November 2000, in preparation for the change of use of beds in Dryad and Daedalus wards from continuing care to intermediate care, the trust undertook an undated resource requirement analysis and identified three risk issues:

- consultant cover
- medical risk with a change in patient group and the likelihood of more patients requiring specialist intervention. The trust believed that the introduction of automated defibrillators would go some way to resolve this. The paper also spoke of "the need for clear protocols...within which medical cover can be obtained out of hours"
- the trust identified a course for qualified nursing staff, ALERT, which demonstrates a technique for quickly assessing any changes in a patients condition in order to provide an early warning of any deterioration

6.28 Despite this preparation, several members of staff expressed concern to CHI regarding the complex needs of many patients cared for at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital and spoke of a system under pressure due to nurse shortages and high sickness levels. Concerns were raised formally with the trust in early 2000 around the increased workload and complexity of patients. This was acknowledged in a letter by the medical director. CHI found no evidence of a systematic attempt to review or seek solutions to the evolving casemix, though a full time staff grade doctor was in post by September 2002 to replace and increase the previous five sessions of clinical assistant cover.

Access to specialist advice

6.29 Older patients are admitted to Gosport War Memorial Hospital with a wide variety of physical and mental health conditions, such as strokes, cancers and dementia. Staff demonstrated good examples of systems in place to access expert opinion and assistance.

6.30 There are supportive links with palliative care consultants, consultant psychiatrists and oncologists. The lead consultant for elderly mental health reported close links with the three wards, with patients either given support on the ward or transfer to an elderly mental health bed. There are plans for a nursing rotation

programme between the elderly medicine and elderly mental health wards. Staff spoke of strong links with the local hospice and Macmillan nurses. Nurses gave recent examples of joint training events with the hospice.

6.31 CHI's audit of recent case notes indicated that robust systems are in place for both specialist medical advice and therapeutic support.

Staff welfare

6.32 Since its creation in 1994, the trust developed as a caring employer, demonstrated by support for further education, flexible working hours and a ground breaking domestic violence policy that has won national recognition. The hospital was awarded Investors in People status in 1998. Both trust management and staff side representatives talking to CHI spoke of a constructive and supportive relationship.

6.33 However, many staff, at all levels in the organisation, spoke of the stress and low morale caused by the series of police investigations and the referrals to the General Medical Council, the United Kingdom Central Council and the CHI investigation. Trust managers told CHI they encouraged staff to use the trust's counselling service and support sessions for staff were organised. Not all staff speaking to CHI considered that they had been supported by the trust, particularly those working at a junior level, "I don't feel I've had the support I should have had before and during the police investigation - others feel the same".

Staff communication

6.34 Most staff interviewed by CHI spoke of good internal communications, and were well informed about the transfer of services to PCTs. The trust used newsletters to inform staff of key developments. An intranet is being developed by the Fareham and Gosport PCT to facilitate communication with staff.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did not have any systems in place to monitor and appraise the performance of clinical assistants. There were no arrangements in place for the adequate supervision of the clinical assistant working on Daedalus and Dryad wards. It was not made clear to CHI how GPs working as clinical assistants and admitting patients to Sultan wards are included in the development of trust procedures and clinical governance arrangements.

2. There are now clear accountability and supervisory arrangements in place for trust doctors, nurses and allied health professional staff. Currently, there is effective nursing leadership on Daedalus and Sultan wards, this is less evident on Dryad ward. CHI was concerned regarding the potential for professional isolation of the staff grade doctor.

3. Systems are now in place to ensure that appropriate specialist medical and therapeutic advice is available for patients. Some good progress has been made towards multidisciplinary team working which should be developed.

4. There was a planned approach to the service development in advance of the change in use of beds in 2000. The increasing dependency of patients and resulting pressure on the service, whilst recognised by the trust, was neither monitored nor reviewed as the changes were implemented and the service developed.

5. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust should be congratulated for its progress towards a culture of reflective nursing practice.

6. The trust has a strong staff focus, with some notable examples of good practice. Despite this, CHI found evidence to suggest that not all staff felt adequately supported during the police and other recent investigations.

7. Out of hours medical cover for the three wards out of hours is problematic and does not reflect current levels of patient dependency.

8. There are systems in place to support patients and relatives towards the end of the patient's life and following bereavement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should develop local guidance for GPs working as clinical assistants. This should address supervision and appraisal arrangemnts, clinical governance responsibilities and trianing needs.

2. The provision of out of hours medical cover to Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan wards should be reviewed. The deputising service and PCTs must work towards an out of hours contract which sets out a shared philosophy of care, waiting time standards, adequate payment and a disciplinary framework.

3. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should ensure that appropriate patients are being admitted to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital with appropriate levels of support.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT should ensure that arrangements are in place to ensure strong, long term nursing leadership on all wards.

5. Both PCTs must find ways to continue the staff communication developments made by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

7 | Lessons learnt from complaints

7.1 A total of 129 complaints were made regarding the provision of elderly medicine since 1 April 1997. These complaints include care provided in other community hospitals as well as that received on the acute wards of St Mary's and Queen Alexandra hospitals. CHI was told that the three wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital had received over 400 letters of thanks during the same period.

7.2 Ten complaints were made surrounding the care and treatment of patients on Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards between 1998 and 2002. A number raised concerns regarding the use of medicines, especially the levels of sedation administered prior to death, the use of syringe drivers and communication with relatives. Three complaints in the last five months of 1998 expressed concern regarding pain management, the use of diamorphine and levels of sedation. The clinical care, including a review of prescription charts, of two of these three patients, was considered by the police expert witnesses.

External review of complaints

7.3 One complaint was referred to the Health Services Commissioner (Ombudsman) in May 2000. The medical adviser found that the choice of pain relieving drugs was appropriate in terms of medicines, doses and administration. A complaint in January 2000 was referred to an independent review panel, which found that drug doses, though high, were appropriate, as was the clinical management of the patient. Although the external assessment of these two complaints revealed no serious clinical concerns, both the Health Services Commissioner and the review panel commented on the need for the trust to improve its communication with relatives towards the end of a patient's life.

Complaint handling

7.4 The trust had a policy for handling patient related complaints produced in 1997 and reviewed in 2000, based on national guidance *Complaints: guidance on the implementation of the NHS complaints procedure*. A leaflet for patients detailing the various stages of the complaints procedure was produced, which indicated the right to request an independent review if matters were not satisfactorily resolved together with the address of the Health Service Commissioner. This leaflet was not freely available on the wards during CHI's visit.

7.5 Both the trust and the local community health council (CHC) described a good working relationship. The CHC regretted, however, that their resources since November 2000 had prevented them from offering the level of advice and active support to trust complainants they would have wished. The CHC did continue to support complainants who had contacted them before November 2000. New contacts were provided with a "self help" pack.

7.6 CHI found that letters to complainants in response to their complaints did not always include an explanation of the independent review stage, although this is outlined in the leaflet mentioned above, which is sent to complainants earlier in the process. The 2000 update of the complaints policy stated that audit standards for complaints handling were good with at least 80% of complainants satisfied with complaint handling and 100% of complaints resolved within national performance targets. The chief executive responded to all written complaints. Staff interviewed by CHI valued the chief executive's personal involvement in complaint resolution and correspondence. Letters to patients and relatives sent by the trust reviewed by CHI were thorough and sensitive. The trust adopted an open response to complaints and apologised for any shortcomings in its services.

7.7 Once the police became involved in the initial complaint in 1998, the trust ceased its internal investigation processes. CHI found no evidence in agendas and minutes that the trust board were formally made aware of police involvement. Senior trust managers told CHI that the trust would have commissioned a full internal investigation without question if the police investigation had not begun. In CHI's view, police involvement did not preclude full internal clinical investigation. CHI was told that neither the doctor nor portering staff involved in the care and transfer of the patient whose care was the subject of the initial police investigation were asked for statements during the initial complaint investigation.

Trust learning regarding prescribing

7.8 Action was taken to develop and improve trust policies around prescribing and pain management (as detailed in chapter 4). In addition, CHI learnt that external clinical advice sought by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust in September 1999, during the course of a complaint resolution, suggested that the prescribing of diamorphine with dose ranges from 20mg to 200mg a day was poor practice and "could indeed lead to a serious problem". This comment was made by the external clinical assessor in regard to a patient given doses ranging from 20mg to 40mg per day.

7.9 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust correspondence states that there was an agreed protocol for the prescription of diamorphine for a syringe driver with doses ranging between 20mg and 200mg a day. CHI understands this protocol to be the Wessex guidelines. Further correspondence in October 1999, indicated that a doctor working on the wards requested a trust policy on the prescribing of opiates in community hospitals.

7.10 A draft protocol for the prescription and administration of diamorphine by subcutaneous infusion was piloted on Dryad ward in 1999 and discussed at the trust's Medicines and Prescribing Committee in February and April 2000 following consultation with palliative care consultants. This guidance was eventually incorporated into the joint Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust policy for the assessment and management of pain which was introduced in April 2001.

Other trust lessons

7.11 Lessons around issues other than prescribing have been learnt by the trust, though the workshop to draw together this learning was not held until early 2001 when the themes discussed were communication with relatives, staff attitudes and fluids and nutrition. *Action taken by the trust* since the series of complaints in 1998 are as follows:

- an increase in the frequency of consultant ward rounds on Daedalus ward, from fortnightly to weekly from February 1999
- the appointment of a full time staff grade doctor in September 2000 which increased medical cover following the resignation of the clinical assistant
- piloting pain management charts and prescribing guidance approved in April 2001. Nursing documentation is currently under review, with nurse input
- one additional consultant session began in 2000, following a district wide initiative with local PCGs around intermediate care
- nursing documentation now clearly identifies prime family contacts and next of kin information to ensure appropriate communication with relatives
- all conversations with families are now documented in the medical record. CHI's review of recent anonymised case notes demonstrated frequent and clear communication between relatives and clinical staff

7.12 Comments recorded in this workshop were echoed by staff interviewed by CHI, such as the difficultly in building a rapport with relatives when patients die a few days after transfer, the rising expectations of relatives and the lack of control Gosport War Memorial staff have over information provided to patients and relatives prior to transfer regarding longer term prognosis.

Monitoring and trend identification

7.13 A key action identified in the 2000/2001 clinical governance action plan was a strengthening of trust systems to ensure that actions following complaints were implemented. Until the dissolution of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, actions were monitored through the divisional review process, the clinical governance panel and trust board. A trust database was introduced in 1999 to record and track complaint trends. An investigations officer was also appointed in order to improve factfinding behind complaints. This has improved the quality of complaint responses.

7.14 Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust offered specific training in complaints handling, customer care and loss, death and bereavement, which many staff interviewed by CHI were aware of and had attended.

KEY FINDINGS

1. The police investigation, the review of the Health Service Commissioner, the independent review panel and the trust's own pharmacy data did not provide the trigger for the trust to undertake an review of prescribing practices. The trust should have responded earlier to concerns expressed around levels of sedation which it was aware of in late 1998.

2. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did effect changes in patient care over time as a result of patient complaints, including increased medical staffing levels and improved processes for communication with relatives, though this learning was not consolidated until 2001. CHI saw no evidence to suggest that the impact of these changes had been robustly monitored and reviewed.

3. Though Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust did begin to develop a protocol for the prescription and administration of diamorphine by syringe driver in 1999, the delay in finalising this protocol in April 2001, as part of the policy for the assessment and management of pain, was unacceptable.

4. There has been some, but not comprehensive, training of all staff in handling patient complaints and communicating with patients and carers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department of Health should work with the Association of Chief Police Officers and CHI to develop a protocol for sharing information regarding patient safety and potential systems failures within the NHS as early as possible.

2. Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should ensure that the learning and monitoring of action arising from complaints undertaken through the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust quarterly divisional performance management system is maintained under the new PCT management arrangements.

3. Both PCTs involved in the provision of care for older people should ensure that all staff working on Dryad, Daedalus and Sultan wards who have not attended customer care and complaints training events do so. Any new training programmes should be developed with patients, relatives and staff to ensure that current concerns and the particular needs of the bereaved are addressed.

8 | Clinical governance

Introduction

8.1 Clinical governance is about making sure that health services have systems in place to provide patients with high standards of care. The Department of Health document *A First Class Service* defines clinical governance as "a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish".

8.2 CHI has not conducted a clinical governance review of the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust but has looked at how trust clinical governance systems supported the delivery of continuing and rehabilitative inpatient care for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. This chapter sets out the framework and structure adopted by the trust between 1998 and 2002 to deliver the clinical governance agenda and details those areas most relevant to the terms of reference for this investigation: risk management and the systems in place to enable staff to raise concerns.

Clinical governance structures

8.3 The trust reacted swiftly to the principles of clinical governance outlined by the Department of Health in *A First Class Service* by devising an appropriate management framework. In September 1998, a paper outlining how the trust planned to develop a system for clinical governance was shared widely across the trust and aimed to include as many staff as possible. Most staff interviewed by CHI were aware of the principles of clinical governance and were able to demonstrate how it related to them in their individual roles. Understanding of some specific aspects, particularly risk management and audit, was patchy.

8.4 The medical director took lead responsibility for clinical governance and chaired the clinical governance panel, a sub committee of the trust board. A clinical governance reference group, whose membership included representatives from each clinical service, professional group, non executive directors and the chair of the community health council, supported the clinical governance panel. Each clinical service also had its own clinical governance committee. This structure had been designed to enable each service to take clinical governance forward into whichever PCT it found itself in after April 2002. Since February 2000, the trust used the divisional review process to monitor clinical governance developments.

8.5 The service specific clinical governance committees were led by a designated clinician and included wide clinical and professional representation. Baseline assessments were carried out in each specialty and responsive action plans produced. The medical director and clinical governance manager attended divisional review meetings and reported key issues back to the clinical governance panel.

8.6 District Audit carried out an audit of the trust's clinical governance arrangements in 1998/1999. The report, dated December 1999, states that the trust had fully complied with requirements to establish a framework for clinical governance. The report also referred to the trust's document, *Improving quality – steps towards a first class service*, which was described as "of a high standard and reflected a sound understanding of clinical governance and quality assurance".

8.7 Whilst commenting favourably on the framework, the District Audit review also noted the following:

- the process for gathering user views should be more focused and the process strengthened
- the trust needed to ensure that in some areas, strategy, policy and procedure is fed back to staff and results in changed/improved practice. Published protocols were not always implemented by staff; results of clinical audit were not always implemented and reaudited; lessons learnt from complaints and incidents not always used to change practice and that research and development did not always lead to change in practice
- more work needed to be done with clinical staff on openness and the support of staff alerting senior management of poor performance

8.8 Following the review, the trust drew up a trust wide action plan (December 1999) which focused on widening the involvement and feedback from nursing, clinical and support staff regarding trust protocols and procedures, and on making greater use of research and development, clinical audit, complaints, incidents and user views to lead to changes in practice. CHI was told of a link nurse programme to take elements of this work forward.

Risk management

8.9 A trust risk management group was established in 1995 to develop and oversee the implementation of the trust's risk management strategy, to provide a forum in which risks could be evaluated and prioritised and to monitor the effectiveness of actions taken to manage risks. The group had links with other trust groups such as the clinical and service audit group, the board and the nursing clinical governance committee. Originally the finance director had joint responsibility for strategic risk with the quality manager; this was changed in the 2000/2003 strategy when the medical director became the designated lead for clinical risk. The trust achieved the clinical negligence scheme for trusts (CNST) level one in 1999. A decision was taken not to pursue the level two standard assessment due to dissolution of the trust in 2002.

8.10 The trust introduced an operational policy for recording and reviewing risk events in 1994. New reporting forms were introduced in April 2000 following a review of the assessment systems for clinical and non clinical risk. The same trust policy was used to report clinical and non clinical risks and accidents. All events were recorded in the trust's risk event database (CAREKEY). This reporting system was also used for near misses and medication errors. Nursing and support staff interviewed demonstrated a good knowledge of the risk reporting system, although CHI was less confident that medical staff regularly identified and reported risks. CHI was told that risk forms were regularly submitted by wards in the event of staff shortages. Staff shortage was not one of the trust's risk event definitions.

8.11 The clinical governance development plan for 2001/2002 stated that the focus for risk management in 2000/2001 was the safe transfer of services to successor organisations, with the active involvement of PCTs and PCGs in the trust's risk management group. Meetings were held with each successor organisation to agree future arrangements for areas such as risk event reporting, health and safety, infection control and medicines management.

Raising concerns

8.12 The trust had a whistle blowing policy dated February 2001. The Public Interest Disclosure Act became law in July 1999. The policy sets out the process staff should follow if they wished to raise a concern about the care or safety of a patient "that cannot be resolved by the appropriate procedure". NHS guidance requires systems to enable concerns to be raised outside the usual management chain. Most staff interviewed were clear about how to raise concerns within their own line management structure and were largely confident of receiving support and an appropriate response. Fewer staff were aware of the trust's whistle blowing policy.

Clinical audit

8.13 CHI was given no positive examples of changes in patient care or prescribing as a result of clinical audit outcomes. Despite a great deal of work on revising and creating policies to support good prescribing and pain management, there was no planned audit of outcome.

8.14 CHI was made aware of two trust audits of medicines since 1998. In 1999, a review of the use of neuroleptic medicines, which includes tranquillisers such as haloperidol, within all trust elderly care continuing care wards concluded that neuroleptic medicines were not being over prescribed. The same review revealed "the weekly medical review of medication was not necessarily recorded in the medical notes". The findings of this audit and the accompanying action plan, which included guidance on completing the prescription chart correctly, was circulated to all staff on Daedalus and Dryad wards. A copy was not sent to Sultan ward. There was a reaudit in late 2001 which concluded that overall use of neuroleptic medicines in continuing care wards remained appropriate.

8.15 More recently, the Fareham and Gosport PCT has undertaken a basic audit based on the prescription sheets and medical records of patients cared for on Sultan, Dryad and Daedalus wards during two weeks in June 2002. The trust concluded "that the current prescriping of opiates, major tranquilisers and hyocine was within British National Formulary guidelines." No patients were prescribed midazolam during the audit timeframe.

KEY FINDINGS

1. The trust responded proactively to the clinical governance agenda and had a robust framework in place with strong corporate leadership.

2. Although a system was in place to record risk events, understanding of clinical risk was not universal. The trust had a whistle blowing policy, but not all staff were aware of it. The policy did not make it sufficiently clear that staff could raise concerns outside of the usual management channels if they wished.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT must fully embrace the clinical governance developments made and direction set by the trust.

2. All staff must be made aware that the completion of risk and incident reports is a requirement for all staff. Training must be put in place to reinforce the need for rigorous risk management.

3. Clinical governance systems must be put in place to regularly identify and monitor trends revealed by risk reports and to ensure that appropriate action is taken.

4. The Fareham and Gosport PCT and East Hampshire PCT should consider a revision of their whistle blowing policies to make it clear that concerns may be raised outside of normal management channels.

APPENDIX A

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61. **Occupational therapy service – continuous professional development and training**, Fareham and Gosport locality, occupational therapy professional advisor, 23 November 2001

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63. **Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Groups: Proposal to establish a primary care trust for Fareham and Gosport, Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority**, July 2001

64. March 2001 Final monitoring report intermediate care, Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, May 2001

D) DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HAMPSHIRE CONSTABULARY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Police expert witness report, Professor B Livesley, MD, FRCP, 9 November 2000
2. Police expert witness report, Professor G Ford, MA, FRCP, 12 December 2001
3. Police expert witness report, Dr K Mundy, FRCP, 18 October 2001

E) OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GOSPORT WAR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

1. A local procedure for the identification and support of primary care medical practitioners whose performance is giving cause for concern, Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority and local medical committee, undated
2. Clinical governance and clinical quality assurance, the baseline assessment framework, NHS Executive south east region, 1999
3. Clinical Governance, Audit 1998/1999 & Summary report, District Audit, December 1999

APPENDIX B

Views from patients and relatives/friends

METHODS OF OBTAINING VIEWS

i. The investigation sought to establish the views of people who had experience of services for older people at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital since 1998.

ii. CHI sought to obtain views about the service through a range of methods. People were invited to:

- meet with members of the investigation team
- fill in a short questionnaire
- write to the investigation team
- contact by telephone or email

iii. In November 2001, information was distributed about the CHI investigation at Gosport War Memorial Hospital to stakeholders, voluntary organisations and statutory stakeholders. This information included posters advertising stakeholder events, information leaflets about the investigation, questionnaires and general CHI information leaflets. Press releases were issued in local newspapers and radio stations. The Hampshire Constabulary agreed to forward CHI contact details to families who had previously expressed their concerns to them.

iv. The written information was distributed to a large group of potential stakeholders. In total 36 stakeholders and 59 voluntary organisations will have received the above information. These people included:

- Motor Neurone Disease Association, Alzheimer's Society, League of Friends and other community groups such as the Gosport Stroke Club and Age Concern
- Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Community Health Council, Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority, local medical committee, members of parliament, nursing homes, Portsmouth social services and Fareham and Gosport primary care groups

STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES

i. CHI received the following responses from patients, relatives, carers, friends and voluntary organisations.

Letters	Questionnaires	Telephone interviews	*Stakeholder interviews
7	2	10	17

(*stakeholders were counted according to the number of attendees and not based on number of interviews)

ii. A number of people who contacted CHI did so using more than one method. In these cases any other form of submitted evidence, was incorporated as part of the stakeholders contact.

Figure B.1 Concerns about care raised by stakeholders by ward and date

	Dryad	Daedalus	Sultan	GWMH	TOTAL
1998		8		2	10
1999	1	5			6
2000		3	3	1	7
2001		1		1	2
GWMH				2	2
TOTAL	1	17	3	6	27

GWMH – Gosport War Memorial Hospital

ANALYSIS OF VIEWS RECEIVED

i. During the CHI investigation stakeholder views highlighted both positive and less positive experiences of patient care.

Positive experiences

ii. CHI received nine letters from stakeholders commenting on the satisfaction of the care that the patients received and highlighting the excellent level of care and kindness demonstrated by the staff. This was also supported by 400 letters of thanks and donations received by the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The most frequently recurring positive comments from stakeholders were about staff attitude (five responses) and the environment (five responses). Other positive feedback was received about access to services, transfer, prescribing, end of life arrangements, communication and complaints.

iii. The overall analysis of the stakeholder comments indicated that staff attitude and the environment were most highly commended. Examples of staff attitude included comments such as, "one lovely nurse on Dryad went to say hello to every patient even before she got her coat off" and "as a whole the ward was lovely and there was no complaints against the staff". The environment was described as being tidy and clean with good decor. Another comment recognised the ward's attention to maintaining patient dignity with curtains been drawn reducing attention to the patient. One stakeholder commented on the positive experience they had when dealing with the trust concerning a complaint they had made.

Less positive experiences

iv. A number of less positive experiences of patients/friends and relatives were shared with CHI by stakeholders. The following table outlines the most frequently recurring negative comments that corresponded with CHI's terms of reference.

Figure B.2 Less positive views of patient and relative/friend experiences

View	Frequency of responses
Communication with relatives/carers/friends	14
Patient transfer	10
Nutrition and fluids	11
Prescription of medicines	9
Continence management, catheritisation	8
Staff attitude	8
End of life communication with:	
patients	4
relatives/carers/friends	6
Humanity of care ie access to buzzer, clothing	8

v. Patient transfer. Contacts commented on the state of the patient's health before and during the transfer. Other stakeholders mentioned the time that it took to transfer the patient and also highlighted the inappropriate method of transporting the patient.

vi. Nutrition and fluids. Stakeholders highlighted a lack of help in feeding patients. They commented on how dehydrated the patients appeared and the lack of positive communication between the relative/carer and the staff to overcome the relative/carer's concern about the level of nutrition and fluids.

vii. Humanity of care.

- incontinence management – stakeholders felt that there was limited help with patients that needed to use the toilet
- attitude of staff – stakeholders commented on staff attitude, mentioning the length of time it took for staff to respond. Other comments related to the basic lack of care for patients in their last few days
- provision of bells – stakeholders observed that the bells were often out of the patients reach
- management of clothing – stakeholders commented that the patients were never in their own clothes

viii. Arrangements for the prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines. The majority of concerns were around the prescribing of diamorphine. Others centred on those authorised to prescribe the medication to the patient and how this was communicated to the relatives/carer.

ix. Communication and collaboration between the trust and patients, their relatives and carers and with partner organisations. Interviewees indicated a lack of staff contact with the relatives/carers about the condition of the patient and the patient's care plan. Other interviewees commented on how some of the staff were not approachable. One interviewee referred to the absence of lay terms to describe a patient's condition, making it difficult to understand the patient's status of health.

x. Arrangements to support patients and their relatives and carers towards the end of the patient's life. Stakeholders mainly thought that there was a lack of communication from the staff after their relative had died.

xi. Three of the contacts had made complaints to the trust through the NHS complaints procedure. All were dissatisfied about the trust response.

APPENDIX C

Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust staff and non executive directors interviewed by CHI

Baldacchino, L, Health Care Support Worker

Banks, Dr V, Lead Consultant

Code A

Barker, M, Enrolled Nurse

Code A

Brind, S, Occupational Therapist

Cameron, F, General Manager

Carroll, P, Occupational Therapist

Clasby, J, Senior Nurse

Crane, R, Senior Dietician

Day, G, Senior Staff Nurse

Douglas, T, Staff Nurse

Dunleavy, J, Staff Nurse

Dunleavy, S, Physiotherapist

Goode, P, Health Care Support Worker

Hair, Revd J, Chaplain

Hallman, S, Senior Staff Nurse (until 11 September 2000)

Code A

Haste, A, Clinical Manager

Hooper, B, Project Director

Humphrey, L, Quality Manager

Hunt, D, Staff Nurse (until 6 January 2002)

Jarrett, Dr D, Lead Consultant

Code A

Jones, J, Corporate Risk Advisor

Jones, T, Ward Clerk

King, P, Personnel Director

King, S, Clinical Risk Advisor

Landy, S, Senior Staff Nurse

Langdale, H, Health Care Support Worker

Law, D, Patient Affairs Manager

Lee, D, Complaints Convenor & Non Executive Director

Lock, J, Sister (retired 1999)

Loney, M, Porter

Lord, Dr A, Lead Consultant

Mann, K, Senior Staff Nurse

Melrose, B, Project Manager – Complaints

Millett, M, Chief Executive (until 31 March 2002)

Monk, A, Chairman

Nelson, S, Staff Nurse

Code A

O'Dell, J, Practice Development Facilitator

Parvin, J, Senior Personnel Manager

Peach, J, Service Manager

Peagram, L, Physiotherapy Assistant

Pease, Y, Staff Nurse

Phillips, C, Speech & Language Therapist

Piper, I, Operational Director

Qureshi, Dr L, Consultant

Ravindrance, Dr A, Consultant

Reid, Dr I, Medical Director

Robinson, B, Deputy General Manager

Scammel, T, Senior Nurse Coordinator

Taylor, J, Senior Nurse

Thomas, Dr E, Nursing Director

Thorpe, M, Health Care Support Worker

Tubbitt, A, Senior Staff Nurse

Walker, F, Senior Staff Nurse

Wells, P, District Nurse

Wigfall, M, Enrolled Nurse

Wilkins, P, Senior Staff Nurse

Williams, J, Nurse Consultant

Wilson, A, Senior Staff Nurse

Wood, A, Finance Director

Woods, L, Staff Nurse

Yikona, Dr J, Staff Grade Physician

CHI is grateful to Caroline Harrington for scheduling interviews.

APPENDIX D

Meetings or telephone interviews with external agencies with an involvement in elderly care at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust

Jill Angus, Clinical Discharge Coordinator

Wendy Peckham, Discharge Planner for Medicine

Clare Bownass, Ward Sister

Sonia Baryschpolec, Staff Nurse

Sam Page, Bed Manager, Royal Haslar Hospital

Sally Clark, Patient Transport Manager

Julie Sprack, Senior Nurse

Jeff Watling, Chief Pharmacist

Vanessa Lawrence, Pharmacist

Hampshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust

Alan Lyford, Patient Transport Service Manager

Isle of Wight, Portsmouth & South East Hampshire Health Authority

Penny Humphris, Chief Executive

Dr Peter Old, Director of Public Health

Nicky Pendleton, Progamme Lead for Elderly Care Services

NHS Executive south east regional office

Dr Mike Gill, Regional Director of Public Health

Dr David Percy, Director of Education and Training

Harriet Boereboom, Performance Manager

Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Community Health Council

Joyce Knight, Chairman

Christine Wilkes, Vice Chair

Margaret Lovell, Chief Officer

Hampshire Constabulary

Detective Superintendent John James

Portsmouth Social Services

Sarah Mitchell, Assistant Director (Older People)

Helen Loten, Commissioning and Development Manager

Hampshire Social Services

Tony Warns, Service Manager for Adults

Alverstoke House Nursing and Residential Care Home

Sister Rose Cook, Manager

Glen Heathers Nursing and Residential Care Home

John Perkins, Manager

Other

League of Friends

Mary Tyrell, Chair

Geoff Rushton, Former Treasurer

Motor Neurone Disease Association

Mrs Fitzpatrick

Members of Parliament

Peter Viggers, MP for Gosport

Sydney Rapson, MP for Portsmouth North

Primary Care Groups

John Kirtley, Chief Executive, Fareham and Gosport Primary Care Groups

Dr Pennells, Chairperson, Gosport Primary Care Groups

Portsmouth Local Medical Committee

Dr Stephen McKenning, Chairman

Gosport War Memorial Hospital medical committee

Dr Warner, Chairman

Local representative for the Royal College of Nursing

Betty Woodland, Steward

Steve Barnes, RCN Officer

- **Local representative for Unison**

  Patrick Carroll, Branch Chair

- **Local general practitioners**

  Dr J Barton, Knapman Practice

  Dr P Beasley, Knapman Practice

  Dr S Brook, Knapman Practice

APPENDIX E

Medical case note review team: terms of reference and membership

Terms of reference for the medical notes review group to support the CHI investigation at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

PURPOSE

The group has been established to review the clinical notes of a random selection of recently deceased older patients at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital in order to inform the CHI investigation. With reference to CHI's investigation terms of reference and the expert witness reports prepared for the police by Dr Munday and Professor Ford, this review will address the following:

(i) the prescription, administration, review and recording of drugs

(ii) the use and application of the trust's policies on the assessment and management of pain, prescription writing and administration of IV drugs

(iii) the quality of nursing care towards the end of life

(iv) the recorded cause of death

METHOD

The group will review 15 anonymised clinical notes supplied by the trust, followed by a one day meeting at CHI in order to produce a written report to inform the CHI investigation. The group will reach its conclusions by 31 March 2002 at the latest.

MEMBERSHIP

- **Dr Tony Luxton, Geriatrician**
  Cambridge City PCT
  (CHI doctor team member and chair of the group)

- **Maureen Morgan, Independent Management Consultant**
  (CHI nurse member)

- **Professor Gary Ford, Professor of Pharmacology of Old Age**
  University of Newcastle and Freeman Hospital

- **Dr Keith Munday, Consultant Geriatrician**
  Frimley Park Hospital

- **Annette Goulden, Deputy Director of Nursing**
  NHS Trent regional office and formerly
  Department of Health Nursing Officer for elderly care

FINDINGS OF GROUP

The findings of the group will be shared with:

(i) the CHI Gosport investigation team

(ii) CHI's Nurse Director and Medical Director and other CHI staff as appropriate

(iii) the trust

(iv) relatives of the deceased (facilitated by the trust) if requested, on an individual basis

The final report of the group will be subject to the rules of disclosure applying to CHI investigation reports.

APPENDIX F

Report of the Gosport investigation medical notes review group

PURPOSE

CHI undertook a review of the anonymised medical notes of a random selection of 15 patients who had died between 1 August 2001 and 31 January 2002 on Daedalus, Dryad or Sultan wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

CHI's intention for this piece of work was to determine whether the policies and systems put in place by the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust since the events of 1998, to address prescribing practices are being implemented and are impacting on the quality of care patients are now receiving. CHI's review also considered the nursing notes for each patient and looked at the quality of nursing care as documented in the notes. Finally, the review considered whether the cause of death recorded in the notes was appropriate.

METHODOLOGY

The group received 15 sets of anonymised medical notes from the trust, which related to the last admission of 15 patients. Five patients were randomly selected from each of the following wards: Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan. A total of 49 patients had died whilst on these wards during the sample timeframe.

FINDINGS

(i) *Use of medicines*

Prescription

The group considered that the volume and combination of medicines used was appropriate for this group of patients and was in line with accepted good practice and British National Formulary guidelines. Single prescription, PRN and syringe driver prescribing was acceptable. There was no evidence of anticipatory prescribing.

The case notes suggested that the use of the trust's 'analgesic ladder' to incrementally increase and decrease pain relief in accordance to need was being followed. The group saw no evidence to suggest that patients had been prescribed large amounts of pain relief, such as diamorphine on admission where this was not necessary. Co-codamol had been prescribed in a number of cases as an initial analgesic, with progression to alternative medicines as and when more pain relief was needed. The use of the analgesic ladder was less evident in Sultan ward.

However, in two cases, the group saw evidence of unacceptable breakthrough pain, and six hourly rather than four hourly prescriptions, which could have allowed this to happen. There was also some evidence of the simultaneous prescribing of co-codamol and fentanyl, which was not thought by the group to be the most effective combination of medicines.

Administration

Syringe drivers had been used to deliver medication to six of the patients reviewed. Appropriate use of syringe drivers as a method of medicine administration was observed, with documented discussions with families before use.

Appropriate administration of medicines by nursing staff was evident. Prescriptions issued over the telephone by GPs on Sultan ward were appropriately completed in accordance with trust policy.

Review and recording of medicines

Evidence of consistent review of medication was seen, with evidence to suggest that patients and relatives were involved in helping to determine levels of pain. Nursing staff had appropriately administered medicines in line with medical staff prescriptions. Prescription sheets had been completed adequately on all three wards. Generally, record keeping around prescribing was clear and consistent, though this was not as clear on Sultan ward.

Based on the medical notes reviewed, the group agreed that the trust's policies on the assessment and management of pain, prescription writing and administration of IV drugs were being adhered to.

(ii) *Quality of nursing care towards the end of life*

The team found a consistently reasonable standard of care given to all patients they reviewed. The quality of nursing notes was generally adequate, although not always of consistent quality. There was some evidence to suggest a task oriented approach to care with an over emphasis on the completion of paperwork. This left an impression of a sometimes disjointed rather than integrated individual holistic assessment of the patient. The team saw some very good, detailed care plans and as well as a number of incidences where no clear agreed care plan was evident.

The team was concerned that swallowing assessments for patients with dysphagia had been delayed over a weekend because of the lack of availability of suitably trained nursing staff. Nurses could be trained to undertake this role in order not to compromise patient nutrition. Despite this, the trust's policies regarding fluid and nutrition were generally being adhered to. Though based on the nursing notes, a number of patients had only been weighed once, on admission.

There was evidence of therapy input, but this had not always been incorporated into care plans and did not always appear comprehensive. There was some concern that despite patients being assessed as at risk of pressure sores, it was not clear how this had been managed for some patients.

There was thorough, documented evidence to suggest that comprehensive discussions were held with relatives and patients towards the end of the patient's life. Do not attempt resuscitation decisions were clearly stated in the medical records.

Recorded cause of death

The group found no cause for concerns regarding any of the stated causes of death.

GENERAL COMMENTS

Admission criteria

The team considered that the admission criteria for Daedalus and Dryad wards was being adhered to. However there were examples of patients admitted to Sultan ward who were more dependent than the admission criteria stipulates. There is also an issue regarding patients who initially meet the admission criteria for Sultan ward who then develop complications and become more acutely sick.

Elderly medicine consultant input and access to specialist advice

Patients on Daedalus and Dryad wards received regular, documented review by consultant staff. There was clear evidence of specialist input, from mental health physicians, therapists and medical staff from the acute sector.

Out of hours cover

There was little evidence of out of hours input into the care of patients reviewed by CHI, though the team formed the view that this had been appropriate and would indicate that the general management of patients during regular hours was therefore of a good standard.

APPENDIX G

An explanation of the dissolution of services into the new primary care trusts

Figure G.1 Arrangements for hosting clinical services

Department	Portsmouth City PCT	East Hampshire PCT	Fareham & Gosport PCT	West Hampshire NHS Trust
Elderly medicine		●		
Elderly mental health		●		
Community paediatrics	●			
Adult mental health services	● For Portsmouth patients			● For Hampshire patients
Learning disability services			●	
Substance misuse	●			
Clinical pyschology	●			
Primary care counselling				●
Specialist family planning	●			
Palliative care		●		

(Source: *Local health, local decisions,* consultation document, September 2001, NHS Executive South East Regional Office, Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority and Southampton and South West Health Authority)

APPENDIX H

Patient throughput data 1997/1998 – 2000/2001

Figure H.1 Throughput data 1997/1998 – 2000/2001

Financial year	Ward	Finished consultant episodes
1997/1998	Daedalus	97
1997/1998	Dryad	72
1997/1998	Sultan	287
	Total	456
1998/1999	Daedalus	121
1998/1999	Dryad	76
1998/1999	Sultan	306
	Total	503
1999/2000	Daedalus	110
1999/2000	Dryad	131
1999/2000	Sultan	402
	Total	643
2000/2001	Daedalus	113
2000/2001	Dryad	86
2000/2001	Sultan	380
	Total	579

(Source: 1997/1998 – trust ward based discharge data, 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 – trust patient administration system (PAS) data).

APPENDIX I

Breakdown of medication in Dryad, Sultan and Daedalus wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

Figure I.1 Summary of medicine usage 1997/1998–2000/2001 (Mar 2002)

Drug	Ward	Dose	Pack	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	5mg	5	0	5	0	3
	Dryad	5mg	5	0	0	0	6
	Sultan	5mg	5	6	5	0	10
	Total			6	10	0	19
Diamorphine via syringe driver	Sultan	5mg	1	0	10	0	0
	Total			0	10	0	0
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	10mg	5	21	34	27	19
	Dryad	10mg	5	40	57	56	20
	Sultan	10mg	5	67	36	24	35
	Total			128	127	107	74
Diamorphine via syringe driver	Dryad	10mg	1	0	17	0	0
	Sultan	10mg	1	0	20	0	0
	Total			0	37	0	0
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	30mg	5	16	27	15	7
	Dryad	30mg	5	34	51	40	4
	Sultan	30mg	5	67	43	14	31
	Total			117	121	69	42
Diamorphine via syringe driver	Dryad	30mg	1	0	5	0	0
	Total			0	5	0	0
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	100mg	5	2	11	1	2
	Dryad	100mg	5	12	13	2	0
	Sultan	100mg	5	20	27	0	31
	Total			34	51	3	33

Drug	Ward	Dose	Pack	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01
Diamorphine injection	Daedalus	500mg	5	0	1	0	0
	Dryad	500mg	5	0	2	0	0
	Sultan	500mg	5	1	1	0	4
	Total			1	4	0	4
Haloperidol injection	Daedalus	5mg/5ml	10	0	3	0	0
	Dryad	5mg/5ml	10	1	1	0	0
	Sultan	5mg/5ml	10	43	15	6	0
	Total			44	19	6	0
Haloperidol injection	Daedalus	5mg/5ml	5	0	0	0	4
	Dryad	5mg/5ml	5	0	0	0	1
	Sultan	5mg/5ml	5	0	0	0	16
	Total			0	0	0	21
Midazolam	Daedalus	10mg/2ml	10	37	51	39	17
	Dryad	10mg/2ml	10	75	108	75	19
	Sultan	10mg/2ml	10	21	9	2	11
	Total			133	168	116	47

(Source: Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust)

Dose: a single measured quantity of medicine

Pack: a collection of single doses, the packaging in which medicines are dispatched *from the pharmacy*

APPENDIX J

Glossary

accountability *responsibility, in the* sense of being called to account for something.

action plan an agreed plan of action and timetable that makes improvements to services.

acute care/ trust/hospital short term (as opposed to chronic, which means long term).
Acute care refers to medical and surgical treatment involving doctors and other medical staff in a hospital setting.
Acute hospital refers to a hospital that provides surgery, investigations, operations, serious and other treatments, usually in a hospital setting.

allied health professionals professionals regulated by the Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine (new Health Professions Council). This includes professions working in health, social care, education, housing and other sectors. The professions are art therapists, music therapists and drama *therapists, prosthetists and orthotists,* dieticians, orthoptists, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, biomedical scientists, speech and language therapists, radiographers, chiropodists and podiatrists, ambulance workers and clinical scientists. Also called professionals allied to or supplementary to medicine.

analgesia medicines prescribed to reduce pain.

anticipatory prescribing to prescribe a drug or other remedy in advance.

antipsychotics A group of medicines used to treat psychosis (conditions such as schizophrenia) and sometimes used to calm agitation. Examples include haloperidol. Also called major tranquillisers or neuroleptics.

appraisal an assessment or estimate of the worth, value or quality of a person or service or thing.

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) an association whose members hold the rank of Chief Constable, deputy Chief Constable or Assistant Chief Constable or their equivalents. They provide a professional opinion to the Government and appropriate organisations.

audit, clinical audit an examination of records to check their accuracy. Often used to describe an examination of financial accounts in a business.
In clinical audit those involved in providing services assess the quality of care. Results of a process or intervention are assessed, compared with a preexisting standard, changed where necessary, and then reassessed.

Barthel score a validated tool used to measure physical disability.

benzodiazepines a diverse group of medicines used for a range of purposes. Some reduce anxiety, others are used as sleeping tablets. Some, such as *midazolam*, act as strong sedatives and can be accompanied by memory loss whilst the medicine is active.

British National Formulary publication that provides information on the selection and use of medicines for healthcare professionals.

carers people who look after their relatives and friends on an unpaid, voluntary basis often in place of paid care workers.

casemix the variety and range of different types of patients treated by a given health professional or team.

catheter a hollow tube passed into the bladder to remove urine.

catheterisation use of a catheter.

CHI see Commission for Health Improvement.

clinical any treatment provided by a healthcare professional. This will include, doctors, nurses, AHPs etc. Non clinical relates to management, administration, catering, portering etc.

clinical assistant usually GPs, employed and paid by a trust, largely on a part time basis, to provide medical support on hospital wards and other departments.

clinical governance refers to the quality of health care offered within an organisation.
The Department of Health document *A First Class Service* defines clinical governance as "a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish." It's about making sure that health services have systems in place to provide patients with high standards of care.

clinical governance review a review of the policies, systems and processes used by an organisation to deliver high quality health care to patients. The review looks at the way these policies work in practice (a health check for a health organisation).

clinical oncologist a doctor who specialises in the treatment of cancer patients, particularly through the use of radiotherapy, but who may also use chemotherapy.

clinical risk management understanding the various levels of risk attached to each form of treatment and systematically taking steps to ensure that the risks are minimised.

clinician/clinical staff a fully trained health professional – doctor, nurse, therapist, technician etc.

clinical negligence scheme for trusts (CNST) an 'insurance' scheme for assessing a trust's arrangements to minimise clinical risk which can offset costs of insurance against claims of negligence. Successfully gaining CNST 'standards' (to level one, two, three) reduces the premium that the trust must pay.

Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) independent national body (covering England and Wales) to support and oversee the quality of clinical governance in NHS clinical services.

co-codamol a medicine consisting of paracetamol and codeine phosphate, used for the relief of mild to moderate pain.

community care health and social care provided by health care professionals, usually outside hospital and often in the patient's own homes.

community health council (CHC) a statutory body sometimes referred to as the patients' friend. CHCs represent the public interest in the NHS and have a statutory right to be consulted on health service changes in their area.

consultant a fully trained specialist in a branch of medicine who accepts total responsibility for specialist patient care. (For training posts in medicine see specialist registrar, senior house officer and preregistration house officer.)

continence management The practice of promoting or sustaning the ability to control urination and defecation.

continuing care a long period of treatment for patients whose recovery will be limited.

defibrillator a piece of equipment which sends an electric current through the heart to restore the heart beat.

diamorphine A medicine used to relieve severe pain.

do not attempt resuscitation (DNAR) or do not resuscitate (DNR) an instruction, which says that if a patient's health suddenly deteriorates to near death, no special measures will be taken to revive their heart. This instruction should be agreed between the patient and doctor or if a patient is not conscious, then with their closest relative.

dysphagia difficulty swallowing.

fentanyl a medicine prescribed to patients who require control of existing pain.

finished consultant episode (FCE) a period of continuous consultant treatment under a specific consultant. If a patient is transferred from one consultant to another it will be counted as two FCEs.

formulary a list of preferred medicinal drugs which are routinely available in a hospital or GP surgery.

General Medical Council (GMC) the professional body for medical doctors which licenses them to practice.

general practitioner (GP) a family doctor, usually patients' first point of contact with the health service.

geriatrician a doctor who specialises in diagnosis and treatment of diseases affecting older people.

haloperidol see antipsychotics.

health authority (HA) statutory NHS body responsible for assessing the health needs of the local population, commissioning health services to meet those needs and working with other organisations to build healthy local communities.

health community or health economy all organisations with an interest in health in one area including the community health councils, and voluntary and statutory organisations.

Health Service Ombudsman investigates complaints about failures in NHS hospitals or community health services, about care and treatment, and about local NHS family doctor, dental, pharmacy or optical services. Anyone may refer a complaint but normally only if a full investigation through the NHS complaints system has been carried out first.

holistic a method of medical care in which patients are treated as a whole and which takes into account their physical and mental state as well as social background rather than just treating the disease alone.

hyocine a medicine to relieve nausea and sickness.

Improving Working Lives a Department of Health initiative launched in 1999. It includes standards for developing modern employment services, putting in place work/life balance schemes and involving and developing staff.

incident reporting system a system which requires clinical staff to report all matters relating to patient care where there has been a special problem.

independent review stage two of the formal NHS complaints procedure, it consists of a panel, usually three members, who look at the issues surrounding a complaint.

intermediate care a short period (normally no longer than six weeks) of intensive rehabilitation and treatment to enable patients to return home following hospitalisation, or to prevent admission to long term residential care; or intensive care at home to prevent unnecessary hospital admission.

intranet an organisation's own internal internet which is usually private.

investigation – by CHI an in depth examination of an organisation where a serious problem has been identified.

Investors in People a national quality standard which sets a level of good practice for improving an organisation's performance through its people.

lay member a person from outside the NHS who brings an independent voice to CHI's work.

local medical committee (LMC) a group of local GPs, elected by the entire local GP population who meet with the health authority to help plan resources and inform decisions.

locum a temporary practitioner who stands in for the permanent one.

medical the branches of medicine concerned with treatment through careful use of medicines as opposed to (surgical) operations.

medical director the term usually used for a doctor at trust board level (a statutory post) responsible for all issues relating to doctors and medical and surgical issues throughout the trust.

midazolam see benzodiazepines.

multidisciplinary from different professional backgrounds within healthcare (e.g. nurse, consultant, physiotherapist) concerned with the treatment and care of patients.

multidisciplinary meetings meetings involving people from different professional backgrounds.

multiprofessional from different professional backgrounds, within and outside of healthcare (e.g. nurse, consultant, social worker) concerned with the care or welfare of people.

National Service Framework (NSF) guidelines for the health service from the Department of Health on how to manage and treat specific conditions, or specific groups of patients e.g. Coronary Heart Disease, Mental Health, NSF for older people. Their implementation across the NHS is monitored by CHI.

neuroleptic see antipsychotics.

neurology a branch of medicine concerned with medical treatment of disorders of the nervous system.

NHS regional office

NHS trust a self governing body in the NHS, which provides health care services. They employ a full range of health care professionals including doctors, nurses, dieticians, physiotherapists etc.

Nursing and Midwifery Council The Nursing Midwifery Council (NMC) is an organisation set up by Parliament to ensure nurses, midwives and health visitors provide appropriate standards of care to their patients and clients. All qualified nurses, midwives and health visitors are required to be members of the NMC in order to practice.

nursing director the term usually used for a nurse at trust board level responsible for the professional lead on all issues relating to nurses and nursing throughout the trust.

occupational therapist a trained professional (an allied health professional) who works with patients to assess and develop daily living skills and social skills.

ombudsman see national health service ombudsman above.

opiates a group of medicines containing or derived from opium, that act to relieve severe pain or induce sleep.

opioid a description applied to medicines that cause similar effects in the body to opiates.

outpatient services provided for patients who do not stay overnight in hospital.

pain management a particular type of treatment that concentrates on managing a patient's pain – rather than seeking to cure their underlying condition – and complements their treatment plan.

palliative a term applied to the treatment of incurable diseases, in which the aim is to mitigate the sufferings of the patient, not to effect a cure.

palliative care care for people with chronic or life threatening conditions from which they will not recover. It concentrates on symptom control and family support to help people have as much independence and quality of life as is possible.

patient administration system (PAS) a networked information system used in NHS trusts to record information and inpatient and outpatient activity.

patient advice and liaison service (PALS) a new service proposed in the July 2000 NHS plan due to be in place by 2002, that will offer patients an avenue to seek advice or complain about their hospital care.

patient centred care a system of care or treatment is organised around the needs of the patient.

patient involvement the amount of participation that a patient (or patients) can have in their care or treatment. It is often used to describe how patients can change, or have a say in the way that a service is provided or planned.

primary care family health services provided by GPs, dentists, pharmacists, opticians, and others such as community nurses, physiotherapists and some social workers.

PCG Organisations now almost completely replaced by primary care trusts. Set up in 1997, PCGs were new organisations (technically Health Authority committees) that brought together all primary care practices in a particular area. PCGs were led by primary care professionals but with lay and social services representation. PCGs were expected to develop local primary health care services and work to improve the health of their populations. Some PCGs additionally took responsibility for commissioning secondary care services.

PCT Organisations that bring together all primary care practices in an area. PCTs are diverse and complex organisations. Unlike PCGs, which came before them, they are independent NHS bodies with greater responsibilities and

powers. They were set up in response to the Department of Health's *Shifting the Balance of Power* and took over many health authority functions. PCTs are responsible for

- improving the health of their population
- integrating and developing primary care services
- directly providing community health services
- commissioning secondary care services

PCTs are increasingly working with other PCTs, local government partners, the voluntary sector, within clinical networks and with 'shared service organisations' in order to fulfil their roles.

level four PCT brings together commissioning of secondary care services and primary care development with the provision of community health services. They are able to commission and provide services, run community health services, employ the necessary staff, and own property.

PRN (Pro re nata) prescribing medication as and when required.

protocol a policy or strategy which defines appropriate action.

psychiatrist a doctor who specialises in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health problems.

regional office see NHS regional office above.

rehabilitation the treatment of residual illness or disability which includes a whole range of exercise and therapies with the aim of increasing a patient's independence.

resuscitation a range of procedures used when someone has suddenly become seriously ill in a way that threatens their life.

risk assessment an examination of the risks associated with a particular service or procedure.

risk management understanding the various risks involved and systematically taking steps to ensure that the risks are minimized.

Royal College of Nursing (RCN) the world's largest professional union of nurses. Run by nurses, it campaigns on the part of the profession, provides higher education and promotes research, quality and practice development through the RCN institute.

sensory disabilities people who have problems hearing, seeing, smelling or with touch.

specialist a clinician most able to progress a patient's diagnosis and treatment or to refer a patient when appropriate.

speech and language therapist professionally trained person who assists, diagnoses and treats the whole spectrum of acquired or developmental communication disorders.

staff grade a full qualified doctor who is neither a General Practitioner nor a consultant.

staff grade doctors doctors who have completed their training but do not have the qualifications to enable them to progress to consultant level. Also called trust grade doctors.

stakeholders a range of people and organisations that are affected by, or have an interest in, the services offered by an organisation. In the case of hospital trusts, it includes patients, carers, staff, unions, voluntary organisations, community health councils, social services, health authorities, GPs, primary care groups and trusts in England, local health groups in Wales.

statutory/statute *refers to* legislation passed by Parliament.

strategic health authority organisations that will replace health authorities and some functions of Department of Health regional offices in 2002. Unlike current health authorities, they will not be involved in commissioning services from the NHS. Instead they will performance manage PCTs and NHS trusts and lead strategic developments in the NHS. Full details of the planned changes are in the Department of Health document, Shifting the Balance of Power, July 2001.

strategy a long term plan for success.

subcutaneous beneath the skin.

swallowing assessments the technique to access the ability of the patient to swallow safely.

syringe driver a device to ensure that a syringe releases medicine over a defined length of time into the body.

terminal care care given in the last weeks of life.

terms of reference the rules by which a committee or group does its work.

trust board a group of about 12 people who are responsible for major strategy and policy decisions in each NHS trust. Typically comprises a lay chairman, five lay members, the trust chief executive and directors.

Unison Britain's biggest trade union. Members are people working in the public services.

United Kingdom Central Council (UKCC) on 1 April 2002 the UKCC ceased to exist. Its successor body is The Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). Its purpose was to protect the public through establishing and monitoring professional standards.

ward round A regular review of each patient conducted by a consultant, often accompanied by nursing, pharmacy and therapy staff.

Wessex palliative care guidelines local guidance to help GPs, community nurses and hospital staff as well as specialist palliative care teams. It provides a checklist for management of common problems in palliative care, with some information on medical treatment. It is not a comprehensive textbook.

whistle blowing the act of informing a designated person in an organisation that patients are at risk (in the eyes of the person blowing the whistle). This also includes systems and processes that indirectly affect patient care.

whistle blowing policy a plan of action for a person to inform on someone or to put a stop to something.

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Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust at Gosport War Memorial Hospital - July 2002



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Notes of a discussion of the Gosport War Memorial File 11/7/2002-07-11

I met with Sonja Wolfskehl and Code A to discuss taking forward the complaints received about nurses at this hospital. The cases will be dealt with by Code A team.

We will put this into part 1 of the agenda at the last PPC meeting in August which will be Code A meeting. I will prepare a report and will attach the CHI report, the reports of the 2 medical experts instructed by the police, and any other relevant material. Code A will identify 3 panel members to give the case special attention and they will be sent the case in advance of the normal mailing date.

NMC File Note

Subject: Gofport War Memorial Hospital Observations

Subject Index Ref:

Date: 11 July 2002

Reference: Code A

NMC Issues

I have attached Code A file note prepared before she left the NMC, about this case.

The nurses E Code A were reported to the UKCC and the case was closed in Part 4 of the agenda on 18 September 2001.

Mr Beed has been reported again on 1 July 2002 by Mrs Jackson, who is a relative of Alice Wilkie. Code A is currently still employed by the Trust.

Nurses Code A are no longer employed by the Trust.

On 6 June 2002, we received a complaint against Sister Hamblin, Freda Shaw, Code A from Ann Reeves in connection with a patient, Mrs Elsie Divine. Nurse Hamblin and Nurse Barker are still employed by the Trust, but Code A

The complaints relate to events concerning the administration of medication during 1998 and raise issues about why the nursing staff didn't query the level of the drugs administered, about the monitoring of the patients and about poor record keeping.

Looking at the notes it appears that highly risky prescribing was going on and was going unchallenged by the nursing staff, which in the view of the experts obtained by the police, probably contributed to the death of patients who had come in for rehabilitation care and not palliative care.

The nursing staff, however, appeared to be treating the patients as if they were in for palliative care. A police investigation as outlined in the CHI report led to no charges being put to any of the practitioners concerning unlawful killing. Therefore, we cannot proceed on this basis.

It is also very apparent from the CHI report that there were failings across the Trust in relation to the supervision of staff, both medical and nursing and that the Trust itself was aware of concerns about levels of sedation as early as 1998 and took no action. There has been a thorough review of procedures since the investigation in 1998 and to

CHI concludes that the nursing practices are now satisfactory, and that there is appropriate administration of medicines.

Code A – 11 July 2002
File Note – Gofport War Memorial Hosp, observations

Professional Conduct Department

File Note

Case Name: Gosport War Memorial Hospital

Date: 12 June 2002

To: Code A

From: Code A

Dear Code A

Please could you have a look at this one. I was hoping to get a bit further on it before I left but I think I need you to have a look at the patients' notes.

Last year Hampshire Constabulary sent us a report by Professor Livesely about the care of an elderly patient Mrs Gladys Richards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital in the weeks prior to her death. Most of the concern was about Dr Barton and her prescribing practises – there were hints at a 'culture of euthanasia' – and there were also three nurses mentioned Code A who were involved in her care. The police did not charge any one and the PPC closed the cases against the three nurses (My part four report is in the file). The original file doesn't exist any more.

The case was evidently revived by the police but again no one was charged. CHI is also involved and their report will come out fairly soon.

The police have sent a report by Professor Ford which reviews the notes of a number of patients and clearly he has concerns about the amount of painkilling drugs given to patients without apparent reason . In relation to some of the patients he criticises the nurses record keeping and also incidents where drugs were given without a reason for it being given in the notes. The implication is that they were complicit in overdosing the patients.

I wrote to the hospital about the specific points raised in the report and although they feel that the investigation has been conducted unfairly they haven't really responded in any detail. They have sent copies of the patients notes however.

The other thing that has happened is that the families have now belatedly been told and we have received a complaint from the son of one of the patients, Mr Page. Mrs Richards daughter also telephoned me. I asked her to write in and make a formal complaint but she did not. (My concern about this one if she does is that we can't reconsider the case which has already closed against Code A)

So we have no nurses specifically reported (except by Mr Page who doesn't make any allegations.) and I am unsure whether there is enough in any of the notes to make a

specific allegation against any nurse, whether there is a justification for instructing solicitors or whether there is enough to ask the committee to close.

Please can you hand over to Code A when you have had the chance to look at the papers.

Thanks Code A

NMC File Note

Subject: Gosport War Memorial Hospital Case

Subject Index Ref:

Date: 11 July 2002

Reference: Code A

I have now had a look at the CHI report into the event of Gosport War Memorial Hospital. I will briefly summarise what seem to me to be the key relevant points for our purposes.

Executive summary

1. Palliative care guidelines were in place, which were inappropriately applied to patients admitted for rehabilitation.

2. No adequate checking mechanisms existed for checking the level of prescribing.

3. CHI has no concerns **now**, relating to the standard of nursing care provided to patients at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

   Then no systems were in place for the adequate supervision of the clinical assistant, a medical practitioner, but **now** clearer accountability and supervisory arrangement are in place, for the doctors, nurses and allied health professions.

4. The Trust only belatedly responded to concerns about the level of sedation at the hospital and it has been aware of this since 1998. The Trust has now taken steps to make changes by increasing medical staffing levels, improving processes for communications with relatives, but CHI found no evidence to suggest there has been any review of the impact of the changes made.

Key conclusions

i) There were insufficient local prescribing guidelines in place, governing the prescription of powerful pain relieving and sedative medicines.

ii) There had been a lack of a rigorous routine review of pharmacy data, which led to high levels of prescribing on wards caring for older people and this wasn't being questioned.

iii) There was an absence of Trust wide supervision and appraisal systems, which meant that poor prescribing practices were not identified.

iv) There was a lack of thorough multidisciplinary total patient assessment to determine care needs on assessment.

v) CHI concludes that the Trust **now** has adequate policies and guidelines in place, which are being adhered to in respect of the prescription and administration of pain relieving medicines to older patients.

Background to the investigation by CHI

March 1999 The CPS advised that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute any staff for manslaughter, or any other offence.

August 2001 Following a further police investigation, the CPS advised that there was insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction against any member of staff.

Local media coverage in March 2001, lead to 11 other families raising their concerns. The police referred four of these deaths for expert opinion and the expert reports were sent to CHI, the UKCC, the GMC, and the Trust, Isle of White Portsmouth, and East Hampshire Health Authority and the NHS South East Regional Office.

February 2002 The police decided not to pursue a more intensive investigation and the medical reports they had obtained were sent to the NMC for review.

The prescription, administration, review and recording of medicines.

The police expert witnesses reviewed the care of five patients who died in 1998.

Summary of conclusions

There was no evidence of a trust policy to ensure the appropriate prescription and dose escalation of strong opiate analgesia as an initial response to pain. There was inappropriate combined subcutaneous administration of Diamorphine, Midazolam and Haloperidol which carries an excessive risk of sedation and respiratory depression in older patients which can lead to death.

There were no clear guidelines for staff to prevent assumptions being made by clinical staff, but patients had been admitted on the basis of palliative, rather than rehabilitative care. There was a failure to recognise the potential adverse effects of prescribed medicines by the clinical staff.

Clinical managers failed (routinely) to monitor and supervise care on the wards.

CHI believes that the combination and use of medicines in 1998 was excessive and outside normal practice.

In recent years the use of the drugs has declined.

In 1998, there was no trust policy for the assessment and management of pain. Such a policy was introduced in April 2001.

Now CHI has seen evidence of the pain management cycle chart and 'analgesic ladder'. The nurses interview appeared to demonstrate a good understanding of pain assessment tools and the use of this analgesic ladder. CHI reviewed 15 recent admissions and found no further anticipatory prescribing of palliative opiates due to the pain and assessment policy, which has been introduced.

A prescription writing policy was produced in March 1998.

Syringe drivers Guidance for staff is now in the trusts policy for assessment and management of pain.

Now CHI has found good documented examples of communication with patients and relatives over medication and the use of syringe drivers, and the application of the Trust's policies.

Training

In 1999, only two qualified nurses from Sultan Ward had done a syringe driver course. Five nurses had completed a drugs competency course. No qualified nurses from Dryad or Daedalus ward had attended a course between 1998-2001.

The CHI report cites the UKCC/NMC Code and Scope documents and states that there is a requirement for nurses to act in the best interest of patients, which could include challenging the prescribing of other clinical staff.

CHI stated that a process needs to be found to ensure there are regular reviews of patient medication by senior clinicians and pharmacy staff. There were no systems in place in 1998 for the routine review of pharmacy data to alert the trust to any unusual or excessive patterns of prescribing.

Assessment

CHI had found little evidence to suggest that thorough individual total patient assessments were being made by multidisciplinary teams in 1998.

However, this approach to care had been developed in recent years.

Quality of care and the patient experience

CHI found that appropriate recording of patients' input and output was **now** being made, but nurses were unable to make swallowing assessments leading to delays in receiving nutrition over weekends when speech and language therapist staff were not on duty.

A recent review showed no evidence of an inappropriate patient catheterisation.

CHI observation during the week of 07/01/2002

CHI found friendly and welcoming ward staff and observed many positive aspect of patient care, which were confirmed by its review of recent patient notes.

CHI found no significant concerns now regarding the nursing care on Daedalus, Dryad and Sulton Wards.

Staffing arrangements and responsibility for patient care

In 1998, there were fortnightly ward rounds on Daedalus, less frequent on Dryad, but **now** there is a weekly round by a consultant and staff grade doctor. In 1998, a clinical assistant was employed for five sessions a week, **now** there is a full time staff grade post.

There was no appraisal system in 1998 for the clinical assistant, which is not uncommon now within the NHS. There had been no system for the consultant to supervise the clinical assistant or to review prescribing practices and the clinical assistant during 1998 was working in excess of the five contracted sessions.

Supervision

The Trust has been working for a number of years to adopt a model of clinical supervision. Since November 2000, there has been an H grade senior nurse co-ordinator to provide nursing leadership at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

Concerns were expressed by staff to CHI about the complex needs of patients at Gosport, and concerns had been formally raised in early 2000 about the increased workload and increased complexity of the patients.

CHI found no evidence of the systematic review, although a full-time staff grade doctor was in post by September 2001 to replace and increase the five sessions of clinical assistant cover.

CHI had found many positive structures in place to support staff who have felt demoralised and stressed by the series of police investigations, referrals to the GMC and the UKCC, and the CHI investigation.

Key findings include

1. Effective nursing leadership on Daedalus and Sulton Ward, but less so on Dryad ward.

2. Good progress made towards multidisciplinary team working.

Lessons learnt from complaints

Ten complaints concerning the care of patients on Daedalus, Dryad and Sultan Ward between 1998 and 2002, concerned levels of sedation, the use of syringe drivers and communication with relatives.

Three complaints in the last five months of 1998 were about concerns to do with pain management, the use of diamorphine and the levels of sedation.

Key findings

1. The Trust should have responded earlier to concerns expressed about levels of sedation, as they have been aware of this since late 1998.

2. Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, did effect changes in patient care over time as a result of complaints including increasing the medical staffing levels and improving communication with relatives. Learning was not consolidated until 2001 and there is no evidence of monitoring and reviews.

3. There was a delay in finalising the protocol for the use of diamorphine by syringe driver, which had begun in 1999, but was not finalised until April 2001, which CHI found unacceptable.

4. There had been some training of staff in handling patient complaints and in communication of patients and carers, but this was not comprehensive.

Clinical auditing board

There has been two trust audits of medicines, one in 1999 and one in late 2001. In 1999 it concluded that neuroleptic medicines were not being overused, although "the weekly medical review of medication was not necessarily recorded in the medical notes". This had been circulated to all staff on Daedalus and Dryad Ward, but a copy was not sent to Sultan Ward.

The re-audit in late 2001 felt that the overall use of neuroleptic medicines remained appropriate.

At appendix F, in the CHI report, there were notes of a medical notes review group. This found that **now** there was an appropriate use of medicines and syringe drivers although there was some evidence of unacceptable breakthrough pain, and that there was appropriate administration of medicines by nursing staff.

Quality of nursing towards the end life

Now there is a consistently reasonable standard of care. The nursing notes are generally adequate, although not always of consistent quality. There is still a task-orientated approach to care, but some very good detailed care plans were seen.

Concern remains about the lack of suitably trained nursing staff to carry out swallowing assessments. The Trust's policy on fluid and nutrition was being adhered to.

There was evidence of therapy input, but concern about the management of pressure areas in cases where people had been assessed as being at risk.

The admission criteria has generally been adhered to.

Code A

From: Code A

Sent: 08 July 2002 09:30

To: Code A

Cc: Code A

Subject: RE: Nurses at Gosport War Memorial hospital

Dear Code A

Code A passed me the file to review which I have done and I discussed it with Liz on 27th June when we decided that as the CHI report was due out very soon, we would review it in the light of this. The 90 page report came out last week and I have set aside some time tomorrow to work at home and read it.
So far we have had cases against Code A were closed by the PPC on 18 Sept 2001.

I am in on Thursday am and if you are too, can we meet to discuss?

Code A

-----Original Message-----
From: Code A
Sent: 05 July 2002 18:53
To: Code A
Cc: Code A
Subject: Nurses at Gosport War Memorial hospital

Code A understand that you have the main file and also the CHI report on Gosport War Memorial hospital.

Code A you have a file on Code A

Code A you have a file about **Phillip Beed**.

Code A it seems that your files come about because the families of patients at the hospital have been advised to make personal complaints but the clinical evidence and information uncovered by an independent review; the police investigation and expert witnesses consulted by the police; and the CHI review are all in the file currently with Code A The families know the police files were sent to us.

In the case of **Beed**, I believe this is one of the core cases investigated by the police.

We need somehow to join all these files together or we'll be wasting time uselessly asking people for information they know we already have.

I also think more families may write in and we should try to link all Gosport War Memorial hospital cases - at least until we are certain they shouldn't be.

Hopefully Code A will be able to give us some guidance about what to do with all this information.

Code A I see that you've already asked for some information from your complainant. You might want to look at Hilary's file and decide whether to contact the complainant and say we find we already have that information.

Code A I know that you've only recently got the file from Nikki. I see she gave you some advice about how to reply to the complainant but I think that the contents of Hilary's file may make that advice unnecessary. You also need to have a look in the file.

Code A although your complainant is Mrs Jackson, her daughter Emily Yeats (pronounced Yates) phoned me today and was expressing great concern that we had received the information in February and apparently had done nothing so far. She was referring not to her mother's complaint which was dated 1 June and arrived in our offices on 11 June, but to the fact that she believes we've had the police file sis Yeats nce February.

After some hunting about, I was able to confirm that I knew we did have the police file but I couldn't actually find it. I didn't know when, exactly, we'd received the file and didn't know what was happening with it but we may have been awaiting the outcome of the CHI investigation which was published on 3 July.

Ms Yeats said she wanted to be sure we appreciated that her mother's complaint concerned one of the core cases in the police files and that her and her mother's complaint didn't just consist of her mother's letter; the full details are all in the police file and possibly the CHI report.

Ms Yeats wants to be kept informed about what's going on and also wants to help us as much as she can; she's aware she may have details of police contacts and so forth that we might find very useful. We should feel free to phone her whenever we like.

Her phone number is : Code A

Other details she gave me are: Chief superintendant Dan Clacher:
Code A desk 02392 899004

Code A please would you print for your files.

Professional Conduct Department

File Note

Case Name: Gosport

Date:

To:

From: Code A

In all five cases subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine and in combination with sedative drugs were administered to older people who were mostly admitted for rehabilitation.

Failure to ensure respiratory depression does not occur.

Failure by medical and nursing staff to recognise or respond to severe adverse effects of depressed respiratory function and conscious level that seemed to occur in all five patients.

Nursing and medical staff appeared to have little knowledge of the adverse effects of these drugs in older people

There is a possibility that prescriptions of subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine may heave been routinely written up for many older frail patients admitted to Daedalus and Dryad wards, which nurses then had the discretion to commence. This practice if present was highly inappropriate, hazardous to patients and suggests failure of the senior hospital medical and managerial staff to monitor and supervise care on the ward.

Problem with training.

Important to examine levels of staffing

Richards

It was not wrong or incorrect of Dr Barton to believe Mrs R might die on the ward, but I would consider her apparent failure to recognise her rehabilitation needs may have led to sub-optimal care.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed para 2.25 – criticism of doctor

Inappropriate prescribing of sedative drugs
These drugs in combination are highly likely to have caused respiratory depression and or the development of bronchopneumonia that led to her death
Some evidence that Mrs R was in pain during the three days prior to her death and the administration of opiates can be justified on these grounds. However Mrs R was at high risk of developing pneumonia and it is possible she would have died for m pneumonia even if she had not been administered the subcutaneous sedative and opiate drugs.

Arthur Cunningham

Died 26 September 1998 on Broncho pneumonia + Parkinson's and Sacral Ulcer. Admitted for medical and nursing care to attempt to heal and control pain from his sacral ulcer.

3.8 Nursing staff made a decision to administer Oramorph but there is no clear recording in the nursing notes that he was in pain or the site of pain.

The nursing entry on 22 Sept indicates a syringe driver was commences for pain relief and to allay anxiety. Again the site of the pain is not stated. My interpretation is that nursing staff considered his agitation was due to pain from his sacral ulcer. The medical and nursing teams view on the cause of Mr Cunningham's deterioration on 23 September when he became chesty are no explicitly stated, but would seem to have been thought to be due to bronchopneumonia since this was the cause of death entered on the death certificate. The medical and nursing staff may not have considered the possibility that Mr Cunningham's respiratory symptoms may have been due to opiate and benzodiazepine respiratory depression. The nursing staff failed to appreciate that the agitation Mr Cunningham experienced on 23 September at 2300hr may have been due to the midazolam and diamorphine. It was appropriate for nursing staff to discuss Mr C's condition at this stage.

Mr Cunningham reviewed by Dr Lord on 24 September 1998.

3.11 in my opinion it is doubtful the nursing and medical staff understood that when a syringe infusion pump rate is increased it takes an often appreciable effect of time before the maximum effect of the increased dose rate becomes evident.

3.12 The nursing notes are at times variable and inadequate

3.13 criticism of Dr Barton

3.14 In my opinion it is of concern that the nursing notes suggest the diamorphine and midazolam infusions were commenced because of Mr C's behaviour recorded in the nursing entry on 22 September.

3.15 Hyoscine was commenced on 23 September after Mr C had become chesty overnight. I consider it very poor practice that there is no record of Mr C being examined by a doctor following admission on 21 September and a decision to treat this symptomatically with hyoscine appears to have been made by the medical staff. – Medical assessment necessary

3.16 I consider it poor practice that the midazolam was increased....on 23 September. There is no entry in the medical notes to explain this dose increase. The decision to triple the midazolam dose appear to have been made by a member of the nursing staff as the nursing notes record 'agitated at 2300h, syringe driver boosted with effect'

3.17 Medical assessment could have found other causes

3.23 Medical and nursing staff on Dryad ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care to attempt to heal Mr C's sacral ulcer and to document the effects of the drug prescribed. In my opinion this duty of care was not met and the denial of fluids and diet

and prescription of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mr C's death.

Despite reason for admission he was treated as if he had been admitted for terminal care.

Medical and nursing records are inadequate
Initial prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine by Dr Barton was in my view reckless.
The dose increases undertaken by nursing staff were inappropriate if not undertaken after medical assessment and review of Mr C.
I consider that doses of these drugs prescribed and administered were inappropriate and that these drugs most likely contributed to his death through pneumonia and/or respiratory depression.

Alice Wilkie

81-year-old patient, demented, admitted from nursing home – UTI, not responded to timethoprim. Had a fall, not refusing fluids and is becoming a little dry. When admitted to Daedulus August 1998 for 4-6 weeks assessment and observation and then decide on placement. Medical history of advanced dementia, urinary tract infection and dehydration.

Deterioration between 10 and 15 August, no diagnosis was made to explain the deterioration. No medical assessment in the notes following 10 august except documentation on 21 August of a marked deterioration. No clear evidence that she was in pain although she was commenced on opiate analgesia.

Should have given oral analgesics before diamorphine and hyoscine infusions

4.10 Medical and nursing notes inadequate

4.12 No clear recording of respiratory observation it is difficult to know where her respiratory depression was present.
Failure to monitor affect of drugs prescribed – mainly criticism of drugs prescribed.

Robert Wilson

75 year old man, admitted September 1998 after he sustained a proximal fracture of the left humerus.

Failure to assess properly by oncall doctor – not managed as assessment but as terminal care

5.10 When condition deteriorated medical and nursing staff did not appear to consider that this might have been due to the diamorphine infusion. When he was unconscious the diamorphine level should have been reduced or discontinued

Nursing and medical staff failed to record Mr Wilson's respiratory rate, it might have been reduced because of the effects of diamorphine

No record of the reason for prescribing Midazolam infusion on the day before his death. At this time the nursing notes record that he was comfortable. Mr Wilson did not improve. The medical and nursing teams did not appear to consider that the diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam

infusion could be a major contributory factor in Mr Wilson's subsequent decline. The infusion should have been discontinued and the need for treatment, in my opinion, unnecessary at the time of commencement reviewed.

5.17 The administration of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mr W's death.

Eva Page

87 years old, admitted in August 1998 with a general deterioration and feeling depressed

Opiates prescribed, not clear why as she was not in pain. I suspect this was because of anxiety and agitation. This is a reasonable indication for opiates in the palliative care of a patient with known inoperable carcinoma.

In my opinion the majority of management and prescribing decisions made by medical and nursing staff were appropriate. With one exception on the day of death

In general I consider that the medical and nursing care she received was appropriate and of adequate quality.

NURSING & MIDWIFERY COUNCIL

Protecting the public through professional standards

Private and Confidential

Mr Bernard Page
d

Code A

12 June 2002
Code A /GEN
PAGE

Direct Line: Code A
Fax Number: 020 7636 2903
Email: conduct@nmc-uk.org

Our ref: PPC Code A /Gosport

Dear Mr Page

Gosport War Memorial Hospital

Thank you for your letter of 17 May 2002 concerning the above and the care received by your mother Mrs E I Page.

The Nursing and Midwifery Council is the regulatory organisation for the professions of nursing and midwifery. This means that we keep the register for the professions, sets standards for practice and also have the power to remove from the register the names of any nurse who is not fit to practice because of professional misconduct.

The Nursing and Midwifery Council does not have the power to investigate the overall care received by Mrs Page whilst at Gosport, but only to investigate the specific practise of the nurses involved. We also cannot help you to obtain the documents that you require.

I enclose the Nursing and Midwifery Council booklet Complaints about professional conduct. This sets out in more detail what happens when a complaint is made and I hope that you will find it helpful.

I confirm that the Nursing and Midwifery Council have received from the police a copy of Professor Ford's report which includes an examination of the care your mother received whilst at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. The report whilst raising a concern about the prescription of medication on one occasion finds the care provided by the nurses adequate.

Therefore if you wish the Nursing and Midwifery Council to proceed with an investigation into the conduct of any nurse it would be helpful if you would specify what your concerns are. I note that you have received a professional opinion, it would be helpful in understanding your concerns if we could receive a copy of any report or letter that you have received from the expert you have consulted.

Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention and we look forward to hearing from you. For your information I am leaving the NMC on 14 June and therefore any reply should be directed to M Code A giving the reference above.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Private and confidential

Mr Bernard Page

Code A

22 May 2002
PPC Code A
Direct line: Code A
Fax No: 020 7636 2903
Email: Conduct@nmc-uk.org

Dear Mr Page

Gosport War Memorial Hospital

Thank you for your letter of 17 May 2002. This matter is receiving attention and I will write to you again in due course.

Yours sincerely

Code A

21 MAY 2002

29 Foster Road
Alverstoke
Gosport
Hampshire
PO12 2JH

Tel: Home Code A
Work
Ext. 2 Code A

Friday 17th May 2002

The Director
The Nursing and Midwifery Council
(NMC)
23 Portland Place
London
W1B 1PZ

RE: GOSPORT WAR MEMORIAL – DEATH OF Mrs E I PAGE

I wish to make a formal complaint against Nursing staff working at The Gosport War Memorial in Gosport, Hampshire, during the time that my mother was in their care.
The nurses concerned are S Code A **and others.**

My mother was admitted from Queen Alexandra's Hospital, Portsmouth on 27th Feb 1998 and died the evening of the 3rd of March 1998.

The events leading up and including her death were investigated in a serious crime investigation carried out by The Major Incident Complex, Portsmouth. Her case was serious enough to be sent to medical experts for opinion, I believe this report substantiates concern in her treatment. I also believe you have a copy and am aware of this case.

It is important to note that I was first made aware that there was concern in the treatment of elderly patients during 1998, when Mrs Gillian MacKenzies's case made local press news. At that time I wrote a letter to the police stating that I had concern relating to my mother, this was on the 9th April 2001. I was told that my mother's case would be investigated. I heard nothing until the 13 February 2002. At that time I was invited with other concerned relatives to a meeting with the head of the enquiry team who explained the events of the investigation and the reasons as to why no further action would be taken. At this meeting I first learnt that my mother's case was one of four cases investigated and expert opinions sought. I was also told at this meeting that these reports, which were highly critical of the care given to these patients, would be available to me. This promise was rescinded, and I was later told later that a Court Order would be required, and that this may well be refused.

I subsequently obtained my mothers notes and after perusal with a professional opinion, I found several areas of grave concern. I now understand from Mrs Ann Reeves (another unhappy relative) that these police reports were sent to you as an area of concern. A copy was also sent to the General Medical Council who I believe are investigating further as regards the doctors concerned.

I am annoyed that throughout this time I have been kept in the dark by the police as to any investigation made, and the investigating officer's decision to take no further criminal action, and his subsequent withdraw of the offer to release the medical opinions. I am presently making a formal complaint to The Chief Constable, Hampshire Police.

I trust you are able to assist me in this very serious matter.

Yours truly,

Code A

Bernard Page

Code A

From: Julie.Miller@chi.nhs.uk

Sent: 26 May 2002 19:50

To: Code A

Subject: RE: Gosport War Memorial Hospital - NMC

Code A

Thanks for this and for talking through with Liz. I will add the short para you have suggested.

Regards,

Julie

Julie Miller
Investigations Manager
Commission for Health Improvement
Finsbury Tower
103-105 Bunhill Row
London
EC1Y 8TG

Direct dial 020 7448 9323

Code A

From: Liz McAnulty

Sent: 23 May 2002 09:45

To: Code A

Subject: RE: Gosport War Memorial Hospital - NMC

Code A
I have had a chance to have a look at this now - I agree with what you have suggested instead of what is written - it might be useful if you give Julie a ring and explain why you are saying what you are saying - but I'll leave that for you to decide.

Thanks

Liz

-----Original Message-----
From: Code A
Sent: 23 May 2002 08:34
To: Liz McAnulty
Subject: FW: Gosport War Memorial Hospital - NMC

Dear Liz

I have been asked to comment by CHI on the NMC section of their report on the Gosport War Memorial. Its not exactly accurate because I don't believe we can reconsider the three nurses previously reported in relation to the same patient and also I don't like confirming that we have complaints.(but I know others think differently!)

Can we suggest instead something like

The police raised concerns about the registered nurses with the UKCC (now NMC) and the council are considering whether there are issues of professional misconduct in relation to any of the registered nurses involved.

-----Original Message-----
From: Julie.Miller@ Code A Code A
Sent: 22 May 2002 17:42
To: Code A
Cc: Kellie-Anne.Rehil Code A
Subject: Gosport War Memorial Hospital - NMC

Dear Code A

I've attached the draft section of the public CHI investigation report we discussed earlier. My main concern is to make sure CHI is factually correct, we also have a role to play in rebuilding public confidence and would like to say, if possible & as a minimum, that the NMC is considering cases at the moment.

Happy to discuss, my print deadline is 30 June.

Many thanks,

Julie

Stella Cates

NURSING & MIDWIFERY COUNCIL

Protecting the public through professional standards

From: Code A

Sent: 25 May 2002 15:04

To: 'Julie.Mille Code A

Subject: RE: Gosport War Memorial Hospital - NMC

Dear Julie

I have now had the opportunity to discuss this with Liz McAnulty, Director of Professional Conduct. We had concerns as we had discussed that our investigations are confidential and we don't normally confirm that we have a practitioner reported until the matter comes before a public hearing. The other concern was that once a case has been closed against a practitioner then it cannot be reopened save in very exceptional circumstances where new evidence has come to light. I don't believe there is any new evidence in relation to the three nurses who were named in relation to pt GR (though clearly this could change when I review the information from the Trust). However we are now looking at concerns that Prof Livesey raised about the care of other patients and whether this could lead to findings of misconduct against any other nurse. So..! We thought that perhaps something like this could be used:

The police raised concerns about the registered nurses with the UKCC (now NMC) and the council are considering whether there are issues of professional misconduct in relation to any of the registered nurses involved.

I am happy to discuss this though I am now away from the office until Wednesday.

Best wishes

Code A

Code A

Fax: 020 7636 2903

www.nmc-uk.org

-----Original Message-----

From: Julie.Miller@ Code A

Sent: 22 May 2002 17:42

To: Code A

Cc: Kellie-Anne.P Code A

Subject: Gosport War Memorial Hospital - NMC

Dear Code A

I've attached the draft section of the public CHI investigation report we discussed earlier. My main concern is to make sure CHI is factually correct, we also have a role to play in rebuilding public confidence and would like to say, if possible & as a minimum, that the NMC is considering cases at the moment.

Happy to discuss, my print deadline is 30 June.

Many thanks,

Julie

NURSING & MIDWIFERY COUNCIL

Protecting the public through professional standards

Investigations Manager
Commission for Health Improvement
Finsbury Tower
103-105 Bunhill Row
London
EC1Y 8TG

Direct dial Code A

1 *United Kingdom Central Council (UKCC) and after 1.4.02*
2 *Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC)*
3 Three nurses were referred to the UKCC's Preliminary Orders
4 Committee in June 2001, which has the authority to suspend
5 nurses, the cases were closed. Following receipt of further
6 information from the police, these cases have been reopened
7 and are under investigation by the UKCC's successor body the
8 NMC. *(This paragraph is subject to change and update)*

Fareham and Gosport NHS
Primary Care Trust

Unit 180, Fareham Reach
166 Fareham Road
Gosport
PO13 OFH

Tel: 01329 233447
Fax: 01329 234984

17 MAY 2002

Code A
Professional Conduct
Nursing & Midwifery Council
23 Portland Place
LONDON
W1B 1PZ

Our Ref: ET/LD

15th May 02

Dear Code A

Thank you for your letter of 29th April outlining information requirements in relation to the police investigation into the care of patients on Daedalus and Dryad Wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

I will respond using the numbers contained in your letter.

1. I note that the NMC will not be further considering the case of Gladys Richards. In relation to points 2 through 4, I am enclosing the records that you have requested relating to Arthur Cunningham, Alice Wilkie and Robert Wilson which will help to address the issues you have raised. It should be noted that the reports from the expert witnesses, from which I assume these issues were taken, are the interpretations reached by the expert witnesses themselves.

   In relation to the reports, questions have been raised about the factual accuracy of some of the content and they are compromised in that the expert witnesses never spoke to the staff concerned or senior clinicians/managers in the Trust. Furthermore, none of the expert witnesses came from a nursing background and no review by a nurse was undertaken as part of the police investigation.

5. I am also enclosing a copy of our own investigation which was generated following the police expert witness reports received first by the Trust in February 2002. As you know, this was the first sight we had of these expert witness reports.

   You will see from the report relating to our investigation that we agree that record keeping at Gosport War Memorial Hospital was inadequate in 1998/99. In contextual terms however, this hospital was in 1998 a cottage hospital, very similar to most others in the country (as reported by the Audit Commission at that time).

Since 1998 and the appointment of myself and key nursing leaders in the division responsible for Gosport War Memorial, the Trust has invested considerably in the development of nurses and nursing practice.

During 1997/1998, there were nursing shortages at Gosport War Memorial which is on the Gosport peninsula with all the attendant difficulties associated with nursing recruitment. The Trust also took steps to increase staff and clinical leadership, and implemented in 1998 one of the first and highly acclaimed Clinical Nursing Development Programmes.

While these factors are relevant, they do not condone the sub optimal practice of nurses. In response to this, the Trust's investigation led to interviews with three key nurses on the ward at the time of the incident in 1998. They were clear that while they agreed totally that their practice was below the standard required by the Trust and their code of conduct, there were mitigating circumstances. I have already outlined some of these and enclosed the investigation reports.

Since the investigation, the report recommendations are all being systematically and rigorously implemented in the PCT. This is being supervised and evaluated by Fiona Cameron, Operational Director for Community Services who is a senior experienced nurse and who was a key appointment to provide leadership to nursing in the area. The PCT is also applying for a nurse consultant to work within community hospitals in the Fareham and Gosport area to further strengthen nursing leadership in the Trust.

I hope this adequately covers the issues that you raised. However, if you have any further questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me again. As I am sure you are aware, this has been an extremely traumatic time for the staff as Gosport War Memorial Hospital was the subject of a CHI investigation earlier this year and this report is still awaited. This trauma has been enduring over a long period of time and has greatly affected the morale of staff at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Dr Eileen Thomas
C/o Fareham & Gosport PCT

Encs.

Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust

Notes of meetings to discuss the actions of nurses referred to the UKCC following events at Gosport War Memorial Hospital, 1998-1999.

1. Purpose

A meeting was convened in response to requests made by the Trust's Clinical Governance Panel meeting. During this, Panel members asked for reassurance that the Trust had taken appropriate action towards the nurses named in the police Expert Witness report sent to the UKCC and received by the Trust for the first time in February 2002. Although the focus of the UKCC investigation was not yet known, and in order to assure Panel members, Dr Thomas and Mrs Cameron were asked to investigate and report back at the next available meeting.

2. Two meetings were held as part of the investigation process.

Meeting One: Mrs Cameron, Dr Thomas, Mrs Woodland (RCN), Mrs Peach and Mrs Bennett.

This indicated that:

- Nursing documentation relating to the four patients in question was inadequate in several key areas; the recording of nutrition, hydration, pain assessment and evaluation, skin integrity and communications with relatives. Action: an independent audit of current nursing documentation.
- The nurses named in the police Expert Witness Report, were primarily the nursing team leaders during the period in question.
- Although extensive training initiatives have been implemented over the intervening years, it was not known if this has applied to the nurses specifically named in the Expert Witness report sent to the UKCC. Action: a review of the training records of the nurses involved and the training programmes available to all staff.
- It was considered important to be clear about the safety and competency of the nurses involved. Action: statements from managers and a review of IPR's would be undertaken.
- There were staff shortages during the time of the incidents. Action: Detailed information regarding increases in staff numbers and skill mix would be obtained.

Those present at the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that, had events occurred now, the usual processes would be invoked and the staff suspended subject to an investigation. There was also total agreement about the inadequacy of record keeping but that no action against the named nurses was indicated at the present time.

3. Meeting Two: Mrs Cameron, Dr Thomas, Mrs Woodland (RCN), Mrs Parvin, Mrs Peach, Mrs Bennett.

3.1.1 The independent audit of current nursing documentation was undertaken. This demonstrated that, while there were some excellent examples of documentation practice, there remained weaknesses in general. This in part, may relate to the structure of the record system used but there remained a training issue for staff. The record keeping of the named nurses was considered satisfactory.
Recommendation: The PCT should investigate the use of an alternative record system and should consider this for implementation across all nursing groups in the area. Training should be provided in the light of the new system.

3.1.2 Given the leadership roles of the nurses involved in the 1998-99 incidents. It was considered important for the Trust to feel confident that they recognised and reflected on the seriousness of the situation as it had occurred.
Action: Mrs Cameron with Mrs Parvin would meet the three nurses concerned. The purpose of this was to formally interview the nurses regarding their omissions in recording, and subject to their understanding of the seriousness and their responsibilities under the Nurses Code of Conduct, Mrs Cameron and Mrs Parvin would determine the next steps, to be taken. These meetings were arranged for 19 April, 2002.

3.1.3 While the nurses had undergone training over the intervening years, much of this was technical in nature and would not assist their leadership function. This includes; ensuring standards on the wards, modelling effective nursing practice and record keeping.
Recommendation: a relevant and evaluated training and development programme would be instigated for the individual nurses. The RCN Gerontological Programme Team should also be involved in addressing the general issue of culture and attitude.

3.1.4 The statements from managers and supervisors regarding the three nurses were positive, although only one nurse remained in the same post since 1998.
Recommendation: Regular supervision of all nursing staff and their clinical practice should be ensured in the PCT, in order to prevent poor practice in the future. It should consider implementing the Department of health's "Essence of Care", Clinical Benchmarks for this purpose.

3.1.5 Since 1998, there had been increases in the numbers of staff on the wards and the creation of a Clinical "H" post, which has 50% of time spent in clinical practice.
Recommendation: As part of the PCT's Clinical Governance arrangements, staffing and workload evaluations should be undertaken at agreed, regular intervals.

4. Summary

The investigation demonstrated that the record keeping of three nursing staff, during 1998-1999 had been sub-optimal, especially relating to the recording of patient care activities. There was no evidence that this continued or that the nurses were not competent to safely undertake their duties at the present time. In order to be certain that the nurses understood the important nature of care documentation and the potential seriousness of the situation they would be interviewed by Mrs Cameron and Mrs Parvin. Action subsequent to this would be determined as a result of these meetings.

While there were individual omissions on the part of the nurses concerned. Trust systems errors also contributed to the events referred to in the Expert Witness Reports. Many of these have been addressed through a number of Trust initiatives but the continued supervision of staff and evaluation of practice is essential to ensure best practice in the future.

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NURSING & MIDWIFERY COUNCIL

Protecting the public through professional standards

Private and confidential

Dr Eileen Thomas
Acting Nursing Director
Fareham and Gosport PCT
Newbridge
Cadnam
SO40 2NW

29 April 2002
PPC Code A
Direct line: Code A
Fax No: 020 7636 2903
Email: Conduct@nmc-uk.org

Dear Dr Thomas

Gosport War Memorial Hospital

I am writing further to our recent conversation concerning an investigation by Hampshire Constabulary into care of patients admitted to Daedalus and Dryad Wards, Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

Hampshire Constabulary have sent me a copy of Professor Livesley's and Rochford report which concluded that in five cases in 1998 subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine and in combination with sedative drugs were administered to older people who were mostly admitted for rehabilitation.

Clearly these issues concerned medical decisions but there were also issues surrounding the accountability of the nurses caring for these patients. There were no nurses named in the report.

Professor Livesley concerns about nursing care are summarised below.

1. Case of patient Gladys Richards

This case has previously been considered by the Preliminary Proceedings Committee of the UKCC who decided to close the case in relation to Beed, Couchman and Joice. Unless there is new evidence or evidence against other practitioners no further action can be taken.

2. Case of patient Arthur Cunningham

1. A decision was made to administer Oramorph but there was no clear recording in the nursing notes that he was in pain or the site of pain;

23 Portland Place, London W1B 1PZ
Telephone 020 7637 7181 Fax 020 7436 2924 www.nmc-uk.org

2. Nursing staff may not have considered the possibility that Mr Cunningham's respiratory symptoms may have been due to opiate and benzodiazepine respiratory depression;
3. Nursing staff failed to appreciate that the agitation Mr Cunningham experienced on 23 September at 2300hrs may have been due to Midazolam and Diamorphine;
4. Nursing notes were variable and at times inadequate;
5. Nursing notes suggest that diamorphine and midazolam infusions were commenced because of Mr Cunningham's behaviour recorded on 22 September;
6. Hyoscine commenced on 23 September after Mr Cunningham had become chesty overnight. There is no record of medical examination in relation to this;
7. On 23 September Midazolam appears to have been tripled without reference to medical staff;
8. Denial of fluids and diet and administration of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam may have contributed to Mr Cunningham's death.

3. Case of patient Alice Wilkie

1. Nursing notes were inadequate in that there were no clear recordings of respiratory observation so it was difficult to know whether respiratory depression was present;
2. There was a failure to monitor affect of drugs prescribed.

4. Case of patient Robert Wilson

1. When patient's condition deteriorated neither medical nor nursing staff appeared to consider that this was due to the high doses of medication Mr Wilson was administered;
2. There was a failure to record respiratory rate;
3. There is no clear reason for the prescribing of Midazolam when the nursing notes record that he was comfortable;
4. Administration of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to his death.

5. Case of patient Eva Page

No concerns about nursing care.

As you will know it is not within the remit of the NMC to investigate general concerns about nursing care on a ward or unit but to consider allegations of professional misconduct against particular nurses, midwives or health visitors in relation to issues which could result in removal from the register.

I am aware that you will have received Professor Livesley report and conducted your own investigation and it would be most helpful to have your comments on the issues outlined above and in particular whether there is concern about the conduct of any particular registered practitioner. Could I also request the following:

- Copies of the relevant pages from the nursing medical notes of Arthur Cunningham, Alice Wilkie and Robert Wilson.
- Copies of any report or document that you are able to provide arising out of your own investigation.
- Details of any disciplinary action taken against any registered practitioner.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter and I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Code A

Code A

From: Code A
Sent: 05 April 2002 10:05
To: Code A
Subject: Gillian McKenzie

Could you pls telephone the above lady it is regarding a complaint she sent in re the nurses at the Gosford Memorial Hospital, P Code A in particular.

Her number is Code A

Thanks
Code A

— She is Mrs Richard's daughter. I asked her to write in with her concerns. She is also concerned about lack of info from police.

Code A

Professional Conduct Department

Telephone note

Case Name: Gosport Hospital

Date: 21 March 2002

Caller: Eileen Thomas

Called: **Code A**

Details

The Trust ceases to exist on 31 March 2002.

She will send the outcome of the internal enquiry and action taken.

Stella Galea

From: Liz McAnulty
Sent: 19 March 2002 10:09
To: Code A
Subject: Beed et al

Code A
I had just sent the last email on this when I received a call from Dr Eileen Thomas as Gosport - can you please ring her on 02380 814582. I would be grateful if you would keep me informed about the progress on this please Code A

Liz

Code A

From: Liz McAnulty
Sent: 19 March 2002 09:59
To: Code A
Subject: Beed et al

Code A

A Code A may have told you Julie Miller from CHI wanted to speak to me about the above case. I explained that you had not had time to take any action as yet as you had been on holiday. Julie and her team are conducting an indepth investigation into the case next week and she will be happy to share the report and any documentation with us. she is going to contact you in about 2 weeks time to discuss it with you.
Dr Barton is apparently appearing before the GMC's interim orders committee tomorrow. When you can read the medical reports will you please consider whether we should put it forward again please?

Liz

Portsmouth HealthCare NHS
NHS Trust

14 MAR 2002

Department of Medicine for Elderly People
Queen Alexandra Hospital
Cosham
Portsmouth
Hants
PO6 3LY

Tel 023 9228 6000
Fax 023 9220 0381

Detective Superintendent John James
Major Incident Room
Hampshire Constabulary
Kingston Crescent
Portsmouth

08 March 2002

RIR/cmp

Dear Superintendent James

Further to you letter of 5th February 2002, to Mr Millett regarding Police enquiries at Gosport War Memorial Hospital and our subsequent discussion, we are considering within the Trust what further appropriate action we need to take as the employer of the staff named in the three reports commissioned by the Police.

In the course of this we have identified several inaccuracies in the text of one of the reports (that from Professor Ford). I am quite sure that these are to do with a misreading of the draft when finally being typed up, but given that the GMC and UKCC, along with ourselves, are considering individual staff on the basis of these reports, I felt that I should write highlighting the points so that they can be corrected:

- **Page 17, paragraph 3.13, fourth sentence**

  This reads "poor assessment by Dr. Lord"

  However in view of the subsequent sentence (which reads that "the assessment by Dr Lord was thorough and competent") and of the context of the patient's medical notes (where there is a comprehensive note by Dr Lord but only four lines by Dr Barton), we assume that this should read "poor assessment by Dr Barton".

- **Page 21, paragraph 4.1, line seven**

  This reads "... she is not refusing fluids ..."

  The G.P. letter referred to states "... she is now refusing fluids".

- **Page 26, paragraph 5.5**

This lists the dates of prescriptions as in September, whereas the prescription chart for the patient shows them as in October.

❖ **Page 27, paragraph 5.9, line one**

This reads as ".. deteriorated on 15 September..."

This should read "October". The patient was admitted on 22 September and was not an in-patient on 15 September.

In paragraph 5.9 there is a reference to Mr Wilson having been seen by the "on-call Doctor". The on-call Doctor concerned was Dr A C Knapnan.

❖ **Page 34, paragraph 6.16, final sentence**

This reads "... was likely to have resulted could have resulted..."

We assume that only one of these statements is meant to be there.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Dr R I Reid
Medical Director

cc: GMC
UKCC
CHI

Medical Report:
concerning the case of Gladys Mable Richards deceased

Prepared for:

Hampshire Constabulary
Major Crime Complex, Fratton Police Station, Kingston Crescent,
North End, Portsmouth, Hampshire PO2 8BU

by: Professor Brian Livesley MD FRCP
The University of London's Professor in the Care of the Elderly
Imperial College School of Science, Technology, & Medicine
The Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, London SW10 9NH

For the purpose of ... providing an independent view about treatment given to Mrs Gladys RICHARDS and the factor(s) associated with her death.

Synopsis

1. At the age of 91 years, Mrs Gladys RICHARDS was an in-patient in Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

1.1. A registered medical practitioner prescribed the drugs diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine for Mrs Gladys RICHARDS.

1.2. These drugs were to be administrated subcutaneously by a syringe driver over an undetermined number of days.

1.3. They were given continuously until Mrs RICHARDS became unconscious and died.

1.4. During this period there is no evidence that Mrs RICHARDS was given life sustaining fluids or food.

1.5. It is my opinion that as a result of being given these drugs, Mrs RICHARDS's death occurred earlier than it would have done from natural causes.

CONTENTS

The writer's declaration

1. This report consisting of thirty-four pages is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that if tendered in evidence, I shall be liable for prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything that I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Introduction

2. The documents with which I have been provided and the visits I have made to the hospitals involved in this enquiry are listed in the Appendix A.

2.1. Appendix B contains facts of the environment provided by the statements of Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE (the elder daughter of Mrs Gladys RICHARDS (deceased)) and Mrs Lesley Frances LACK (the younger daughter).

2.2. I have indicated any medical terms in **bold type**. I have defined these terms in a glossary in Appendix C.

2.3. I have included in Appendix D references to published material.

2.4. Appendix E contains details of my qualifications and experience.

2.5. This report has been presented on the basis of the information available to me—should additional information become available my opinions and conclusions may be subject to review and modification.

Information relating to Mrs Gladys Richards (deceased)

3. Mrs Gladys Mable RICHARDS (née Beech) was born on 13th April 1907 and died on 21st August 1998 aged 91 years.

3.1. Mrs Richards has two daughters. They are Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE (the elder daughter) and Mrs Lesley Frances LACK.

3.1.1. Mrs Lack is a retired Registered General Nurse. She retired during 1996 after 41 years continuously in the nursing profession. For 25 years prior to her retirement she was involved in the care of elderly people. For 20 years prior to retirement she held supervisory and managerial positions in this particular field of nursing.

3.2. The Glen Heathers Nursing Home is a private registered nursing and residential home at Lee on the Solent, Hampshire. Dr J BASSETT is a general practitioner who visits.

3.3. The Royal Hospital Haslar is an acute general hospital in Gosport, Hampshire serviced by the Armed Forces at the time of the incident but available as a National Health Service facility to local people.

3.4. Gosport War Memorial Hospital is part of the Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

3.4.1. Daedalus ward is a continuing care and rehabilitation ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

3.5. Dr Jane Ann BARTON is a registered medical practitioner who in 1988 took up a part-time post as clinical assistant in elderly medicine. This post became centered at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. She retired from this part-time post in the year 2000.

3.6. Code A is the clinical manager and charge nurse on Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Ms Code A are registered general nurses who were working on Daedalus ward at the time of the incident.

3.7. Dr Anthea Everista Geredith LORD is a consultant physician, within the department of elderly medicine of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust, who was usually responsible for the patients on Daedalus ward and who was on study leave on 17/18 August 1998.

3.7.1. Other consultant physicians from the department of elderly medicine provide on-call consultant physician cover when Dr LORD is absent from duty.

Relevant aspects of Mrs RICHARDS's medical history

4. Mrs RICHARDS became resident at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home on 5th August 1994 at the age of 87 years and although disorientated and confused she was able to wash and dress herself and able to go up and down stairs and walk well.

4.1. It is noted that she also had a past medical history of bilateral deafness for which she required hearing aids.

4.1.1. Unfortunately both of her hearing aids were lost by December 1997 while she was at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home and had not been replaced by July 1998 when she was admitted to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital).

4.1.2. It is noted that on 8th July 1998 her general practitioner, Dr J BASSETT wrote to the audiologist at Queen Alexandra Hospital, Cosham requesting an '**URGENT** [sic]' domiciliary visit to Glen Heathers Nursing Home. This was '... with a view to supplying her [Mrs RICHARDS] with two new hearing aids.... Since her poor hearing probably contributes to her

confusional state I would be grateful if you would visit with a view to fitting of replacement aids as soon as possible please.'

4.2. It is also noted that Mrs RICHARDS had had operations for the removal of cataracts and required glasses.

4.2.1. Unfortunately her spectacles were also lost at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home and had not been replaced by August 1998 when she was admitted to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

4.2.2. As Dr BASSETT had noted Mrs RICHARDS poor hearing probably contributed to her confusional state. The absence of her spectacles would also make it difficult for Mrs RICHARDS to be aware of what was going on around her, further aggravate her confusional state due to lack of sensory stimulation, and increase her dependency on others for her normal daily activities.

4.2.3. The absence of both her hearing aids and her spectacles would make the assessment of and communication with Mrs RICHARDS extremely difficult.

4.2.3.1. It is noted that such sensory deprivation can produce and aggravate confusional and disorientated states.

4.3. At the beginning of 1998, she had become increasingly forgetful and less able physically but was inclined to wander and she had about a six months' history of falls.

4.4. On 29th July 1998, at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home, Mrs RICHARDS developed a fracture of the neck of her right femur [thighbone] and she was transferred to the Royal Hospital Haslar, Gosport.

4.4.1. In the Accident & Emergency department she was given 2.5mg of **morphine** and 50 mg of **cyclizine** at 2300 hours to relieve her pain and distress. She was known to be taking **haloperidol** 1mg twice daily and **Tradazone** 100mg at night.

4.5. On 30th July 1998 Mrs RICHARDS had a right cemented hemiarthroplasty [an artificial hip joint inserted].

4.5.1. Post-operatively she was given 2.5 mg morphine intravenously on July 30th at 0230 hours, 31st at 0150 and 1905 hours, and on August 1st at 1920 hours and 2nd at 0720 hours. From August 1st –7th she was weaned over to two tablets of **co-codamol,** requiring these on average twice daily for pain relief.

4.5.2. On 3rd August 1998 it was noted 'All well. Sitting out early mobilization'.

4.6. On 5th August 1998, Dr REID, a consultant geriatrician, saw her. He stated in a letter that '... she appeared to have a little discomfort on passive movement of the right hip. I understand that she has been sitting out in a chair and I think that, despite her dementia, she should be given the opportunity to try to re-mobilise. I will arrange for her transfer to Gosport Memorial Hospital.'

4.6.1. Dr REID also noted that Mrs RICHARDS had continued on Haloperidol and '... her Trazodone has been omitted. According to her daughters it would seem that since her Tradozone has been omitted she has been much brighter mentally and has been speaking to them at times.'

4.7. A discharge letter, dated 10th August 1998, was sent by the sergeant staff nurse at the Royal Hospital Haslar and addressed to 'The Sister in Charge Ward [sic] Memorial Hospital, Bury Road, Gosport, Hants.' It contained the following information:-

4.7.1. After the operation Mrs RICHARDS became '...fully weight bearing, walking with the aid of two nurses and a **Zimmer frame**.' She was noted to require 'total care with washing and dressing, eating and drinking....' She was '... continent, when she become[s] fidgety and agitated it means she wants the toilet....' She 'Occasionally says recognisable words, but not very often.' Her wound 'Is healed, clean and and dry.'

4.8. On 11th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was transferred to Daedalus ward at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. She was not in pain and had been fully weight bearing at the Royal Hospital Haslar walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame.

4.8.1. At the Gosport War Memorial Hospital there was an unsigned 'Summary' record which is apparently a Nursing record and this states:-

4.8.1.1. '11-8-98 Addmitted [sic] from E6 Ward Royal Hospital Haslar, into a continuing care bed. Gladys had sustained a right fractured neck of Femur on 30th July 1998 in Glen Heathers Nursing Home. She has had a right cemented hemi-arthroplasty and she is now fully weight bearing, walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame. Daughter visits regularly and feeds mother. She wishes to be informed Day or night of any deterioration in mothers condition....'

4.8.2. The contiguous 'Assessment Sheet' states, 'Patient has no apparent understanding of her circumstances due to her impaired mental condition ... Deaf in both ears ... Cataract operation to both eyes ... occasionally says recognisable words, but not very often ... soft diet. Enjoys a cup of tea ... requires feeding ... Dental/Oral status Full "Set" – keeps teeth in at night.'

4.8.3. The 'Patient Medication Information' states, '11.8.98 ... Haloperidol O[rally] 1 mcg [looks like 'mcg' but probably is 'mg' since this drug is not prescribed in single **microgram** doses] B.D. [twice daily]'

4.9. ??[initials]B [subsequently identified as Dr BARTON] has written in the medical case records '11-8-98 Transferred to Daedalus Ward Continuing Care.... O/E [on examination] Impression frail demented lady [paragraph] not obviously in pain [paragraph] Please make comfortable [paragraph] transfers with hoist Usually continent needs help with **ADL [activities of daily living]**.... I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death.'

4.10. At 1300 hours on the 13th August 1998 the Nursing Contact Record states 'Found on floor at 13.30hrs [sic]. Checked for injury none apparent at time hoisted into safer chair 20.00 [hours][altered on record to 19.30] pain Rt [right] hip internally rotated. Dr BRIGG contacted advised Xray AM [in the morning] & **analgesia** during the night. Inappropriate to transfer for Xray this PM [evening] [initialled signature (? by whom)] RGN [Registered General Nurse] [next line] Daughter informed.'

4.11. Dr BARTON has recorded '14-8-98 Sedation/pain relief has been a problem screaming not controlled by haloperidol 1 [illegible symbol or word] but very sensitive to **oramorph**. Fell out of chair last night ... Is this lady well enough for another surgical procedure?'

4.12. In her contiguous note Dr BARTON has recorded '14-8-98 Dear [?] Cdr [Commander] SPALDING Further to our telephone conversation thank you for taking this unfortunate lady who slipped from her chair at 1.30 pm yesterday and appears to have dislocated her R[ight] hip.... She has had 2.5ml of 10mg/5ml Oramorph at midday.'

4.12.1. According to the letter signed by Code A Mrs RICHARDS was given 10mgs of Oramorph at 1150 hours on 14th August 1998 prior to being transferred back to the Royal Hospital Haslar.

4.13. The Nursing Contact Record at Daedalus ward continues:-

4.13.1. '14/8/98 am [morning] R[ight] Hip Xrayed – Dislocated [paragraph] Daughter seen by Dr BARTON & informed of situation. For transfer to Haslar A&E [accident and emergency department] for reduction under sedation [initialled signature]'

4.13.2. 'pm [afternoon or evening of 14th August 1998] Notified that dislocation has been reduced. [Mrs RICHARDS] To stay in Haslar [hospital] for 48 hours then return to us [[initialled signature] Family aware.'

4.14. At the Royal Hospital Haslar (at 1400 hours) Xray having confirmed that the hemiarthroplasty had dislocated, intravenous sedation using 2 mgs of midazolam

allowed the dislocation to be corrected by traction. The procedure was described as 'Under sedation c [with] CVS/RS [cardiovascular and respiratory systems] monitoring. ... Easy reduction.' Mrs RICHARDS was noted to be 'rather unresponsive following the sedation. The [She] gradually became more responsive....' She was then admitted the Royal Hospital for 48 hours observation.

4.15. Apart from two tablets of co-codamol on the 15th August 1998, she did not need to be given any pain relief following the reduction of her hip dislocation.

4.15.1. Two days later, on 17th August 1998, it was recorded that 'She was fit for discharge that day and she was to remain in straight knee splint for four weeks. In the discharge letter from Haslar Hospital it was also recorded that Mrs RICHARDS was to return to Daedalus Ward. It was further stated that 'She has been given a canvas immobilising splint to discourage any further dislocation, and this must stay in situ for four weeks. When in bed it is advisable to encourage abduction by using pillows or abduction wedge. She can however mobilise fully weight bearing.'

4.16. On 17th August 1998 it was also recorded that she was 'Fit for discharge today (Gos[port] War Mem[orial hospital). To remain in straight knee splint for 4/52 [four weeks] ... No follow-up unless complications.'

4.17. She was returned to Daedalus ward in the Gosport War Memorial Hospital later that day but in a very distressed state. The Daedalus ward nursing record states 'Returned from R.N. Haslar, patient very distressed appears to be in pain. No canvas under patient – transferred on sheet by crew To remain in straight knee splint for 4/52 [four weeks] For pillow between legs at night (abduction) No follow-up unless complications.'

4.17.1. Mrs RICHARDS was given Oramorph 2.5 mg in 5mls. The nursing record for 17th August 1998 further states '1305 [hours] ... Daughter reports surgeon to say her mother must not be left in pain if dislocation occurs again. Dr Barton contacted and has ordered an Xray. Code A [paragraph] pm Hip Xrayed at 1545 [hours] Films seen by Dr PETERS & radiologist & no dislocation seen. For pain control overnight & review by Dr BARTON mane [in the morning]. ?[illegible nurse signature]

4.17.1.1. This radiograph was reported by Dr. DOMJAN, Consultant Radiologist as showing 'RIGHT HIP: The right hemiarthroplasty is relocated in the **acetabulum**.'

4.18. On 17th August 1998, Dr BARTON noted 'Readmission to Daedalus from RHH [Royal Hospital Haslar] Closed reduction under iv [intravenous] sedation remained unresponsive for some hours now appears peaceful. Plan Continue haloperidol [paragraph] Only give oramorph if in severe pain See daughter again.'

4.19. On 18th August 1998, Dr BARTON recorded 'Still in great pain [paragraph] Nursing a problem. [paragraph] I suggest sc[subcutaneous] diamorphine/Haloperidol/midazolam [paragraph] I will see daughters today [paragraph] please make comfortable.'

4.20. The nursing Contact Record on Daedalus ward in the Gosport War Memorial Hospital continues:-

4.20.1. '18/8/98 am Reviewed by Dr Barton. For pain control via syringe driver. [paragraph] 1115 Treatment discussed with both daughters [Mrs LACK and Mrs MACKENZIE]. They agree to use of **syringe driver** to control pain [It is noted that Mrs LACK has disagreed with this statement] & allow nursing care to be given. [paragraph] 1145 Syringe driver diamorphine 40 mg. Haloperidol 5 mg, Medazolam [midazolam] 20 mg commenced'

4.20.2. '18/8/98 20.00 Patient remained peaceful and sleeping. Reacted to pain when being moved – this was pain in both legs. [paragraph] Daughter quite upset and angry about mother's condition, but appears happy that she is pain free at present. C JOICE.'

4.20.2.1. It is noted that a 'disturbance reaction' occurs in patients when they are moved that is easily mistaken for pain requiring specific treatment. It is noted here that Mrs RICHARDS was described as being 'pain free' at this time apart from when she was being moved.

4.20.3. The nursing Contact Record continues 'Daughter, Jill, stayed the night with Gladys [Mrs RICHARDS], grandson arrived in early hours of morning [initialled signature; dated '19/8/98'] [paragraph] He would like to discuss Grand mother's condition with someone – either Dr. Barton or Phillip Beed later today [initialled signature]' [paragraph] '19/8/98 am Mrs Richards comfortable. [paragraph] Daughters seen. Unhappy with various aspects of care, complain[t] to be handled officially by Mrs S Hutchings Nursing co-ordinator [initialled signature]'

4.20.4. It is noted that there is no continuing nursing Contact Record for the 20th August 1998.

4.20.5. The contiguous nursing Contact Record states '21/8/98 12.13 [hours] Patient's [Mrs RICHARDS] overall condition deteriorating, medication keeping her comfortable. Daughters visited during the morning. C JOICE'

4.21. Dr BARTON's next contiguous medical record was on 21st August 1998 when she wrote 'Much more peaceful [paragraph] needs Hyoscine for rattly chest'.

4.21.1. It is noted that Mrs RICHARDS was already being given hyoscine at this time and had been doing so continuously since 19th August 1998.

4.21.2. Nurse GRIFFIN made the next note in the medical records on 21st August 1998 stating that Mrs Richards was dead at 2120 hours.

4.22. The Nursing Care Plan records state:-

4.22.1. '12.8.98 Requires assistance to settle and sleep at night.... 12.8.98 Haloperidol given at 2330 [hours] as woke from sleep very agitated shaking and crying. Didn't settle for more than a few minutes at a time. Did not seem to be in pain.'

4.22.2. '13.8.98 oromorph at 2100 [hours] Slept well [initialled signature] [paragraph] For Xray tomorrow morning [initialled signature]'

4.22.3. '14.8.98 Same pain in rt[right] leg / ?[query] hip this am. [initialled signature]'

4.22.4. 'Re-admitted 17/8/98'

4.22.5. '17.8.98 Oromorph [Oramorph] 10mg/5ml at present.'

4.22.6. '18.8.98 Now has a syringe driver with 40mgs Diamorphine – comfortable. Daughters stayed. [initialled signature]'

4.22.7. 'Daughters stayed with Gladys [Mrs RICHARDS] overnight. [initialled signature]'

4.22.8. There is no record of continuance of the Nursing Care Plan for 20th and 21st August 1998.

4.22.9. After Mrs RICHARDS had been readmitted to Daedalus ward on 17th August 1998, there is no record between 17th and 21st August 1998 in the patient Nursing Care Plan for 'Nutrition'. On 21st August the record states 'no food taken [initialled signature]'.

4.22.9.1. There is no record that Mrs RICHARDS was offered any fluids.

4.22.10. Similarly, the Nursing Care Plan for 'Constipation' shows no record between 17th and 21st August1998. On 21st August the record states 'BNO [bowels not open] [initialled signature]'

4.22.11. The Nursing Care Plan for 'Personal Hygiene' states:-

4.22.11.1. '18.8.98 Complete Bed Bath given plus oral [Signature] Hygiene [second signature]'

4.22.11.2. '18.8.98 Night: oral care given frequently'

4.22.11.3. '19.8.98 Nightie changed & washed, repositioned. Apparently pain free during care [initialled signature]'

4.22.11.4. It is noted that there is no record of Mrs Richards being attended to for 'Personal Hygiene' on 20th August 1998.

4.22.11.5. '21.9.98 General care and oral hygiene given [initialled signature]'

4.23. The drugs prescribed for Mrs RICHARDS at Gosport War Memorial Hospital from the time of her admission there on 11th August 1998 are described below.

Drugs prescribed for Mrs RICHARDS at Gosport War Memorial Hospital

5. Dr BARTON wrote the following drug prescriptions for Mrs RICHARDS.

5.1. On 11th August 1998:-

5.1.1. Oramorph 10mgs in 5mls to be given orally four hourly. On the Administration Record these doses are recorded as being given—

5.1.1.1. twice on 11th August 1998 (10mg at 1015 [?1215] and 10mg at 1145 [?pm]);

5.1.1.2. once on 12th August (10mg at 0615);

5.1.1.3. once on 13th August (10mg at 2050);

5.1.1.4. once on 14th August (5ml [10mg] at 1150);

5.1.1.5. four times on 17th August (2.5ml [5mg] at 1300, 2.5ml [5mg] at ????[time illegible], 2.5ml [5mg] at1645, and 5ml [10mg] at 2030); and,

5.1.1.6. twice on 18th August 1998 5ml [10mg] at 01230[sic and ? meaning 0030 hours] and 5ml [10mg] at [?]0415).

5.1.2. Diamorphine at a dose range of 20 – 200 mg to be given subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.1.2.1. None of this diamorphine prescription is recorded on the Administration Record as having been given between 11th – 14th August inclusive.

5.1.3. Hyoscine at a dose range of 200 – 800 mcg [micrograms] to be given subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.1.3.1. None of this hyoscine prescription is recorded on the Administration Record as having been given between 11th – 14th August inclusive.

5.1.4. Midazolam at a dose range of 20-80 mgs to be given subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.1.4.1. None of this midazolam prescription is recorded on the Administration Record as having been given between 11th – 14th August inclusive.

5.1.5. Haloperidol 1mg orally twice daily. It is noted that at the top of this prescription chart 'TAKES MEDICINE OFF A SPOON' [sic] is clearly written.

5.1.5.1. She was give 1mg of haloperidol at 1800 hours on 11th August 1998, at 0800 and 2330 hours on 12th August 1998, at 0800 and 1800 hours on 13th August 1998.

5.1.5.2. In addition, on 13th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was prescribed haloperidol 2mgs in 1ml to be administered orally as required at a dose of 2.5ml [this figure has been altered and also can be read as 0.5 ml] to be given 'IF NOISY' [sic]. She was given a dose [quantity not stated bearing in mind the altered prescription] at 1300 on 13th August 1998.

5.1.5.3. She was also given 1mg of haloperidol at 0800 hours on 14th and also at 1800 hours on 17 August 1998.

5.1.6. It is noted that, apart from 2330 hours on 12 August 1998, at the above times when Mrs RICHARDS was given haloperidol she was also give 10ml of **Lactulose** [a purgative].

5.2. On 12th August 1998:-

5.2.1. Oramorph 10mgs in 5mls to be given orally in a dose of 2.5 mls four hourly [equivalent to 5mgs of oramorph].

5.2.1.1. Although this drug was apparently not administered its prescription was written up on the 'Regular Prescription' chart but at the side in an ink-drawn box there are the letters PRN [meaning that the prescription is to be administered as required].

5.2.2. Oramorph 10mgs in 5mls to be given orally once at night.

5.2.2.1. Although this drug was apparently not administered its prescription was also written up on the 'Regular Prescription' chart but at the side in an ink-drawn box there are the letters PRN [meaning that the prescription is to be administered as required].

5.3. 18th August 1998:-

5.3.1. Diamorphine at a dose range of 40-200mg to be administered subcutaneously in 24 hours

5.3.2. Haloperidol a dose range of 5-10 mgs to be administered subcutaneously in 24 hours.

5.4. On 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was given simultaneously and continuously subcutaneously diamorphine 40mgs, and haloperidol 5mgs, and midazolam 20mgs during each 24 hours.

5.4.1. These drugs are recorded as being administered at the same time of day on each of the four days they were given. They were administered at 1145, 1120, 1045, and 1155 for 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998 respectively.

5.4.1.1. All these drugs were administered at the times stated and were signed off by initials as being co-administered by the same person each day. Over the four days of 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998, at least three nurses were involved in administering these drugs.

5.4.1.2. According to the prescription charts these drugs were signed for as being administered to Mrs RICHARDS via the syringe driver by Code A on 18th and 19th August 1998, by Code A Code A on 20th August 1998, and by Code A on 21st August 1998.

5.4.2. It is noted that on the 19th, 20th, and 21st August 1998 the drugs midazolam 20mgs, diamorphine 40mgs, and haloperidol 5mgs were also co-administered subcutaneously in 24 hours with 400mcg of hyoscine [this last drug had been

prescribed by Dr BARTON to be given as required on 11th August 1998 but its administration was not commenced until 19th August 1998].

5.4.3. It is also noted that all the drugs for subcutaneous administration were not prescribed at specific starting dosages but each was prescribed for a wide range of dosages and for continuous administration over 24-hour periods.

5.4.3.1. It is not known who selected the dosages to be given.

Death certification and cremation

6. The circumstances of Mrs RICHARDS death have been recorded as follows:

6.1. In a document [Case no. 1630/98] initialled by the Coroner on 24th August 1998 'Reported by Dr BARTON [sic]. Deceased had undergone surgery for a fractured neck of femur. Repaired. Death cert[ificate] issued. [paragraph] THOMAS [sic]

6.2. The cause of death was accepted by the Coroner on 24th August 1998 as being due to:-

6.2.1. '1(a) Bronchopneumonia'..

6.2.2. The death was certified as such by Dr J A BARTON and registered on 24th August 1998.

6.2.3. It is noted that the continuous subcutaneous administration of diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine to an elderly person can produce unconsciousness and death from respiratory failure associated with pneumonia.

6.3. The body was cremated.

Conclusions

7. Mrs Gladys Mable RICHARDS died on 21st August 1998 while receiving treatment on Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

7.1. Some fours years earlier, on 5th August 1994, Mrs RICHARDS had become resident at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home.

7.2. Mrs RICHARDS's had a confused state that after December 1997 had been aggravated by the loss at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home of her spectacles and both of her hearing aids.

7.3. On 29th July 1998, Mrs RICHARDS developed a fracture of the neck of her right femur [thighbone] and she was transferred from the Glen Heathers Nursing Home to the Royal Hospital Haslar, Gosport.

7.4. Despite her confused state, Mrs RICHARDS was considered by medical staff at the Royal Hospital Haslar to be suitable for implantation of an artificial hip joint. This took place on 30th July 1998.

7.5. On 11th August 1998, and having been seen by a consultant geriatrician, Mrs RICHARDS was transferred for rehabilitation to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

7.6. At that time Dr BARTON recorded that Mrs RICHARDS was not obviously in pain but despite this Dr BARTON prescribed Oramorph [an oral morphine preparation] to be administered orally four hourly.

7.6.1. At that time also Dr BARTON prescribed for Mrs RICHARDS diamorphine, hyoscine, and midazolam. These drugs were to be given subcutaneously and continuously over periods of 24 hours for an undetermined number of days and the exact dosages were to be selected from wide dose ranges.

7.6.2. Also on 11th August 1998, at the end of a short case note, Dr BARTON wrote 'I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death'.

7.6.3. It is noted that although prescribed on the day of her admission to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital these drugs (diamorphine, hyoscine, and midazolam) were not administered at that time.

7.7. On 13th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS's artificial hip joint became dislocated.

7.8. The following day, 14th August 1998, although Dr BARTON had recorded 'Is this lady well enough for another surgical procedure?' she arranged for Mrs RICHARDS to be transferred back to Haslar Hospital where the dislocation of the hip was reduced.

7.8.1. It is noted that at the age of 91 years, and despite Dr Barton's comment about Mrs RICHARDS, and her confused mental state, Mrs RICHARDS was considered well enough by the staff at the Royal Hospital Haslar to have two operations on her right hip within about two weeks.

7.9. Three days later, on 17th August 1998, Mrs RICHARDS was returned to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital on a sheet and not on a stretcher. She was very distressed when she reached Daedalus ward.

7.10. There is no evidence that Mrs RICHARDS, although in pain, had any specific life-threatening and terminal illness that was not amenable to treatment and from which she could not be expected to recover.

7.11. Despite this, and on 18th August 1998, Dr BARTON, while knowing of Mrs RICHARDS's sensitivity to oral morphine and midazolam, prescribed diamorphine, midazolam, haloperidol, and hyoscine to be given (from wide dosages ranges) continuously subcutaneously and by a syringe driver over periods of 24 hours for an unlimited period.

7.11.1. Neither midazolam nor haloperidol is licensed for subcutaneous administration.

7.11.2. It is noted, however, that in clinical practice these drugs are administered subcutaneously in the management of distressing symptoms during end-of-life care for cancer.

7.11.3. It is also noted that Mrs RICHARDS was not receiving treatment for cancer.

7.12. There is no evidence that in fulfilling her duty of care Dr BARTON reviewed appropriately Mrs RICHARDS's clinical condition from 18th August 1998 to determine if any reduction in the drug treatment being given was indicated.

7.13. During this period when a syringe driver was being used to administer the subcutaneous drugs, there is no evidence that Mrs RICHARDS was given fluids or food in any appropriate manner.

7.14. There is no evidence that in fulfilling their duty of care Code A Code A reviewed appropriately Mrs RICHARDS's clinical condition from 18th August 1998 to determine if any reduction in the drug treatment they were administering was indicated.

7.15. There is, however, indisputable evidence that the subcutaneous administration of drugs by syringe driver continued without modification and during every 24 hours from 18th August 1998 until Mrs RICHARDS died on 21st August 1998.

7.16. Dr Barton recorded that death was due to bronchopneumonia.

7.16.1. It is noted that the continuous subcutaneous administration of diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine to an elderly person can produce unconsciousness and death from respiratory failure associated with pneumonia.

My opinion

8. When Mrs RICHARDS was first admitted to Daedalus ward at Gosport War Memorial hospital on 11th August 1998 she was not in pain and had been fully weight bearing walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame.

8.1. Despite recording that Mrs RICHARDS was not in pain, on 11th August 1998 Dr BARTON prescribed wide dosage ranges of opiate and sedative drugs to which Mrs RICHARDS was known to be sensitive.

8.1.1. Dr Barton also recorded that 'I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death.' when Mrs RICHARDS had been admitted for rehabilitation and her death was not obviously imminent.

8.2. When, at the age of 91 years, Mrs RICHARDS dislocated her operated hip and despite her confused mental state, she was considered well enough to have a second operation on her right hip within about two weeks of the first operation.

8.3. There is no evidence to show that after her second operation Mrs RICHARDS, although in pain, had any specific life-threatening and terminal illness that was not amenable to treatment and from which she could not be expected to recover.

8.4. It is my opinion, and there is evidence to show, that Mrs RICHARDS was capable of receiving oral medication for the relief of the pain she was experiencing on 17th August 1998.

8.5. Mrs RICHARDS was known by Dr BARTON to be very sensitive to Oramorph, an oral morphine preparation, and to have had a prolonged sedated response to intravenous midazolam.

8.6. Despite this, and from 18th August 1998 for an undetermined and unlimited number of days, Dr BARTON prescription led over 24-hours periods to the continuous subcutaneous administration to Mrs RICHARDS of diamorphine 40mgs, haloperidol 5mgs, and midazolam 20mgs to which was added hyoscine 400mcg from 19th August 1998.

8.7. The administration of these drugs continued on a 24-hours regime without their dosages being modified according to Mrs RICHARDS's response to them and until Mrs RICHARDS died on 21st August 1998.

8.8. There is no record that Mrs RICHARDS was given any food or fluids to sustain her from the 18th August 1998 until she died on 21st August 1998.

8.9. As a result of the continuous subcutaneous administration of the prescribed drugs diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine Mrs RICHARDS became unconsciousness and died on 21st August 1998.

8.10. No other event occurred to break the chain of causation and in my opinion Mrs RICHARDS's death was directly attributable to the administration of the drugs she continuously received by syringe driver from 18th August 1998 until her death on 21st August 1998.

8.11. It is my opinion that Mrs Gladys RICHARDS's death occurred earlier than it would have done from natural causes and was the result of the continuous administration of diamorphine, haloperidol, midazolam, and hyoscine which had been prescribed to be administered continuously by a syringe driver for an undetermined number of days.

APPENDIX A

14. I have received and read the following documents:-

14.1. The letter of DCI BURT dated 22nd November 1999 that gave an initial overview of the case.

14.2. The documents in the file DCI BURT presented at our meeting on 28th January 2000 as follows:-

14.2.1. 1) Draft (unsigned) statement (MG11) of Lesley HUMPHREY.
14.2.2. 2) Copy of PEC (NHS) T Health Record (LH/1/C).
14.2.3. 3) Copy of RHH Medical Record (AF/1/C).
14.2.4. 4) Draft (unsigned) statement (MG11) of Gillian MACKENZIE.
14.2.5. 5) Draft (unsigned) statement of Lesley LACK.

14.3. The documents in the file DCI BURT presented at our meeting on 8th March 2000 including those pursuant to my request of 28th January 2000 (documents WX1, WX2, and YZ were forward to me on 9 March 2000) as follows:-

14.3.1.	A	Typed copy of Notes prepared by Mrs LACK and given to Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust
14.3.2.	B	Typed copy of additional page of notes which was prepared by Mrs LACK but, apparently, not passed to Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust
14.3.3.	C	Typed copy of Notes prepared by Mrs LACK and given to Social Services
14.3.4.	D	Typed copy of comments made by Mrs LACK in respect of letter from Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust which represented a response to her Notes of complaint (A)

14.3.5.	E	Typed copy of comments made by Mrs LACK in respect of a Report prepared by Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust which resulted in the letter referred to above
14.3.6.	F	As D above but made by Mrs MACKENZIE
14.3.7.	G	As E above but made by Mrs MACKENZIE
14.3.8.	HI	Copy of letter written by Mrs MACKENZIE to DI MORGAN (OIC of initial investigation) plus 5 copies newspaper cuttings
14.3.9.	JK	Copy of Coroner's Officer's Form
14.3.10.	L	Copy of letter from Dr REID to S/Cdr SCOTT
14.3.11.	M	Copy of Report made by,Dr LORD during original investigation
14.3.12.	N	Copy of additional newspaper cutting
14.3.13.	O (1)	Typed copy of signed statement of Anne FUNNELL (RHH)
14.3.14.	O (2)	Typed copy of signed statement of Lesley HUMPHREY (Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust)
14.3.15.	O (3)	Copy of signed statement of Lesley LACK
14.3.16.	O (4)	Copy of final draft of Gillian MACKENZIE's statement
14.3.17.	PQ	Copy of schedule of x-ray images (RHH)
14.3.18.	R	Copy of Risk Event Record (Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust)
14.3.19.	S (1)	Copy of letter which DCI BURT has sent to Lesley HUMPHREY (Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust) raising various issues
14.3.20.	S (2)	Copy of entries in medical directories 1998/1999 - Dr Jane Ann BARTON
14.3.21.	S (3)	Copy of letter from Mrs MACKENZIE to DCI BURT
14.3.22.	S (4)	Copy of documents which accompanied the two Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust x-ray images
14.3.23.	T	Copy of various documents which featured in a Social Services Case Conference stemming from receipt of Mrs LACK's Notes of complaint (C above)
14.3.24.	UV	Copy of Death Certificate - Mrs RICHARDS
14.3.25.	WX1	Witness Statement of Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE dated March 6 2000
14.3.26.	WX2	Copy of letter from DR J.H. BASSETT to Mrs MACKENZIE with an addendum of five pages being a photocopy from 'Toxic Psychiatry' a book by Dr Peter BREGGEN published by Harper Collins.
14.3.27.	YZ	Two extracts from 'Criminal Law. Diana Rowe. Hodder & Stoughton 1999.'

14.4. On 8th March 2000, in the presence of DCI BURT, I visited:-

14.4.1. the Gosport Memorial Hospital and followed the passageways along which Mrs Richards was conveyed and the ward areas in which she was treated; and,

14.4.2. the Royal Hospital Haslar and followed the passageways along which Mrs Richards was conveyed and the ward area in which she was treated.

14.4.2.1. At the Royal Hospital Haslar, on 8th March 2000, in the presence of DCI BURT, I was also shown twelve (12) radiographs relating to Mrs Richards' treatment there on 12th April 1998, 17th July 1998, 14th August 1998, 29th July 1998, and 31st July 1998.

14.5. In addition I have read the following the documents given to me by DCI BURT on 12th May 2000 consisting of the following which are numbered below as listed in the two containing ring binders:

14.5.1.	E 25	Copy of Glen Care Homes file Re: Gladys RICHARDS supplied by Glen Care Homes
14.5.2.	E 22	Copy of Hampshire County Council Social Services file Re: Gladys RICHARDS
14.5.3.	E23	Copy of Glen Care Homes file Re: Gladys RICHARDS supplied Nursing Homes Inspectorate
14.5.4.	E 24	Copy Portsmouth and South East Hampshire Health Authority GP Patient Records of Gladys RICHARDS
14.5.5.	D 63	Police letter 090300 to Miss CROSS, Haslar Hospital with further questions
14.5.6.	D 65	Letter 100400 from Miss CROSS at Haslar including Patient transfer order and further medical records
14.5.7.	D 104	Letter 080200 from Mrs. MACKENZIE with notes Re: draft statement
14.5.8.	D 108	Portsmouth NHS Trust Dept. of Diagnostic Imaging report folder
14.5.9.	D 110	Copy typed Gladys RICHARDS Death Certificate dated 240898

14.6. I have also read the documents given to me by DCI BURT on 19th July 2000, consisting of copies of the statements made by:-

14.6.1. J[Code A]
14.6.2. GIFFIN Sylvia Roberta
14.6.3. PULFORD Monica Catherine
14.6.4. WALKER Fiona Lorraine
14.6.5. MARJORAM Catherine
14.6.6. BALDACCHINO Linda Mary
14.6.7. PERKINS Margaret Joan
14.6.8. TUBBRITT Anita
14.6.9. [Code A]
14.6.10. WALLINGTON Kathleen Mary
14.6.11. FLETCHER Anne
14.6.12. COOK Joanne
14.6.13. MOSS JEAN Kathleen
14.6.14. TYLER Christina Ann

14.7. I have also read statements, provided on 30th August 2000 by DCI BURT, made by:

14.7.1. Doctor Jane Ann BARTON
14.7.2. Phillip James BEED

14.8. I have also received from DCI BURT on 8th September 2000 and read copies of:-

14.8.1. A letter dated 18th August 2000 from Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE to DCI BURT.

14.8.1.1. Enclosed with this letter was a copy of a letter dated 9th August 2000 from Ms Jill BAKER to Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE to which had been added a petition form.

14.9. A letter dated 21st August 2000 from Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE to DCI BURT.

14.9.1. Enclosed with this letter was a copy of a letter dated 14th December 1998 from Ms Lesley HUMPHREY, Quality Manager at Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust Central Office to Mrs Gillian MACKENZIE. This had enclosed with it a copy of a letter dated 22nd September 1998 from Mr Max MILLETT, Chief Executive of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust.

14.10. Copies of Witness Statements (taken by Mrs S HUTCHINGS who led the initial Internal Inquiry as Investigating Officer of Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust) as follows:-

14.10.1. On 3rd September 1998 statement consisting of four pages from Mrs Jenny BREWER – Staff Nurse Daedalus Ward to which is attached an additional statement (three pages) by Staff Nurse Brewer (the first page of this three pages is headed Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust and has been signed on page three by S. N J Brewer RGN and dated 9-9-98 (Reference D142)).

14.10.2. On 8th September 1998 statement consisting of five pages from Code A Code A – Clinical Manager Daedalus Ward (Reference D143).

14.10.3. On 9th September 1998 statement consisting of three pages from Ms Code A – Staff Nurse Daedalus Ward (Reference D144).

14.10.4. On 8th September 1998 statement consisting of two pages from Ms Monica PULFORD – Enrolled Nurse Daedalus Ward (Reference D145).

14.10.5. On 3rd September 1998 statement consisting of four pages from Ms Code A – Staff Nurse Daedalus Ward (Reference D146).

14.11. A copy of the National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services paper entitled 'Ethical decision-making in palliative care'.

14.12. On 5th and 6th October 2000 I received from Hampshire Constabulary and subsequently read:-

14.12.1. The records of the interviews conducted with Dr Anthea Everista Geredith LORD on 27th September 2000.

14.12.2. During these interviews Dr LORD produced as listed in the Officer's Report by DC McNally the following documents:-

14.12.2.1. Drug Therapy Guidelines for subcutaneous fluid replacement as approved by the Elderly Medicine and Formulary & Medicines Group of Portsmouth Hospitals and Portsmouth Healthcare updated for 1998.

14.12.2.2. Consultants' Rota for August 1998 of the Department of Medicine for Elderly People (Ref: CI/28.7.98).

14.12.2.3. Memorandum from Mrs. L HUMPHREY of Portsmouth Health Care NHS Trust to Dr. LORD dated 17th December 1998 and headed 'Mrs. Richards deceased, Gosport War Memorial Hospital, 21st August, 1998.'

14.12.2.4. Letter from Dr R I REID, Medical Director of Portsmouth Health Care NHS Trust giving approval of study leave for Dr. LORD for the dates of 17/18 August 1998.

14.12.2.5. Consultants' Timetable of the Department of Medicine for Elderly People from 4.5.98 – 8.2.99.

Appendix B

Facts of the environment - obtained from the statements of Mrs RICHARDS's daughters

15. Mrs MACKENZIE is the elder of Mrs RICHARDS's two daughters. It is noted that her sister, Mrs LACK, is a retired Registered General Nurse.

15.1. Mrs LACK retired in 1996 after 41 years continuously in the nursing profession. For 25 years prior to retirement she was involved in the care of elderly people. For 20 years prior to retiring she held supervisory and managerial positions in this field of nursing.

15.2. By July 1998, Mrs RICHARDS had been resident at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home for some four years. She had a past medical history of bilateral deafness for which she required two hearing aids (unfortunately these were lost while she was at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home). She had had operations for the removal of cataracts and required glasses (unfortunately these were also lost at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home).

15.3. Also by July 1998, Mrs RICHARDS had become increasingly forgetful and less able physically. She had had 17 falls documented at the Glen Heathers Nursing Home between 29th January 1998 and 29th July 1998.

15.3.1. During this period Mrs MACKENZIE decided to meet and question her mother's general practitioner, Dr BASSETT. Mrs MACKENZIE had formed the opinion that the drugs Dr BASSETT was prescribing could contribute to her mother's confused mental state and deterioration of her physical health. One drug was Trazodone and the other was haloperidol. Following this meeting she sent him a copy of a book entitled *Toxic Psychiatry*.

15.3.2. Dr BASSETT replied, in a hand-written letter, thanking Mrs MACKENZIE and stating '... I have a reputation in Lee [-on-Solent] of being somewhat sparing with 'mood' drugs and especially antibiotics. ... most drugs are prescribed with more caution these days. [paragraph] Hopefully we can continue to keep your Mother's drugs to a minimum!'

15.4. It is convenient to mention here that both Mrs MACKENZIE and Mrs LACK have registered serious concerns about the care given to their mother in the Glen Heathers Nursing Home.

15.4.1. Jane PAGE, Principal Nursing Home Inspector, Portsmouth & S.E. Hants Health Authority investigated these concerns formally. On 11th August 1998, she made an unannounced visit to the Glen Heathers Nursing Home. She reported, on 26th August 1998, that 'From the written records obtained and discussions held, I can find no evidence to substantiate that Mrs RICHARDS did not receive appropriate care and medication.'

15.4.2. These concerns were discussed further by the Social Services Department at a meeting held on 23rd November 1998 when Mrs LACK was present. The conclusion was that 'There was no evidence of deliberate abuse [of Mrs RICHARDS] although there seemed to be problems of complacency in some of the care practices which needed review.... However, there was no evidence of malpractice by the Home.'

15.5. On 29th July 1998, while in the Glen Heathers Nursing Home, Mrs RICHARDS sustained a fracture of the neck of her right femur (thighbone). According to Mrs

LACK her mother underwent a surgical operation on 30th July 1998 'following a discussion with the consultant who thought my mother should be given the chance to remain ambulant.'

15.6. Mrs LACK has also stated:-

15.6.1. 'My mother received a replacement hip, on her right side, and remained in the Haslar Hospital a further eleven days until Tuesday the 11th August 1998. [paragraph] I visited my mother every day during this period and, in my view, when taking into account the serious injury which she had sustained and the trauma she had suffered, my mother appeared to make a good recovery during this period.'

15.6.2. 'Prior to her discharge, and transfer to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, my mother was responding to physiotherapy, able to walk a short distance with the aid of a zimmer frame and no longer required a catheter. Her medication had been reduced and she was able to recognise family members and make comments to us which made sense.'

15.6.3. 'She was with encouragement, eating and drinking naturally and as a result the drips, which had facilitated the provision of nourishment after the operation, had been removed.'

15.6.4. 'Significantly, my mother was no longer in need of pain relief. It was quite apparent, to me, that she was free of pain.'

15.6.5. 'Such was the extent of my mother's recovery that it was considered appropriate to discharge her and transfer her to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital where she was admitted to Daedalus Ward on Tuesday the 11th August 1998. This was the first occasion that my mother had been admitted to this particular hospital.'

15.7. On 12th August 1998, the day after her mother's admission to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, Mrs LACK visited her mother there and has recorded '... I was rather surprised to discover that I could not rouse her [Mrs RICHARDS]. As she was unrousable she could not take nourishment or be kept hydrated. [paragraph] I enquired among the staff and I was told that my mother had been given the morphine based drug 'Oramorph' for pain. This also surprised me. When my mother had been discharged from the Haslar Hospital, the day before, she had not required pain relief for several days. [paragraph] I was distressed to observe my mother's deteriorated condition which significantly contrasted with the level of recovery which had been achieved following treatment at the Haslar hospital during the period after the surgical operation to replace her hip. [paragraph] I was told that my mother had been calling out, showing signs of being anxious, and it was believed that she was suffering pain. They did not investigate the possible cause. I consider it likely that she was in need of the toilet. ... One of the

consequences of being rendered unrousable, by the effects of 'Oramorph', was that no fluids could be given to my mother and this, together with the abandonment of other forms of rehabilitation, would have served to inhibit or prevent the recovery process which had begun prior to her admission to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.'

15.8. Mrs RICHARDS had a fall on 13th August 1998 (as described above). On the following morning (14th August 1998), Mrs LACK noted that while her mother was being taken to the X-ray department at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital 'She was still deeply under the effects of the 'Oramorph' drug.'

15.9. As described above Mrs RICHARDS was then transferred to the Royal Hospital Haslar for the reduction of her dislocated artificial hip. She was returned to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital on 17th August 1998 having been noted the previous day (16th August) by Mrs LACK [a nurse experienced in the care of elderly people] to be 'easily manageable'.

15.9.1. In accepting that he would transfer Mrs RICHARDS to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, Dr REID (consultant geriatrician) had stated that '... despite her dementia, she [Mrs RICHARDS] should be given the opportunity to try to re-mobilise.'

15.10. On visiting her mother at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital at about 1215 hours on 17th August 1998, Mrs LACK accompanied by her sister [Mrs MACKENZIE], found her mother to be screaming and in pain. The screaming ceased 'within minutes' when Mrs LACK and a registered general nurse repositioned Mrs Richards.

15.11. Subsequently, the X-ray at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital showed no fresh dislocation of the artificial hip.

15.12. Following this further X-ray, Mrs LACK told Dr BARTON that Haslar Hospital would be prepared to readmit her mother. Dr BARTON is reported to have '... felt that was inappropriate.' Mrs LACK '... considered this was essential so that the 'cause' of my mother's pain could be treated and not simply the pain itself.'

15.12.1. Dr BARTON is stated to have said to Mrs LACK that, '..."It was not appropriate for a 91 year old, who had been through two operations, to go back to Haslar Hospital where she would not survive further surgery." '

15.13. Mrs LACK states that, on 18th August 1998, the Ward Manager [Code A explained to her and her sister that a syringe driver was going to be used. This was to ensure Mrs RICHARDS 'was pain free at all times' so that she would not suffer when washed, moved, or changed in the event she should become incontinent. Mrs LACK has also described in her contemporaneous notes (as well as in her Witness Statement, see below) that 'A little later Dr BARTON appeared and confirmed that a haematoma

was present and that this [the use of a syringe driver] was the kindest way to treat my mother. She [Dr BARTON] also stated "And the next thing will be a chest infection." '.

15.13.1. In her Witness Statement, Mrs LACK has recorded 'The outcome of the syringe driver was explained to my sister and I fully. Drawing on my experience as a nurse I [Mrs LACK] knew that the continuous use of morphine, as means of relieving her pain, could result in her death. She [Mrs RICHARDS] was, at the time, unconscious from the effects of previous doses of 'Oramorph'.... [paragraph] As result of seeing my mother in such great pain I was becoming quite distressed at this stage. My sister asked the Ward Manager, "Are we talking about euthanasia? It's illegal in this country you know." The Ward Manager replied, "Goodness, no, of course not." I was upset and said, "Just let her be pain free". [paragraph] The syringe driver was applied and my mother was catheterised to ease the nursing of her. She had not had anything by mouth since midday Monday 17th August 1998. [paragraph] A little later Dr BARTON [sic] appeared and confirmed that a haemetoma [sic] was present and that this was the kindest way to treat my mother. She also stated, "And the next thing will be a chest infection." .... [In her witness statement Mrs Mackenzie has stated that ' DR BARTON [sic] then said, "Well, of course, the next thing for you to expect is a chest infection".'][paragraph] I would like to clarify the issue of my 'agreement' to the syringe driver process. It was not a question, in my mind, of 'agreement'. [paragraph] I wanted my mother's pain to be relieved. I did not 'agree' to my mother being simply subjected to a course of pain relief treatment, at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, which I knew would effectively prevent steps being taken to facilitate her recovery and would result in her death. [paragraph] I also wanted my mother to be transferred back to the Haslar Hospital where she had, on two occasions, undergone operations and recovered well. My mother was not, I knew, terminally ill and, with hindsight, perhaps I should have challenged Dr BARTON [sic] more strongly on this issue. [paragraph] In my severe distress I did not but I do believe that my failure to pursue the point more vigorously should not have prevented Dr BARTON [sic] from initiating an alternative course of action to that which was taken, namely a referral back to the Haslar Hospital where my mother's condition could have been treated and where an offer had already been made to do so. [paragraph] I accept that my mother was unwell and that her physical, reserves had been depleted. However, she had, during the preceding days and weeks, demonstrated great courage and strength. I believe that she should have been given a further chance of recovery especially in the light of the fact that her condition had, it would seem likely, been aggravated by poor quality service and avoidable delay experienced whilst in the hands of those whose responsibly [responsibility] it was to care for her. [paragraph] My mother's bodily strength allowed her to survive a further 4 days using her reserves. She suffered kidney failure on 19th August and no further urine was passed. The same catheter remained in place until

her death. [paragraph] Because the syringe driver was deemed to be essential following the night of several doses of pain relief my mother's condition gradually deteriorated during the next few days, as I knew it inevitably would, and she died on Friday the 21st August 1998.'

15.14. It is noted that Mrs LACK had made contemporaneous hand-written notes comprising five numbered pages. In her Witness Statement she records these '... are in the form of a basic chronology and I incorporated within them a series of questions which focused on particular areas of concern in respect of which I sought an explanation or clarification from the hospital authorities. Following presentation of my notes we were visited on the ward by Mrs Sue HUTCHINGS [sic] on 20.8.98.'

15.14.1. Mrs LACK also made a further one page of contemporaneous hand-written notes. In these she states she was so appalled about her mother's condition, discomfort and severe pain that she visited Haslar Hospital at about lunchtime on 17th August 1998 to ask questions about her mother's condition before she [Mrs RICHARDS] had left the Haslar Hospital ward for her second transfer to Gosport War Memorial Hospital. She learned that, prior to her discharge from Haslar Hospital on 17th August 1998, her mother had been eating, drinking, using a commode and able to stand if aided. Mrs LACK also states in this contemporaneous record that 'On leaving the ward [at Haslar Hospital at about lunchtime on 17th August 1998] I bumped into the Dr [doctor] who had been in casualty theatre for my mothers [sic] second [sic] operation. He was with consultant when all the procedures were explained to me on Friday 14th [August 1998] He said "How's your mother". I explained the current position to him in detail. I told him that she was in severe pain since the transfer which had been undertaken a short time earlier. He said "We've had no referral. Get them to refer her back. We'll see her."

15.15. It is noted that a Discharge Letter from the Royal Hospital Haslar describes Mrs RICHARDS' condition on discharge on 17th August 1998 as "She can, however, mobilise fully weight bearing."

15.16. It is also noted that Mrs LACK has stated that she and her sister were constantly at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, day and night, from 17th August 1998 until the time their mother died.

15.16.1. Mrs MACKENZIE has stated that 'I stayed with my mother until very late that Tuesday night [18th August 1998]. it was past midnight, in fact, when my son arrived from London. As from the Wednesday night my sister also sat with me all night long and we both remained, continuously, until twenty past nine on the following Friday evening [21st August 1998] when my mother died. During that time Dr Barton [sic] did not visit my mother. I am quite certain about this because our mother was not left alone, in her room, at

any time apart from when she was washed by the nursing staff. Either my sister or I, [sic] was with her throughout.'

15.16.2. Mrs MACKENZIE has also stated that although she did not sign the contemporaneous notes made by Mrs LACK she '... was a party, at times, to the preparation process and where, on occasions, my sister has referred to 'I' in fact it could read 'we' as we were together when certain events occurred.'

15.16.3. Mrs MACKENZIE continues 'It seems to me that she [Mrs RICHARDS] must have had considerable reserves of strength to enable her to survive from Monday until Friday, five days, when all she had was a diet of Diamorphine and no hydration whatsoever, apart from porridge, scrambled eggs and a drink, at the Royal Hospital Haslar, before transfer to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital.'

Appendix C

Glossary

Acetabulum is the name given to the two deep socket into which the head of the thigh bone (femur) fits at the hip joint.

ADL [activities of daily living] are those physical activities of daily life necessary for normal human functioning and include getting up, washing, dressing, preparing a simple meal, etc.

Analgesia is the relief of pain. This can be achieved by physical means including warmth and comfortable positioning as well as by the use of drugs. The aim is to keep patients pain free with minimal side effects from medication.

Bronchopneumonia is inflammation of the lung usually caused by bacterial infection. Appropriate antibiotic therapy, based on the clinical situation and on microbiological studies, will result in complete recovery in the majority of patients. It can contribute to the cause of death in moribund patients.

Co-codamol is a drug mixture consisting of paracetamol and codeine phosphate, which is used for the relief of mild to moderate pain.

Cyclizine is a drug used to prevent nausea and vomiting, vertigo, and motion sickness.

Dementia is the name given to a condition associated with the acquired loss of intellect, memory, and social functioning.

Diamorphine, also known as heroin, is a powerful opioid analgesic.

Haematoma is an accumulation of blood within the tissues, which clots to form a solid swelling.

Haloperidol, a drug used in the treatment of psychoses including schizophrenia and mania and also for the short-term management of agitation, excitement, and violent or dangerously impulsive behaviour. Dosage for all indications should be individually determined and it is best initiated and titrated under close clinical supervision. For patients who are elderly the normal starting dose should be halved, followed by a gradual titration to achieve optimal response. It is not licensed for subcutaneous administration (see **licensed** below).

Hemiarthroplasty is the surgical remodelling of a part of the hip joint whereby the bone end of the femur is replaced by a metal or plastic device to create a functioning joint.

Hyoscine is a drug used to reduce secretions and it also provides a degree of amnesia and sedation, and has an anti-vomiting effect. Its side effects include drowsiness.

Lactulose is a preparation taken by mouth to relieve constipation.

A microgram is one millionth of a gram and is not to be confused with a milligram dosage of a drug, which is one thousand times larger.

Midazolam is a sedative drug about which there have been reports of respiratory depression. It has to be use with caution in elderly people. It is used for intravenous sedative cover for minor surgical procedures. It is also used for sedation by intravenous injection in critically ill patients in intensive care. It can be given intramuscularly. In the management of overdosage special attention should be paid to the respiratory and cardiovascular functions in intensive care. It is not licensed for subcutaneous administration (see **licensed** above).

Morphine is an opioid analgesic used to relieve severe pain.

Oramorph is a drug used in the treatment of chronic pain. It contains morphine and is in the form of a liquid. 10mls of Oramorph at a strength of 10mgs of morphine sulphate in 5mls of liquid is an appropriate first dose to give to a person in severe pain, which had not responded to other less potent, pain relieving drugs.

Respiratory depression is the impairment of breathing by drugs or mechanical means which leads to asphyxia and, if uncorrected, to death.

Subcutaneous means beneath the skin.

A **syringe driver** is a power driven device for pushing the plunger of a syringe forward at an accurately controlled rate. It is an aid to administering medicinal preparations in liquid form over much longer periods than could be achieved by injecting by hand. In this case the syringe driver used was a Sims Graseby MS 26 Daily rate syringe driver which operates over periods of 24-hours.

Tradazone is a drug used in the treatment of depressive illness, particularly when sedation is required.

Unlicensed medicines. In order to ensure that medicines are safe, effective and of suitable quality, they must have a product licence (now called a market authorisation) before being marketed in the United Kingdom. Unlicensed drugs are not licensed for use for any indication or age group. Licensing arrangements constrain pharmaceutical companies but not prescribers. The Medicines Act 1968 and European legislation make provision for doctors to use unlicensed medicines. Individual prescribers of unlicensed medicines, however, are always responsible for ensuring that there is adequate information to support the quality, efficacy, safety and intended use of a drug before using it.

A **Zimmer frame** is a lightweight, but sturdy, frame the patient can use for support to assist safe walking.

APPENDIX D

Texts used for reference have included:

1. Adam J. ABC of palliative care: The last 48 hours. *British Medical Journal* 1997; 315: 1600-1603.

   1.1. This paper is from the widely read, British Medical Journal which is published weekly and received by about 30,000 general practitioners and 45,000 hospital doctors in England and Wales. It records that treatment with opioids (viz. morphine and diamorphine) should be individually tailored, the effect reviewed, and the dose titrated accordingly.

2. *ABPI Compendium of data sheets and summaries of product characteristics 1998-99: with the code of practice for the Pharmaceutical Industry*. Datapharm Publications Limited, 12 Whitehall, London SW1A 2DY.

3. Breggin P R. *Toxic psychiatry. Drugs and electroconvulsive therapy: the truth and the better alternatives*. 1993. HarperCollins Publishers. London. pp. 578.

4. British Medical Association and the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. *British National Formulary*. Number 32 (September 1996). The Pharmaceutical Press. Oxford.

5. *Cecil Textbook of Medicine*. eds. J.C. Bennett & F. Plum. W.B. Saunders Co. 20th Edition. 1996.

6. Letter from Clive Ward-Able (Medical and Healthcare Director) and Lee Neubauer BSc (Hons) (New Product Specialist), Roche Pharmaceuticals.

6.1. A copy of this letter has already been supplied to the Police and reports that the product licence does not cover the administration of Hypnovel® (midazolam) by subcutaneous injection.

7. Roche Pharmaceuticals. Hypnovel® [midazolam]. Summary of product characteristics.

8. Letter from Dr R J Donnelly, Medical Director of Janssen-Cilag Ltd.

8.1. A copy of this letter has already been supplied to the Police and reports that Haldol™ decanoate (haloperidol) is not licensed for subcutaneous use.

9. Letter from Miss Jo Medlock, Manager of Medical Information and Pharmacovigilance, Norton Pharmaceuticals.

9.1. A copy of this letter has already been supplied to the Police and reports that Serenace™ (haloperidol) ampoules are not licensed for subcutaneous administration.

10. MeReC. Pain control in palliative care. *MeReC Bulletin National Prescribing Centre*. 1996; 7 (7); 25-28.

10.1. MeReC is the abbreviation for the 'Medicines Resource Centre'. This bulletin is sent free to all general practitioners in England and Wales and also to NHS Hospital and Community Pharmacists. The list of those who receive this bulletin is updated every few weeks.

11. Sims Graseby Limited. *MS 16A Syringe Driver. MS 26 Syringe Driver: Instruction manual*. Sims Graseby Limited. 1998.

Appendix E

The writer's qualifications and experience including the management of dying patients

I, Brian Livesley, qualified MB, ChB (Leeds) in 1960.
My principal additional qualifications are MD (London) 1979, FRCP (London) 1989.

From 1961-69, I held a series of clinical training and teaching posts through all hospital medical grades to senior medical registrar level at University and District Hospitals in Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool in which I gained a wide range of general medical expertise.

At the beginning of my medical career during 1961, I was also trained in the management of diabetic patients in Leeds by Professor (later Sir) Ronald Tunbridge. For five years (1963-67), I held a regular weekly diabetic out-patient clinic in Manchester (two diabetic clinics each week during 1963-65) being also responsible for the acute and follow-up management of newly presenting diabetic patients as well as having a full range of general medical experience.

For four years (1969-72), I was Harvey Research Fellow in cardiology at King's College Hospital, London, where I developed original research in electrocardiographic, cardiac pacing, and metabolic techniques for the study of ischaemic heart disease. This also involved extensive follow-up studies over a period of more than six years. The several and separate aspects of this work were published in internationally reputable professional journals and now form part of the corpus of present day knowledge in cardiology. My continuing interest in this area led me to specialise in geriatric medicine with some emphasis on cardiology in elderly people.

I have been a consultant physician since 1973 and am entered in the General Medical Council's Principal List as a specialist in both General Medicine and Geriatric Medicine.

In 1987, I was appointed against open competition to a Foundation Chair as the University of London's Professor in the Care of the Elderly based at Charing Cross and Westminster Medical School (now the Imperial College School of Medicine) and as Honorary Consultant Physician.

I am in active clinical practice at the Chelsea & Westminster Hospital, London, where I head up a busy clinical department consisting of three consultant-led medical teams. These are all routinely involved in the emergency medical admissions and follow-up management of adults of all ages including those with diabetes mellitus, cardiac, respiratory, and skeletal diseases. During the last two years I have developed one other team that is providing a palliative care service for non-cancer patients.

Since 1969 I have taught not only undergraduate and postgraduate medical students, but also by invitation have lectured (throughout the United Kingdom, Europe, and elsewhere) to a wide range of other groups—professional and lay. I have also initiated and led courses teaching and appraising senior medical teachers. For fifteen years (1980-94), I served as a clinical examiner for the Final MB degree at the University of London—latterly (1990-94) as a senior clinical examiner. For six years (1987-93), I also examined in Medicine for the Worshipful Society of Apothecaries of London. For seven years (1986-93), I was Royal College of Physicians of London Examiner for the Diploma of Geriatric Medicine; and, for two years (1994-96) was an appointed Member of the United Examining Board for England and Scotland. In addition, I have examined externally for the degrees of BPharm and PhD. During 1998, 1999, & 2000 I have been an invited external clinical examiner for the Final MB degree at the Royal Free and

University College London Medical School where by recent invitation I will examine the candidates being considered for a Distinction in 2001.

In 1991, by invitation, I addressed a House of Lords group on issues relating to the clinical management of elderly people.

In 1992, I was one of a team at the Royal College of Physicians who contributed to the College's publication entitled, 'High quality long-term care for elderly people.'

From 1983-1995 I was a Justice of the Peace for the SE London Commission of the Peace having to stand down following a invitation in 1995 to head up a comprehensive review of the care provided in a 150-bedded nursing home. In 1996 all 16 recommendations in the resulting 40,000-word report were accepted and acted upon by the commissioning Health Agency (1). Also in 1996, I gave invited evidence on this topic to a Health Committee in the House of Commons (2).

In 1999 and again in 2000, the King's Fund in London identified the work in my clinical department as a national model for the care of elderly people.

In July 2000, I was the only clinician to give a presentation by invitation at a meeting on "Emerging Intermediate Care Strategy — 'Leading edge' Practice" held at the Royal College of Surgeons of England, London. This was well received and repeated by invitation in the North of England in November 2000.

During 1999 and 2000 I was working with the British Medical Association's Ethics department on the topics of 'dying as a diagnosis' and 'the appropriate care of the dying'. In addition, I have recently chaired a medico-legal group within my NHS Hospital Trust and produced a report on 'Guidelines for the artificial nutrition of patients affected by strokes'. My clinical, teaching, and research work on the management of dying patients extends over the last twenty five years and I was a leader of the concept that 'dying should be a recognised diagnosis' to allow for the appropriate palliative care of patients dying from non-cancer conditions. More recently I have established an original palliative care service for non-cancer patients in my own department at the Chelsea & Westminster hospital where we are pursuing research in this topic.

My over 120 publications include several monographs, many peer-reviewed research investigations into clinical, scientific, social, historical, and educational problems of medicine in our ageing society, editorials and leading articles by invitation of professional journals, and, in addition by invitation, more than 100 standard and extended book reviews. My peer-reviewed publications also include those on the clinical management of dying patients.

References as numbered above:

1. Livesley B, Ellington S. Report on the independent comprehensive review of the care of elderly people at St. Christopher's Nursing Home, Hatfield. East and North Hertfordshire Health Authority, 1996. (by invitation)

2. Livesley B. Memorandum of recommendations and evidence submitted to the Health Committee on long-term care provision and funding. Volume II; pp. 114-22. London: HMSO, 1996. (by invitation)

signed Code A date 10th July 2001

BRIAN LIVESLEY

MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT

Re: **Gladys Mabel RICHARDS**
Arthur "Brian" CUNNINGHAM
Alice WILKE
Robert WILSON
Eva PAGE

Prepared by:

Professor G A Ford, MA, FRCP
Consultant Physician, Freeman Hospital
Newcastle upon Tyne
Professor of Pharmacology of Old Age, University of Newcastle upon Tyne

For: **Hampshire Constabulary**

Date: **12th December 2001**

Contents

Introduction and Remit of the Report

8.1 I am Professor of Pharmacology of Old Age in the Wolfson Unit of Clinical Pharmacology at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, and a Consultant Physician in Clinical Pharmacology at Freeman Hospital. I am a Doctor of Medicine and care for patients with acute medical problems, acute poisoning and stroke. I have trained and am accredited on the Specialist Register in Geriatric Medicine, Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics and General Internal Medicine. I provide medical advice and support to the Regional Drugs and Therapeutics Centre Regional National Poisons Information Service. I was previously clinical head of the Freeman Hospital Care of the Elderly Service and have headed the Freeman Hospital Stroke Service since 1993. I undertake research into the effects of drugs in older people. I am co-editor of the book 'Drugs and the Older Population' and in 2000 was awarded the William B Abrams award for outstanding contributions to Geriatric Clinical Pharmacology by the American Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics. I am a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians and have practised as a Consultant Physician for nine years.

8.2 I have been asked by Detective Superintendent John James of Hampshire Constabulary to examine the clinical notes of five patients (Gladys Mabel Richards, Arthur "Brian" Cunningham, Alice Wilkie, Robert Wilson, Eva Page) treated at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital and to apply my professional judgement to the following:

- The gamut of patient management and clinical practices exercised at the hospital
- Articulation of the leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved
- The accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments
- An evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimes
- The quality and sufficiency of the medical records
- The appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made
- Comment on the recorded causes of death
- Articulate the duty of care issues and highlight any failures

1.3 I have prepared individual reports on each case and an additional report commenting on general aspects of care at Gosport War Hospital from a consideration of all five cases.

1.4 I have been provided with the following documents by Hampshire Constabulary, which I have reviewed in preparing this report:

- Comment on the recorded causes of death
- Letter DS J James dated 15th August 2001
- Terms of Reference document
- Hospital Medical Records of Gladys Richards, Brian Cunningham, Alice Wilkie, Robert Wilson and Eva Page
- Witness statements by Leslie France Lack, and Gillian MacKenzie
- Report of Professor Brian Livesley
- Transcripts of police interviews with Gosport War Memorial staff Dr Barton, Mr Beed, Ms Couchman, Ms Joice

- Transcript of police interviews with Royal Hospital Haslar staff Dr Reid and Flt. Lt. Edmondson
- Transcript of interviews with patient transfer staff Mr Warren and Mr Tanner
- Transcript of police interviews with or statements from following medical and nursing staff: Dr Lord, LM Baldacchino, M Berry, JM Brewer, J Cook, E Dalton, W Edgar, A Fletcher, J Florio and A Funnell.

Gladys Mabel RICHARDS

Course of Events

2.1 Gladys Richards was 91 years old when admitted as an emergency via the Accident & Emergency Department to Haslar Hospital on 29Th July 1998. She had fallen onto her right hip and developed pain. At this time she lived in a nursing home and was diagnosed as having dementia. She had experienced a number of falls in the previous 6 months and the admission notes comments "*quality of life has ↓↓ markedly last 6/12*". She was found to have a fracture of the right neck of femur. An entry in the medical notes by Surgeon Commander Malcom Pott, Consultant orthopaedic surgeon dated 30 July 1998 states '*After discussion with the patient's daughters in the event of this patient having a cardiac arrest she is NOT for cardiopulmonary resuscitation. However she is to be kept pain free, hydrated and nourished.*' Surgery (right hemiarthroplasty) was performed on 30 July 1998.

2.2 On 3rd August she was referred for a geriatric opinion and seen by Dr Reid, Consultant Physician in Geriatrics on 3rd August 1998. In his letter dated 5th August 1998 he notes she had been on treatment with haloperidol and trazadone and that her daughters thought she had been 'knocked off' by this medication for months, and had not spoken to then for 6-7 months. Her mobility had deteriorated. Her daughters commented to Dr Reid that she had spoken to them and had been brighter mentally since the trazadone had been omitted following admission. Dr Reid found Mrs Richards to be confused but pleasant and cooperative, unable to actively lift her right leg from the bed but appeared to have little discomfort on passive movement of the right hip. He commented '*I understand she has been sitting out in a chair and I think that despite her dementia, she should be afforded the opportunity to try to re-mobilise her.* He arranged for her transfer to Gosport War Memorial Hospital.

2.3 Following Dr Reid's entry in the notes on 3rd August two further entries are made in the medical notes by the on call house officer (Dr Coales?) on 8th August 1998. Dr Coales was asked to see Mrs Richards who was agitated on the ward. She had been given 2mg haloperidol and was asleep when first seen at 0045h. At 02130 hr a further entry records Mrs Richards was '*noisy and disturbing other patients n ward. Unable to reason with patient. Prescribed 25mg thioridazine'*. A transfer letter for Sergeant Curran, staff nurse to the Sister in Charge dated 10th August 1998 describes Mrs Richards status immediately prior to transfer and notes *'Is now fully weight bearing, walking with the aid of two nurses and a zimmer frame. Gladys needs total care with washing and dressing eating and drinking. Gladys is continent, when she becomes fidgety and agitated it means she wants the toilet. Occasionally incontinent at night, but usually wakes.*

2.4 On 11th August 1998 Mrs Richards was transferred to Daedalus ward. Dr Barton writes *in the medical notes "Impression frail demented lady, not obviously in pain, please make comfortable. Transfers with hoist, usually continent, needs help with ADL Barthel 2. I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death".* The summary admitting nursing notes record *"now fully weight bearing and walking with the aid of two nurses and a Zimmer frame"*. On 12th August the nursing notes record "*Haloperidol given at 2330 as woke from sleep. Very agitated, shaking and crying. Didn't settle for more than a few*

*minutes at a time. Did not seem to be in pain".*On 13th August nursing notes record *"found on floor at 1330h. Checked for injury none apparent at time. Hoisted into safer chair. 1930 pain Rt hip internally rotated, Dr Brigg contacted advised Xray am and analgesia during the night. Inappropriate to transfer for Xray this pm."*

2.5 On 14th August 1998 Dr Barton wrote *'sedation/pain relief has been a problem. Screaming not controlled by haloperidol 1g ? but very sensitive to Oramorph. Fell out of chair last night. R hip shorter and internally rotated, Daughter nurse and not happy. Plan Xray . Is this lady well enough for another surgical procedure?"* A further entry the same day states *"Dear Cdr Spalding, further to our telephone conversation thank you for seeing this unfortunate lady who slipped from her chair and appears to have dislocated her R hip. Hemiarthroplasty was done on 30-8-98. I am sending Xrays. She has had 2.5ml of 10mg/5ml oramoroph at midday. Many thanks".*

2.6 Following readmission to Haslar hospital Mrs Richards underwent manipulation of R hip under iv sedation (2 mg midazolam) at 1400h. At 2215h the same day she was not responding to verbal stimulation but observations of blood pressure, pulse, respiration and temperature were all in the normal range. A further entry on 17th August by Dr Hamlin (House Officer) states *"fit for discharge today (Gosport War Mem) To remain in straight knee splint for 4/52. For pillow between legs (abduction) at night."* A transfer letter to the nurse in charge at Daedalus ward states *"Thank you for taking Mrs Richards back under your care... was decided to pass an indwelling catheter which still remains in situ. She has been given a canvas knee immobilising splint to discourage any further dislocation and this must stay in situ for 4 weeks. When in bed it is advisable to encourage abduction by using pillows or abduction wedge. She can however mobilise fully weight bearing".*

2.7 Nursing notes record on 17th August " 1148h *returned from R.N.Haslar patient very distressed appears to be in pain. No canvas under patient – transferred on sheet by crew."* Later that day at 1305h *"in pain and distress, agreed with daughter to give her mother Oramorph 2.5mg in 5ml"*. A further hip Xray was performed which demonstrated no fracture. Dr Barton writes on 17th August 1998 *"readmission to Daedalus ward. Closed reduction under iv sedation. Remained unresponsive for some hours. Now appears peaceful. Can continue haloperidol, only for Oramorph if in severe pain. See daughter again"* and on 18th August *"still in great pain, nursing a problem, I suggest sc diamorphine/ haloperidol/midazolam. I will see daughters today. Please make comfortable".* Nursing notes record *"reviewed by Dr Barton for pain control via syringe driver".* At 2000h *"patient remained peaceful and sleeping. Reacted to pain when being moved – this was pain in both legs".* On 19th August the nursing notes record *"Mrs Richards comfortable"* and in a separate entry *"apparently pain free"*. There are no nursing entries I can find on 20th August. I can find no entries in the nursing notes describing fluid or food intake following admission on 17th August.

2.8 The next entry in the medical notes is on 21st August by Dr Barton *"much more peaceful. Needs hyoscine for rattly chest"*. The nursing notes record *"patient's overall condition deteriorating. Medication keeping her comfortable"*. A staff

nurse records Mrs Richards's death in the notes at 2120h later that day. The cause of death was recorded as bronchopneumonia.

2.9 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate, analgesic and sedative drugs during Mrs Richards's first admission to Haslar Hospital.

29 July 2000h Trazadone 100mg (then discontinued)
29 July to 11th August. Haloperidol 1mg twice daily
30 July 0230h Morphine iv 2.5mg
31 July 0150h morphine iv 2.5mg
1905h morphine iv 2.5 mg
1 Aug 1920h morphine iv 2.5mg
2 Aug 0720h morphine iv 2.5mg
Cocodamol two tablets as required taken on 16 occasions at varying times between 1-9th August

2.10 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate, analgesic and sedative drugs during Mrs Richards second admission to Haslar Hospital

14 Aug 1410h midazolam 2mg iv
15 Aug 0325h cocodamol two tablets orally
16 Aug 0410h haloperidol 2mg orally
0800h haloperidol 1mg orally
1800h haloperidol 1mg orally
2310h haloperidol 2mg orally
!7 Aug 0800h haloperidol 1mg orally

2.11 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate and sedative drugs on Daedalus ward:

11 Aug	1115h	5mg/5ml Oramorph
	1145h	10 mg Oramorph
	1800h	1 mg haloperidol
12 Aug	0615h	10 mg Oramorph
		haloperidol
13 Aug	2050h	10mg Oramorph
14 Aug	1150h	10mg Oramorph
17 Aug	1300h	5mg Oramorph
	?	5 mg Oramorph
	1645h	5mg Oramorph
	2030h	10mg Oramorph
18 Aug	0230h	10mg Oramorph
	?	10mg Oramorph
	1145h	diamorphine 40mg/24hr, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hrby
19 Aug	1120h	diamorphine 40mg/24hr, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 400microg/24hr
20 Aug	1045h	diamorphine 40mg/24hr, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 400microg/24hr
21 Aug	1155h	diamorphine 40mg/24h, haloperidol 5mg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 400microg/24hr

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

2.12 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Richards during her two admissions to Gosport Hospital lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for his care. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was delegated to the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital (statement of Dr Lord in interview with DC Colvin and DC McNally). Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Richards during her two admissions to Queen Alexandra Hospital lay with Surgeon Commander Scott, Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon. Junior medical staff were responsible for day-to-day medical care of Mrs Richards whilst at Queen Alexandra Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mrs Richards and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

2.13 Dr Reid, Consultant Geriatrician was responsible for assessing Mrs Richards and making recommendations concerning her future care following her orthopaedic surgery, and arranged transfer to Gosport Hospital for rehabilitation.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

2.14 The initial assessment by the orthopaedic team was in my opinion competent and the admitting medical team obtained a good history of her decline in the previous six months. Surgeon Commander Pott discussed management options with the family and a decision was made to proceed with surgery but for Mrs Richards to not undergo cardiopulmonary resuscitation if she sustained a cardiac arrest, with a clear decision to keep Mrs Richards pain free, hydrated and nourished. There are good reasons to offer surgery for a fractured neck of femur to very frail patients with dementia even when a high risk of peri-operative death or complications is present. This is because without surgery patients continue to be in pain, remain immobile and nearly invariably develop serious complications such as pneumonia and pressure sores, which are usually fatal. From the information I have seen I would, as a consultant physician/geriatrician recommended the initial management undertaken. I consider it good management that the trazadone as discontinued when the history from the daughters suggested this might have been responsible for decline in the recent past.

2.15 After Mrs Richards was stable a few days following surgery it was appropriate to refer her for a geriatric opinion, and Dr Reid rapidly provided this. Dr Reid's assessment was in my opinion thorough and competent. He identified the potential for her to benefit from rehabilitation. I would consider his decision to refer her for rehabilitation despite her dementia to be appropriate. An elderly care rehabilitation, rather than an acute orthopaedic ward is in general a preferable environment to undertake such rehabilitation. It is implicit in his decision to transfer her to Gosport War Memorial Hospital that she would receive rehabilitation there and not care on a continuing care ward without input from a rehabilitation team. Dr Lord in an interview with DC McNally and DC Colvin describes Daedalus ward as "*Back in '98 .. Daedalus was a continuing care ward with 24 beds of which 8 beds were for slow stream stroke*

rehabilitation". Although Mrs Richards had a fractured neck of femur and not stroke as her primary problem requiring rehabilitation I would assume, in the light of Dr Reid's letter that she was transferred to one of the 8 slow stream rehabilitation beds on Daedalus ward.

2.16 The transfer letter from Sergeant Curran provides a clear description of Mrs Richards's status at the time of transfer. The observation that she was walking with the aid of two nurses and a zimmer frame, and the usual cause of agitation was when she needed to use the toilet are relevant to subsequent events following transfer to Gosport Hospital. The use of a Barthel Index score as a measure of disability is good practice and demonstrates that Mrs Richards was severely dependent at the time of her transfer to Gosport Hospital.

2.17 The initial entry by Dr Barton following Mrs Richards' transfer to Daedalus ward does not mention that she has been transferred for rehabilitation, and focuses on keeping her 'comfortable' despite recording that she is "*not obviously in pain*". The statement '*I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death*" also suggests that Dr Barton's assessment was that Mrs Richards might die in the near future. Dr Barton in her statement to DS **Code A** and DC Colvin, confirms this when she states "*I appreciated that there was a possibility that she might die sooner rather than later*". Dr Barton refers to her admission as a "*holding manoeuvre*" and her statement suggests a much more negative view of the potential for rehabilitation. She does not describe any rehabilitation team or focus on the ward and suggests her transfer was necessary because she was not appropriate for an acute bed, rather than her being appropriate for rehabilitation- "*.her condition was not appropriate for an acute bed. ....seen whether she would recover and mobilise after surgery. If as was more likely she would deteriorate due to her age, her dementia, her frail condition and the shock of the fall followed by the major surgery, then she was to be nursed in a clam environment away from the stresses of an acute ward*". In my opinion this initial note entry and the statement by Dr Baron indicate a much less proactive view of rehabilitation, less appreciation than Dr Reid of the potential for Mrs Richards to recover to her previous level of functioning, and probably a failure to appreciate the potential benefits of appropriate multidisciplinary rehabilitation to Mrs Richards. This leads me to believe that Dr Barton's approach to Mrs Richards was in the context of considering her as a continuing care patient who was likely to die on the ward. It was not wrong or incorrect of Dr Barton to believe Mrs Richards might die on the ward, but I would consider her apparent failure to recognise Mrs Barton's rehabilitation needs may have led to subsequent sub-optimal care.

2.18 There are a number of explanations and contributory factors that may have led to Dr Barton possibly not recognising Mrs Richard's rehabilitation needs in addition to her nursing and analgesic needs. First she may have not clearly understood Dr Reid's assessment that she needed rehabilitation. In her statement Dr Barton states " *Dr Reid was of the view that, despite her dementia, she should be given the opportunity to try to remobilise*" which suggests Dr Barton may not have considered the necessity for Mrs Richards to receive Physiotherapy as a necessary part of her opportunity to remobilise. Second the ward had both continuing care and rehabilitation beds and these patients may require very different care. It is not uncommon for "slow stream" rehabilitation beds to be in the same ward as continuing care beds, but it does

require much broader range of care to meet the medical and social needs of these patients. I would anticipate that some patients would move from the slow stream rehabilitation to continuing care category. Dr Lord describes the existence of fortnightly multidisciplinary ward case conference suggesting there was a structured team approach that would have made Dr Barton and nursing staff aware of rehabilitation needs of patients. In Mrs Richards's case no such case conference took place because she became too unwell in a short period. Third Dr Barton may not have received sufficient training or gained adequate experience of rehabilitation or geriatrics despite working under the supervision of Dr Lord. Dr Lord states that Dr Barton was "*an experienced GP*" who had rights of admission to a GP ward and that Dr Lord had admitted patients "*under her care say for palliative care*". Experience in palliative care may possibly have influenced her understanding and expectations of rehabilitating older patients.

2.19 The assessment of Mrs Richard's agitation the following day on 12th August was in my opinion sub-optimal. The nursing records state that she did not appear to be in pain. There is no entry from Dr Barton this day but in her statement she states which I have some difficulty in interpreting: "*When I assessed Mrs Richards on her arrival she was clearly confused and unable to give any history. She was pleasant and co-operative on arrival and did not appear to be in pain. Later her pain relief and sedation became a problem. She was screaming. This can be a symptom of dementia but could also be caused by pain. In my opinion it was caused by pain as it was not controlled by Haloperidol alone. Screaming caused by dementia is frequently controlled by this sedative. Given my assessment that she was in pain I wrote a prescription for a number of drugs on 11th August, including Oramorph and Diamorphine. This allowed nursing staff to respond to their clinical assessment of her needs rather than wait until my next visit the following day. This is an integral part of team management. It was not in fact necessary to give diamorphine over the first few days following her admission but a limited number of small doses of Oramorph were given totalling 20mg over the first 24 hours and 10mg daily thereafter. This would be an appropriate level of pain relief after such a major orthopaedic procedure*".

2.20 I am unable establish from the notes and Dr Barton's statement whether she saw Mrs Richards in pain after she wrote in the notes and then wrote up the opiate drugs later on the 11th August, or if she wrote up these drugs after seeing her when she was not in pain, because she considered she might develop pain and agitation. In either case there is no evidence that the previous information provided by Sergeant Curran that Mrs Richards usually required the toilet when she was agitated was considered by Dr Barton. Screaming is a well-described behavioural disturbance in dementia (Dr Barton was clearly aware of this), which can be due to pain but is often not. In some cases it is not possible to identify a clear precipitating cause although a move to a new ward could precipitate such a behavioural disturbance. I would consider the assumption by Dr Barton that Mrs Richards screaming was due to pain was not supported by her own recorded observations. There is no evidence from the notes that Dr Barton examined Mrs Richards in the first two days to find any evidence on clinical examination that pain from her hip was the cause of her screaming. If the screaming had been worse on weight bearing or movement of the hip this would have provided supportive evidence that her screaming was

due to hip pain. Staff Nurse Jennifer Brewer in her interview with DC Colvin and DC McNally states that the nursing staff had considered the need for toileting and other potential causes of Mrs Richards screaming.

2.21 Mrs Richards pain following surgery had been controlled at Haslar hospital by intermittent doses of intravenous morphine and then intermittent doses of cocodamol (paracetamol and codeine phosphate). Dr Barton did not prescribe cocodamol or another mild or moderate analgesic to Mrs Richards to take on a prn basis when she was transferred. This makes me consider it probable that Dr Barton prescribed prn Oramorph, diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam when she first saw Mrs Richards and she was not in pain. If this is the case it is highly unusual practice in a patient who has been transferred for rehabilitation, was not taking any regular or intermittent analgesics for 36 hours prior to transfer, and had last taken two tablets of cocodamol. In a rehabilitation or continuing care ward without resident medical staff I would consider it reasonable and usual practice to prescribe a mild or moderate analgesic to take on an as required basis in case further pain developed. In Mrs Richards's case a reasonable choice would have been cocodamol since she had been taking this a few days earlier without problems. I do not consider it was appropriate to administer intermittent doses of oramorph to Mrs Richards before first prescribing paracetamol, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs or mild opiate. It is not appropriate to prescribe powerful opiate drugs as a first line treatment for pain not clearly due to a fracture or dislocation to a patient such as Mrs Richards 12 days following surgery. Dr Barton's statement that diamorphine and oramorph were appropriate analgesics at this stage following surgery when she had been pain free is incorrect and in my opinion would not be a view held by the vast majority of practising general practitioners and geriatricians.

2.22 The management of Mrs Richards when sustained a dislocation of her hip on 13th August was in my opinion sub-optimal. The hip dislocation most likely occurred following the fall from her chair at 1330h. The nursing notes suggest signs of a dislocation were noted at 1930h. If there was a delay in recognising the dislocation I would not consider this indicates poor care, as hip fractures and dislocations can be difficult to detect in patients who have dementia and communication difficulties. Mrs Richards suspected dislocation or fracture was discussed with the on-call doctor, Dr Briggs, who I would assume is a medical house officer. Given the concern about a fracture or dislocation I would judge it would have been preferable for her to b transferred to the orthopaedic ward that evening and be assessed by the orthopaedic team. I certainly consider the case should have been discussed with either the on call consultant geriatrician or the orthopaedic team. The benefits of transfer that evening in a patient where it was highly probable a fracture or dislocation were present would have been Mrs Richards could have received manipulation earlier the following morning and possibly that same evening, and that traction could have been applied even if reduction was not attempted.

2.23 Mrs Richards was found to have a dislocation of her right hip and this was manipulated under intravenous sedation the same day. Although she was initially unresponsive, most probably due to prolonged effects of the intravenous midazolam, 3 days later on 17th August she was mobilising and fully weight bearing and not requiring any analgesia. Although there are few medical note entries, the management at Haslar hospital during this period

appears to be appropriate and competent. Shortly after transfer back to Daedalus ward Mrs Richards again became very distressed. The nursing notes indicate there was an incorrect transfer by the ambulance staff of Mrs Richards onto her bed. Repeat dislocation of the right hip was reasonably suspected but not found on a repeat Xray. My impression is that this transfer may have precipitated hip or other musculoskeletal pain in Mrs Richards but that other causes of screaming were possible.

2.24 Intermittent doses of oral morphine were first administered to Mrs Richards, again without first determining whether less powerful analgesics would have been helpful. On 18th August Dr Barton suggested commencing subcutaneous diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam. The diamorphine and midazolam had been prescribed 7 days earlier. An infusion of the three drugs was commenced later that morning and hyoscine was added on 19th August. Both Dr Barton's notes and the nursing notes indicate Mrs Richards was in pain, although it is not clear what they considered was the cause of the pain at this stage, having excluded a fracture or dislocation of the right hip. Dr Barton states in her prepared statement "... *it was my assessment that she had developed a haematoma or large collection of bruising around the area where the prosthesis had been lying while dislocated*".

2.25 Although there are no clear descriptions of Mrs Richard's conscious level in the last few days, her level of alertness appears to have deteriorated once the subcutaneous infusion of diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam was commenced. It also seems that she was not offered fluids or food and intravenous or subcutaneous fluids were not considered as an alternative. My interpretation is that this was most probably because medical and nursing staff were of the opinion that Mrs Richards were dying and that provision of fluids or nutrition would not change this outcome. In her prepared statement Dr Barton states "*As their mother was not eating or drinking or able to swallow, subcutaneous infusion of pain killers was the best way to control her pain.*" and "*I was aware that Mrs Richards was not taking food or water by mouth*". She then goes on to say "*I believe I would have explained to the daughters that subcutaneous fluids were not appropriate*".

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

2.26 The decision to prescribe oral opiates and subcutaneous diamorphine to Mrs Richards initial admission to Daedalus ward was in my opinion inappropriate and placed Mrs Richards at significant risk of developing adverse effects of excessive sedation and respiratory depression. The prescription of oral paracetamol, mild opiates such as codeine or non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs such as ibuprofen, naproxen would have been appropriate oral and preferable with a better risk/benefit ratio. The prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam infusions to be taken if required was inappropriate even if she was experiencing pain. Subcutaneous opiate infusions should be used only in patients whose pain is not controlled by oral analgesia and who cannot swallow oral opiates. The prescription by Dr Barton on 11th August of three sedative drugs by subcutaneous infusion was in my opinion reckless and inappropriate and placed Mrs Richards at serious risk of developing coma and respiratory depression had these been administered by the nursing staff. It is exceptionally unusual to prescribe subcutaneous infusion of these three drugs with powerful effects on conscious level and respiration to

frail elderly patients with non-malignant conditions in a continuing care or slow stream rehabilitation ward and I have not personally used, seen or heard of this practice in other care of the elderly rehabilitation or continuing care wards. The prescription of three sedative drugs is potentially hazardous in any patient but particularly so in a frail older patient with dementia and would be expected to carry a high risk of producing respiratory depression or coma.

2.27 I consider the statement by Dr Barton "*my use of midazolam in the dose of 20mg over 24 hours was as a muscle relaxant, to assist movement of Mrs Richards for nursing procedures in the hope that she could be as comfortable as possible. I felt it appropriate to prescribe an equivalence of haloperidol to that which she had been having orally since her first admission.*" Indicates poor knowledge of the indications for and appropriate use of midazolam administered by subcutaneous infusion to older people. Midazolam is primarily used for sedation and is not licensed for use as a muscle relaxant. Doses of benzodiazepine that produce significant muscle relaxation in general produce unacceptable depression of conscious level, and it is not usual practice amongst continuing care and rehabilitation wards to administer subcutaneous midazolam to assist moving patients.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

2.28 The medical and nursing records relating to Mrs Richards admissions to Daedalus ward are in my opinion not of an adequate standard. The medical notes fail to adequately account for the reasons why oramorph and then infusions of diamorphine and haloperidol were used. The nursing records do not adequately document hydration and nutritional needs of Mrs Richards during her admissions to Daedalus ward.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

2.29 There are a number of decisions made in the care of Mrs Richards that I consider to be inappropriate. The initial management of her dislocated hip prosthesis was sub-optimal. The decision to prescribe oral morphine without first observing the response to milder opiate or other analgesic drugs was inappropriate. The decision to prescribe diamorphine, haloperidol and midazolam by subcutaneous infusion was, in my opinion, highly inappropriate.

Recorded cause of death

2.30 The recorded cause of death was bronchopneumonia. I understand that the cause of death was discussed with the coroner. A post mortem was not obtained and the recorded cause was certainly a possible cause of Mrs Richards's death. I am surprised the death certificate makes no mention of Mrs Richards's fractured neck of femur or her dementia. It is possible that Mrs Richards died from drug induced respiratory depression without bronchopneumonia present or from the combined effects of bronchopneumonia and drug-induced respiratory depression. Mrs Richards was at high risk of developing pneumonia because of the immobility that resulted following her transfer back to Daedalus ward even if she had not received sedative and opiate drugs. Bronchopneumonia can also occur as a secondary complication of opiate and sedative induced respiratory depression. In the absence of post-mortem, radiological data (chest Xray) or recordings of Mr Cunningham's respiratory rate I would consider the recorded cause of death of bronchopneumonia was possible. However given the rapid decline in

conscious level that preceded the development of respiratory symptoms (rattly chest) I would consider it more likely that Mrs Richards became unconscious because of the sedative and opiate drugs she received by subcutaneous infusion, that these drugs caused respiratory depression and that Mrs Richards died from drug induced respiratory depression and/or without *bronchopneumonia resulting from immobility or drug induced respiratory* depression. There are no accurate records of Mrs Richards respiratory rate but with the doses used and her previous marked sedative response to intravenous midazolam it is highly probable that respiratory depression was present.

Duty of care issues

2.31 Medical and nursing staff on Daedalus ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care to attempt to monitor Mrs Richards and to document the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of care was not adequately met. The prescription of diamorphine, midazolam and haloperidol was extremely hazardous and Mrs Richards was inadequately monitored. The duty of care of the medical and nursing staff to meet Mrs Richard's hydration and nutritional needs was also in my opinion probably not met.

Summary

2.32 Gladys Richards was a frail older lady with dementia who sustained a fractured neck of femur, successfully surgically treated with a hemiarthroplasty, and then complicated by dislocation. During her two admissions to Daedalus ward there was inappropriate prescribing of opiates and sedative drugs by Dr Baron. *These drugs in combination are highly likely to have produced respiratory* depression and/or the development of bronchopneumonia that led to her death. In my opinion it is likely the administration of the drugs hastened her death. There is some evidence that Mrs Richards was in pain during the three days prior to her heath and the administration of opiates can be justified on these grounds. However Mrs Richards was at high risk of developing pneumonia and it possible she would have died from pneumonia even if she had not been administered the subcutaneous sedative and opiate drugs.

Arthur "Brian" CUNNINGHAM

Course of Events

3.1 Mr Cunningham was 79 years old when admitted to Dryad ward, Gosport Hospital under the care of Dr Lord. Dr Lord had assessed him on a number of occasions in the previous 4 years. A letter dated 2nd December 1994 from Dr Bell, Clinical Assistant, indicates Parkinson's disease had been diagnosed in the mid 1980s and that he was having difficulties walking at this time. In 1998 it was noted he had experienced visual hallucinations and had moved into Merlin Park Rest Home. His weight was 69Kg in August 1998. In July 1998 he was admitted under the care of Dr Banks, Consultant in Old Age Psychiatry to Mulberry Ward A and discharged after 6 weeks to Thalassa Nursing Home. He was assessed to have Parkinson's disease and dementia, depression and myelodysplasia. Dr Lord in a letter dated 1 September 1998 summarises her assessment of Mr Cunningham when she saw him on Mulberry Ward A on 27 August 1998 before he was discharged to Thalassa Nursing Home. At this time he required 1-2 people to transfer and was unable to wheel himself around in his wheelchair. She commented that more levodopa might be required but was concerned it would upset his mental state. She arranged to review him at the Dolphin Day Hospital.

3.2 On 21st September 1998 he was seen at the Dolphin Day Hospital by Dr Lord who recorded *'very frail, tablets found in mouth, offensive large necrotic sacral sore with thick black scar. PD - no worse. Diagnoses listed as sacral sore (in N/H), PD, old back injury, depression and element of dementia, diabetes mellitus –diet, catheterised for retention. Plan – stop codanthramer and metronidazole. looks fine. TCI Dyad today –aserbine for sacral ulcer – nurse on side – high protein diet – oramorph prn if pain. N/Home to keep bed open for next 3/52 at least. Pt informed of admission agrees. Inform N/Home Dr Banks and social worker. Analgesics prn.'* He was admitted to Dyad ward. An entry by Dr Baron on 21 September states *'make comfortable, give adequate analgesia. Am happy for nursing staff to confirm death.'* On 24th September Dr Lord has written *'remains unwell. Son has ??? again today and is aware of how unwell he is. sc analgesia is controlling pain just. I am happy for nursing staff to confirm death.'* The next entry by Dr Brook is on 25th September *'remains very poorly. On syringe driver. For TLC'.*

3.3 Medication charts record the following administration of opiate and sedative drugs:

21 Sep 1415h Oramorph 5mg
1800h Coproxamol two tablets
(subsequent regular doses not administered)
2015h Oramorph10mg
21 Sep 2310h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, midazolam 20mg/24hr infusion sc
22 Sep 2020h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, midazolam 20mg/24hr infusion sc
23 Sep 0925h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 200microg/24hr
midazolam 20 mg/24hr infusion sc
2000h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 200microg/24hr
midazolam 60mg/24hr infusion sc
24 Sep 1055h Diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 800microg/24hr
midazolam 80mg/24hr infusion sc
25 Sep 1015h Diamorphine 60mg/24hr, hyoscine 1200mg/24hr

midazolam 80mg/24hr infusion
26 Sep 1150h Diamorphine 80mg/24hr, hyoscine 1200mg/24hr
midazolam 100mg/24hr infusion
Sinemet 110 5 times/day was discontinued on 23rd September

3.4 The nursing notes relating to the admission to Dyad ward record on 21st Sept *'remained agitated until approx 2030h. Syringe driver commenced as requested* (unclear who made this request) *diamorphine 20mg, midazolam 20mg at 2300. Peaceful following".* On 22nd Sep *'explained that a syringe driver contains diamorphine and midazolam was commenced yesterday evening for pain relief and to allay his anxiety following an episode where Arthur tried to wipe sputum on a nurse saying he had HIV and going to give it to her. He also tried to remove his catheter and empty the bag and removed his sacral dressing throwing it across the room. Finally he took off his covers and exposed himself.'*

3.5 On 23rd Sep *'Has become chesty overnight to have hyoscine added to driver. Stepson contacted and informed of deterioration. Mr Farthing asked is this was due to the commencement of the syringe driver and informed that Mr Cunningham was on a small dosage which he needed.'* A later entry *'now fully aware that Brian is dying and needs to be made comfortable. Became a little agitated at 2300h, syringe driver adjusted with effect. Seems in some discomfort when moved, driver boosted prior to position change'.* On 24th Sept *'report from night staff that Brian was in pain when attended to, also in pain with day staff – especially his knees. Syringe driver renewed at 1055".* On 25th Sept *'All care given this am. Driver recharged at 1015 –diamorphine 60mg, midazolam 80mg and hyoscine 1200mcg at a rate of 50mmols/hr. Peaceful night - unchanged, still doesn't like being moved.'* On 26th September *'condition appears to be deteriorating slowly'.*

3.6 On 26th September staff nurse Tubbritt records death at 2315h. Cause of death was recorded on the death certificate as bronchopneumonia with contributory causes of Parkinson's disease and Sacral Ulcer.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

3.7 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mr Cunningham during his last admission lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for his care. She saw Mr Cunningham 5 days before his death in the Dolphin Day Hospital, and 2 days before his death on Dyad ward. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was the responsibility of the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mr Cunningham and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

3.8 Initial assessment by Dr Lord was comprehensive and appropriate with a clear management plan described. The nursing staff record Mr Cunningham was agitated following admission on 21st September. Dr Lord had prescribed prn (intermittent as required) oramorph for pain. Nursing staff made the decision to administer oramorph but there is no clear recording in the nursing notes that he

was in pain or the site of pain. The nursing entry on 22nd Sept indicates a syringe driver was commenced for 'pain relief and to allay anxiety. Again the site of pain is not states. My interpretation of the records is that the nursing staff considered his agitation was due to pain from his sacral ulcer. The medical and nursing teams view on the cause of Mr Cunningham's deterioration on 23rd September when he became 'chesty' are not explicitly stated, but would seem to have been thought to be due to bronchopneumonia since this was the cause of death later entered on the death certificate. The medical and nursing staff may not have considered the possibility that Mr Cunningham's respiratory symptoms and deterioration may have been due to opiate and benzodiazepine induced respiratory depression. The nursing staff filed to appreciate that the agitation Mr Cunningham experienced on 23rd Sept at 2300h may have been due to the midazolam and diamorphine. It was appropriate for nursing staff to discuss Mr Cunningham's condition with medical staff at this stage.

3.9 When Dr Lord reviewed Mr Cunningham on 24th September the notes imply that he was much worse that when she had seen him 3 days earlier. There is clear recording by Dr Lord that Mr Cunningham was in pain. The following day the diamorphine dose was increased three fold from 20mg/24hr to 60mg/24hr and the dose was further increased on 26th September to 80mg/24hr although the nursing and medical notes do not record the reason for this. The notes suggest that the nursing and medical staff may have failed to consider causes of agitation other than pain in Mr Cunningham or to recognise the adverse consequences of opiates and sedative drugs on respiratory function in frail older individuals.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

3.10 The prescription of oramorph to be taken 4 hourly as required by Mr Cunningham was reasonable if his pain was uncontrolled from cocodamol. I consider the decision by Dr Barton to prescribe and administer diamorphine and midazolam by subcutaneous infusion the same evening he was admitted was highly inappropriate, particularly when there was a clear instruction by Dr Lord that he should be prescribed intermittent (underlined instruction) doses of oramorph earlier in the day. I consider the undated prescription by Dr Baron of subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr to be poor practice and potentially very hazardous. In my opinion it is poor management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam in a frail elderly underweight patient such as Mr Cunningham. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and it would have been more appropriate to review the response to diamorphine alone before commencing midazolam, had it been appropriate to commence subcutaneous analgesia, which as I have stated before was not the case.

3.11 In my opinion it is doubtful the nursing and medical staff understood that when a syringe infusion pump rate is increased it takes an often appreciable effect of time before the maximum effect of the increased dose rate becomes evident. Typically the time period would be 5 drug half-lives. In the case of diamorphine this would be between 15 and 25 hours in an older frail individual.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

3.12 In my opinion the medical and nursing records are inadequate following Mr Cunningham's admission to Dryad ward. The initial assessment by Dr Lord on 21st September is in my opinion competent and appropriate. The medical notes following this are inadequate and do not explain why he was commenced on subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine and midazolam. The nursing notes are variable and at times inadequate.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

3.13 An inappropriately high dose of diamorphine and midazolam was first prescribed. There was a failure to recognise or respond to drug induced problems. Inappropriate dose escalation of diamorphine and midazolam and poor assessment by Dr Lord. The assessment by Dr Lord on 21st September 1998 was thorough and competent and a clear plan of management was outlined. There is a clear note by Dr Lord that oramorph was to be given intermittently (PRN) for pain and not regularly. It is not clear from the medical and nursing notes why Mr Cunningham was not administered the regular cocodamol he was prescribed following the initial dose he received at 1800h following admission. It is good practice to provide regular oral analgesia, with paracetamol and a mild opiate, particularly when a patient has been already taking this medication and to use prn morphine for breakthrough pain. I consider the prescription by Dr Barton on admission of prn subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr to be unjustified, poor practice and potentially very hazardous. It is particularly notable that only hours earlier Dr Lord had written that oramorph was to be given intermittently and this had been underlined in the medical notes. There is no clear justification in the notes for the commencement of subcutaneous diamorphine and midazolam on the evening following admission. If increased opiate analgesia was required increasing the oramorph dose and frequency could have provided this. I would judge it poor management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and it would have been more appropriate to review the response to diamorphine alone before commencing midazolam.

3.14 I am concerned by the initial note entry by Dr Barton on 21st September 1998 that she was happy for nursing staff to confirm death. There was no indication by Dr Lord that Mr Barton was expected to die, and Dr Barton does not list the reason she would have cause to consider Mr Cunningham would die within the next 24 hours before he was reviewed the following day by medical staff. In my opinion it is of concern that the nursing notes suggest the diamorphine and midazolam infusions were commenced because of Mr Cunningham's behaviour recorded in the nursing entry on 22nd September.

3.15 Hyoscine was commenced on 23rd September after Mr Cunningham had become 'chesty' overnight. I consider it very poor practice that there is no record of Mr Cunningham being examined by a doctor following admission on 21st September, and a decision to treat this symptomatically with hyoscine appears to have been made by the medical staff. At this stage Mr Cunningham's respiratory signs are likely to have been due to bronchopneumonia or respiratory depression resulting in depressed clearance of bronchial secretions. A medical assessment was very necessary at this

stage to diagnose the cause of symptoms and to consider treatment with antibiotics or reduction in the dose of diamorphine and midazolam.

3.16 Again I consider it very poor practice that the midazolam was increased from 20mg/24hr to 60mg/24 hr at 2000h on 23rd September. There is no entry in the medical notes to explain this dose increase. The decision to triple the midazolam dose appears to have been made by a member of nursing staff as the nursing notes record *"agitated at 2300h, syringe driver boosted with effect."*

3.17 A medical assessment should have been obtained before the decision to increase the midazolam dose was made. At the very least Mr Cunningham's problems should have been discussed with on call medical staff. Mr Cunningham's agitation may have been due to pain, where increasing analgesia would have been appropriate, or hypoxia (lack of oxygen). If Mr Cunningham's agitation was due to hypoxia a number of interventions may have been indicated. Reducing the diamorphine and midazolam dose would have been appropriate if hypoxia was due to respiratory depression. Commencement of oxygen therapy and possibly antibiotics would have been appropriate if hypoxia was due to pneumonia. Reducing the dose diamorphine or midazolam would have been indicated if hypoxia was due to drug-induced respiratory depression. The decision to increase the midazolam dose was not appropriately made by the ward nursing staff without discussion with medical staff.

3.18 When Mr Cunningham was reviewed by Dr Lord on 24th September he was very unwell but there is not a clear description of his respiratory status or whether he had signs of pneumonia. At this stage Dr Lord notes Mr Cunningham is in pain, but does not state the site of his pain. It is not clear to me whether the subsequent alteration in infusion rate of diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam was discussed with and sanctioned by Dr Lord or Dr Barton. I consider the increase in midazolam from 60mg/24 hr to 80mg/24 hr was inappropriate as a response to the observation that Mr Cunningham was in pain. It would have been more appropriate to increase the diamorphine dose or even consider treatment with a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug. The increase in midazolam dose to 80mg/24 hr would simply make Mr Cunningham less conscious than he already appears to have been (there is not a clear description of his conscious level at this stage).

3.19 The increase in hyoscine dose to 800microg/24 hr is also difficult to justify when there is no record that the management of bronchial secretions was a problem. The subsequent threefold increase in diamorphine dose later that day to 60mg/24 hr is in my view very poor practice. Such an increase was highly likely to result in respiratory depression and marked depression of conscious level, both of which could lead to premature death. The description of Mr Cunningham, was that analgesia was 'just' controlling pain and a more cautious increase in diamorphine dose, certainly no more than two fold, was indicated with careful review of respiratory status and conscious level after steady state levels of diamorphine would have been obtained about 20 hours later. A more appropriate response to deal with any acute breakthrough pain is to administer a single prn (intermittent) dose of opiate by the oral or intramuscular route, depending on whether Mr Cunningham was unable to swallow at this time.

3.20 The increase in both diamorphine dose and midazolam dose on 26th September is difficult to justify when there is no record in the medical or nursing notes that Mr Cunningham's pain was uncontrolled. Although it is possible to accept the increase in diamorphine dose may have been appropriate if Mr Cunningham was observed to be in pain, I find the further increase in midazolam dose to 100mg/24hr of great concern. I would anticipate that this dose of midazolam administered with 80mg/24hr of diamorphine would be virtually certain to produce respiratory depression and severe depression of conscious level. This would be expected to result in death in a frail individual such as Mr Cunningham. I would expect to see very clear reasons for the use of such doses recorded in the medical notes.

3.21 I can find no record of Mr Cunningham receiving food or fluids following his admission on 21st September despite a note from Dr Lord that Mr Cunningham was to receive a 'high protein diet'. There is no indication in the medical or nursing notes as to whether this had been discussed, but given that Mr Cunningham was admitted with the intention of returning to his Nursing Home (it was to be held open for 3 weeks) I would expect the notes to record a clear discussion and decision making process involving senior medical staff accounting for the decision to not administer subcutaneous fluids and/or nasogastric nutrition once Mr Cunningham was commenced on drugs which may have made him unable to swallow fluids or food.

Recorded causes of death

3.22 The recorded cause of death was bronchopneumonia with contributory causes of Parkinson's disease and sacral ulcer. A post mortem was not obtained and the recorded causes were in my opinion reasonable. It is possible that Mr Cunningham died from drug induced respiratory depression without bronchopneumonia present or from the combined effects of bronchopneumonia and drug-induced respiratory depression. Mr Cunningham was at high risk of developing pneumonia even if he had not received sedative or opiate drugs, bronchopneumonia can occur as a secondary complication of opiate and sedative induced respiratory depression. In the absence of post-mortem, radiological data (chest Xray) or recordings of Mr Cunningham's respiratory rate I would consider the recorded cause of death of bronchopneumonia as reasonable. Even if the staff had considered Mr Cunningham had drug-induced respiratory depression as a contributory factor, it would not be usual medical practice to enter this as a contributory cause of death where the administration of such drugs was considered appropriate for symptom relief.

Duty of care issues

3.23 Medical and nursing staff on Dryad ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care to attempt to heal Mr Cunningham's sacral ulcer and to document the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of are was not adequately met and the denial of fluid and diet and prescription of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mr Cunningham's death.

Summary

3.24 In summary although Mr Cunningham was admitted for medical and nursing care to attempt to heal and control pain from his sacral ulcer, Dr Barton and the ward staff appear to have considered Mr Cunningham was dying and had been admitted for terminal care. The medical and nursing records are inadequate in documenting his clinical state at this time. The initial prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine by Dr Barton was in my view reckless. The dose increases undertaken by nursing staff were inappropriate if not undertaken after medical assessment and review of Mr Cunningham. I consider it highly likely that Mr Cunningham experienced respiratory depression and profound depression of conscious level due to the infusion of diamorphine and midazolam. I consider the doses of these drugs prescribed and administered were inappropriate and that these drugs most likely contributed to his death through pneumonia and/or respiratory depression.

ALICE WILKIE

Course of Events

4.1 Alice Wilkie was 81 years old when admitted under the care of Dr Lord, by her general practitioner on 31st July 1998 from Addenbrooke Rest Home to Phillip Ward, Department of Medicine for Elderly People, at the Queen Alexandra Hospital, Portsmouth. The general practitioner referral letter states "*This demented lady has been in this psychogeriatric care home for a year. She had a UTI early this week and has not responded to trimethoprim. Having fallen last night, she is not refusing fluids and is becoming a little dry*". The medical admitting notes record she was taking prozac (fluoxetine) syrup 20 mg once daily, codanthramer 5-10ml nocte, lactulose 10ml once daily zopiclone 1.875 or 3.75mg nocte and promazine syrup 25mg as required. On examination she had a fever and bilateral conjunctivitis but no other significant findings. The admitting doctor diagnosed a urinary tract infection and commenced intravenous antibiotics to be administered after a blood culture and catheter specimen of urine had been obtained. The following day DNR (do not resuscitate) is recorded in the notes. On 3rd August 1998 the medical notes record the fever had settled, that she was taking some fluids orally, was taking the antibiotic Augmentin elixir orally and receiving subcutaneous fluids. The notes then record (date not clear) that her Mental Test Score was 0/10 and Barthel 1/20 (indicating severe dependency). Mrs Wilkie was to be transferred to Daedalus NHS continuing care ward on 6th August 1998 with a note that her bed was to be kept at Addenbrooke Rest Home.

4.2 Following transfer on 6th August an entry in the medical notes states "*Transferred from Phillips Ward. For 4-6/52 only. On Augmentin for UTI*". Dr Lord writes on 10th August 1998 '*Barthel 2/20. Eating and drinking better. Confused and slow. Give up place at Addenbrooke's. R/V* (review) *in 1/12* (one month) *–if no specialist medical or nursing problems D* (discharge) *to a N/Home. Stop fluoxetine*'. The next entry is by Dr Barton on 21st August "*Marked deterioration over last few days. sc analgesia commenced yesterday. Family aware and happy*". The final entry is on the same day at 1830h where death is confirmed. The most recent record of the patient's weight I can find is 56Kg in April 1994.

4.3 The nursing notes, which have daily entries during her one week stay on Phillip ward note she was catheterised, was confused at times and was sleeping well prior to transfer. The nursing notes on Daedalus ward record "6/8/98 *Transferred from Philip ward QAH for 4-6 weeks assessment and observation and then decide on placement. Medical history of advanced dementia, urinary tract infection and dehydration*" and that she was seen by Dr Peters. The nursing assessment sheet notes *"does have pain at times unable to ascertain where"*. The nutrition care plan states on 6th August 1998 "*Due to dementia patient has a poor dietary intake*". And dietary intake is recorded between 12th August and 18th August but not before or following these dates. Nursing entries in the contact record state on 17th August 1998 "*Condition has generally deteriorated over the weekend Daughter seen- aware that mums condition is worsening, agrees active treatment not appropriate and to use of syringe driver if Mrs Wilkie is in pain*". There is no entry in the notes on 20th August or preceding few days indicating Mrs Wilkie was in pain.

4.4 A nursing entry on 21st August 1998 at 1255h states "*Condition deteriorating during morning. Daughter and granddaughters visited and stayed. Patient comfortable and pain free*". There are a number of routine entries in the period 6th August 1998 to death on 21st August 1998 in nutrition, pressure area care, constipation, catheter care, and personal hygiene. The nursing care plan records no significant deterioration until 21st August where it is noted death was pronounced at 2120h by staff nurse Sylvia Roberts. Cause of death was recorded as bronchopneumonia.

4.5 The drug charts records that Dr Barton prescribed as a regular daily review (not intermittent as required) prescription diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr all to be administered subcutaneously. The prescription is not dated. Drugs were first administered on 20th August, diamorphine at 30mg/24hr and midazolam 20mg/24hr from 1350h and then again on 21st August. Mrs Wilkie had not been prescribed or administered any analgesic drugs during her admission to Daedalus ward prior to administration of the diamorphine and midazolam infusions. During the period 16th-18th August she was prescribed and received zopiclone (a sedative hypnotic) 3.75mg nocte and co-danthramer 5-10ml (a laxative) orally.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

4.6 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Wilkie during her admission to Daedalus ward lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for her care. She saw Mrs Wilkie on 10th August 1998, 11 days prior to her death. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was the responsibility of the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mrs Wilkie and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

4.7 The initial diagnosis of a urinary tract infection and dehydration was reasonable and appears correct. Mrs Wilkie had a diagnosis of dementia, which there was clear evidence for. The entry by Dr Lord on 10th August 1998 provides a reasonable assessment of her functional level at this time, and a plan to review appropriate placement in one month's time. No diagnosis was made to explain the deterioration Mrs Wilkie is reported to have experienced around 15th August. There is no medical assessment in the notes following 10th August except documentation on 21st August 1998 of a marked deterioration. There is no clear evidence that Mrs Wilkie was in pain although she was commenced on opiate analgesics.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

4.8 No information is recorded in the medical or nursing notes to explain why Mrs Wilkie was commenced on diamorphine and hyoscine infusions. In my opinion there was no indication for the use of diamorphine and hyoscine in Mrs Wilkie. Other oral analgesics, such as paracetamol and mild opiate drugs could and should first have been tried, if Mrs Wilkie was in pain, although there is no evidence that she was. If these were inadequate oral morphine would have

been the next appropriate choice. From the information I have seen in the notes it appears the diamorphine and midazolam may have been commenced for non-specific reasons, perhaps as a non-defined palliative reasons as it was judged she was likely to die in the near future.

4.9 I consider the undated prescription by Dr Barton of subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr to be poor practice and potentially very hazardous. I consider it poor and hazardous management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam in a frail elderly underweight patient with dementia such as Mrs Wilkie. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and it would have been more appropriate to review the response to diamorphine alone before commencing midazolam, had it been appropriate to commence subcutaneous analgesia, which as I have stated before was not the case.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

4.10 The medical and nursing records during her stay on Daedalus ward are inadequate not sufficiently detailed, and do not provide a clear picture of Mrs Wilkie's condition. In my opinion the standard of the notes falls below the expected level of documentation on a continuing care or rehabilitation ward. The assessment by Dr Lord on 10th August 1998 is the only satisfactory medical note entry during her 15 day stay on Daedalus ward.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

4.11 As discussed above I do not consider the decision to commence diamorphine and hyoscine was appropriate on the basis of the information recorded in the clinical notes.

Recorded causes of death

4.12 There was no specific evidence that bronchopneumonia was present, although this is a common pre-terminal event in frail older people, and is often entered as the final cause of death in frail older patients. I am surprised the death certificate did not apparently refer to Mrs Wilkie's dementia as a contributory cause. It is possible Mrs Wilkie's death was due at least in part to respiratory depression from the diamorphine she received, or that the diamorphine led to the development of bronchopneumonia. However since there are no clear observations of Mrs Wilkie's respiratory observations it is difficult to know whether respiratory depression was present Mrs Wilkie deteriorated prior to administration of diamorphine and midazolam infusion, and in view of this, my opinion would be that although the opiate and sedative drugs administered may have hastened death, and these drugs were not indicated, Mrs Wilkie may well have died at the time she did even if she had not received the diamorphine and midazolam infusions.

Duty of care issues

4.13 Medical and nursing staff on Daedalus ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care, to monitor, and to document the effects of drugs prescribed to Mrs Wilkie. In my opinion this duty of care was not adequately met, the prescription of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and this may have contributed to Mrs Wilkie's death.

Summary

4.14 In my opinion the prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine and midazolam was inappropriate, and probably resulted in depressed conscious level and respiratory depression, which may have hastened her death. However Mrs Wilkie was a frail very dependent lady with dementia who was at high risk of developing pneumonia. It is possible she would have died from pneumonia even if she had not been administered the subcutaneous sedative and opiate drugs.

Robert WILSON

5.1 Mr Wilson was 75 years old man when he was admitted to Queen Alexandra Hospital on 22nd September 1998 after he sustained a proximal fracture of the left humerus. He was treated with morphine, initially administered intravenously and then subcutaneously. He developed vomiting. On 24th September he was given 5mg diamorphine and lost sensation in the left hand. On 29th September an entry in the medical notes states "*ref to social worker, review resus status. Not for resuscitation in view of quality of life and poor prognosis*".

5.2 On 7th October the notes record he was "*not keen on residential home and wished to return to his own home*". Dr Lusznat, Consultant in Old Age Psychiatry on 8th October 1998, saw him. Dr Lusznat's letter on 8th October notes that Mr Wilson had been sleepy and withdrawn and low in mood but was now eating and drinking well and appeared brighter in mood. His Barthel score was 5/20. Dr Lusznat noted he had a heavy alcohol intake during the last 5 years. At the time he was seen by Dr Lusznat her was prescribed thiamine 100 mg daily, multivitamins two tablets daily, senna two tablets daily, magnesium hydroxide 10 mls twice daily and paracetamol 1g four time daily. On examination he had mildly impaired cognitive function (Mini Mental State Examination 24/30). Dr Lusznat considered Mr Wilson might have developed an early dementia, which could have been alcohol related, Alzheimer's disease or vascular dementia. An antidepressant trazadone 50mg nocte was commenced. Dr Lusznat states at the end of her letter "*On the practical side he may well require nursing home care though at the moment he is strongly opposed to that idea I shall be happy to arrange follow up by our team once we know when and where he is going to be discharged*". On 13th October the medical notes record a ward round took place, that he required both nursing and medical care, was at risk of falling and that a short spell in long-term NHS care would be appropriate. Reviewing the drug charts Mr Wilson was taking regular soluble paracetamol (1g four times daily) and codeine phosphate 30mg as required for pain. Between 8th and 13th October Mr Wilson was administered four doses of 30mg codeine. Mr Wilson's weight in March 1997 was 93Kg

5.3 On the 14th October Mr Wilson was transferred to Dryad Ward. An entry in the medical notes by Dr Barton reads "*Transfer to Dryad ward continuing care. HPC fracture humerus. needs help with ADL (*activities of Daily Living*), hoisting, continent, Barthel 7. Lives with wife. Plan further mobilisation*". On 16th November the notes record; '*Decline overnight with S.O.B. o/e ? weak pulse. Unresponsive to spoken work. Oedema ++ in arms and legs. Diagnosis ?silent MI, ? decreased __ function. ↑frusemide to 2 x 40mg om* '. On 17th October the notes record '*comfortable but rapid deterioration*'. On 18th October staff nurse Collins records death at 2340h. Cause of death is recorded as congestive cardiac failure.

5.4 Nursing notes state in the summary section on 14th October "*History of left humerus fracture, arm in collar and cuff. Long history of heavy drinking. LVF chronic oedematous legs. S/B Dr Barton. Oramorph 10mg/5ml given. Continent of urine – uses bottles*". On 15th October "*Commenced oramorph 10mg/5ml 4 hrly for pain in L arm. Wife seen by* [redacted] *who explained Robert's condition is poor*". An earlier note states "*settled and slept well*". On 16th October "*seen by Dr Knapman an as deteriorated over night. Increase*

frusemide to 80mgdaily. For A.N.C (active nursing care)". Later that day a further entry states "*Patient very bubbly chest this pm. Syringe driver commenced 20mg diamorphine, 400mcgs hyoscine. Explained to family reason for driver*". A separate note on 16th October in the nursing care plan states "*More secretions – pharyngeal – during the night, but Robert hasn't been distressed. Appears comfortable*". On 17th October 0515h "*Hyoscine increased to 600mcgs as oro-pharyngeal secretions increasing. Diamorphine 20mg.*" Later that day a further entry states "*Slow deterioration in already poor condition. Requiring suction very regularly – copious amounts suctioned. Syringe driver reviewed at 15.50 s/c diamorphine 40mg, midazolam 20mcgs, hyoscine 800 mcgs*". A later note states "*night: noisy secretions but not distressing Robert. Suction given as required during night. Appears comfortable*". On 18th October "*further deterioration in already poor condition. Syringe driver reviewed at 14:40 s/c diamorphine 60mg, midazolam 40mg, hyoscine 1200mcg. Continues to require regular suction*".

5.5 The medication charts record administration of the following drugs:

14 Sep 1445h oramorph 10mg
2345h oramorph 10mg
16 Sep 1610h diamorphine 20mg/24 hr, hyoscine 400 microg/24hr subcutaneous infusion
17 Sep 0515h diamorphine 20mg/24hr, hyoscine 600 microg/24hr
1550h diamorphine 40mg/24hr, hyoscine 800 microg/24hr midazolam 20mg/24hr
18 Sep 1450h diamorphine 60mg/24hr, hyoscine 1200 microg/24hr midazolam 40mg/24hr

Frusemide was administered at a dose of 80mg daily at 0900h on 15th and 16th October. An additional 80 mg oral dose was administered at an unstated time on 16th October.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

5.6 Responsibility for the care of Mr Wilson during his admission to Dryad ward lay with Dr Lord as the consultant responsible for his care. My understanding is that day to day medical care was delegated to the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during the out of hours responsibility was with the on call doctor based at Queen Alexandra Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mr Wilson and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

5.7 Dr Lusznat was responsible for assessing Mr Wilson and making further recommendations concerning his future care when he was seen at Queen Alexandra Hospital.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

5.8 Dr Barton assessed Mr Wilson on 14th October the day he was transferred to Dyad ward. There was a plan to attempt to improve his mobilisation through rehabilitation. There is no record of any significant symptomatic medical problems, in particular any record that Mr Wilson was in pain in the medical

notes. The nursing notes suggest Mr Wilson was prescribed oramorph for pain in his arm following his admission to Dryad Ward. He was prescribed paracetamol to take as required but did not receive any paracetamol whilst on Dryad Ward.

5.9 Mr Wilson deteriorated on 15th September when he became short of breath. The working diagnosis was of heart failure due to a myocardial infarct. I do not consider the assessment by the on call doctor of Mr Wilson was adequate or competent. There is no record of his blood pressure, clinical examination findings in the chest (which might have indicated whether he had signs of pulmonary oedema or pneumonia). In my opinion an ECG should have been obtained that night, and a Chest Xray obtained the following morning to provide supporting evidence for the diagnosis. Mr Wilson was admitted for rehabilitation not terminal care and it was necessary and appropriate to perform reasonable clinical assessments and investigations to make a correct diagnosis.

5.10 Following treatment Mr Wilson was noted to have had a rapid deterioration. The medical and nursing teams appear to have failed to consider that Mr Wilson's deterioration may have been due to the diamorphine infusion. In my opinion when Mr Wilson was unconscious the diamorphine infusion should have been reduced or discontinued. The nursing and medical staff failed to record Mr Wilson's respiratory rate, which was likely to have been reduced, because of respiratory depressant effects of the diamorphine. The diamorphine and hyoscine infusion should have been discontinued to determine whether this was contributing to his deteriorating state. There is no record of the reason for the prescribing of the midazolam infusion commenced the day before his death. At this time the nursing notes record he was comfortable. Mr Wilson did not improve. The medical and nursing teams did not appear to consider that the diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam infusion could be a major contributory factor in Mr Wilson's subsequent decline. The infusion should have been discontinued and the need for this treatment, in my opinion unnecessary at the time of commencement, reviewed.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

5.11 The initial prescription and administration of oramorph to Mr Wilson following his transfer to Dryad ward was in my opinion inappropriate. His pain had been controlled with regular paracetamol and as required codeine phosphate (a mild opiate) prior to his transfer, and in the first instance these should have been discontinued.

5.12 I am unable to establish when Dr Barton wrote the prescription for subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr, and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr as these are undated. The administration of diamorphine and hyoscine by subcutaneous infusion as a treatment for the diagnosis of a silent myocardial infarction was in my opinion inappropriate. The prescription of a single dose of intravenous opiate is standard treatment for a patient with chest pain following myocardial infarction is appropriate standard practice but was not indicated in Mr Wilson's case as he did not have pain. The prescription of an initial single dose of diamorphine is appropriate as a treatment for pulmonary oedema if a patient fails to respond to intravenous diuretics such as frusemide. Mr Wilson was not administered intravenous

frusemide or another loop diuretic. Instead only a single additional oral dose of frusemide was administered. In my opinion this was an inadequate response to Mr Wilson's deterioration. The prescription of continuous subcutaneous infusion of diamorphine and hyoscine is not appropriate treatment for a patient who is pain free with a diagnosis of a myocardial infarction and heart failure. When opiates are used to treat heart failure, close monitoring of blood pressure and respiratory rate, preferably with monitoring of oxygen saturation is required. This was not undertaken.

5.13 The increase in diamorphine dose to 40mg/24hr and then 60mg/24 hr in the following 48 hours is not appropriate when the nursing and medical notes record no evidence that Mr Wilson was in pain or distressed at this time. This was poor practice and potentially very hazardous. Similarly the addition of midazolam and subsequent increase in dose to 40mg/24hr was in my opinion highly inappropriate and would be expected to carry a high risk of producing profound depression of conscious level and respiratory drive.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

5.14 The initial entry in the medical records by Dr Barton on 14th October is reasonable and sufficient. The subsequent entries relating to Mr Wilson's deterioration are in my opinion inadequate, and greater detail and the results of examination findings should have been recorded. No justification for the increases in diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine dose are written in the medical notes. The nursing notes are generally of adequate quality but I can find no record of fluid and food intake by Mr Wilson.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

5.15 I consider the prescription of oramorph was inappropriate. The subsequent prescription and administration of diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam was highly inappropriate, not justified by information presented in the notes and could be expected to result in profound depression of conscious level and respiratory depression in a frail elderly man such as Mr Wilson.

Recorded causes of death

5.16 The recorded cause of death was congestive cardiac failure. The limited clinical information recorded in the absence of a chest Xray result or post-mortem findings, suggest this may have been the cause of Mr Wilson's death. However in my opinion it is highly likely that the diamorphine, hyoscine and midazolam infusion led to respiratory depression and/or bronchopneumonia and it is possible that Mr Wilson died from drug induced respiratory depression.

Duty of care issues

5.17 Medical and nursing staff on Dryad ward had a duty of care to deliver appropriate medical and nursing care to Mr Wilson, and to monitor the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of care was not adequate. The administration of high doses of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mr Wilson's death.

Summary

5.18 Mr Wilson was a frail elderly man with early dementia who was physically dependent. Following his admission to Dryad ward he was, in my opinion, inappropriately treated with high doses of opiate and sedative drugs. These drugs are likely to have produced respiratory depression and/or the development of bronchopneumonia and may have contributed to his death.

Eva PAGE

6.1 Eva Page was 87 years old when admitted as an emergency on 6th February 1998 to the Department of Medicine for Elderly People at Queen Alexandra Hospital. The medical notes record that she had experienced a general deterioration over the last 5 days was complaining of nausea and reduced appetite and was dehydrated. She had felt 'depressed' during the last few weeks. On admission she was taking ramipril 5mg once daily (a treatment for heart failure and hypertension), frusemide 40mg once daily (treatment for fluid retention), digoxin 125microg once daily (to control irregular heart rate), sotalol 40 mg twice daily (to control irregular heart rate), aspirin 75 mg once daily (to prevent stroke and myocardial infarction) and sertraline 50mg once daily (an antidepressant commenced by her general practitioner on 26th January 1998). A discharge summary and medical notes relating to an admission in May 1997 states that she was admitted with acute confusion, had reduced movement on the right side and was discharged back to her residential home on aspirin. No admitting diagnosis is recorded in the clerking notes written by Dr Harris on 6th February 1998 but they record that *"patient refuses iv fluids and is willing to accept increased oral fluids"*.

6.2 On 7th February 1998 the medical notes record an opacity seen on the chest Xray and sate "*mood low. Feels frightened – doesn't know why. Nausea and ??. Little else. Nil clinically.*" An increased white cell count is noted (13.0) and antibiotics commenced. A subsequent chest Xray report (undated) states there is a 5cm mass superimposed on the left hilum highly suspicious of malignancy. The medical notes on 11 February 1998 record this at the Xray meeting. On 12th February 1998 the notes record (? Dr Shain) '*In view of advanced age aim in the management should be palliative care. Charles Ward is suitable. Not for CPR*'. On 13th February the notes record '*remains v low Appears to have 'given up' d/w son re probably diagnosis d/w RH (residential home) re ability to cope*'. The notes record *'son agrees not suitable for invasive Tx (*treatment*). Matron from RH visiting today will check on ability to cope.*'

6.3 On 19th February the notes record she fell on the ward and experienced minor cuts. On 16th February '*gradual deterioration, no pain, confused. For Charles Ward she could be discharged to community from Charles Ward*'. On 19th February the notes summarise her problems '*probable Carcinoma of the bronchus, previous left ventricular failure, atrial fibrillation, digoxin toxicity and a transient ischaemic attack, that she was sleepy but responsive, states that she is frightened but doesn't know why. Says she has forgotten things, not possible to elicit what she can't remember, low MTS (mental test score). Plan encourage oral fluids, s/c fluid over night if tolerated. Continue antidepressants*'. On 18th February the medical notes state "*No change. Awaiting Charles Ward bed*".

6.4 The nursing notes record she was confused but mobilised independently. On 19th February she was transferred to Charles Ward instead of the preferred option of a bed at Gosport Hospital, which the notes record was full ('no beds'). The Queen Alexandra Hospital medical notes record a summary of her problems on 19th February prior to transfer as follows " *Diagnosis CA bronchus probable [no histology] Diag based on CXR. PMH 95 LVF + AF 95 Digoxin toxicity 97 TIA. Admitted 6.2.98 general deterioration CXR ? Ca Bronchus.*

Well defined O lesion. Exam: sleepy but responsive answers appropriately. States that she is frightened but doesn't know why. Says she has forgotten things. Not possible to elicit what she can't remember. Low MTS" and *"Feels in general tired and very thirsty. Plan encourage oral fluids, s/c fluid overnight is tolerated continue antidepressants".*

6.5 The medical notes on 23rd February record diagnoses of depression, dementia, ? Ca bronchus, ischaemic heart disease and congestive heart failure. On 25th February Dr Lord records in the medical notes "*confused and some agitation towards afternoon – evening try tds* (three times daily) *thioridazine, son in Gosport, transfer to Gosport 27/2, heminevrin prn nocte'.* A further entry states *'All other drugs stopped by Dr Lord'.*

6.6 Mrs Page was transferred to Dryad ward at Gosport War Memorial Hospital on 27th February 1998. Dr Barton writes in the medical notes "*Transfer to Dryad ward continuing care, Diagnosis of Ca Bronchus on CXR on admission. Generally unwell off legs, not eating, bronchoscopy not done, catheterised, needs help with eating and drinking, needs hoisting, Barthel 0. Family seen and well aware of prognosis. Opiates commenced. I'm happy for nursing staff to confirm death".* The nursing notes state she was admitted for *'palliative care'*, that she had a urinary catheter (inserted on 22nd February 1998) was incontinent of faeces, and was dependent for washing and dressing but could hold a beaker and pick up small amounts of food. Barthel Index was 2/20. The nursing action plan states *'encourage adequate fluid intake'.* On 28th February an entry in the medical notes by Dr Laing (duty GP) record *'asked to see: confused. Feels 'lost' agitated esp. night/evening, not in pain, to give thioridazine 25mg tds regular, heminevrin noct.* The nursing notes record she was very distressed and that she was administered thioridazine and Oramorph 2.5ml.

6.7 On 2nd March Dr Barton records *'no improvement on major tranquillisers. I suggest adequate opioids to control fear and pain; Son to be seen by Dr Lord today'.* A subsequent entry by Dr Lord on the same day states *' spitting out thioridazine, quieter on prn sc diamorphine. Fentanyl patch started today. Agitated and calling out even when staff present (diagnoses) 1) Ca Bronchus 2) ? Cerebral metastases. -ct* (continue) *fentanyl patches.'* A further entry by Dr Lord that day records *'son seen. Concerned about deterioration today. Explained about agitation and that drowsiness was probably due in part to diamorphine. He accepts that his mother is dying and agrees we continue present plan of Mx* (management)".

6.8 On 2nd March the nursing notes record "*commenced on Fentanyl 25mcg this am. Very distressed this morning seen by Dr Barton to have and diamorphine 5mg i/m (intramuscular) same given 0810h by a syringe driver.* A further entry the same day states *"S/B Dr Lord. Diamorphine 5mg i/m given for syringe driver with diamorphine loaded*". On 3rd March a rapid deterioration in Mrs Page's condition is recorded *'Neck and left side of body rigid – right side rigid,* At 1050h diamorphine and midazolam were commenced by syringe driver. Death is recorded later that day at 2130h, 4 days following admission to Dyad ward.

6.9 The prescription charts (which are incompletely copied in notes made available to me) indicate she received the following drugs during this admission Two doses of intramuscular diamorphine 5 mg were administered at 0800 and 1500h (date not visible)

28 Feb 1998	1300h thioridazine 25mg
	1620h oramorph 5mg
	2200h heminevrin 250mg in 5ml
1 Mar 1998	0700h thioridazine 25 mg
	1300h thioridazine 25 mg
	2200h heminevrin 250mg
2 Mar 1998	0700h thioridazine 25mg
	0800h fentanyl 25microg
3 Mar 1998	1050h diamorphine 20mg/24hr, midazolam 20 mg/24hr by subcutaneous infusion

On 27th February Dr Barton prescribed thioridazine 25mg (prn tds) and Oramorph (10mg/5ml) 4hrly prn. On 2nd March Dr Barton prescribed fentanyl 25microg patch (x3 days) to take as required (prn). On 3rd March Dr Barton prescribed diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr, hyoscine 200-800ucg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr by subcutaneous infusion.
The notes do not indicate that the fentanyl patch was removed and I would assume this was continued when the diamorphine and midazolam infusion was commenced.

Opinion on patient management

Leadership, roles, responsibilities and communication in respect of the clinicians involved

6.10 Primary responsibility for the medical care of Mrs Page during her admission to Dryad Ward lay with Dr Lord, as the consultant responsible for his care. She saw Mrs Page 2 days before her transfer to Dryad ward and two days following her admission, the day before she died. My understanding is that day-to-day medical care was the responsibility of the clinical assistant Dr Barton and during out of hours period the on call doctor based at the Queen Alexander Hospital. Ward nursing staff were responsible for assessing and monitoring Mrs Page and informing medical staff of any significant deterioration.

Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis including risk assessments

6.11 The assessment and management of Mrs Page at Alexandra Hospital was in my opinion competent and considered. From the information in the clinical notes I would agree with the diagnosis of probable carcinoma of bronchus. The decision to prescribe an antidepressant was in my opinion appropriate. Prior to transfer to Dryad ward she was not in pain but was transferred for palliative care. Although Mrs Page was clearly very dependent and unwell, it is not clear why Dr Barton prescribed opiates to Mrs Page on admission to Dryad ward when there is no evidence she was in pain. I suspect the reason was to provide relief for Mrs Page's anxiety and agitation. This is a reasonable indication for opiates in the palliative care of a patient with known inoperable carcinoma. Mrs Page was noted to be severely dependent, Barthel Index 0, and in conjunction with a probable carcinoma of the bronchus the assessment that she required palliative care and was likely to die in the near future was appropriate.

Evaluation of drugs prescribed and the administration regimens

6.12 The prescription of the major tranquilliser thioridazine for anxiety was reasonable and appropriate. The prescribing of the sedative/hypnotic drug heminevrin was similarly reasonable although potential problems of sedation from the combination need to be considered. Mrs Page was not in pain but I consider the prescription of oramorph on 28th February to attempt to improve her distress was reasonable. By 2nd March Mrs Page remained very distressed despite prescription of Oramorph, thioridazine and heminevrin. Since the notes reported she was more settled following intramuscular diamorphine and she had been spitting out her oral medication, I would consider it appropriate to prescribe a transdermal fentanyl patch to provide continuing opioid drugs to Mrs Page. The lowest dose patch was administered but it would have been important to be aware of the potential for depression of respiration and/or conscious level that could occur.

6.13 I do not understand why subcutaneous diamorphine and midazolam infusions were commenced on 3rd March when Mrs Page had deteriorated whilst on the fentanyl patch. There is no indication in the notes that Mrs Page was in pain or distressed. The notes describe her as having undergone a rapid deterioration, which could have been due to a number of different causes, including a stroke or an adverse effect of the fentanyl patch. In my opinion the prescription by Dr Barton of subcutaneous diamorphine 20-200mg/24hr prn, hyoscine 200-800microg/24hr and midazolam 20-80mg/24hr was poor practice and potentially very hazardous. I would judge it poor management to initially commence both diamorphine and midazolam in a frail elderly underweight patient such as Mrs Page who was already receiving transdermal fentanyl. I would expect very clear reasons to support the use of the drugs to be recorded in the medical notes. The combination could result in profound respiratory depression and there are no symptoms recorded which suggest the administration of either drug was appropriate.

Quality and sufficiency of the medical records

6.14 The medical and nursing records relating to Mrs Page's admission to Dryad ward are in my view of adequate quality, although as stated above the reasons for the use of midazolam and diamorphine are not recorded in either the medical or nursing notes.

Appropriateness and justification of the decisions that were made

6.15 In my opinion the majority of management and prescribing decisions made by medical and nursing staff were appropriate. The exception is the prescription of diamorphine and midazolam on the day of Mrs Page's death. From the information I have seen in the notes it appears that Dr Barton may have commenced the diamorphine and midazolam infusion for non-specific reasons or for non-defined palliative reasons when it was judged she was likely to die in the near future.

Recorded causes of death

6.16 In the absence of a post-mortem the recorded cause of death is reasonable. Mrs Page had a probable carcinoma of the bronchus and experienced a slow deterioration in her general health and functional abilities. It is possible that Mrs Page died from drug induced respiratory depression. However Mrs Page was at high risk of dying from the effects of her probable carcinoma of the bronchus even if she had not received sedative and opiate drugs. Bronchopneumonia

can also occur as a complication of opiate and sedative induced respiratory depression but also in patients deteriorating from malignancy. In the absence of post-mortem, radiological data (chest Xray) or recordings of Mrs Page's respiratory rate I would consider the recorded cause of death was possible. The deterioration on between the 2nd March and 3rd March could have been secondary to the fentanyl patch she received but again could have occurred in the absence of receiving this drug. There are no accurate records of Mrs Page's respiratory rate but significant potentially fatal respiratory depression was likely to have resulted could have resulted from the combination of diamorphine, midazolam and fentanyl.

Duty of care issues

6.17 Medical and nursing staff on Dryad ward had a duty of care to deliver medical and nursing care, to monitor Mrs Page and to document the effects of drugs prescribed. In my opinion this duty of care was adequately met except during the last day of her life when the prescription of diamorphine and midazolam was poor practice and may have contributed to Mrs Wilkie's death.

Summary

6.18 Mrs Page was a frail elderly lady with probable carcinoma of the bronchus who had been deteriorating during the two weeks prior to admission to Dryad ward. In general I consider the medical and nursing care she received was appropriate and of adequate quality. However I cannot identify a reason for the prescription of subcutaneous diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine by Dr Barton on the 3rd March. In my view this was an inappropriate, potentially hazardous prescription. I would consider it highly likely that Mrs Page experienced respiratory depression and profound depression of conscious level from the combination of these two drugs and fentanyl but I cannot exclude other causes for her deterioration and death at this time such as stroke or pneumonia.

Opinion on clinical management at Gosport War Memorial Hospital based on review of five cases presented by Hampshire Police

7.1 My opinion on the five cases I have been asked to review at Gosport War Memorial Hospital must be considered in context. My understanding is that the five cases have been selected by Hampshire Police because of concerns expressed relating to the management of these patients. Therefore my comments should not be interpreted as an opinion on the quality of care in general at Gosport War Memorial Hospital or of the general quality of care by the clinicians involved. My comments also relate to a period 2-4 years ago and the current clinical practice at the hospital may be very different today. An opinion on the quality of care in general at the hospital or of the clinicians would require a systematic review of cases, selected at random or with pre-defined patient characteristics. Examination of selected cases is not an appropriate mechanism to comment on the general quality of care of an institution or individual practitioners.

7.2 However having reviewed the five cases I would consider they raise a number of concerns that merit further examination by independent enquiry. Such enquiries could be made through further police interviews or perhaps more appropriately through mechanisms within the National Health Service, such as the Commission for Health Improvement, and professional medical and nursing bodies such as the General Medical Council or United Kingdom Central Council for Nursery, Midwifery and Health Visiting.

7.3 My principle concerns relate to the following three areas of practice: prescription and administration of subcutaneous infusions of opiate and sedative drugs in patients with non-malignant disease, lack of training and appropriate medical supervision of decisions made by nursing staff, and the level of nursing and non-consultant medical skills on the wards in relation to the management of older people with rehabilitation needs.

7.4 In all five cases subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine and in combination with sedative drugs were administered to older people who were mostly admitted for rehabilitation. One patient with carcinoma of the bronchus was admitted for palliative care. Although intravenous infusion of these drugs are used frequently in intensive care settings, very close monitoring of patients is undertaken to ensure respiratory depression does not occur. Subcutaneous infusion of these drugs is also used in palliative care, but the British National Formulary indicates this route should be used only when the patient is unable to take medicines by mouth, has malignant bowel obstruction or where the patient does not wish to take regular medication (Appendix 2). In only one case were these criteria clearly fulfilled i.e. in Mrs Page who was refusing to take oral medication. Opiate and sedative drugs used were frequently used at excessive doses and in combination with often no indication for dose escalation that took place. There was a failure by medical and nursing staff to recognise or respond to severe adverse effects of depressed respiratory function and conscious level that seemed to have occurred in all five patients. Nursing and medical staff appeared to have little knowledge of the adverse effects of these drugs in older people.

7.5 Review of the cases suggested that the decision to commence and increase the dose of diamorphine and sedative drugs might have been made by nursing staff without appropriate consultation with medical staff. There is a possibility that prescriptions of subcutaneous infusions of diamorphine, midazolam and hyoscine may have been routinely written up for many older frail patients admitted to Daedalus and Dryad wards, which nurses then had the discretion to commence. This practice if present was highly inappropriate, hazardous to patients and suggests failure of the senior hospital medical and managerial staff to monitor and ~~supervise care on~~ the ward. Routine use of opiate and sedative drug infusions without clear indications for their use would raise concerns that a culture of "involuntary euthanasia" existed on the ward. Closer enquiry into the ward practice, philosophy and individual staff's understanding of these practices would be necessary to establish whether this was the case. Any problems may have been due to inadequate training in management of older patients. It would be important to examine levels of staffing in relation to patient need during this period, as the failure to keep adequate nursing records could have resulted from under-staffing of the ward. Similarly there may have been inadequate senior medical staff input into the wards, and it would be important to examine this in detail, both in terms of weekly patient contact and in time available to lead practice development on the wards. My review of Dr Lord's medical notes and her statement leads me to conclude she is a competent, thoughtful geriatrician who had a considerable clinical workload during the period the above cases took place.

7.6 I consider the five cases raise serious concerns about the general management of older people admitted for rehabilitation on Daedalus and Dryad wards and that the level of skills of nursing and non-consultant medical staff, particularly Dr Barton, were not adequate at the time these patients were admitted.

7.7 Having reviewed the five cases presented to me by Hampshire Police, I consider they raise serious concerns about nursing and medical practice on Daedalus and Dryad wards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. In my opinion a review of practice at the institution is necessary, if this has not already taken place. I would recommend that if criminal proceedings do not take place, that these cases are brought to the attention of the General Medical Council and United Kingdom Central Council for Nursery, Midwifery and Health Visiting, in relation to the professional competence of the medical and nursing staff, and the Commission for Health Improvement, in relation to the quality of service provided to older people in the Trust.

APPENDIX 1

Pharmacology of Opiate and Sedative Drugs

Morphine

8.1 Morphine is a potent opiate analgesic considered by many to the 'drug of choice' for the control of acute pain (Therapeutic Drugs Dollery). Recommended starting dosage regimens for a fit adult of 70Kg are for intravenous bolus dosing 2.5mg every 5 min until analgesia achieved with monitoring of the duration of pain and dosing interval, or a loading dose of 5-15mg over 30min than 2,5mg – 5mg every hour. A standard reference text recommends 'morphine doses should be reduced in elderly patients and titrated to provide optimal pain relief with minimal side effects'. Morphine can be used for sedation where sedation and pain relief are indicated, Dollery comments '*it should be noted that morphine is not indicated as a sedative drug for long-term use. Rather the use of morphine is indicated where the requirement for pain relief and sedation coexist such as in patients admitted to intensive care units and other high dependency areas, the morphine dose should be titrated to provide pain relief and an appropriate level of sedation. Frequently other pharmacological agents (e.g.: benzodiazepines) are added to this regimen to increase the level of sedation".*

8.2 Diamorphine

8.3

8.4 **Fentanyl**

8.5 Fentanyl is a transdermal opioid analgesic available as a transdermal patch. The '25' patch releases 25microg/hr.

8.6 The British National Formulary (copy of prescribing in palliative care attached Appendix 2) comments on the use of syringe drivers in prescribing in palliative care that drugs can usually be administered by mouth to control symptoms, and that indications for the parenteral route are: patient unable to take medicines by mouth, where there is malignant bowel obstruction, and where the patient does not wish to take regular medication by mouth, It comments that staff using syringe drivers should be adequately trained and that incorrect use of syringe drivers is a common cause of drug errors.

Heminevrin

Midazolam

8.1 Midazolam is a benzodiazepine sedative drug. It is used as a hypnotic, preoperative medication, sedation for procedures such as dentistry and GO endoscopy, long-term sedation and induction of general anaesthesia. Iot is not licensed for subcutaneous use, but is described in the British National Formulary prescribing in palliative care section as 'suitable for a very restless patient: it is given in a subcutaneous infusion dose of 20-100mg/24 hrs.

8.2 DA standard text describes the use of sedation with midazolam in the intensive care unit setting, and states, "*sedation is most commonly met by a combination of a benzodiazepine and an opioid, and midazolam has generally replaced diazepam in this respect".* It goes on to state, "in critically ill patients, prolonged sedation may follow the use of midazolam infusions as a result of delayed administration". Potentially life threatening adverse effects are described, "Midazolam can cause dose-related CNS depression, respiratory and

cardiovascular depression. There is a wide variation in susceptibility to its effects, the elderly being particularly sensitive. Respiratory depression, respiratory arrest, hypotension and even death have been reported following its use usually during conscious sedation. The elderly are listed as a high-risk group; the elderly are particularly sensitive to midazolam. The dose should be reduced and the drug given slowly intravenously in a diluted form until the desired response is achieved. In drug interactions the following is stated. "*midazolam will also potentiate the central depressant effects of opioids, barbituates, and other sedatives and anaesthetics, and profound and prolonged respiratory depression might result.*

8.3

Hyoscine

8.4 The British National Formulary describes hyoscine hydrobromide as an antagonist (blocking drug) of acetylcholine. It reduces salivary and respiratory secretions and provides a degree of amnesia, sedation and antiemesis (antinausea). IN some patients, especially the elderly, hyoscine may cause the central anticholinergic syndrome (excitement, ataxia, hallucinations, behavioural abnormalities, and drowsiness). The palliative care section describes it as being given in a subcutaneous infusion dose of 0.6-2.4mg/24 hours.

8.5

Use of syringe drivers

8.1 The BNF states 'oral medication is usually satisfactory unless there is severe nausea and vomiting, dysphagia, weakness, or coma in which case parenteral medication may be necessary. In the pain section it comments the non-opioid analgesics aspirin or paracetamol given regularly will often make the use of opioids unnecessary. An opioid such as codeine or dextropropoxyphene alone or in combination with a non-opioid analgesic at adequate dosage may be helpful in the control of moderate pain id non-opioids are not sufficient. If these preparations are not controlling the pain, morphine is the most useful opioid analgesic. Alternatives to morphine are hydromoprhine, oxycodone and transdermal fentanyl. In prescribing morphine it states 'morphine is given as an oral solution or as standard tablets every 4 hour, the initial dose depending largely on the patient's previous treatment. A dose of 5-10mg is enough to replace a weaker analgesic. If the first dose of morphine is no more effective than the previous analgesic it should be increased by 50% the aim being to choose the lowest dose which prevents pain. The dose should be adjusted with careful assessment of the pain and the use of adjuvant analgesics (such as NSAIDs) should also be considered. Although morphine in a dose of 5-10mg is usually adequate there should be no hesitation in increasing it stepwise according to response to 100mg or occasionally up to 500mg or higher if necessary. The BNF comments on the parenteral route '*diamorphine is preferred for injection. The equivalent intramuscular or subcutaneous dose of diamorphine is approximately a third of the oral dose of morphine.*'

8.2 In the chapter on pain relief in 'Drugs and the Older Person' Crome writes on the treatment of acute pain ' *treat the underlying cause and give adequate pain relief. The nature of the painful condition, the response of the patient and the presence of comorbidity will dictate whether to start with a mild analgesic or to go immediately to a more potent drug. In order to avoid the situation that patients remain in pain, "starting low" must be followed by regular re-evaluation with, if necessary, frequent increases in drug dose. The usual method of*

prescribing morphine for chronic pain is to start with standard oral morphine in a dose of 5-10mg every four hours. The dose should be halved in frail older people.

Prescribing for the Elderly

The British National Formulary states in Prescribing for the Elderly section "*The ageing nervous system shows increased susceptibility to many commonly used drugs, such as opioid analgesics, benzodiazepines, antipsychotics and antiparkinsonian drugs, all of which must be used with caution*".

APPENDIX 2

BNF Prescribing in palliative care

HAMPSHIRE Constabulary

Paul R. Kernaghan QPM LL.B MA DPM MCIPD
Chief Constable

Major Incident Complex
Kingston Crescent
North End
Portsmouth
PO2 8BU

Code A

Our Ref. : MIC/Det.Supt/JJ/DM
Your Ref. :

Tel. : 0845 045 45 45
Direct Dial :
Fax. : 023 9289 1884

27 February 2002

Ms E McAnulty
Director Of Professional Conduct
United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing
Midwifery and Health Visiting
23 Portland Place
LONDON
W1B 1PZ

Dear Ms McAnulty

Thank you for your letter of the 26th February clarifying the current position as far as the UKCC are concerned.

For your information I am away from the office between the 28th February and the 25th March. Should you or Code A ish to speak to an officer on our team, please contact in the first instance Detective Inspector John ASHWORTH on Code A

He will update me on my return as appropriate.

Yours sincerely

Code A

J JAMES
Detective Superintendent

UKCC Internal Memorandum

To:	Code A	Date:	25 February 2002
Copy to:		Ref:	Code A/memo - Beed et al
From:	Liz McAnulty	File:	

Beed, Couchman, Joice

I would be grateful if you would keep me posted on this case. The Commission for Health Improvement is also investigating the situation at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital. It may be helpful for you to liaise with Liz Fradd and her colleagues on this. If you think this would be a good idea let me know and I will brief you.

Thanks.

Code A

Liz

Enclosure:

DS J James
Hampshire Constabulary
Major Incident Complex
Kingston Crescent
North End
Portsmouth
PO2 8BU

26 February 2002
Code A
Direct line: Code A
Fax No: 020 7333 6536
Email: Code A

Dear Detective Superintendent James

Code A

Thank you for your letter dated 21 February 2002 regarding the above and for your helpful additional elucidation of the situation.

The case which this Council closed was in relation to Mrs Gladys Richards. However, as the report by Professor Ford contains information relating to other patients, it may now be possible for an investigation to be carried out in relation to those patients as well as in relation to any new allegations concerning Mrs Richards. I have, therefore, passed the documentation to Code A who will take these new allegations forward. Code A will no doubt be in touch with you to obtain any further information you have on this case.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Liz McAnulty
Director of Professional Conduct

CC Code A

HAMPSHIRE Constabulary

Paul R. Kernaghan QPM LL.B MA DPM MCIPD
Chief Constable

Major Incident Complex
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21 February 2002

Ms E McAnulty
Director Of Professional Conduct
United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing
Midwifery and Health Visiting
23 Portland Place
LONDON
W1B 1PZ

Dear Ms McAnulty

Re: Code A

I am writing in reply to your letter of the 11th February 2002, concerning the above named.

I note that you conclude that you are not in a position to take any further action. In respect of that decision I consider I must draw to your attention matters that may not have been clearly articulated in my letter of the 6th February.

I am aware that you attended a briefing with the previous Senior Investigating Officer, DCI Ray BURT, at our headquarters in May 2001. At that time we were awaiting a decision from the Crown Prosecution Service as to whether or not any clinical or nursing staff were criminally liable in respect of the death of Gladys RICHARDS at Gosport War Memorial Hospital in August 1998. You will be aware from my correspondence to you that the Crown Prosecution Service decided in July 2001 that on the basis of evidence presented to them there was not a realistic prospect of conviction in that case and that proceedings should not be instituted.

You will also be aware that we commissioned two further experts to report on other deaths at the hospital and I have forwarded those reports to you.

Whilst it is the position that the Crown Prosecution Service concluded in the case of Gladys RICHARDS there was insufficient evidence to prosecute that decision was taken before Professor FORD's report was commissioned. I took the view, for a variety of reasons, that

HAMPSHIRE Constabulary

we could not re-visit that decision. I also concluded that a wider police investigation was not appropriate, again for a variety of reasons I am happy to discuss with you.

Despite these decisions it is clear to me that Professor FORD in his report makes a number of observations about the role of other agencies in investigating the appropriateness of individuals actions in delivering care to patients at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. In particular I refer to pages 35/36, paragraphs 7.3 to 7.7 inclusive.

His conclusions on five patient cases are reflected in the report of Professor LIVESLEY who reported on Gladys RICHARDS alone. I am not sure you have previously received a copy of the report and now enclose it for your information. I would draw your attention particularly to page 16, paragraph 7.14.

The combined impact of these reports clearly raises concerns about the actions of individual nurses and doctors as described fully in the papers. Our decision not to re-visit the decision in respect of the Gladys RICHARDS case and other patient deaths is primarily concerned with the investigation of potential offences of manslaughter by gross negligence. The test being applied, in part, to that decision is whether or not there is, or we are likely to gather, evidence in support of those offences to the appropriate standard of proof. This seems to me to be very different from determining, to the same standard of proof, that nursing or medical staff have failed to deliver care to the appropriate professionally recognised standards.

The reports previously forwarded to you were only a small part of the information gathered during the course of our investigations. In order to enable the UKCC to discharge its functions as a regulatory body I have authority to share all of that information with you in addition to the material already supplied.

I would stress that our enquiries have focused upon the potential criminal liability of individuals. I, nor any other member of the enquiry team, have not, and could not, come to an informed conclusion about the standard of care delivered by individual doctors or nurses against any recognised professional benchmark.

Nevertheless it appears that there is a prima facia case for enquiries to be commenced to establish whether or not individuals concerned in the care of patients described in the reports of FORD, LIVESLEY and MUNDY have failed to meet professional standards of care.

The Force is clearly willing and able to share any information required to support that investigation.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

Code A

J JAMES
Detective Superintendent

Code A

From: Code A
Sent: 15 February 2002 15:23
To: Code A
Subject:

Not sure who's this was, I think Code A but here is this message anyway.

Yesterday Fiona Cameron from a trust in Portsmouth rang. She said that the police had reported the above 3 to us last year and we had closed in Oct/Nov time. She says the police are planning to report again based on an expert's report, and what would we do if they did?

I said generally that if we had had that evidence before, probably we wouldn't do anything as it would not be anything new. If it was something new, we may re-open it depending on the circumstances under which we'd closed it before, sometimes we were in difficulties re-opening complaints, but we would have to assess the complaint when it came in to see what we were going to do.

Liz phoned today wanting to speak to someone about it. She was at the CHI and may have to ring the dept of health about it, as the expert's report uses phrases such as "culture of euthanasia", and this has been sent to the family. She contacted Code A Helen to find the decision letters to see if we'd told them it might be re-opened. And this is the last I know of it.

Preliminary Proceedings Committee
18 September 2001

Complaint where no action would appear to be indicated

Practitioner	Complaint	Reasons for no action
a) Code A Case Ref: 10347 PIN: 81F010E(D.O.B: 21.3.1963) RGN (Part 1 of the register) – September 1984 Date complaint received: 25 September 2000 b) Code A Case Ref: 10348 PIN: 75K0264E D.O.B: 16.11.1937 RGN (Part 1 of the register) – August 1992 EN(G) (Part 2 of the register) – August 1978 Date complaint received: 25 September 2000 c) Code A Case ref: 10349 PIN: 84L0392E D.O.B: 17.12.1950 RGN (Part 1 of the register) – July 1988 Date complaint received: 25 September 2000	SEE ATTACHED REPORT	SEE ATTACHED REPORT

Code A
Code A
28 August 2001

Professional Conduct Report

for the

Preliminary Proceedings Committee

on

18 September 2001

Case Name: a Code A
b
c

Case Ref: a) 10347
b) 10348
c) 10349

Complaint

This referral was made by Hampshire Constabulary who informed the UKCC that they were investigating the circumstances of the death of an elderly patient Mrs Richards at Gosport War Memorial Hospital in August 1998. No specific complaint was made however we were informed that Philip Beed, Code A were being interviewed and that there may be element of criminal culpability in their conduct. The doctor in charge of Mrs Richards' care, Dr Barton, was also the subject of investigation.

Code A was ward manager at GWMH, Code A Code A were both staff nurses.

The police investigation was started because of concerns raised by the daughters of Mrs Richards Mrs Lack and Mrs MacKenzie. Their main concern was about the medical treatment Mrs Richards received with the implication that she was given high doses of morphine instead of proper treatment and nourishment and that consequently she died when she could have survived. The family had previously complained to Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust raising wider concerns about her treatment. The family have never made complaints about specific nursing staff.

Mrs Richards was aged 91 when she died. She suffered from dementia and had been a resident at Glen Heathers Home since 1994 until 29 July 1998 when she was admitted to Haslar Hospital Gosport following a fall. She had suffered a fractured neck of femur and made a good recovery from a surgical repair. She was admitted to Gosport War Memorial Hospital on 11 August 1998 to give her the opportunity for mobilisation. Following a fall that resulted in

dislocation of her hip she was returned to Haslar Hospital on 14 August 1998. She went back to Gosport War Memorial Hospital on 17 August 1998. A heametoma developed at the site of the manipulation and she died in hospital on 21 August 1998.

Family concerns

The family's concerns are outlined in Mrs Lack's statement to the police and also in the correspondence with Portsmouth Healthcare NHS Trust. The main ones are as follows:

1. On 12 August when first admitted to Gosport her agitation was put down to dementia when in fact it could have been simply that she wanted the toilet. She could have been treated with a milder form of pain relief.

2. When she suffered her fall a doctor should have been called before she was moved back to her chair.

3. On 13 August it took a long time for staff to identify that she had suffered a fall. Her distress was continually put down to her dementia and she was not admitted to Haslar A and E until 24 hours after the fall.

4. On 17 August when she was returned to Haslar Hospital she was obviously in extreme pain from being positioned wrongly. Why was nothing done about this until Mrs Lack arrived and assisted the nurse to move her.

5. When Mrs Richards developed a haemetoma why was a decision made to do nothing other than to keep her pain free.

Outcome of investigations

The police have now informed the UKCC that there is no sufficient evidence to support a prosecution of any of the three practitioners. Neither are the police taking any action against Dr Barton.

The trust have provided information relating to their investigation conducted in 1998. They found no evidence of misconduct by any nurse.

The trust found that when Mrs Richards fell on 13 August 1998 there were no witnesses. A HCSW found her and called the trained nurse on duty, Staff Nurse Brewer. She checked her for injuries before transferring her to a different chair. She did not consider it necessary to call a doctor. However later in the evening Staff Nurse Brewer transferred Mrs Richards to bed she notice the angle of her hip and called the duty doctor. In the meantime Mrs Lack had advised staff that she did not consider her to be in pain. A decision was taken to wait until morning to transfer to Haslar Hospital as a transfer at night would be disturbing for the patient.

On 17 August when she was transferred back to Gosport War Memorial Hospital two HCSWs transferred Mrs Richard to bed. One of them noted the position of her leg and that she was in pain. As she was not qualified she went to get the qualified nurse, Code A arrived at the same time as Mrs Lack and they assisted her together.

The decisions about the quantity of pain relief and the decision not to treat Mrs Richards after she developed the haemetoma were medical ones. The Trust found that at no time had the nursing staff administered anything but the prescribed minimum of morphine.

Possible allegations

No specific allegations have been made against the three practitioners, however, a review of the documentation suggests that there could be the following concerns by the family against each nurse.

Philip Beed

1. Co-operated with inappropriate management of Mrs R's care by Dr Barton.
2. Inadequate care plan/nursing notes.
3. Failed to tell family that Mrs Richards was inappropriately transferred (no direct evidence she was)

Code A

1. Failed to attend to Mrs Richards when she was in pain on 17 August 1998.

Code A

1. Failed to take action when Mrs Richards appeared to be drowsy on 12 August 1998 and misinterpreted her anxiety as due to dementia.

The following documents are attached:

1. Documents provided by the Trust.
2. Documents provided by Police.
3. Mrs Richard's notes.

Code A
Code A
28 August 2001

Reasons for no action

- The police are not proceedings with any criminal prosecution of any practitioner.
- The Trust's findings do not support any allegations of misconduct.
- The family's complaints are mainly about the medical treatment received by Mrs Richards, although they have identified some mistakes and delays in the system their evidence does not provide proof to the required standard of professional misconduct by any practitioner.

Code A
Pc3beed
28 August 2001

NURSING MIDWIFERY COUNCIL

Protecting the public through professional standards

Mr Ray Greenwood
Head of Clinical Performance Improvement
(Designate)
Directorate of Health and Social Care (South)
NHS
South Regional Office

13 September 2002
N/Redacted/DN/Greenwood
Direct line: Code A
Fax No: 020 7333 6536
Email: l Code A

Dear Ray

Re: Gosport War Memorial Hospital

Further to our telephone conversation a short while ago I've been through the file and I attach the only correspondence remaining between you and I on this case. They are:

- letter from me to you on 17 May 2001,
- one from me to you on 20 February 2002; and
- a reply from you on 26 February.

Redacted is on holiday this week and there may be other letters that she can locate on her return on 23 September 2002 but I doubt it. She telephoned your secretary following your reply on 26 February 2002 this year as we realised the letter you sent to me in response to my letter of 17 May 2002 had been destroyed with the case file when the case was originally closed. Unfortunately your secretary could not find any of the correspondence. I do not think that Ms/Mrs Thomas actually wrote directly to me. I just remember the letter from you confirming that you had received reassurance from the relevant staff that all aspects of controlled drugs management were being carried out to a safe standard.

I hope what I am sending now is helpful but if any more comes to light when Helen returns I will send it to you.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Liz McAnulty
Director of Professional Conduct

Enclosures

NURSING
MIDWIFERY
COUNCIL

Protecting the public through professional standards

Facsimile Cover Sheet

To:	Mr Ray Greenwood
Company:	Head of Clinical Performance Improvement (Designate) Directorate of Health and Social Care (South)
Telephone:	Code A
Facsimile:	020 7402 4245
From:	Liz McAnulty
Telephone:	Code A
Facsimile:	020 7333 6536
Date:	13 September 2002
Pages including this cover page:	5
Comments:	

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT

TIME : 13/09/2002 12:09
NAME : PERSONNEL DEPT
FAX : 01715801146
TEL : 01713336665

DATE,TIME	13/09 12:06
FAX NO./NAME	902074024245
DURATION	00:02:02
PAGE(S)	05
RESULT	OK
MODE	STANDARD ECM

United Kingdom Central Council
for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting

Mr R Greenwood
Regional Nurse Director
Public Health Department
South Thames Regional Health Authority
40 Eastbourne Terrace
London W2 3QR

20 February 2002
H/Liz/Greenwood.1
Direct line: Code A
Fax No: 020 7333 6536
Email: li Code A

Dear Ray

Just a note to offer my warmest congratulations on your appointment to one of the major posts in England. It would be very good to have lunch with you some time soon, to catch up on a number of issues.

I would also like to update you on some developments in relation to the Gosport War Memorial Hospital, which we communicated about last year. You may be aware that the Commission for Health Improvement are conducting an investigation into that hospital. Would you be happy to share the correspondence between you and I last year on this matter with Liz Fradd?

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Liz McAnulty
Director of Professional Conduct

NHS
South East Regional Office

Direct tel. Line: Code A
Direct fax: 020 7725 5521
E-mail: Code A

40 Eastbourne Terrace
London
W2 3QR

Tel: 020 7725 2500
Fax: 020 7258 3908

Ref: RG/dr/26/02/2002

26 February 2002

Liz McAnulty
Director of Professional Conduct
UKCC
23 Portland Place
London
W1B 1PZ

Dear Liz,

Many thanks for your letter of 20th February and your congratulations on my new post.

I am very happy for you to share all information with Liz about Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Please let me know if you also want me to speak to her. It would be great to have lunch. Can your PA agree a time with Dorrett (my PA)?

Kindest regards.

Code A

Ray Greenwood
Head of Clinical Performance Improvement (Designate)
Directorate of Health and Social Care (South)

Mr R Greenwood
Regional Nurse Director
Public Health Department
South Thames Regional Health Authority
40 Eastbourne Terrace
London W2 3QR

17 May 2001
H/Liz/Greenwood
Direct line: Code A
Fax No: 020 7333 0330
Email: l Code A

Dear Ray

Gosport War Memorial Hospital

It was good to talk to you again on Tuesday last. I raised an issue which was reported in the Portsmouth News on April 3rd and 7th of this year concerning a police investigation into an allegation of unlawful killing of a patient. As yet, no nurse has been reported to the UKCC for alleged misconduct, however, the newspaper report raised questions about the practices in relation to Controlled drugs.

I would not wish to interfere in any way with the integrity of the police investigation into this matter, however, if the practice in relation to Controlled drugs is unsafe it could compromise public protection. I would be most grateful if you could provide reassurance that all aspects of Controlled drugs management, including prescribing, administration and recording are carried out to a safe standard.

Thanks for your help in this matter Ray.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Liz McAnulty
Director of Professional Conduct

United Kingdom Central Council
for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting

Ms L Fradd
Director of Nursing
CHI
10th Floor
Finsbury Tower
103 - 105 Bunhill Row
London
EC1Y 8TG

11 February 2002
Redacted B Code A
Direct line: Code A
Fax No: 020 7333 6536
Email: Code A

Dear 43

Code A

I have received a communication from Detective Superintendent James of Hampshire Constabulary concerning the above, a copy of which was sent to Julie Miller your Investigations Manager.

I would be grateful if we could discuss this case when we meet on Friday 15th February.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Liz McAnulty
Director of Professional Conduct

United Kingdom Central Council
for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting

DS J James
Hampshire Constabulary
Major Incident Complex
Kingston Crescent
North End
Portsmouth
PO2 8BU

11 February 2002
Redacted /Beed et al
Direct line: 020 7333 6617
Fax No: 020 7333 6536
Email: Code A

Dear Detective Superintendent James

Code A

Thank you for your letter dated 6 February 2002 regarding the above.

I note that you have concluded that you will not be conducting any further enquiries, subject to further substantial evidence becoming available.

As you may be aware this regulatory body is currently required to apply the criminal standard of proof to matters of fact and, therefore, we are in a similar position to yourselves. Nevertheless, the reports you have sent may well assist us in our closer working with colleagues within the health service and at the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI). I note that you have forwarded a copy of these reports to Julie Miller, Investigations Manager, CHI. I will raise this with colleagues at CHI during our next meeting.

Yours sincerely

Code A

Liz McAnulty
Director of Professional Conduct

CC Liz Fradd, CHI

HAMPSHIRE Constabulary

Paul R. Kernaghan QPM LL.B MA DPM MCIPD
Chief Constable

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06 February 2002

Ms E McAnulty
Director Of Professional Conduct
United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing
Midwifery and Health Visiting
23 Portland Place
LONDON
W1B 1PZ

Dear Ms Smith

Re: Code A

I am writing following my letter to you of the 14th August 2001, concerning the above named. You will note that this correspondence refers to other matters that may concern the above named which the police were investigating to determine whether or not a more intensive police investigation should be commenced.

In the case of those preliminary investigations reports were commissioned from two other professionals. The further reports comment upon the death of Gladys RICHARDS in August 1998, of which you have previous knowledge and four other patients who died at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. On receipt of those reports we have concluded that we will not be conducting any further enquiries. That decision is subject to review should further substantial evidence become available.

I have personally reviewed all three reports commissioned by the police in respect of patient deaths at Gosport War memorial Hospital. These reports are enclosed for your attention.

The reports raise a number of very serious concerns about the adequacy of medical care delivered by doctors and nursing staff at Gosport War Memorial Hospital. Particularly the reports of Professor FORD and Professor LIVESLEY concerning the care delivered to Gladys RICHARDS are critical of both clinical and nursing care. The three nurses named in this letter were involved in delivering nursing care to Mrs RICHARDS.

HAMPSHIRE Constabulary

I believe that the reports provide information, which should be disclosed, to you as the regulatory body for the named individuals. It is on that basis after advice from our Force solicitor that I am forwarding the reports to you.

I should also advise you that I will be advising relevant relatives of the patient's subject of the reports that the reports have been forward to you for your consideration.

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

Code A

J JAMES
Detective Superintendent

c.c. Julie MILLER
Investigations Manager
Commission for Health Improvement

Code A

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Appendix F — medical notes review group:

NOW Generally — appropriate use of medicines and syringe drivers.
Some evidence of unacceptable breakthrough pain.

Appropriate administration of medicines by nursing staff.

Quality of nursing towards end of life

NOW Consistently reasonable standard of care.
Generally adequate nursing notes — not always of consistent quality.
Task-oriented approach to care.
Some good detailed care plans.

Concern re lack of suitably trained nursing staff to carry out swallowing assessments.
Trust's policy on fluid + nutrition was being adhered to.

Evidence of (?) therapy input. Concern re management of pressure area care in cases where they had been assessed as being at risk.

Admission criteria generally being adhered to.

5. ~~Re~~ Clinical Governance.

Clinical audit

2 recent audits of medicines 1999 & late 2001.

One in 1999 concluded that neuroleptic medicines were not being overused although 'the weekly medical reviews of medication was not necessarily recorded in the medical notes'.

– this was circulated to all staff on Daedalus & Dryad wards – a copy was not sent to Sultan Ward,

Second late 2001 – overall use of neuroleptic medicine remained appropriate.

Of those reported to us:

		Still employed		Not employed.
Q.	Beed	✓		Freda Shaw
	Hamblin	✓		GN Kelly.
	Barker	–		Jane Couchman – left 4/10/99

Appendix F – review of current policies 1-64.
– nothing new re referral to ...
re satisfactory – one or two areas – not ... separate